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

A

TEXT-BOOK

OF THE

HISTORY OF DOCTRINES.

13868

BY

DR. K. R. HAGENBACH,

PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF BASLE.

THE EDINBURGH TRANSLATION OF C. W. BUCH, REVISED WITH LARGE ADDITIONS FROM THE FOURTH GERMAN EDITION, AND OTHER SOURCES.

BY HENRY B. SMITH, D.D.,

PROFESSOR IN THE UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

VOLUME I.

NEW YORK:
SHELDON & COMPANY, PUBLISHERS,
498 & 500 BROADWAY.

1867.

"Nec pigebit autem me sicubi hæsito, quærere, nec pudebit sicubi erro, discere." —AUGUSTINUS.

"Ideoque utile est, plures (libros) a pluribus fieri diverso stilo, non diversa fide, etiam de quæstionibus eisdem, ut ad plurimos res ipsa perveniat, ad alios sic, ad alios autem sic."—IDEM.

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PREFACE BY THE EDITOR.

THE first edition of Hagenbach's History of Doctrines was published in Germany in 1841. Mr. Buch's translation of this edition appeared in Edinburgh in 1846; a second edition, comprising a part of the additions to the second German edition (1848), was issued in 1850; and a third, without further revision or alteration, in 1858. Meanwhile, the German work was so favorably received, that it appeared in a third, and a fourth (1857) edition, each containing improvements and additions.

All these improvements are comprised in the present revision, together with citations from other authors, and references to the more recent German, as well as English and American literature. Among the works most freely used in making these additions are Gieseler's Dogmengeschichte, 1855; Neander's Christliche Dogmengeschichte, edited by Jacobi (translated by J. E. Ryland, London, 1858); and, particularly, the second edition of Baur's Dogmengeschichte, 1858. The latter work, though affected by the theological prepossessions of the author, recently deceased, exhibits a thorough knowledge of the different shades of opinion, as well as of the general characteristics of each period. The additions thus made to the Edinburgh edition, and to the text of Hagenbach, increase the matter of the volume about one third. What is added to Hagenbach, is uniformly indicated by brackets; and this includes some references and citations by the English translator. The sign † is usually prefixed to the name of a Roman Catholic author; the sign * prefixed, is intended to commend the work. The Edinburgh translation has been revised throughout; in some instances it was found necessary to rewrite whole sentences and even paragraphs. Those passages, too, have been translated, which were there omitted, because "they were found to be of such a nature as to convey little definite meaning in translation."

The value of Dr. Hagenbach's work is attested by the constant demand for new editions in Germany, in the midst of much competition. It has, as a text-book, its peculiar merits and advantages, in giving a candid and compressed statement of the main points, fortifying every position by exact and pertinent citations from the original sources. The theological position of the author is on the middle ground between the destructive criticism of the school of Tübingen, and the literal orthodoxy of the extreme Lutherans, while he also sympathises with the Reformed rather than with the

Lutheran type of theology He enjoys the highest respect and consideration for his learning and candor. And among the works published upon the History of Doctrines, this is still perhaps the one best adapted to general consultation and profitable use. Münscher's Lehrbuch, as edited by Von Cölln, Hupfeld and Neudecker (in the successive parts, 1832–38) is valuable chiefly as a collection of materials ; Ruperti (1831), Augusti (4th edit., 1835), and Lentz (1834), have been superseded. Baumgarten-Crusius' Compendium, 1840–46 (the second volume edited by Hase), and Engelhardt (1839), show an abundance of learning, but are deficient in the method essential to a text-book. Meier's Lehrbuch (2d edit. 1854), and Beck's (1864), simply present the results in a concise form. Gieseler's Dogmengeschichte, edited by Redepenning, 1855, extends only to the Reformation, and is rather intended as a supplement to his Church History. Baur's work is pervaded throughout by the theory, that dogmas are destined to be resolved into philosophical ideas. Noack's Dogmengeschichte (2d ed., 1856) has the same tendency, with less learning and method. Neander's History of Dogmas, admirable in many respects, has the disadvantages of a posthumous publication ; it devotes less than a hundred pages to the history since the Reformation.

Some of the other works of Dr. Hagenbach are, his Lectures on the Church History of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, and on the History of the Reformation, 3d ed. in 6 Parts, 1856–7 ; Theological Encyclopædia, 4th ed., 1854 ; Lectures on Ancient Church History, to the Sixth Century, 2 vols., 1855-56 ; and Lectures on the Church History of the Middle Ages, 2 vols, 1860,–1.

Among all the branches of theological study, the History of Doctrines has been the most neglected in the general course of instruction in our theological schools. There are not wanting some healthful indications of an increasing sense of its value and importance. Without it, neither the history of the church, nor the history of philosophy, nor the present phases and conflicts of religious belief, can be thoroughly appreciated. It gives us the real internal life of the church. It renders important aid in testing both error and truth. It may guard against heresy, while it also confirms our faith in those essential articles of the Christian faith, which have been the best heritage of the church. In the fluctuations of human opinion, the History of Doctrines shows the immutability and progress of divine truth.

H. B. S.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY,
NEW YORK, Jan. 21, 1861.

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Comp. *Hagenbach*, Encyclopædie, 4te Aufl. s. 239 ff. *Kliefoth, Th.* Einleitung in die Dogmengeschichte, Parchim, 1839. *F. Dörtenbach*, Die Methode der Dogmengesch. in the Studien und Kritiken, 1842. *Kling*, in Herzog's Encyclopædie, under *Dogmengeschichte*. [Hagenbach's History of Doctrines, reviewed in the Bibliotheca Sacra, vi., 1849.]

§ 1.

DEFINITION.

The History of Doctrines is that branch of theological science, which exhibits the gradual development and definite shaping of the substance of the Christian faith into doctrinal statements (definitions, dogmas).[1] It also sets forth the different forms which the system of doctrines has assumed in the course of history; the changes it has undergone as influenced by the culture of different periods; and it likewise illustrates the religious value which it has always maintained, as containing unchangeable elements of truth in the midst of all these transformations.[2]

[1] On the meaning of the word *δόγμα* (statutum, decretum, præceptum, placitum), see *Suicer*, Thesaurus, sub voce. *Münscher*, Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte, edit. by *von Cölln*, p. 1. *Baumgarten-Crusius*, Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengesch. p. 1. *Augusti*, Dogmengeschichte, § 1. *Klee*, Dogmengeschichte, Prolegomena. *Nitzsch*, System der christlichen Lehre, 6th edit. p. 52. *Hagenbach*, Encycl., 4th edit. p. 240 sq. J. P. Lange, Dogmatik, p. 2. Gieseler and Neander, Dogmengesch. p. 1. The word *δόγμα* signifies in the first place: *decree*, edict, statute. Comp. (Sept. vers.) Dan. ii. 13; vi. 8; Esth. iii. 9; 2 Macc. x. 2; and in the New Testament, Luke ii. 1; Acts xvii. 7 (where it has a political sense only), Acts xvi. 4 (used in a theological sense, denoting the apostolical rule for the gentile Christians); Eph. ii. 15, Col. ii. 14 (in these passages it has a theological sense, not referring to *Christian* belief and *Christian* doctrine, but to the Old Testament Jewish ordinances; comp. *Winer*, Grammatik des Neutestamentlichen Sprachidioms, 5th ed. p. 250, 6th ed. p. 196). Its use in the sense of substance of the Christian faith, can not be established from any passage in the N. T.; the words employed to express this idea, are: *εὐαγγέλιον*, *κήρυγμα*, *λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ*, etc. In the writings of the Stoics, *δόγμα* (decretum, placitum) signifies: *theoretical principle*. Marcus Aurelius *εἰς ἑαυτ.* 2, 3:

Ταῦτά σοι ἀρκέτω ἀεὶ δόγματα ἔστω. Cic. Quaest. Acad. iv. 9: Sapientia neque de se ipsa dubitare debet, neque de suis decretis quæ philosophi vocant *δόγματα*. With this signification is connected the usage of the teachers of the Church, who first in the sphere of Christianity employed the word *δόγμα* (also with the predicate *τὸ θεῖον*) to designate the whole substance of doctrine. Compare the passages from Ignatius, Clement of Alex. (Paed. I. 1, Strom. viii. p. 924, edit. of Potter), Origen, Chrysostom, Theodoret, etc., in *Suicer*, Thesaurus, sub voce. They also sometimes called the opinions of heretics *δόγματα*, with the epithet *μυσαρά*, or others of similar import, but more frequently *δόξαι*, *νοήματα*; comp. *Klee*, l. c. *Cyril of Jerusalem* (Cat. 4, 2) already makes a distinction between the dogmatic and the moral, and understands by *δόγμα* that which relates to *faith*, by *πρᾶξις* that which refers to moral action: Ὁ *τῆς θεοσεβείας τρόπος ἐκ δύο τούτων συνέστηκε· δογμάτων εὐσεβῶν καὶ πράξεων ἀγαθῶν*. The former are the source of the latter. In a similar way Seneca describes the *dogmas* as the elements of which the body of wisdom is composed, as the heart of life, Ep. 94, 95. Thus Socrates (Hist. Eccl. 11, 44) says of Bishop Meletius of Antioch: Περὶ *δόγματος διαλέγεσθαι ὑπερετίθετο, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν διδασκαλίαν τοῖς ἀκροαταῖς προσήκειν*. (Scribendum videtur *προσεῖχεν* vel *προσῆγεν*; Vales.) So, too, Gregory of Nyssa says of Christ and his mode of teaching, Ep. 6: *Διαιρῶν γὰρ εἰς δύο τὴν τῶν χριστιανῶν πολιτείαν, εἴς τε τὸ ἠθικόν μέρος καὶ εἰς τὴν δογμάτων ἀκρίβειαν*. A peculiar definition of *δόγμα* is given by *Basil*, De Spiritu S. c. 27: Ἄλλο *γὰρ δόγμα καὶ ἄλλο κήρυγμα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ σιωπᾶται, τὰ δὲ κηρύγματα δημοσιεύεται* (esoteric and exoteric doctrine). According to Eusebius (Adv. Marc. i. 4), Marcellus had already used the word *δόγμα* in the sense of a human, subjective opinion: Τὸ *τοῦ δόγματος ὄνομα ἀνθρωπίνης ἔχει τι βουλῆς τε καὶ γνώμης*. Only in modern times (Nitzsch says, since Döderlein) did the usage become general, in accordance with which *δόγμα* does not designate *ipsa doctrina*, so much as *sententia alicujus doctoris*, that is, doctrinal opinion rather than a definite doctrinal position. With this explanation of the word, is intimately connected the definition of the idea of the science of the History of Doctrines, as well as its worth and mode of treatment. (Comp. § 10, and Gieseler's Dogmengeschichte, p. 2.) [Gieseler here says, that dogma designates a doctrine, which, as essential to Christianity, claims acceptance among all Christians. The dogmas of any Church express its views of what is essential in the Christian system, in distinction from subjective opinions.]

[1] In respect to this, there is need of guarding against two extremes. The one is that of those who descry a perversion of doctrine, in every departure from certain fixed conceptions, in every change of expression and statement; on the false assumption, that none but biblical terminology should be introduced into the doctrinal system, they look upon these alterations in such a way that the whole history of doctrines becomes to them only a history of corruptions. The other extreme is that of those, who assume that there has been only a constant and sound development of truth within the Church, and who will not concede that, together with the healthy growth, diseased conditions have also been generated. Genuine science has respect to both; it finds

progress, checks, and retrogression, genuine formations and malformations. (Thus, *e. g.*, it would be incorrect to reject the doctrines of the Trinity, of Original Sin, of the Sacraments, etc., because these words do not occur in the Bible; although we may lawfully inquire whether foreign ideas may not have crept in with such definite formulas; for with the development of a doctrine also grows the danger of crippling or of exaggerating it.) We must, then, distinguish between formation, the deforming, and the reformation of dogmas; and this last, again, is different from mere restoration and re-pristination.

Just here the position of the Catholic and of the Protestant in relation to the History of Doctrines is quite different. According to the former, dogmas have been shaped under the constant guidance of the Divine Spirit, and whatever is unhealthful has been rejected under the name of heresy; so that we can not really talk about a proper development of doctrine: compare the remarkable concession of Hermes of Bonn, as cited in Neander's Dogmengeschichte, p. 28 [viz., that it is contrary to the principles of the Catholic Church to treat the history of doctrines as a special branch, since this presupposes the changes made by a developing process; and, consequently, Hermes had doubts about reading lectures on the subject]. Protestantism, on the other hand, perpetually applies the standard of the Scriptures to the unfolded dogma, and allows it to be a doctrine of the Church only so far as it reproduces the contents of the Scripture. But it is a misunderstanding of the Protestant principle which would lead one to reject every thing which is not verbally contained in the Scriptures. From such a standpoint, as finds the whole of dogmatic theology already complete in the Bible, the possibility of a History of Doctrines must be denied, or it must be made to be only a history of errors.

§ 2.

THE RELATION OF THE HISTORY OF DOCTRINES TO CHURCH HISTORY AND DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

The History of Doctrines is a part of Church History, but separated from it on account of its wide ramifications, and treated as an independent science.[1] It forms the transition from church history to ecclesiastical and dogmatic theology.[2]

[1] Comp. § 16, and *Hagenbach*, Encyclop. p. 239. Church history also treats of the history of doctrine, but, in relation to the whole ecclesiastical life, it appears only as the muscles greet the eye upon the living body, while the knife of the anatomist lays them bare, and dissects them out for scientific uses. *"The difference between the history of doctrines as a separate branch of theological science, and as a part of ecclesiastical history, is merely one of form. For, apart from the difference of extent, which depends on external considerations, the subject of investigation is the same in both cases,—different poles of the same axis. The History of Doctrines treats of the dogma as it*

levelops itself in the form of definite conceptions; ecclesiastical history views the dogma in its relation to external events." *Hase*, Church History, New York, ed., pref. p. iv. v. Comp., also, Neander Dogmengesch. p. 6: "*Church History judges phenomena by their external influence, the History of Doctrines by their internal importance. Events are incorporated into Church History only as they have a diffused influence, while the History of Doctrines goes back to the germs of the antagonisms.*" Thus, the History of Doctrines gives up to Church History the narration of the external course of doctrinal controversies, and takes for granted that this is already known.

[1] Many think that the History of Doctrines is an *appendix* to dogmatic theology, rather than an *introduction* to it; but this arises from incorrect assumptions about the nature of dogmatic theology, and from a misapprehension of its historical character (one-sided conception of dogmatic theology, either from the biblical or from the speculative point of view). The History of Doctrines is the bridge between historical theology on the one hand, and didactic (systematic) theology on the other. Ecclesiastical history is presupposed; dogmatic theology, both of the present and the future, is the aim and end of its researches. Comp. Neander, 4, 5: "*The History of Doctrines mediates between pure apostolical Christianity and the Church of the present times, by exhibiting the development of Christian doctrine.*"

§ 3.

RELATION TO BIBLICAL THEOLOGY.

The History of Doctrines presupposes biblical theology (the doctrines of the New Testament in particular) as its basis; just as the general history of the church presupposes the life of Jesus and the apostolic age.

Those writers who reduce theology in general to *biblical* theology, and ignore dogmatic theology, are consistent in regarding the History of Doctrines as a mere appendix to biblical theology. But in our view biblical theology is to be considered as only the *foundation* of the edifice; the history of doctrines the history of its *construction;* and dogmatic theology, as a science of doctrines, is still engaged in its *completion.* It is no more the object of the history of doctrines to expound the doctrines of the Bible, than of ecclesiastical history to give a complete account of the life of Christ and his apostles. But as the history of primitive Christianity is the only solid foundation and starting-point of church history, so the history of doctrines must rest upon, and begin with the theology, first of all of the New Testament, and, still further, in an ascending line, also of the Old Testament. It is, of course, understood that the relation in which biblical theology stands to biblical exegesis and criticism, also applies as a standard to the history of doctrines.

§ 4.

Relation to Symbolism.

The History of Doctrines comprises the *Symbols*[1] of the church, since it must have respect, not only to the formation and contents of public confessions of faith,[2] but also to the distinguishing principles set forth in them.[3] Symbolism may, however, be separated from the history of doctrines, and treated as comparative dogmatic theology. It stands in the same relation to the history of doctrines, as the church statistics of any particular period stand to the advancing history of the church.

[1] On the ecclesiastical usage of the terms *σύμβολον, συμβάλλειν, συμβάλλεσθαι*, comp. *Suicer*, Thesaurus, p. 1084. *Creuzer*, Symbolik, § 16. *Marheineke*, christliche Symbolik, vol. i. toward the beginning. *Neander* [Church History, Torrey's transl. i. 306.] [*Pelt*, Theol. Encyclop. p. 456. Maximus Taurinensis (about the year 460), says in Hom. in Symb. p. 239 : Symbolum tessera est et signaculum, quo inter fideles perfidosque secernitur.] By *symbols* (in the doctrinal sense of the word, but not its liturgical or artistic sense) are meant the public confessions of faith by which those belonging to the same branch of the church recognize each other, as soldiers by the watch-word (tessera militaris).

[2] The *earlier symbols* of the church (*e. g.*, the so-called Apostles' Creed, the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds), were the shibboleth (Judg. xii. 6) of the Catholic church, in contrast with heretics. It is evident that these symbols are deserving of special consideration in the history of doctrines. They are in relation to the private opinions of individual ecclesiastical writers, what systems of mountains are in relation to the hills and valleys of a country. They are, as it were, the watch-towers from which the entire field may be surveyed, the principal stations in the study of the history of doctrines, and can not therefore be arbitrarily separated from it, and consigned to an isolated department. Just as little should the study of the history of doctrines be restricted to symbolism. See, *Dorner*, Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi, I. i. s. 108 sq. *J. P. Lange*, Dogmatik, i. s. 32 sq.: "The ecclesiastical dogma lies between the doctrine of the church and the church symbols; it is their living centre, mediating between them: and hence it can be considered as the church doctrine in a narrower, or as the church symbol in a wider, sense."

[3] Since the Reformation, the symbols are to Protestants, not only, as they were to the Catholic church in ancient times, a barrier erected against heretics—although Protestantism has also united with the old church in keeping up these boundaries; but Protestants were also forced to give prominence in special confessions to the characteristic peculiarities of their faith in opposition to the old church. These confessions of faith, moreover, had regard to the differences which arose out of controversies within the pale of the Protestant

church itself (Lutherans and Calvinists), and to other opinions at variance with those held by the orthodox party (Anabaptists, Unitarians, and others). And so, too, the Catholics exhibited the doctrines of their church in a special confession of faith. All this led to the formation of a separate branch of theological science, which was first known under the name of *Theologia Elenctica* or Polemics, and in later times has taken the more peaceful appellation of *Symbolism*, which last name has not so much reference to the struggle itself as to the historical knowledge of the points at issue, and the nature of that struggle.[a] When the history of doctrines comes to the time of the Reformation, it becomes of itself what has been meant by the word symbolism; *i. e.*, the stream of history spreads of itself into the sea, the quiet contemplation of the developing process passes over into a complicated series of events, until these are seen to lead into a new course of development; and thus the ancient history of doctrines is adjusted in relation to the modern. Baumgarten-Crusius has also indicated the necessity of uniting symbolism and the history of doctrines, Dogmengesch. i. s. 14 sq. Comp. Neander, Dogmengesch. i. p. 7: [Symbolism sprung from a dogmatic, and the History of Doctrines from a historical, interest: the latter has to do with the historical process leading to the results, which Symbolism compares, etc.]

§ 5.

RELATION TO PATRISTICS.

As the History of Doctrines has to do with doctrines chiefly as the common property of the church, it can consider the private views of individual teachers only so far as these have had, or at least striven after, a real influence in the formation of the church doctrine. More precise investigations about the opinions of any one person in connection with his individual characteristics, and the influence of the former upon the latter, must be left to Patristics (Patrology).

On the definition of the indefinite term Patristics as a science, comp. *Hagenbach*, Encyclopædie, p. 248, ss.[b] Even if we enlarge its sphere, so as to make it embrace not only the teachers of the first six centuries, but all who have worked upon the church, either in a creative or reforming spirit—since church fathers must continue as long as the church (Möhler, Patrologie, s. 20); it is evident that a large proportion of patristic material must be incorporated into the history of doctrines; the very study of the sources leads to this. But

[a] *Sack*, however, has recently published a work on Polemics (Christliche Polemik, Hamburgh, 1838) as a distinct science, falling within the historical sphere of Symbolism. Comp. Hagenbach, Encycl. p. 281 sq.

[b] The distinction made by some writers, especially Roman Catholics, between Patristics and Patrology (v. *Möhler*, Patrologie, p. 14), appears to be rather arbitrary. [Protestants usually end the series of the fathers of the church with the sixth century, Roman Catholics extend it to the thirteenth. The latter distinguish between fathers, teachers, and authors. The scholastic divines are *Doctores*.]

we would not maintain with Baumgarten-Crusius (Dogmengeschichte, p. 12), that the History of Doctrines already comprises the *essential* part of Patristics; for the individual characteristics which are essential to the latter, can have only a secondary place in the former. Thus the object of the latter is to know Augustinianism, that of Patristics to know Augustine. How the system is related to the person? is a biographical (patrological) question: what is its relation to the doctrine of the church? is the inquiry in the History of Doctrines. The opinions, too, of individual theologians are of importance in the History of Doctrines, only so far as they have had an appreciable influence upon the formation of the doctrinal system, or have in some way acted upon it. Comp. *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. s. 11. On the literature of this subject, see § 14.

§ 6.

RELATION TO THE HISTORY OF HERESIES AND THE GENERAL HISTORY OF RELIGION.

Since the doctrines of the church have for the most part been shaped in conflict with heretical tendencies, it is evident that the History of Doctrines must also include the History of Heresies, giving prominence to those points which have had an influence in completing or adjusting the forms of the doctrine, because they contained essential elements of the doctrinal development; or, to such as have set the doctrine itself in a clearer light, by their very antagonism.[1] To learn the formation and ramifications of heretical systems themselves appeals to a different interest, which is met either in the so-called History of Heresies[2] or in the general History of Religion. Still less is it the object of the history of doctrines to discuss the relation between Christianity and other forms of religion. On the contrary, it presupposes the comparative history of religion, in the same manner as dogmatic theology presupposes *apologetic theology*.[3]

[1] In the ecclesiastical point of view, the history of heresies may be compared to pathology, the history of doctrines to physiology. It is not meant by this that every heretical tendency is an absolute disease, and that full health can only be found in what has been established under the name of ecclesiastical orthodoxy. For it has been justly observed, that diseases are frequently natural transitions from a lower to a higher stage of life, and that a state of relative health is often the product of antecedent diseases. Thus the obstinacy of a one-sided error has often had the effect of giving life, and even a more correct form of statement, to the doctrines of the church. Comp. *Schenkel*, das Wesen des Protestantismus (Schaffh. 1845), i. p. 13. *Baur*, die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit, i. p. 112. *Neander*, Dogmengesch. s. 16. On the relation of heresy to orthodoxy in general, see *Dorner*, Lehre von der Person Christi, I. i. s. 71 Note. [See also Rothe's Anfänge

d. christl Kirche, s. 333, for the difference between the church view and the heretical view of doctrines.]

[8] The phrase History of Heresies, has been banished by a more humane usage; but not the thing itself, any more than Polemics. The very able publications of recent writers on the Gnostic systems, Ebionitism, Manichæism, Montanism, Unitarianism, etc., and the lives of some of the Fathers, are of great use to the historian of Christian doctrine; but he can not be expected to incorporate all the materials thus furnished into the History of Doctrines. Thus the first period of the History of Doctrines must constantly recur to the phenomena of Ebionitism and Gnosticism, since the problem of the church doctrine then was to work itself out between these two perilous rocks. But the wide-spread branches of the Gnostic systems, so far as they differ from one another (*e. g.*, as to the number of the æons and the succession of the syzygies), can not here be traced in detail, unless, indeed, we are to seek in the slime of heresy, as it is collected *e. g.* in the Clementina, for the living germ of Christianity! Holding fast, on the other hand, to the Biblical type of truth, so far as heresy is concerned it will be sufficient to exhibit those forms in which it deviates from this type, and to delineate its physiognomy in general outlines, as they are given in church history. In the same manner Nestorianism and Monophysitism are of importance in the christological controversies of the second period. But after they have been overcome by the Catholic Church, and fixed in sects, which, in consequence of further conflicts, were themselves divided into various parties, it can be no longer the office of the History of Doctrines to follow them in this process. This must be left to monographs on the heresies. For as soon as a sect has lost its doctrine-shaping power, it falls simply into the department of statistics.

[9] Just as it is no part of the functions of systematic divinity to defend the truth of the Christian religion, since Apologetics (the Evidences) must do this work beforehand (see Hagenbach, Encyclop., § 81); so, too, the history of doctrines has nothing to do with the conflict of Christianity with polytheism, Islamism, etc. But the history of these religions is indispensable as an auxiliary study. The notions of the Jewish sects, the myths and symbols of polytheistic religions, the systems of Mohammed, of Buddha, etc., are still more foreign to the history of Christian doctrines than the heresies of the church. *Works of Reference: Creuzer*, Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, Darmstad, 1819–23, 6 vols. *Stuhr*, allgemeine Geschichte der Religionsformen der heidnischen Völker: 1. die Religionssysteme der heidnischen Völker des Orients. Berlin, 1836. 2. die Religionssysteme der Hellenen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung bis auf die makedonische Zeit. Berlin, 1838. *Grimm, J.*, deutsche Mythologie, Göttingen, 1835. 2. Aufl. 1844. *Görres*, Mythengeschichte der Asiatischen Völker. *Richter*, Phantasien des Orients. *Eckermann, Dr. K.*, Lehrbuch der Religionsgeschichte und Mythologie der vorzüglichsten Völker des Alterthums, nach der Anordnung von Ottfr. Müller. Halle, 1845, 2 vols. [A. Wuttke, Gesch. des Heidenthums, 2. 8vo. Berl. 1852–3. Hegel, Phil. der Religion (Werke). Sepp, Das Heidenthum, 3 Bde. 1853. L. Preller, Griech Mythologie, 2. 8vo. 1854. J. J. I. Döllinger, Heidenthum und Judenthum, Regensb.

1857. C. C. J. Bunsen, Gott in d. Geschichte, 3. 8vo. 1857–8. Schelling, Phil. der Mythologie, 2. 1857. C. O. Müller, Mythology, transl. by Leitch. Lond. 1844. *Chs. Hardwick*, Christ and other Masters, four parts, Cambridge, 1855–9.]

§ 7.

Relation to the History of Philosophy, the History of Christian Ethics, and the History of Dogmatic Theology.

Although the History of Doctrines has elements in common with the history of philosophy,[1] yet they are no more to be confounded with each other than dogmatic theology and philosophy.[2] The history of doctrines is also to be separated from the history of Christian ethics, so far as systematic theology itself is able to make a relative distinction between dogmatics and morals.[3] And even to the history of scientific theology, it has the relation, at the utmost, of the whole to the part, since the former may indeed have its place in the history of doctrines (in the general portion), but can by no means be supplanted by it.[4]

[1] This is the case, *e. g.* with the Alexandrian school, the Gnostics, the scholastics and modern philosophical schools. Still the object of the history of philosophy is distinct from that of the history of doctrines. Comp. Baumgarten-Crusius, i. p. 8. *Works of Reference: Brucker, J.* Historia Critica Philosophiae, Lips. 1742–44, 5 vols. 4to.; 2d edit. 1766, '67, 6 vols. 4to. [The History of Philosophy drawn up from Brucker's Hist. Crit. Philos., by *William Enfield*, Lond. 1819, 2 vols.] *Tennemann, W. G.*, Geschichte der Philosophie, Leipzig, 1798–1819, 11 vols. [The "Lehrbuch" of the same author is published in English under the title: "A Manual of the History of Philosophy, translated from the German, by the Rev. *Arthur Johnson*, Oxf. 1832; revised edition by Morell, in Bohn's Library.] *Reinhold, E.*, Geschichte der Philosophie, Jena, 1845, 3d edit. 2 vols. *Ritter, H.*, Geschichte der Philosophie, Hamburg, 1829–53, 12 vols. [The Ancient Phil. translated into English, by *Alex. J. W. Morrison*, Oxf. 1838–39, 4 vols. 8vo.] *Fries*, Geschichte der Philosophie, i. Halle, 1837. *Schleiermacher*, Geschichte der Philosophie, edit. by *H. Ritter*. (Complete works, iv. 1), Berlin, 1839. [T. A. Rixner, Handbuch d. Gesch. d. Phil. 3 Bde. 1829; Gumposch, Supplement, 1850. E. Zeller, Die Philos. d. Griechen. 3 Bde. 1846–59. J. E. Erdmann, Gesch. d. neueren Phil. 3 Bde. (6 Theile) 1834–53. K. Fischer, Neuere Phil. 2 Bde. 1853–4. Albert Schwegler, Hist. of Phil., transl. by J. H. Seelye, New York, 1856. J. D. Morell, Phil. of the Nineteenth Century. New York, 1856. H. M. Chalybäus, Hist. Entwickelung . . . von Kant bis Hegel. Trans. (Edinb. and Andover) 1856. H. Ritter. Die christl. Philosophie . . . in ihrer Geschichte, 2 Bde. Göttingen, 1858–9. Erdmann, Grundriss, 2. 1866. Ueberweg, 2. 1865.]

[2] "*By the obliteration of the distinction between the History of Philosophy and the History of Doctrines, the essential nature of Christianity is funda-*

mentally obscured." *Dorner*, Person Christi, i. s. 108; comp. *Neander*, Dogmengesch., s. 9 :—["Philosophy develops conscious reason of and by itself; theology is employed upon data historically given—the truths that repose in the divine word, and have passed over into Christian consciousness."]

[3] Comp. Baumgarten-Crusius, p. 9.

[4] Comp. § 11 : Neander, Dogmengesch., s. 6 : Gieseler, s. 16.

§ 8.

AUXILIARY SCIENCES.

Although the branches of theological science above enumerated are strictly distinct from the History of Doctrines, they are, nevertheless, connected with it as auxiliary sciences.[1] *Archæology*,[2] and, in the second line, the sciences auxiliary to church history,[3] may be added to their number.

[1] *Ecclesiastical history* itself may be viewed in the light of an auxiliary science, since the history of forms of church government, of worship, of the private life of Christians, etc., are connected with the history of doctrines. In like manner *Patristics*, *the History of Heresies*, *the General History of Religion*, *the History of Philosophy*, and *the History of Christian and Natural Ethics*, are to be numbered among the auxiliary sciences.

[2] From the connection between the doctrines and the liturgy of the church, it is obvious that *Archæology* must be considered as an auxiliary science, if we understand by it the history of Christian worship. This may easily be seen from the use of certain doctrinal phrases (*e. g.* θεοτόκος etc.) in the liturgies of the church, the appointment of certain festivals (the feast of Corpus Christi, that of the conception of the Virgin Mary), the reflex influence of the existence or absence of certain liturgical usages upon the doctrinal definitions of the church (*e. g.*, the influence of the withholding of the sacramental cup from the laity upon the doctrine of concomitance, comp. § 195), etc. *Works of Reference: Bingham, J.*, Origg. s. Antiqu. Ecclesiasticæ. Halæ, 1751–61. [*Bingham, J.*, Antiquities of the Christian Church, and other works. Lond. 1834, ss. 8 vols.; a new edition by Richard Bingham. *Augusti, J. Ch. W.*, Denkwürdigkeiten aus der christlichen Archæologie. Leipz. 1817–31, 12 vols. [Christian Antiquities, translated and compiled from the works of Augusti by the Rev. *Lyman Coleman*, Andover, 1844.] *Rheinwald, F. H.*, kirchliche Archæologie. Berl. 1830. [*Schöne, K.*, Geschichtforschungen über die kirchlichen Gebräuche und Einrichtungen der Kirche. Berl. 1819–22, 3 vols.] *Böhmer, W.*, christlich-kirchliche Alterthumswissenschaft, Bresl. 1836–39, 2 vols. [*Siegel*, Handbuch d. christl. kirchl. Alterthümer. 4 Bde. Leipz. 1835–8. *Guericke*, Archäologie. Leipz. 1859. *J. E. Riddle*, Manual, Lond. 1839. *William Bates*, Lect. on Christ. Antiquities, 1854–7.]

[3] These are, besides those already mentioned, Universal History, Ecclesiastical Philology, Ecclesiastical Chronology, Diplomatics, etc. [Comp. the introductions to works on ecclesiastical history. *Gieseler*, Text-Book of Church Hist., edited by H. B. Smith, New York, vol. I. pp. 19–20, 560–2.]

§ 9.

IMPORTANCE OF THE HISTORY OF DOCTRINES.

Ernesti, Prolusiones de Theologiæ Historicæ et Dogmaticæ conjungendæ Necessitate, Lips. 1759, in his Opusc. Theol. Lips. 1773–92. *Ilgen, Ch. T.*, über den Werth der christlichen Dogmengeschichte, Leips. 1817. *Augusti*, Werth der Dogmengeschichte, in his Theologische Blätter II. 2, p. 11, sq. *Hagenbach*, Encyclop. § 69. *Niedner*, Das Recht der Dogmen, in his Zeitschrift f. d. hist. Theol. 1851. [Comp. *Kling*, in the Studien und Kritiken, 1840. *Niedner*, Zur neuesten Dogmengesch. in the Allg. Monatsschrift, 1851. *Engelhardt*, in the Zeitschrift f. d. historische Theologie, 1853. *J. Murdock*, in the Christ. Monthly Spectator, vol. ix. pp. 27 sq., 249 sq.]

The value of the History of Doctrines, in a scientific point of view, follows in part from what has already been said. 1. It helps to complete the study of church history in one of its most important aspects. 2. It is an introduction to the study of systematic theology.[1] Its moral and religious influence, its practical benefits, are the result of its purely scientific worth. In general, it exerts a shaping influence, by bringing into view the efforts and struggles of the human mind in relation to its most important concerns. But it is of special use to the theologian, preserving him both from a one-sided and rigid adherence to the letter (false orthodoxy), and from the superficial love of novelty which is characteristic of a contemptuous and impatient spirit (heterodoxy and neology).[2]

[1] Comp. § 2.

[2] Comp. §10. The importance of the history of doctrines in both these respects has frequently been overrated. Every theological party has appealed to it in support of its peculiar views, or dreaded its results, both equally unworthy of a scientific spirit. Comp. Baumgarten-Crusius, I. p. 16-20.

§ 10.

MODE OF HANDLING THE HISTORY OF DOCTRINES.

Daub, die Form der christlichen Dogmen- und Kirchenhistorie in Betracht gezogen, in Baur's Zeitschrift fur speculative Theologie. Berlin, 1836. Parts 1 and 2. *Kliefoth, Th.*, Einleitung in die Dogmengeschichte, Parchim und Ludwigslust, 1839.

But only that mode of treating the History of Doctrines leads to these beneficial results, which brings to distinct consciousness, not only what is changeable in the doctrinal statements, but what is permanent in the midst of the changes; that which moves through the transient with a revivifying energy: in a word, that which is essential and unchangeable in the Christian system of redemption. Only such a mode of handling the subject, viz.: historical

pragmatism, exhibits the external causes of the variations, in union with those dynamical principles, which work from within outward.

The following are the different methods in which the History of Doctrines may be handled:

1. *The merely statutory*, which takes in what has been established by the church as decisive truth, and excludes all that differs from this as decisive heresy; the logical standpoint of Roman Catholicism. History here is simply the recital of the protocols of the dictatorship of faith, exercised once for all.

2. *The exclusive biblical*, which starts from the position that the biblical statement of doctrine in its simple form is sufficient for all times, and which then convinces itself, either that it finds in the Bible, according to a traditional exegesis, the orthodox formulas that were later developed (*e. g.*, those about the Trinity and Original Sin); or, in logical accordance with its exegetical exclusiveness, excludes what is not verbally contained in the Scriptures (biblical supernaturalism on the one side, or biblical rationalism on the other) —the standpoint of an incomplete Protestantism. With this method of handling the matter is usually conjoined

3. *The pragmatic and critical*, which explains all that goes beyond the Bible (or even what surpasses popular reasoning) by all sorts of accidents and externalities, by climatic, or social and political, relations, personal sympathies and antipathies, passions, cabals of courts, priestly deception, superstitition, and the like: the standpoint of the vulgar rationalism, in which, too, for a long time, the merely formal biblical supernaturalism shared.

4. *The one-sided speculative treatment*, which sees in the whole development of doctrines a higher, but naturalistic, process, carried on and out by an internal necessity. Thus, every dogma at some period puts out its blossoms, and then fades away and gives place to another. Here the religious and practical worth of doctrines is underrated, as is their philosophical value by the previous tendency. The error at the basis of this method is in considering Christianity as the mere development of a process of thought, that is, as a mode of philosophy; but it is rather a moral force, resting on historical facts, and continually working upon personal agents. Neander (Dogmengeschichte, s. 15) correctly says: "While a superficial pragmatism concedes too much influence to the individual, the speculative method sets it wholly aside, regarding individuals as nothing but the blind organs of the idea, necessary *momenta* in its process of development."

5. *The theological method* considers the doctrinal substance of the Scriptures as a living seed, capable of the most prolific development; in the midst of the most unfavorable influences, it retains the formative energy, by which it evokes new and living products, adapted to the times. It always (like the second method) recurs to the Scriptures, and measures the products by this canon; but those plants which spring from biblical roots it will neither drive back into their roots, nor cut off. It has respect (like the third method) to the external circumstances, and those conditions of personal life, under which the doctrines have been developed, and is far from denying these influences, often

so palpable and tangible; only it does not rank them so high as to get lost, with such pragmatism, in a mere atomistic tendency. Instead of this, it takes for granted (with the fourth method) that there is a dynamic process of development, which, however, is not purely dialectic or logical, and hence not subject to dissolution—for this were only a more refined atomism (as is seen in Strauss's method). But, as *religious* truth can be only approximately expressed in speculative forms,* it also seeks after the beatings of the heart of the religious life, in the midst of both the coarser and the finer muscular systems, that it may thus grasp the law of the whole organism. This is the noble and *scientific* standpoint of genuine Protestantism; for that alone is true science which knows the real nature of the object, which the science is to exhibit. He who misconceives the nature of religion [as contrasted with philosophy], though he may have all historical knowlege and speculative tact, can not adequately narrate the History of Doctrines.

§ 11.

ARRANGEMENT OF THE MATERIALS.

The object of the History of Doctrines is to exhibit, not only the history of the Christian system as a whole, *i. e.*, the whole substance of Christian truth, and the doctrinal tendencies expressed in its definite statements, but also the history of dogmas, *i. e.*, the development of these particular doctrinal statements, opinions, and representations of the faith, to which the church theology of each period has given expression.[1] Both these points of view ought, then, to be so combined, that the general shall be made more clear by the special, and the special also by the general. This is the import of the division of the materials into the *General and the Special History of Doctrines.* This division can not be vindicated, if the two are put in a merely external relation with each other; but they must be so presented, that the General History shall be seen to be the root of the Special; in the relative proportion, too, in which it is treated, it should sustain merely the relation of an introduction.[2]

[1] "*The Christian dogma (as a whole) approves itself as a thoroughly organic, and, at the same time, as an infinitely varied, system of dogmas; it is just as much a single dogma as it is also a world of dogmas. And this is the test of a complete dogmatic principle, that all genuine dogmas can be derived from it, and referred back to it.*" J. P. Lange, ubi supra, i. s. 29.

[2] The division into the General and Special History of Doctrines has been assailed in recent times (Baur, in his review of Münscher's Lehrbuch, von Cölln's edition, in the Berlin wiss. Jahrbücher, Febr. 1836; s. 230, and by

* Compare the striking remark of Hamaan, cited in Neander, u. s. p. 3: ["The pearl of Christianity is a life hid in God, consisting neither in dogmas, nor in notions, nor in rites and usages."]

Klee, in his Dogmengesch. a. 9), and justly, so far as the two are merely coördinated without internal relations, and the one handled after the other has been fully presented (as in *Augusti and Baumgarten-Crusius*); for in this way, the one half has the aspect of an extended History of Doctrines, or of a chapter of church history, while the other becomes a system of theology in a historical form; and, moreover, repetitions can not be avoided. But even *Münscher* has the correct view, bringing forward the general and the special in each period, so that the former stands as an introduction to the latter, and the one becomes the test of the other; and this is undoubtedly the best method. (Comp. Neander's Dogmengeschichte.) The so-called General History of Doctrines is the band which binds into one whole the history of the particular doctrines, since it exhibits the points of view under which they are to be considered, the conditions under which they originated, etc.* Or, would it be better, with *Klee*, to treat merely of the history of individual doctrines, without prefixing any general summary, and without any division into periods? This leads to disintegration. The method chosen by *Meier* appeals most strongly to the artistic sense; he tries to mould the historical material in such a way "that the course of the history may correspond as exactly as possible with the course of development of the dogma itself, in which the general and the special are always acting as conditions, the one upon the other; and so, too, that the different aspects of the dogma can always be brought forward just at the juncture where there is manifestly some decisive or new point of development." But, still, in this mode of treatment the materials are apt to be too concisely used. Such artistic handling demands compression, and must demand it; while the history of doctrines ought to give the materials as completely as possible for the aid of the student.

§ 12.

DIVISION INTO PERIODS.

Comp. *Hagenbach's* Essay in the Theologischen Studie und Kritiken, 1828, part 4, and his Encyclop., p. [Comp. *Kling* in the Studien und Kritiken, 1841.]

The Periods of the History of Doctrines are to be determined by the most important epochs of development in the history of the theology. They do not quite coincide with those adopted in ecclesiastical history,[1] and may be divided as follows:[2]

I. *Period.* From the close of the Apostolic Age to the death of Origen (A. D. 80–254): the Age of *Apologetics.*[3]

* So far, the General History of Doctrines is like the History of Dogmatics; but yet it is not to be identified with it. It comprises a broader sphere. It is related to it as is the History of Moral Law to the History of Jurisprudence, as is the History of Art to the History of Æsthetics, as is the History of Christian Sermons to the History of Homiletics (as a science).

II. *Period.* From the death of Origen to John Damascenus (254–730): the Age of *Polemics.*[4]

III. *Period.* From John Damascenus to the Reformation (730–1517): the Age of *Systems* (scholasticism in its widest sense).[5]

IV. *Period.* From the Reformation to the Rise of the Philosophy of Leibnitz and Wolf in Germany (1517–1720): the Age of Polemico-ecclesiastical *Symbolism*, or of the Conflict of Confessions.[6]

V. *Period.* From the year 1720 to the present day: the Age of *Criticism*, of *Speculation*, and of the *Antagonism* between Faith and Knowledge, Philosophy and Christianity, Reason and Revelation, including the attempts to reconcile them.[7]

[3] Events that make an epoch in church history may not have the same significance in respect to the history of doctrines; and so conversely. It is true that the development of doctrines is connected with the history of church government, of Christian worship, etc., but the influences which they exert upon each other are not always contemporaneous. Thus the Arian controversy occurred in the age of Constantine, but it was not called forth by his conversion, which, on the other hand, is of so much importance, that it determines a period in ecclesiastical history. On the contrary, the views of Arius arose out of the speculative tendency of Origen and his followers, in opposition to Sabellianism. Accordingly, it is better in this instance to make the epoch with the death of Origen, and the rise of the Sabellian controversy, which are nearly coeval.* And so in other periods.

[4] The numerical differences are very great. *Baumgarten-Crusius* adopts twelve periods, *Lenz* eight, etc. *Münscher* follows a different division in his (larger) Hand-book from the one in his Text-book—in the former he has seven, in the latter only three periods (ancient, medieval, and modern times). *Engelhardt* and *Meier* have adopted the same threefold division, with this difference, that the latter, by subdividing each period into two, has six periods.† It is alike inconvenient to press very different tendencies into

* This is conceded by *Neander*, although he prefers, as does Gieseler, to retain in the History of Doctrines the periods of general church history.

† [Neander's division is: 1. To Gregory the Great, subdivided by the times of Constantine, and forming respectively the Apologetic period and the Polemic and Systematic periods. 2. To the Reformation, subdivided by Gregory VII., comprising a transition period and the scholastic era. 3. From the Reformation to the present time. Gieseler separates the ancient from the medieval periods by the Image Controversy, taking A. D. 726 as the epoch. Baumgarten-Crusius, in his Compendium, makes six periods, skillfully characterised: 1. Formation of the System of Doctrines by reflection and opinion (to the Council of Nice). 2. Formation by the Church (to Chalcedon). 3. Confirmation of the System by the Hierarchy (to Gregory VII.). 4. Confirmation by the Philosophy of the Church (to the end of the fifteenth century). 5. Purification by Parties (to beginning of the eighteenth century). 6. Purification by Science (to the present time).]

long periods, and to have too great a number of divisions. Thus it is one of the chief defects of Münscher's Text-book, that the first period extends from A. D. 1 to 600. The periods in the History of Doctrines may be of greater extent than those in ecclesiastical history (see Baur in the review above cited), because the whole style of the system of doctrines does not undergo as rapid changes as Christian life in general; but natural boundaries which are as distinct as the age of Constantine, should not be lightly disregarded. *Klee* coincides most nearly with us, though he considers the division into periods as superfluous. *Vorländer* also, in his tables, has adopted our terminology. Comp. also the review of Lenz's Dogmengesch., in the Litt. Blätter d. allg. Lit. Zeitung, for Jan., 1836. *Rosenkranz* (Encyclopædie, 2d edit., p. 259, ss.) makes, according to philosophico-dialectic categories, the following division: 1. Period of Analytic Knowledge, of substantial feeling (Greek Church). 2. Period of Synthetic Knowledge, of pure objectivity (Roman Catholic Church). 3. Period of Systematic Knowledge, which combines the analysis and synthesis in their unity, and manifests itself in the stages of symbolical orthodoxy, of subjective belief and unbelief, and in the idea of speculative theology (Protestant Church). The most ingenious division is that of *Kliefoth*, though it is not free from faults peculiar to itself:

1.	The Age of Formation of Doctrines....	Greek.....	Analytic.....	Theology.
2.	" Symbolical Unity.....	Rom. Catholic.	Synthetic.....	Anthropology.
3.	" Completion.....	Protestant....	Systematic....	Soteriology.
4.	" Dissolution.....	?	?	Church.

On the grounds on which this division rests, see Kliefoth, l. c. *Pelt* (Encycl. p. 323) combines this with our division.

[3] In answer to the question, Why not commence with the first year of our era? comp. § 3. The year 70 here assumed is also only approximative. We call this period the age of *Apologetics*, because its theology was chiefly developed in the defense of Christianity against both Judaism and Paganism. The controversies which took place within the church itself (with Ebionites, Gnostics, etc.), had respect for the most part to the opposition of judaising teachers and pagan philosophers, so that the polemical interest was conditioned by the apologetic. The work of Origen *περὶ ἀρχῶν* is the only one in which we find any independent attempt to form a system of theology.

[4] During the second period the conflict became an internal one. The apologetic interest in relation to those outside of the church ceases almost entirely with the conversion of Constantine, or, at any rate, recedes into the background as compared with the polemical activity (a converse relation to that of the previous period). The history of ecclesiastical controversies, from the rise of the Sabellian, down to the close of the Monothelite controversy, forms one continuous series, the different parts of which are so intimately connected that it can not easily be interrupted. It is concluded by the work of John Damascenus (*ἔκθεσις πίστεως*). This period, with its numerous conflicts, its synods for the definition of doctrines, is undoubtedly the most important for the History of Doctrines, if this importance be measured by

the efforts put forth to complete the structure, whose foundation had been laid in the preceding period. The following periods, too, are employed either in completing and adorning what was here constructed, or else in efforts to restore when not to demolish it, in the most wonderful succession and variation.

[5] This period, which we call the *scholastic*, in the widest sense of the word, may be subdivided into three shorter periods. 1. From John Damascenus to Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury; during this period John Scotus Erigena takes the most prominent position in the West. 2. From Anselm to Gabriel Biel, the age of scholasticism properly so called, which may again be subdivided into three periods (its rise, ripeness, and decay); and, 3, from Gabriel Biel to Luther (the period of transition). But we prefer an arrangement which facilitates a general view of the subject, to such articulations. Mystical and scholastic tendencies alternately rule this period; even the forerunners of the Reformation adhered more or less to the one or the other of these tendencies, though they belong to the next period in the other half of their nature.

[6] We might have fixed upon the year 1521, in which the first edition of Melancthon's Loci Communes was published, or upon the year 1530, in which the Confession of Augsburg was drawn up, instead of the year 1517; but, for the sake of the internal connection of the events, we make our date agree with the normal epoch of ecclesiastical history, especially as the *Theses* of Luther were of importance in a doctrinal point of view. Inasmuch as the distinguishing principles of the different sections of the church are brought out very prominently in the Confessions of the age of the Reformation, the History of Doctrines naturally assumes the character of Symbolism; what may be called the statistics of the History of Doctrines, as has already been stated (comp. § 4). From the second half of the sixteenth century, the history again assumes the form of a progressive narrative; up to that time it has rather the character of a comparative sketch of opinions—a broad surface and not a process of growth. The age of Polemics, and that of Scholasticism, may be said to re-appear during this period, though in different forms; we also see various modifications of mysticism in opposition to one-sided rationalism. We might commence a new period with *Calixt* and *Spener*, if their peculiar opinions had then at all prevailed. What both of them wished to effect, from different points of view, shows itself in the sphere of doctrinal history in the period which we have adopted as the last.

[7] A definite year can here least of all be given. The tendency to a dissolution of the old forms begins with the English deists as early as the close of the seventeenth century. In Germany the struggle with the established orthodoxy is prepared by Thomasius and the Pietists; both elements of opposition—the rationalistic and the pietistic—at first work together, but are separated after Wolf begins to teach philosophy in Halle. The negative, critical, and rationalistic tendency does not, however, become vigorous until the middle of the century; and hence many date the new period from 1750. But, in general, it is very perceptible that the bonds of strict symbolical orthodoxy began to be relaxed even in the first decennia of the cen-

tury; this is manifest in the abolition of the *Formula Consensus* in Switzerland, and in the attempts at union in Germany; and also in the fact that it was more frequently asked, What are the conditions of a living Christianity? than, What are the differences in the confessions of faith? In the period that preceded the Reformation, apologetic tendencies came first, and were followed by the polemic; now the order is reversed; we first have the polemic period of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and then the apologetic of the eighteenth, in which the question was, whether Christianity is to be or not to be. None of these agencies are indeed isolated; and the nearer we come to the present times, the more varied and involved becomes the conflict. Thus we can subdivide this last period into three parts. The first, from Wolf to Kant, contains the struggles of a stiff and unwieldy dogmatism (in part, too, a supernaturalism on a deistic basis), with an undefined illuminatism (*Aufklärung*). The second, from Kant, strives to insure the predominance in science and the church of a rationalism, negative as to doctrine, and chiefly restricted to morals, in opposition to both the old and the new faith. In fine, the third period, most fitly dated from Schleiermacher, constantly looking at the real and vital questions about Christianity, brings into view the most diverse tendencies, partly reactionary to restore the old, partly idealizing and mediating, and again tearing down and building up all anew; and thus it is the introduction to a new period, for which history has as yet no name.

§ 13.

SOURCES OF THE HISTORY OF DOCTRINES.

a. Public Sources.

Everything may be considered as a source of the History of Doctrines, which gives sure expression to the religious belief of any given period. In the first rank stand the public confessions of faith or symbols (creeds) of the church;[1] in connection with them the acts of councils,[2] the decrees, edicts, circular letters, bulls, and breves of ecclesiastical superiors, whether clerical or secular,[3] and, lastly, the catechisms,[4] liturgies,[5] and hymns,[6] sanctioned by the church.

[1] Comp. § 4. The ancient creeds may be found in the Acts of Councils mentioned Note 2; the three creeds commonly called œcumenical (the Apostles' Creed, the Nicene, and the Athanasian) are also reprinted in the collections of Protestant symbols; comp. *Ch. W. F. Walch*, Bibliotheca Symbolica Vetus. Lemgoviæ, 1770, 8. *Semler, J. S.*, Apparatus ad Libros Symbolicos Ecclesiæ Lutheranæ, Hal. 1755, 8. COLLECTIONS OF SYMBOLICAL BOOKS (they become important only since the fourth period): *a*) *Of the Lutheran Church*: Libri Symbolici Ecclesiæ Evangelicæ ad fidem opt. exempl. recens. *J. A. H. Tittmann*, Misn. 1817, '27. Libri Symbolici Ecclesiæ Evangelicæ, s. Concordia, rec. *C. A. Hase*, Lips. 1827, '37, '46. Die Symbolischen Bücher der Evang Luther. Kirche, von *J. J. Müller*, Stuttg. 1846. Libri Symbol. Eccl. Luth. ed.

F. Francke, Ed. stereotyp. Lips. 1847. Libri Symbol. Luth. ad edit. princ. etc. ed. *H. A. G. Meyer*, Gött. 1850. *b*) *Of the Reformed:* Corpus Libror. Symbolicor. qui in Ecclesia Reformatorum Auctoritatem publicam obtinuerunt, ed. *J. Ch. W. Augusti*, Elberf. 1828. Sammlung Symb. Bücher der ref. Kiche, von *J. J. Mess.* Neuwied, 1828, 30, 2 vols. 8. *H. A. Niemeyer*, Collectico Confessionum in Ecclesiis Reformatis Publicatarum, Lips. 1840, 8. Die Bekeuntnisschriften der Evangel. ref. Kirche, mit Einleitung. und Anmk. von *E. G. A. Böckel*, Leips. 1847. [Harmonia Confessionum Fidei Orthodoxarum et Reform. Ecclesiarum, ete. 4to. Genev. 1581: an English translation, Cambr. 1586, Lond. 1643. Corpus et Syntagma Confess. Fidei, ete. 4to. 1612, and Geneva 1654. Sylloge Confess. sub Tempus. Reform. Eccl. Oxon. 1801, 1827. The Harmony of Prot. Confess. of Faith, edited *Rev. Peter Hall*, 8vo. Lond. 1842. *Butler's* Historical and Literary Account of the Formularies, ete. 8vo. Lond. 1816.] *c*) *Of the Roman Catholic. Danz*, Libri Symbolici Ecclesiæ Romano-Catholicæ, Vimar. 1835.—*Streitwolf et Klener*, Libri Symb. Eccl. Cathol. Gött. 1835. [Sacrosancti et Œcumenici. Conc Trid. Canones et Decreta, ed. *W. Smets*, Bielefeld, ed. 4, 1854. Canones et Decreta Conc. Trid. acced. declarationes . . . ex Bullario Romano, edd. *A. L. Richter* et *Fr., Schulze*, Lips. 1853.] (Comp. the works mentioned § 16, Note 9.) *d*) *Of the Greek: E. T. Kimmel*, Libri Symbolici Ecclesiæ Orientalis. Jen. 1843, 8. Append. adj. H. T. C. Weissenborn, 1849. (Comp. *Pitzipios*, l'Eglise Orientale de Rome.)

[1] Acts of Councils: *J. Merlin* (Par. 1523, fol. Cöln. 1530, ii. Par. 1535). *Grabbe* (Cöln. 1508, f.). *L. Surius*, Col. 1577, fol. iv. The edition of Sixtus V. Venice, 1585, that of *Binius* (Severinus) Col. 1606, iv. f. *Collectio Regia*, Paris, 1644 (by Cardinal Richelieu) xxxvii. f. *Phil. Labbeus* and *Gabr. Cossart*, Par. 1671, '72, xvii. f. *Balluzii* (Stephan.) Nova Collectio Conciliorum, Par. 1683, f. (Suppl. Conc. Labbei) incomplete. *Harduin*, (Joh.), Conciliorum Collectio Regia Maxima, seu Acta Conciliorum et Epistolæ Decretales ac Constitutiones summorum Pontificum, græce et latine, ad Phil. Labbei et Gabr. Cossartii labores haud modica accessione facta et emendationibus pluribus additis Par. 1715, xi. (xii.) fol.—*Nic. Coleti*, S. S. Concilia ad regiam edit. exacta, etc. Venet. xxiii. with additions by Mansi vi. f.—**Mansi* (J. Dom.), Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio, Flor et Venet. 1759, sqq. xxxi. f. Comp. *Ch. W. F. Walch*, Entwurf einer vollständigen Geschichte der Kirchenversammlungen, Lpz. 1759. *Fuchs*, Bibliothek der Kirchenversammlungen des 4 und 5. Jahrhunderts, Lpz. 1788, 4 vols. Bibliotheca Ecclesiastica quam moderante D. Augusto Neander adornavit *Herm. Theod. Bruns*, I. (Canones Apostolorum et Concil. Sæcul. iv. v. vi. vii.) Para. I. Berol. 1839. [*D. Wilkins*, Conc. Mag. Brit. et Hibern. Lond. 1727, 4 fol. *Hefele, C. J.*, Conciliengeschichte, 3 8vo. 1855–9. *E. H. Landon*, Manual of Councils, 1846. *W. A. Hammond*, Definitions of Faith and Canons of Six Œcumenical Councils, New York ed. 1844. *L. Howell*, Synopsis Conciliorum, fol. 1708.] The so-called Apostolical Constitutions belong here for the ancient times: Constitutiones Apostol. Text. Græc. rerognovit Gulielm. Ueltzen. Sverini. 1853. [Cf. Bunsen's Hippolytus, vol. 3. The Didascalia or Apost. Const. of Abyssinian Church, by Thos. P. Platt, published by the Orient. Transl. Society, vol. xxxix. Beveridge.

Pandectæ Canonum ss. et Conciliorum ab Eccles. Græc. recept. etc. 2 fol. Oxon. 1672. De Lagarde, Constit. Apostolorum 8. Lpz. 1862.]

[3] Partly contained in the Acts of Councils.

a) DECREES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENTS EXERCISING AUTHORITY IN ECCLESIASTICAL AFFAIRS (viz. emperors, kings, magistrates): *Codex Theodosianus*, c. perpetuis commentariis Iac. Gothofredi, etc. Edit. Nova in vi Tom. digesta, cura Ritteri, Lips. 1736.—*Codex Justinianeus*, edid. *Spangenberg*, 1797. *Balluzii* (Steph.) Collectio Capitularium Regum Francorum, etc. Par. 1780, ii. f. *Corpus Juris Canonici* (editions of J. H. Böhmer, 1747, and A. L. Richter, 1833). *Codicis Gregoriani* et *Codicis Hermogeniani* Fragmenta, ed *G. Hänel*, Bonn. 1837, 4to. Under this head come also the regulations concerning the Reformation, the agendas and the religious edicts of Protestant governments, which, at least formerly, were in a great measure based upon doctrinal principles. *Æm. Ludw. Richter*, Die Evangelischen Kirchenordnungen des 16 Jahrh. Weimar, 1846, 4to.

b) PAPAL DECRETALS: Pontificum Romanorum a Clemente usque ad Leonem M. Epistolæ Genuinæ, cur. *C. F. G. Schönemann*, T. i. Gött. 1796, 8.—*Bullarium Romanum* a Leone M. usque ad Benedictum XIII. opus. absolutiss. *Laërt. Cherubini*, a D. Angelo Maria Cherubini al. illustratum et auctum et ad Ben. XIV. perductum, Luxemb. 1727, ss. xix. fol.—Bullarum, Privilegiorum et Diplomatum Roman. Pontif. amplissima Collect. opera et stud. *Car. Cocquelines*, Rom. 1739–44, xxviii. fol. [The Bullarium is continued by *A. Spetia*, 1835, sq. 9 tom. folio.] *Eisenschmid.* römisches Bullarium, oder Auszüge der merkwürdigsten päbstlichen Bullen, übersetzt und mit fortlaufenden Anmerkungen. Neustadt. 1831, 2 vols.

[4] Catechisms become important only from the period of the Reformation, especially those of Luther, the Heidelberg, the Racovian, the Roman Catholic catechism, etc. Some of them, *e. g.*, those just mentioned, may be found in collections of symbolical books (note 1); others are separately published. Comp. *Langemack*, Historia Catechetica, Stralsund, 1729–33, iii. 1740, iv.

[5] *J. S. Assemani*, Codex Liturgicus Ecclesiæ Universæ, Rom. 1749–66, xiii. 4. *Renaudot* (Eus.) Liturgiarum Orientalium Collectio, Paris, 1716, ii. f. *L. A. Muratori*, Liturgia Romana Vetus, Venet. 1748, ii. f. *M. J. G Volbeding*, Thesaurus Commentationum select. et antiq. et recent. etc. Tom ii. Lips. 1848. *T. S. Mone*, Lateinische u. griechische Messen, 2 bis 6 Jahr. Frankf. 1849. Compare the missals, breviaries, liturgies, etc. *Augusti's* Denkwürdigkeiten der christlichen Archäologie, vol. v. *Gerbert*, Vetus Liturgia Allemanica, Ulm, 1776, ii. 4. [*H. A. Daniel*, Codex Lit. Eccl. Univ. in Epitome redact. 4 vols. Lips. 1847–51. *J. Pinius*, Liturg. Ant. Hisp. Goth. etc. 2 fol. Rom. 1749. *W. Palmer*, Origines Liturg. or Antiq. of the Church of England, 2 8vo. 1845. *J. M. Neale*, Tetralogia Liturg. Lond. 1848. Eutaxia, or the Presbyterian Liturgies; Historical Sketches. New York, 1855. *Bunsen*, Analecta Ante-Nicaena. 3, 8vo. 1854.]

[6] *Rambach*, Anthologie christlicher Gesänge aus allen Jahrhunderten der Kirche, Altona, 1816–22, iv. 8, and the numerous psalm and hymn-books. How much sacred songs have contributed to the spread of doctrinal opinions, may be seen from the example of Bardesanes [Gieseler, i. § 46, n. 2, p. 138], of the Arians, and in later times, of the Flagellants, the Hussites, etc.;

from the history of the sacred hymns of the Lutheran, and the sacred psalms of the Reformed church, the spiritual songs of Angelus Silesius, of the Pietists and Moravian brethren, and (in a negative point of view) from the dilutions found in many modern hymn-books. Comp. *Augusti*, De antiquissimis Hymnis et Carminibus Christianorum sacris in historia dogmatum utiliter adhibendis, Jen. 1810, and De audiendis in Theologia poëtis, Vratisl. 1812–15. *Hahn, A.*, Bardesanes Gnosticus, primus Syrorum Hymnologus, 1820–8. †*Buchegger*, De Origine sacræ Christianorum Poëseos, Frib. 1827, 4. *Hoffman, Dr. H.*, Geschichte des deutschen Kirchenliedes bis auf Luthers Zeit, Breslau, 1832. [*J. M. Neale*, Hymni Ecclesiæ e Brevariis, etc., Lond. 1851. *Mohnike*, hymnologische Forschungen, 4 Bde. 1855 sq. *T. J. Mone*, Lateinische Hymnen, 3 Bde. 1853 sq. *Daniel*, Thesaurus Hymnologicus, 5 Tom. 1856. *Koch*, Gesch. des Kirchenlieds. 4 Bde. 2d. ed. 1853.]

§ 14.

b. Private Sources.

Next in order after these public sources come private sources of the History of Doctrines. These are: 1. The works of the fathers, theologians, and ecclesiastical writers of all the Christian centuries;[1] but in these we are to distinguish between scientific and strictly doctrinal works on the one hand, and practical (sermons) and occasional writings (letters, etc.) on the other.[2] 2. The works of secular writers, *e. g.*, the Christian philosophers and poets of any period.[3] 3. Lastly, the indefinite form of popular belief, which manifests itself in legends, proverbial sayings, and songs, and representations of Christian art, viewed as memorials of certain religious views, may also be numbered among these secondary sources.[4]

[1] Comp. § 5. Concerning the distinction (which is very relative) made between fathers, teachers, and ecclesiastical writers, see the introductions to the works on Patristics, *e. g.*, *Möhler*, p. 17–19. The fathers of the first centuries are followed by the compilers, the scholastic and mystic divines of the middle ages, and these again by the Reformers and their opponents, the polemical writers of various sections of the church, and the later theologians in general. Their particular works will be referred to in their proper place. Works of a more general character are: *Fabricii, J. G.*, Bibliotheca Ecclesiastica, Hamb. 1718, f. *Cave, W.*, Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Historia litteraria, Lond. 1688, 91. Oxon. 1740, 43, Bas. 1740. *C. Oudin*, Comment. de Scriptoribus Ecclesiæ Antiquis, Lips. 1722, iii. *L. El. Dupin*, Nouvelle Bibliothèque des Auteurs Ecclésiastiques, Par. 1686–1714, xlvii. 8, [transl. by *Wotton* and *Cotes*, 3 fol. Dublin, 1733]. Bibliothèque des Auteurs séparés de la communion de l'église Romaine du 16 et 17 siècle, Par. 1718, '19, iii. Bibliothèque des Auteurs Ecclesiastique du 18 siècle par *Claude Pierre Goujet*, Par. 1736, '37, iii. 8, comp. *Richard Simon*, Critique de la Bibliothèque, etc. Paris, 1730, iv. 8. *Ceillier, Remy*, Histoire Générale des

Auteurs Sacrés et Ecclésiastiques, Paris, 1729–63, xxiii. 4 *J. G. Walch*, Bibliotheca Patristica, Jen. 1770, 8. Edit. Nova Auctior et Emendatior adornata a *I. T. L. Danzio*, Jen. 1834. *Assemani, I. S.*, Bibliotheca Orientalis, Rom. 1719–28, iii. in 4 vols. f. *Oelrichs, J. G. A.*, Commentarii de Scriptoribus Ecclesiæ Latinæ, Lips. 1791, 8. *Schönemann, C. F. G.*, Bibliotheca Historico-litteraria a Tertulliano Principe usque ad Gregorium M. et Isidorum Hispal. Lips. 1792, '94, ii. 8. *Rössler, Ch. F.*, Bibliothek der Kirchenväter, Leips. 1776–86, x. 8. *Augusti, J. Ch. W.*, Chrestomathia Patristica ad usum eorum, qui Historiam Christianam accuratius Discere Cupiunt, Lips. 1812, ii. 8. *Royaards, D. H. I.*, Chrestomathia Patristica, Pars. I. Traj. ad Rhen. 1831. *Engelhardt*, Litterarischer Leitfaden zu Vorlesungen über die Patristik. †*Winter*, Patrologie, München, 1814. †*Goldwitzer, F. W.*, Bibliographie der Kirchenväter und Kirchenlehrer, vom 1. bis zum 13 Jahrhundert, Landsh. 1828. †*Möhler, Dr. J. A.*, Patrologie oder Christliche Litterärgeschichte, aus dessen Nachlasse herausgegebs. von *Reithmayr*. 1st vol. Regensb. 1839, 8. *Danz, J. T. L.*, Initia Doctrinæ Patristicæ Introductionis instar in Patrum ecclesiæ studium, Jen. 1839. *Böhringer*. die Kirche Christi und ihre Zeugen, oder die Kirchengeschichte in Biographien, Zur. 1842–58. 2 Bde. 8 Theile. [Patrologiæ Cursus Compl. accur. J. B. Migne, Paris; in the course of publication, 140 vols. issued.]

A. BEST COLLECTIONS OF THE WORKS OF THE FATHERS: *Magna Bibliotheca Veterum*, primo quidem a *Margarito de la Bigne* composita, postea studio Coloniens. Theolog. aucta, etc. (with Auctuarium by F. Ducæus and Fr. Combefisius) 1664–72, v. fol.—*Maxima Bibliotheca Vett. Patr.* et. Lugd. 1677, xxvii. fol.—*And. Gallandii*, Bibliotheca Græco-latina Vett. Patrum, etc. Venet. 1765–81, xiv. f. Corpus Apologetarum Saec. sec. *J. C. Th. Otto*, ed. 2, Jen. 1848–50, iii. *Biblioth. Patrum Græcor. Dogmatica, cura *J. C. Thilo*, 2 Tom. Lips. 1853, sq. [Bibliotheca Patrum Eccles. Latin. ed. Gersdorf, xiii. Tom. 12mo. Corpus Hæreseologicum, ed. *F. Oehler*, Tom. v. Berol. 1856 sq. *Angelo Mai*, Patrum Spicilegum Rom. 10 8vo. Rom. 1839–44, and Patrum Nova Bibl. 6 Tom. 1852, sq. Martène et Durand, Vet. Script. Coll. Paris, 1724–33, 9 fol. *J. E. Grabe*, Spicilegium ss. Patrum, 2 fol. Oxon. 1698. *D'Achery*, Spicilegium, 13, 4to. Paris, 1655. Spicilegium Solesmense, ed. J. Pitra, 4 Tom. 4to. Paris, 1853, sq. Comp. *J. G. Dowling*, Notitia Script. ss. Patrum, etc. 1839.] *Philological Aids.: J. C. Suiceri*, Thesaurus Ecclesiasticus, Amst. 1682 (1728, Traj. 1746), ii. fol.—*Du Fresne* (du Cange) *Car.* Glossarium ad Scriptores Mediæ et Infimæ Latinitatis, Paris, 1733–36, vi. f. [New edition, ed. *G. A. L. Henschel*, Paris, F. Didot, 1840–'50, 7 vol. 4to.]

B. COLLECTIONS OF THE WORKS OF ECCLESIASTICAL WRITERS DURING THE MIDDLE AGES (more important for ecclesiastical history in general than for the history of doctrines in particular): *Meibomius, Basnage, Muratori, Mabillon, *Martène et Durand* (Thesaurus Anecd. v. f.), **Pertz* (Monumenta, 1826–35), etc. Comp. the Literature as to Church History in *Hase's* History of the Church, p. 181 of the New York edition. *For the East:* Scriptores Byzantini (Par. 1645, ss.) and latest edition by **Niebuhr*, Bonn. 1829, ss.

C. COLLECTIONS OF THE WORKS OF THE REFORMERS: *Bretschneider*, Corpus

Reformatorum, Halæ, 1834–59, 27 Tom. 4to. (containing as yet works of Melancthon only); the works of individual reformers will be named in their proper places.

D. On Modern Dogmatic Literature: *Walch, J. G.* Bibliotheca Theologica, T. I. Jen. 1757. *Winer, G. B.*, Handbuch der theologischen Litteratur, S. 290, ss. *Bretschneider*, Systematische Entwickelung aller in der Dogmatik vorkommenden Begriffe, us. s. w. Lpz. 1841–8.

[3] Since the earlier theologians, *e. g.* Origen drew a distinction between what they taught the people κατ' οἰκονομίαν, and what they propounded in a scientific manner; and since popular language in general does not make any pretension to dogmatic precision, practical works are not of so much importance for the history of doctrines as strictly dogmatic works. But, like all liturgical and ascetic writings, they may be regarded as concrete and living witnesses to the dogmatic spirit of a period.—Homiliarium Patristicum, edid. *Ludov. Pelt* et *A. Rheinwald*, Berol. 1829, deinde *H. Rheinwald* et *C. Vogt*, Ber. 1831.—*Lentz, E. G. H.*, Geschichte der Christlichen Homiletik, ii. Braunschw. 1839, 8. *Paniel*, Pragmatische Geschichte der Christl. Beredsamkeit und der Homiletik, i. 1, 2, Lpz. 1839, 8. During the middle ages, the sermons of Berthold, Tauler, etc., in the time of the Reformation, those of the Reformers, etc., come into consideration. *W. Beste*, Die Kanzelredner d. ältest. Luth. Kirche. Leips. 1836. Modern homiletical literature also gives a more or less faithful representation of doctrinal tendencies.

[4] Comp. § 13, noté 6. As sacred hymns were numbered among the public sources, so poetical works in general may be considered as private source, *e. g.*, the works of some of the earlier poets, of the so-called Minnesingers, Dante's Divina Commedia, and many others. In like manner a comparison of the poetical views of Milton, Shakespeare, Göthe, Byron, or the romantic school, with the doctrinal opinions of the church, might lead to interesting results A history of *Christian* poetry in its whole extent, and with constant reference to the theological spirit of each period, does not as yet exist.

[5] The influence which popular belief (with its remnants of heathen superstitions) may have exerted upon certain dogmatic notions, *e. g.*, concerning the devil and hell, is deserving particular attention (comp. *Grimm's* deutsche Mythologie). The spirit of a theology also manifests itself in the silent monuments of art: ecclesiastical buildings, tombs, vasa sacra, paintings, *e. g.*, representing the general judgment, or the Deity itself (comp. *Grüneisen, C.* über bildliche Darstellung der Gottheit, Stuttg. 1828), in coins, gems, etc. (*Münter*, Sinnbilder und Kuntsvorstellungen der alten Christen. Altona, 1825, 4. *Bellermann*, die Gemmen der Alten mit dem. Abraxasbilde, Berlin, 1817. *Piper*, Mythologie der Christl. Kunst. Weimar, 1847. [*Didron's* Christ. Iconography, transl. in Bohn's Lib. 1852. *L. Twining*, Symbols of Early and Mediæval Art. 1852. *Mrs. Jameson*, Sacred and Legendary Art. 3 vols.]

§ 15.

c. *Indirect Sources.*

We can not always have access to direct sources, but must frequently have recourse to such as are indirect, *i. e.*, accounts or reports which have been transmitted to us by other writers, as is the case, for the most part, with the opinions of heretics,[1] whose writings were destroyed at an early period. In like manner, the works of some of the Fathers are either entirely lost, or have come down to us only in a corrupt form.[2] In the use of both the direct and indirect sources, much critical skill is needful.[3]

[1] Hence the accounts given by different writers of Cerinthus, the Ebionites, Gnostics, Manicheans, etc., frequently vary from one another, and even contradict each other.

[2] Thus, in the case of Origen, of whose writings we frequently have nothing but the translations of Rufinus, or the relations of Jerome and Eusebius.

[3] Not only the criticism of the text and words, in respect to the genuineness and integrity of the writings (cf. *Danz*, Initia Doctrinæ Patrist. § 7–20), but also the criticism of the contents, in relation to the greater or less credibility of the authors. Comp. *Hagenbach*, Encyclop. § 49.

§ 16.

WORKS UPON THE HISTORY OF DOCTRINES.

[Cf. C. F. Baur, Epochen der kirchlichen Geschichtschreibung. 1852.]

As all the sources are not at the command of every one, and as their study, generally speaking, will only be fruitful after we have acquired a general outline of the history which we intend more fully to investigate, we must have recourse, in the first instance, to the works of those who, by their own historical researches, and in the application of the historical art, have placed the treasures of science within the reach of all who desire to be learners. The History of Doctrines itself has been treated as an independent branch of theological science only in modern times;[1] yet some of the earlier writers of church history,[2] as well as the theologians,[3] have prepared the way for it. Besides those works which treat of the History of Doctrines exclusively,[4] we have to compare the modern works on ecclesiastical history,[5] as well as the monographs upon the Fathers and upon particular doctrines,[6] and also those works on dogmatic theology,[7] and Christian ethics,[8] which combine the historical with the sys-

tematic. Lastly, the literature of symbolism[1] forms (according to § 4) a part of the literature of the History of Doctrines.

[1] The History of Doctrines was formerly treated in connection with ecclesiastical history, or dogmatic theology (comp. §2); *Semler* and *Ernesti* first showed the necessity of separating the one from the other. The former attempted this in his historical introduction to Siegm. Baumgarten's Glaubenslehre, Halle, 1759, iii. 4. His design was (according to i. p. 101): "*to expand the views of divines or studiosi theologiæ in general, and to show the origin, nature, and true object of dogmatic theology.*" In the same year J. A. Ernesti published his programm, De Theologiæ Historicæ et Dogmaticæ conjungendæ Necessitate et Modo universo, Lips. 1759 (Opusc. Theol. Lips. 1773, ed. 2, 1792, p. 567); he does not indeed speak of the History of Doctrines as a separate science, but it is not difficult to perceive that he felt the necessity of its being so. Comp. also *C. W. F. Walch*, Gedanken von der Geschichte der Glaubenslehre, 2 edit. Gött. 1764, 8.

[2] Eusebius, Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret, etc. (Editions of *Valesius*, Par. 1659, iii. *Reading*, Cant. 1720, iii. f.—Manual edition of Eusebius by *Heinichen*, Lips. 1827–28, iii.) [English translations of Euseb., Socrat., Sozom., Theod., and Evagrius, published by Bagster, Lond. 6 vols.] Rufinus, Sulpicius, Severus, Cassiodorus, Epiphanius Scholasticus. *Writers during the Middle Ages:* Gregor. Turonensis, Beda Venerabilis, Adamus Bremensis, Nicephorus Callisti, etc. (comp. the literature in works on ecclesiastical history). *Since the Reformation:* the *Magdeburg Centuriators* under the title: Ecclesiastica Historia per aliquot studiosos et pios viros in urbe Magdeburgica, Bas. 1559–74, xiii. f. †*Cæs. Baronius*, Annales Ecclesiastici, Rom. 1588–1607, xii. f. †*Odoricus Raynaldus*, Annales Eccles. Rom. 1646–1674, x. f. (both edited by *Mansi*, along with the Critica Historico-Theologica of Pagi, Luccæ, 1738, '39, xxxiii. f.—*J. G. Arnold*, Unparteiische Kirchen-und Ketzerhistorie, Fkft. 1699, iv. f. †*Nat. Alexander*, Historia Ecclesiastica, Par. 1676–86, xxiv. 8, Venet. 1759, 1778, ix. f. †*Fleury*, Histoire Ecclésiastique, Paris, 1691–1720, xx. 4 (continued by *Jean Claude Fabre*, Paris, 1726–1740, xvi. 4, and *Al. de la Croix*, Par. 1776–78, vi.) Par. xxxvi. 12, 1740, '41. †*Tillemont*, Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire Ecclésiastique des 6 premiers siècles, justifiés par les Citations des Auteurs Originaux, Paris, 1693, sa. xvi. 4. *L. Moshemii*, Institutionum Historiæ Eccles. Antiquioris et Recentioris libri IV. Helmst. 1755, 1764, 4 [transl. by J. Murdock, 3 8vo. 2d ed. New York, 1849]. *Walch, Ch. W. F.*, Historie der Ketzereien, Spaltungen und Religionsstreitigkeiten, Leipz. 1762–85, xi. *Baumgarten, J. S.*, Untersuchung theologischer Streitigkeiten mit einigen Anmerkungen, Vorrede und fortgesetzten Geschichte der Christlichen Glaubenslehre, herausgegeben von Dr. *J. S. Semler*, Halle, 1762–64, iii. 4. *By the same:* Geschichte der Religionsparteien, herausgegeben von *J. S. Semler*, ibid. 1766, 4.

[3] Thus the works of Irenæus, Hippolytus, Origen, Tertullian and Epiphanius contain much material for the History of Doctrines in their refutation of heretics; much, too, is found scattered about in the polemic and dogmatic works of ancient and mediæval times. Thus, in the work of bishop *Facundus*, of Hermiane, Pro Defensione trium Capitulorum, libri XII (in Gal-

landi Bibl. Patrum, Tom. XI., p. 665, sq.), in that of the monophysite, *Stephen Gobarus* (in Photii Bibl. Cod. 232), as well as in the treatise of *Abelard*, Sic et Non (edited by G. L. Henke and G. S. Lindenkohl, Marb., 1851). More definite preparation for the History of Doctrines is found in works published after the Reformation: † *Petavius* (*Dion.*), Opus de Theologicis Dogmatibus, Par. 1644–50, iv. Antw. 1700, vi. *"This work is no less ingenious than profound, and deserves to be more carefully and frequently studied than is generally done."* Dorner. [The first volume of a new edition of *Petau*, expolitum et auctum, collatis studiis C. Passaglia et C. Schrader was published at Rome, in 4to., 1857.] † *Thomassin, L.*, Dogmata Theologica, Par. 1684–89. † *Dumesnil, Lud.*, Doctrina et Disciplina Ecclesiæ, ex ipsis Verbis ss. codd. concc. PP. et vett. genuinorum Monumentorum sec. seriem temporis digesta, iv. Col. 1730, f. *Io. Forbesius a Corse*, Instructiones Historico-theologicæ de Doctrina Christiana et vario Rerum Statu Ortisque Erroribus et Controversiis, etc., Amst. 1745, f. Gen. 1699, and in his Opera, Amst. 1703, ii. f. (vol. 2). The design of this work is to prove the agreement between the doctrines of the Reformers and the opinions of the earlier Fathers (especially in opposition to Bellarmin). The various Loci of *Chemnitz*, *Hutter*, *Quenstedt*, *Baier*, and of *Joh. Gerhard* in particular, contain much historical matter: *J. Gerhard*, Loci Theol. (Edit. of *Cotta*) Tüb. 1762–89, xxii. 4. Works which form the transition to the treatment of the History of Doctrines as a separate science: *Lor. Reinhard*, Introductio in Historiam Præcipuorum Dogmatum, Jen. 1795, 4, and *J. S. Baumgarten*, Evangelische Glaubenslehre, Halle, 1759, '60 4 (the above mentioned preface to this work by Semler).

* COMPENDIUMS AND MANUALS OF THE HISTORY OF DOCTRINES: *Lange, S. G.*, ausführliche Geschichte der Dogmen, Lpz. 1796, (incomplete). *Wundemann, J. Ch.*, Geschichte der christlichen Glaubenslehren vom Zeitalter des Athanasius bis Gregor den Gr., 1st and 2d vol. Leipz. 1798–99. * *Münscher W.*, Handbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte, Marb. vol. i. and ii. 1797, 3d edit. without any alteration, 1817, '18; vol. iii. 1802, 1804; vol. iv. 1809 (only to the year 604); the first treatment of the History of Doctrine in the pragmatic method. *By the same:* Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte, Marb. 1812, 1819, 3d edit., mit Belegen aus den Quellenschriften, Ergänzungen der Literatur, historischen Notizen und Fortsetzungen versehen von * *Dan. von Cölln* 1st part, Cassel, 1832, 2d part, ibid. 1834 (edited by *Hupfeld*); 2d part, 2d section (also under the title: Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte von der Reformationszeit bis auf unsere Tage), by *Ch. Gotth. Neudecker*, Cassel, 1838, 8 (*Münscher's* Manual, translated by T. Murdock, New Haven, 12 mo., 1830.) *Münter, Friedr.*, Handbuch der ältesten christlichen Dogmengeschichte, from the Danish, by *Evers*, 1st vol. Gött. 1802, 8 (incomplete). * *Augusti, J. Ch. W.*, Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte, Leipz. 1805, 4th edit. 1835. *Bertholdt, L.*, Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte, herausg. von *Veit Engelhardt*, Erl. 1822, '23, ii. 8. *Ruperti, F. A.*, Geschichte der Dogmen, oder Darstellung der Glaubenslehre des Christenthums von seiner Stiftung bis auf die neueren Zeiten, insbesondere für Studierende der Theologie und zu ihrer Vorbereitung auf ihre Prüfung, Berlin, 1831. * *Baumgarten-Crusius L. F. O.*, Lehrbuch

der christlichen Dogmengeschichte, Jena, 1832, ii. 8. *Lentz, C. G. H.*, Geschichte der christlichen Dogmen in pragmatischer Entwicklung, Helmst. 1834, 1st vol. † *Klee, H.*, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 1st vol. Mainz, 1837, 2d vol. 1838. *Engelhardt, J. G. V.*, Dogmengeschichte, ii. Neust. 1839. **Meier, Karl*, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte für akademische Vorlesungen, Giessen, 1840. (* *Baumgarten-Crusius*, Compendium der christlichen Dogmengeschichte, Lpz. i. 1840, ii. 1846 (edited by *Hase*). * *F. Ch. Baur*, Lehrb. d. christl. Dogmengesch., Stuttg. 1847 [second edition, 1858]. *Karl Beck*, Lehrb. d. christl. Dogmengesch. Weimar, 1864. *L. Noack*, Die christl. Dogmengesch. nach ihrem organischen Entwicklungsgange, Erlang. 1852, second ed. 1856. **D. J. C. L. Gieseler*, Dogmengeschichte (posthumous, edited by *Redepenning*) Bonn, 1855. * *Dr. A. Neander*, christl. Dogmengesch., edited by *Dr. J. L. Jacobi*, 2 Thle. Berlin, 1857–8 (translated by J. E. Ryland in Bohn's library). [*H. Schmid*, Lehrbuch d. Dogmengesch. Nördlingen. 1860.]

Tables: *Hagenbach, K. R.* tabellarische Uebersicht der D. G. bis auf die Reformation, Basel, 1828, 4. *Vorländer, Karl*, tabell. übersichtl. Darstellung der Dogmengesch. nach Neanders dogmengeschichtl. Vorlesungen. Per. i. Hamb. 1835, Per. ii. 1837.

* Works of Modern Authors on Church History, which include the History of Doctrines: *Schröckh, J. M.*, christliche Kirchengeschichte, Lpz. 1768–1803, xxxv. 8, since the Reformation (continued by *Tzschirner*), 1804–1810, x. 8. *Henke*, allegemeine Geschichte der Christlichen Kirche nach der Zeitfolge, Branschw. 1788, ss. continued by *Vater*, ix. (in several editions). *Schmidt, J. E. Ch.*, Handbuch. der Christlichen Kirchengeschichte, Giessen und Darmstadt, 1801, ss. vi. (2d edit. 1825–27) vii. vol. by *Rettberg*, 1834. **Neander Aug.*, Allgemeine Geschichte der Christlichen Religion und Kirche, Hamb. 1825–52, i.–vi. in 14 parts [The sixth vol. edited by K. F. H. Schneider, from MSS. 1852. A new edition (the third of the earlier volumes), 2, 8vo. with preface by Ullmann, Gotha, 1856; translation by Joseph Torrey, 5, 8vo. Boston. 1849–54, reprinted in Bohn's Library, London.] **Gieseler, L.*, Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte, Bonn, 1824–57, 3 vols. in several parts (i. 4th edit. in 2 parts, 1844; ii. in 4 parts; iii. 1, 1840). [Of Gieseler's work, vols. iv.–vi., are edited from his MSS. by E. R. Redepenning; the 5th vol. to 1848; the 6th vol. is the History of Doctrines, to 1517. A translation of this History, to the Reformation, by Francis Cunningham, was published in Phil. 1836. *Davidson* and *Hull's* translation, in Clark's Library, Edinburgh, 5 vols. 8vo. 1846–59. A new edition, revised and ed. by Henry B. Smith, New York, 4, 8vo. 1855–60, to 1648; the fifth and last volume is in preparation]. *K. Hase*, Lehrbuch d. Kirchengesch. Lpz. 1833; 8th ed. 1857 [translated from 7th ed. by *C. E. Blumenthal* and C. P. Wing, New York, 1855]. *H. E. F. Guericke*, Handbuch d. Allg. Kirchengesch. Halle, 1833; 8th ed. 1855, 3. 8vo. [vol. 1, comprising six centuries, translated by *W. G. T. Shedd*, Andover, 1857]. *Schleiermacher*, Gesch. d. Christl. Kirche [posthumous, ed. by Bonnel], Berlin, 1840. *A. F. Gfrörer*, Allg. Kirchengesch. Stuttg. 1841–46, iv. *Ch. W. Niedner*, Gesch. d. Christl. Kirche, Lpz. '46'66.

J. H. Kurtz, Lehrb. d. Kirchengesch. Mietau, 1840; several editions [translated by *Schæffer*. *Ibid.* Handbuch d. Kirchengesch. i. in three parts, 2d. ed. 1858]. *Ph. G. A. Fricke*, Lehrb. d. Kircheng. i. Lpz. 1850. [*W. B. Lindner*, Lehrb. d. Kircheng. 3. 8vo. Leips. 1854. *J. G. V. Engelhardt*, Handbuch, 4, 1834. *J. L. Jacobi*, Lehrb. i. 1850. *M. T. Matter*, Histoire universelle de l'Église, 4, 8vo. 2d ed. Paris, 1838. *Milner's* Church History, 4, 8vo.; several editions. *H. H. Milman*, Hist. of Latin Christ. 6. 8vo. Lond. 1854–7, New York ed. in 8 vols. 1860. *H. Stebbing's* Hist. of Church, to 18th cent. 6, 8vo. 1842. *Philip Schaff*, Hist. of Christ. Church, vol. i. New York, 1859. *Foulke's* Manual, 1851. *Chs. Hardwick*, Middle Ages and Reform. 2. 1853–6. *J. C. Robertson*, Ancient and Mediæval, 3 vols. 1854–66 *Waddington*, through Ref. 6 vols. 1835, sq. New York ed. of first 3 vols. in one.]

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[*Tables of Church History: J. S. Vater*, 1803; 6th ed. Thilo, 1833. *J. T. L. Danz*, 1838. *Lob. Lange*, 1841. *C. D. A. Donai*, 2d. ed. 1850. *Henry B. Smith*, Hist. of the Church in Synchronistic Tables, fol. New York, new ed. 1860.]

Works on the Church History of Particular Periods: a. Ancient Times. Moshemii Commentarius de Rebus Christianorum ante Constantinum M. Helmstad. 1753, '4; [vol. i. transl. by *R. S. Vidal*; vol. ii. by *Jas. Murdoch*, 2. 8vo. New York, 1852. *Philip Schaff*, Hist. of Apostolic Church, etc. 8vo. New York, 1853. *H. H. Milman*, Hist. of Christ. to Abolition of Paganism in the Rom. Emp., New York ed. 1842.] *Rothe*, Anfänge d. Christl. Kirche. 1837. *A. Ritschl.* d. Altkathol. Kirche. 1850. *W. Burton*, Lect. on Eccl. Hist. of First Three Cent. in his Works, vols. iv. and v., Oxf. 1837. *K. R. Hagenbach*, die Christl. Kirche d. drei ersten Jahr. 1853. *F. C. Baur*, Das Christenthum . . . in d. drei ersten Jahrh. 1853. *H. W. J. Thiersch*, Gesch. d. Christl. Kirche; trans. by Carlyle, Lond. 1852. Compare also the works of *M. Baumgarten*, *Lechler*, *Schwegler*, *Dietlein*, *Volkmar*, *Bunsen*, *Hilgenfeld*, *L. Noack*, etc. *b. Middle Ages* (especially in relation to Scholasticism). *J. B. Bossuet*, Einleitung, in die Allg. Gesch.; German, transl. by J. A. Cramer, Lpz. 1757–86 [in French, and English, numerous editions. *J. T. Damberger*, Synchron. Gesch. d. Kirche u. Welt im Mittelalter, Regensb. 6 Bde. 1850–4; also a French edition. *M. B. Hauréau*, De la Philos. Scholastique (crowned), 2 8vo. Paris, 1859. *E. Chastel*, Le Christianisme et l'Église au Moyen Age. Paris, 1857.] *c. The Time of the Reformation* (in addition to works on the History of the Reformation): *Planck, J. C.*, Geschichte der Enstehung, der Veränderungen und Bildung unseres Protestantischen Lehrbegriffs, von Anfang der Reformation bis zur Einführung der Concordienformel, vi. 2d edit. Lpz. 1791–1800. *d. Modern Times: By the*

same, Geschichte der Prot. Theol. von der Concordienformel an bis in die Mitte des 18. Jahrh. Gött. 1831, 8. Comp. *Walch, J. G.*, Histor. u. Theolog. Einleitung in die Religionsstreitigkeiten in und ausserhalb der Lutherischen Kirche, Jena, 1733, x. 8.

* Works which treat on particular subjects (monographs) will be mentioned in their proper place. Essays in which the systems of individual Fathers are more fully discussed, will be found in the works of Rössler, Augusti, Möhler, etc., mentioned § 14, Note 1.

† Works on Dogmatic Theology which also consider the History of Doctrines, or include it: *Seiler, G. I.*, Theologia Dogmatico-Polemica, cum Compendio Historiæ Dogmatum, Ed. 3, Erl. 1789, 8. *Gruner, J. F.*, Institutionum Theologiæ Dogmaticæ lib. iii. Hal. 1777, 8. *Döderlein, J. Ch.*, Institutio Theologi Christiani in Capitibus Religionis theoreticis, Ed. 6, Alt. 1797, ii. 8. *Stäudlin, C. Fr.*, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik und Dogmengeschichte (Gött. 1801, 1809), 1822, 8. **Wegscheider, J. A. L.*, Institutiones Theol. Christ. Dogmaticæ, addita Singulorum Dogmatum Historia et Censura, Hal. 1815, ed. 8, 1344. **Bretschneider, C. G.*, Handbuch der Dogmatik der Evangelischen Kirche, ii. 8, Lpz. 1828. *By the same:* Versuch einer systematischen Entwicklung aller in der Dogmatik vorkommenden Begriffe, nach den Symb. Büchern der Luth. Kirche, Lpz. 1841. **Hase, Karl*, Lehrbuch der Evangelischen Dogmatik, Stuttg. 1826, 8 (4th edit. Lpz. 1842). **By the same:* Gnosis oder Evang. Glaubenslehre für die Gebildeten in der Gemeinde, wissenschaftlich dargestellt, 3 vols. Lpz. 1827–29. [*Knapp, G. Ch.*, Vorlesungen über die Christliche Glaubenslehre, herausgeg. von *Thilo*. 2 edit. 1837; translated into English by *Leon. Woods*, And. 1831, and often republished.] *D. F. Strauss*, Die Christl. Glaubensl. in ihrer gesch. Entwicklung, ii. Tüb. 1840. *Ch. E. Weisse*, Philos. Dogmatik, oder Phil. ds. Christenth., i. Leipz. 1855, § 180–247. [*Dan. Schenkel*, Die Christl. Dogmatik, vom Standpunkte des Gewissens, ii. (in 3 parts), Wiesbaden, 1858–9. *G. Thomasius*, Christi Person u. Werk, 3 Thle. Erlangen, 1853, sq. *J. P. Lange*, Christl. Dogmatik, iii. Heidelb. 1849–52. *A. D. C. Twesten*, Dogmatik d. Evang.-Luth. Kirche, 2d ed. ii. 1834–7.] *J. H. A. Ebrard*, Christl. Dogmatik, ii. 1852. *F. A. Philippi*, Kirchl. Glaubensl. iii. 1856, sq. *Aug. Hahn*. Lehrb. d. Christl. Glaubens. 4te. Auft. ii. 1858.] *On the History of the Protestant Doctrine:* **De Wette, W. L. M.*, Dogmatik der Evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche nach den Symbolischen Büchern und den ältern Dogmatikern (the 2d part of his Lehrb. der Christ. Dogmatik) 2d edit, Berlin, 1821, 3d edit. 1840. *Klein, F. A.*, Darstellung des dogmatischen Systems der Evangel. Prot. Kirche, Jena, 1822, 3d edit. revised by Dr. *Lobegott Lange*, ibid. 1840. **Hase*, Hutterus Redivivus, oder Dogmatik der Evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, Lpz. 1829–58, 9th edit. *Al. Schweizer*, Die Glaubensl. d. Evang. Ref. Kirche, aus den Quellen, ii. Zürich, 1844 [Die Protestantischen Centraldogmen. ii. 1856. *D. Schenkel*, Das Wesen ds. Protest. aus d. Quellen. iii. Schaffh. 1546–51]. Works on the History of Dogmatic Theology: *Heinrich, Ch. G.*, Versuch einer Geschichte der verschiedenen Lehrarten der Christl. Glaubenswahrheiten und der merkwürdigsten Systeme und Compendien derselben, von Christo bis auf unsere Zeiten, Lpz. 1790. *Schickedans, J. H.*, Versuch einer Geschichte der Christ. Glaubenslehre und der merk

würdigsten Systeme, Compendien, Normalschriften und Katechismen der Christ. Hauptparteien, Braunschw. 1827. *Flügge* und *Stäudlin*, Geschichte der theol. Wissenschaften. *Herrmann*, Gesch. d. Prot. Dogmatik, von Melanc. bis Schleiermacher. Lpz. 1842. *Gass*, Gesch. d. Prot. Dogmatik, iii. Berl. 1854–62. [Frank, Prot. Theol. 2. Lpz. 1862–5. Dorner, 1866.]

* *Stäudlin, K. F.*, Geschichte der Sittenlehre Jesu, 3 vols. Gott. 1799–1812. **De Wette*, Christliche Sittenlehre iii. 8, Berlin, 1819–24. The shorter Compendium of the same author: Lehrbuch der Christlichen Sittenlehre und der Geschichte derselben, Berlin, 1833, 8.

* Comp. § 13, note 1, and § 4 (on the importance of Symbolism). * *Marheineke*, Dr. *Phil.*, christl. Symbolik, oder historisch-kritische und dogmatisch comparative Darstellung des katholischen, lutherischen, reformirten und socinianischen Lehrbegriffs, Heidelb. vol. i. part i. ii. 1810, part iii. 1813, (also under the title: das System des Katholicismus); also his Lectures, edited by *Matthies*, and *Vatke*, 1848. *By the same:* Institutiones symbolicæ, doctrinam Catholicorum, Protestantium, Socinianorum, ecclesiæ Græcæ, minorumque societatt. christ. summam et discrimina exhibentes, Berol. 1812, ed. 3, 1830. *Marsh. Herb.*, the Churches of Rome and England compared: translated into German by *I. C. Schreiter*, Sulzb. 1821, 8. * *Winer, G. B.*, comparative Darstellung des Lehrbegriffs der verschiedenen christlichen Kirchenpartheien, nebst vollständigen Belegen aus den symbolischen Schriften derselben in der Ursprache (mit angehängten Tabellen) Lpz. 1824, 4to., new edit. 1865. † *Möhler, J. A.*, Symbolik, oder Darstellung der dogmatischen Gegensätze der Katholiken und Protestanten, nach ihren öffentlichen Bekenntnissschriften, Mainz. 1832, edit. 6th, 1843, 8. On the other side: *Baur, Ferd. Chr.*, Gegensatz des Katholicismus und Protestantismus nach den Principien und Hauptdogmen der beiden Lehrbegriffe, Tüb. 1834, 8. *Nitzsch, K. Im.*, Prot. Beantwort. der Symbolik Möhlers; in reply: *Möhler*, neue Untersuchung der Lehrgegensätze zwischen den Katholiken und Protestanten, Mainz. 1834, 35, 8; and also: *Baur*, Erwiderung auf Möhlers neueste Polemik u. s. w. Tüb. 1834, 8.—*Köllner, Ed.*, Symbolik aller christlichen Confessionen, vol. i. Symbolik der luth Kirche, Hamb. 1837. vol. ii. Symbolik der römischen Kirche, 1844. *Guericke, H. E. F.*, allgem. christl. Symbolik vom luth. kirchl. Standpuncte, Lpz. 1839: 3d ed. 1861. . *H. W. J. Thiersch*, Vorlesungen über Kath. u. Protest. 2d ed. 1848. *A. H. Baier*, Symbolik d. Römisch-Kath. Kirche, 2. Greifsw. 1854. *Matthes*, Comp. Symbolik, Lpz. 1854. *R. Hoffmann*, Symbolik, oder system. Darstellung d. Symb. Lehrbegriffe, Lpz. 1854. † *Hilgers*, Symbolische Theologie. Bonn. 1841. [*M. Schneckenburger*, Vergleichende Darstellung des lutherischen u. reformirten Lehrbegriffs: herausg. von Ed. Güder, Zwei Theile. Stuttg. 1855.] For the editions of the symbolical books, see § 13, 1.

FIRST PERIOD.

FROM THE APOSTOLIC AGE TO THE DEATH OF ORIGEN, OR FROM THE YEAR 70 TO THE YEAR 254.

THE AGE OF APOLOGETICS.

A. GENERAL HISTORY OF DOCTRINES DURING THE FIRST PERIOD.

§ 17

CHRIST AND CHRISTIANITY.

On the Life of Christ in general see the earlier Harmonies of the Gospels; [William Newcome, Eng. Harmony, repr. Phil. 1809; *E. Robinson*, in Greek, 1831, in English, 1846; *L. Carpenter*, Lond. 1835; *J. G. Palfrey*, Bost. 1831; *Stroud's* New Greek Harmony, 1853. Comp. *Davidson*, *S.* in Kitto, l. c. sub voce,] and the modern works of *Hess*, *Hase*, *Paulus*, *Strauss*, and (in reference to the latter) *Weisse*, *Neander*, *Wilke*, *Kuhn*, *Theile*, *Lange*, *Ebrard*, etc. [Voices of the Church, in reply to Dr. Strauss, by the Rev. *J. R. Beard*, Lond. 1845.] Concerning the internal or apologetico-dogmatic aspect of his life, which forms the basis of the History of Doctrines, comp. (*Reinhard*) Versuch über den Plan, den der Stifter der christlichen Religion zum Besten der Menschheit entwarf, Wittenberg, 1781, new edit., with additions by *Heubner*, Wittenb. 1830 (primarily a reply to the Wolfenbüttel Fragments). [Plan of the Founder of Christ. from the German, by *O. W. Taylor*, 12mo., Andover, 1831.] *Herder*, *J. G.*, Vom Erlöser der Menschen, nach den drei ersten Evangelien, Riga, 1796. *By the same:* vom Sohne Gottes, der Welt Heiland, nach Johannes, Riga, 1797. (Comp. Werke zur Religion und Theologie, vol. xi., or Christliche Schriften, part 1). *Böhme*, *Ch. F.*, die Religion Jesu Christi, aus ihren Urkunden dargestellt, Halle, 1825–27. * *Ullmann*, über die Sündlosigkeit Jesu, in the Studien und Kritiken, 1828, part 1, reprinted, Hamb., 1833, 5th edit., 1845. [Dr. Ullmann on the Sinless Character of Jesus, in Clark's Students' Cabinet Library of Useful Tracts, taken from Selections from German Lit. by *Edwards* and *Park*, Andover, 1839; *ibid* Essence of Christianity, translated by Rev. J. Bleasdell, London, 1860.] *By the same:* Was setzt die Stiftung der christlichen Kirche durch einen Gekreuzigten voraus? in the Studien und Kritiken, 1832, p. 579–596, and reprinted in his treatise: Historisch oder mythisch? Beiträge zur Beantwortung der gegenwärtigen Lebensfrage der Theologie, Hamb. 1838). *Fritzsche*, *Ch. F.*, de *ἀναμαρτησίᾳ* Jesu Christi, Commentationes 4, (repr in Fritzschiorum Opuscula Academica, Lips. 1838, p. 48, seq.) * *Schweizer*, *Alex.*, über die Dignität des Religionsstifters, in the Studien und Kritiken, 1834. *Lücke*, *F.* two programms (against Hase): Examinatur, quæ speciosius nuper commendata est sententia de

mutato per eventa adeoque sensim emendato Christi consilio, Gött., 1831, 4. On the other side: *Hase*, Streitschriften, Leipz. 1834.—*Strauss* and his opponents. (The Literature in *Theile* and elsewhere.) [*Neander's* Life of Christ, transl. from 4th ed. by J. McClintock and C. E. Blumenthal, New York, 1848. *Hase's* Life of Jesus, transl. by J. F. Clarke, Boston, 1860. *Strauss's* Life, transl. 2, 8vo., Lond. 1854. *W. H. Furness*, History of Jesus, Boston, 1850; *ibid.*, Jesus and his Biographers, 1838.—*Sepp* (Rom. Cath.) Das Leben Jesu, iv. Regensb. 1843 sq: in French, 1854. *J. P. Lange*, Das Leben Jesu, Heidelb. 1847. *A. Ebrard*, Kritik d. evang. Gesch. 2d ed. Erlangan, 1850. C. F. Von Ammon, iii. 1844. *B. Bauer*, Evang. Gesch. iii. 2d ed. 1855. *J. Bucher* (Rom. Cath.) Leben Jesu, i. 1859. *Paulus*, 2 Bde. 1828. Krabbe, 1838. *Weisse*, Evang. Gesch. ii. 1828 '29. *Ewald*, Gesch. Jesu u. seiner Zeit, 1855. *A. Tholuck*, Glaubwürdigkeit, 1837. *T. Young.* The Christ of History, repr. New York, 1855. *Alexander*, Christ and Christianity, repr. New York, 1854. [*Isaac Taylor*] Restoration of Belief, 1855. *W. H. Mill*, Christian Advocate Sermons, Camb. 1844 '49. *G. Volkmar*, Die Religion Jesu und ihre erste Entwicklung. Leipz. 1857. *Gess* Lehre von der Person Christi. 1856.]

WITH the incarnation of the Redeemer, and the introduction of Christianity into the world, the materials of the History of Doctrines are already fully given in germ. The object of all further doctrinal statements and definitions is, in the positive point of view, to unfold this germ; in the negative, to guard it against all foreign additions and influences. We here assume, on the basis of the evidences, that what Jesus Christ brought to light, in relation to the past,[1] was new and original, *i. e.*, a revelation, and, in relation to the future, is theoretically perfect, not standing in need of correction or improvement.[2] This is the principle which stands at the very head of the History of Doctrines, and by which we are to judge all its phenomena. We can not, therefore, separate Christ's doctrine from his person. For the peculiar and untroubled relation in which Christ, as the Son of God, stands to the Deity, as well as the spiritual and moral renovation which were to flow from himself, as the Saviour, unto mankind, form the kernel and central point of his doctrine. It has not the character of a system made up of certain definitive notions, but it is a fact in the religious and moral sphere, the joyful news (*εὐαγγέλιον κήρυγμα*) of which was to be proclaimed to all men for their salvation, on condition of faith, and a willingness to repent and obey in newness of life. Jesus is not the author of a *dogmatic theology*, but the author and finisher of *faith* (Heb. xii. 2); not the founder of a school, but in the most exalted sense the founder of a religion and of the church. Hence he did not propound dogmas dressed in a scientific garb, but he taught the word of God in a simply human and popular manner, for the most part in parables and proverbs. We find these laid down in the canonical gospels, though in a somewhat different form in the gospel of John from that in the synoptical gospels.[3] One of the objects shared by evangelical interpretation, by the histories of the life of Jesus, by apologetics and biblical theology, is to ascertain the pecu-

liar contents of these gospels, to reduce them to certain fundamental ideas and one uniform principle.

[1] "*The office of the Saviour was not to propound doctrines, or to set forth doctrinal formulas, but to manifest himself, and to reveal his unity with the Father. His person was a fact, and not an idea.*" *Schwegler*, Montanismus, p. 3. Our Saviour, indeed, adopted many of the current opinions, especially the Mosaic doctrine of *one* God, and also the prevailing opinions and expectations of the age concerning the doctrine of angels, the kingdom of God, etc. But to consider him merely as the reformer of Judaism, would be to take a very narrow view of his work; see *Schwegler*, das nachapostolische Zeitalter, p. 89, ss. On the relation in which the History of Doctrines stands to the doctrine propounded by Jesus and his apostles, see *Dorner*, Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi, I. i. p. 68. Gieseler's Dogmengeschichte, s. 4, 29 sq.

[2] A perfectibility of Christianity is, from the Christian point of view, impossible, if we mean by this an extension or perfection of the *idea* of religion as taught by the Son of God; for this is complete in itself, and realized in the incarnation of Christ. There is, therefore, no room within the History of Doctrines for a new revelation, which might supersede the Christianity of its founder. (Comp. the recent controversy aroused by Strauss upon the question whether and how far the entire *religious life* (and this only as the first point in the debate) can be said to be perfectly realized in any one individual? [This is the point which Strauss debated in the form, that no one individual of a species can fully realize and exhaust any general idea or conception, *e. g.*, an incarnation, a perfect religion. See Dorner, Göschel, Schaller, and others, in reply.]

[3] In the synoptical gospels we find more of *doctrina Christi*, in John more of *doctrina de Christo*—hence the former are more objective, the latter is more subjective. But though we concede such a subjective coloring, on the part of the fourth Evangelist, in his conception and narration of the words of Christ, yet this does not affect the *credibility* of his report, or the religious truth of what he imparts; comp. *Ebrard*, das Evang. Johannis, Zür. 1845. Upon the extent to which the divine dignity of Christ is manifested even in the synoptic gospels, see *Dorner's* work, cited above, p. 79, ss. [Comp. also, *W. T. Gass*, Die Lehre von d. Person Christi, 1856, and Lechler in Stud. und Kritiken, 1857. *Delitzsch*, Bibl. Psychologie, s. 204 sq. *Hahn*, Theol. ds. neuen Test. i. 205. *Weizsäcker*, Lebenszeugniss ds. johanneischen Christus, in Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. 1857.]

§ 18.

THE APOSTLES.

[*] *Neander*, Geschichte der Pflanzung und Leitung der christlichen Kirche durch die Apostel, vol. ii. sect. 6. [History of the Planting and Training of the Christian Church by the Apostles, translat. by *J. E. Ryland*, Edinb. 1842 (reprinted in Phila.), vol. ii. book vi.: The Apostolic Doctrine.] *Matthaei*, *G. Ch. R.*, der Religionsglaube der Apostel

Jesu, nach seinem Ursprunge und Werthe, vol. i. Gött. 1826, 8. *Böhme, Ch. F.*, die Religion der Apostel Jesu Christi, aus ihren Urkunden dargestellt, Halle, 1829. *Kleuker*, Johannes, Petrus und Paulus, Riga, 1785. *Schmid, T. Ch. E.*, Dissertationes II. de theologia Joannis Apostoli, Jen. 1801. * *Usteri, L.*, Entwickelung des Paulinischen Lehrbegriffs in seinem Verhältniss zur biblischen Dogmatik des N. Test. Zurich, 1824, 29, 31, 32. *Dähne, A. F.*, Entwickelung des Paulinischen Lehrbegriffs, Halle, 1835. *Baur, F. Ch.*, der Apostel Paulus, 2d. ed. 1866. *Frommann*, Der johanneische Lehrbegriff, 1839. *Köstlin*, der Lehrbegriff des Evangeliums und der Briefe Johannis und die verwandten neutestamentlichen Lehrbegriffe. Berl. 1843. *Steiger, W.*, der erste Brief Petri, mit Berüksichtigung des ganzen biblischen Lehrbegriffs, Berlin, 1832. Weiss, Petrin. Lehrb. 1856. *Ulrich, M.*, Versuch einer Eintheilung der biblischen Dogmatik des Neuen Testaments, in Röhrs Krit. Predigerbibliothek, xix. 1. [*Tholuck*, Remarks on the Life, Character, and Style of the Apostle Paul, in Clark's Students' Cabinet Library of Useful Tracts.] *In general: Zeller*, Aphorismen über Christenthum, Urchristenthum und Unchristenthum, in Schwegler's Jahrbücher der Gegenwart, 1844 (June). *Schwegler, A.*, das nachapostolishe Zeitalter, Tüb. 1846. *Dietlein, W. O.*, das Urchristenthum, eine Beleuchtung der von der Schule des Dr. Baur in Tübingen über das apostolische Zeitalter aufgestellten Vermuthungen, Halle, 1845. *Dorner*, l. c. *Schwegler*, Apologetisches und Polemisches (against Dorner) in Zeller's Jahrbücher, 1846. *Planck*, Judenthum und Urchristenthum, ibid. 1847. *H. W. T. Thiersch*, Die Kirche im apostol. Zeitalter, Frankf. 1852. *Baumgarten*, Die Apostelgesch. Halle, 1852 [in Clark's Library, 1856.] *E. Reuss*, Historie de la Théologie chrétienne au siècle apostolique, Paris, 1852 [2d ed., 1858.] *F. Ch. Baur*, Das Christenthum und die christl. kirche d. 3 ersten Jahrb. Tüb. 1853. *Lechler*, Das apostol. und nachapostol. Zeitalter (a prize essay), Haarlem, 1854 [2d. ed., 1857.] *Herm. Messner*, Lehre d. Apostel. Lpz. 1856.

[*K. Schrader*, Der Apostel Paulus, Lpz. 1830–33, 3 Bde. Pearson, Annales Paulini, 1688. *W. T. Conybeare* and *J. Howson*, The Life and Epistles of St. Paul, Lond. 1852, 2 4to. New York, 1856. *Paret*, Paulus und Jesus, Jahrb. f. deutsche Theologie, 1858. On Paul and Seneca; *Chs. Aubertin*, Etude critique, Paris, 1858: *Baur* in Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theol. 1858. *H. H. Milman*, Character and Conduct of the Apostles, as an Evidence of Christianity, 8vo. Lond. *F. Trench*, Life and Character of St. John, Lond. 1850. *Luthardt*, Das Evangelium Johannes, 1853. *K. F. T. Schneider*, Aechtheit d. Evang. Johan. 1854; *G. K. Mayer*, Aechtheit d. Ev. Joh. 1854; comp. *Lechler* in Stud. u. Krit. 1856; *F. C. Baur* in Theol. Jahrb. 1854, 1857, *Hilgenfeld* in Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theol. 1858 and 1859, and in Theol. Jahrb. 1855; *Weizsäcker* in Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. 1859. *Düsterdieck*, Die 3 Joh. Briefe, 2 Bde. 1852–4. *A. Hilgenfeld*, Paulus und die Urapostel, in Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theol. 1860. Comp., also, the controversy between Baur and Hase and Hilgenfeld, on the principles of the Tübingen School, various pamphlets, 1855–7. *J. P. Lange*, Das apostol. Zeitalter, 1853. *L. Noack*, Der Ursprung da. Christenthums, 2 Bde. Lpz. 1857. *R. C. Lutterbeck* (Rom. Cath.), Die Neutestamentl. Lehrbegriffe, 2 Bde. Mainz. 1852. Schaff's Apostolic Church, u. s. p. 614 sq. *Köstlin*, Einheit u. Mannigfaltigkeit der neutest Lehre, in Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. 1857–8.]

As little as their Master, did the first disciples of the Lord propound a dogmatic system. But as they made the doctrine primarily taught by Christ himself the subject of theoretical contemplation, and as their hearts and lives were practically penetrated by it, and as Christ's spiritual personality had been, as it were, formed in them anew, we find, in the writings of those endowed with higher gifts,[1] the beginnings of a systematic view of Christian doctrines. And this in such a way, that while *Peter* and *James* (in this respect to be compared with the synoptical writers) simply

relate in an objective manner what was delivered to them ;[2] an internal and contemplative view of Christianity prevails in the writings of *John*, and a practical and dialectic tendency in those of *Paul*, who was later called to be an apostle.[3] And these may be said to be types of the subsequent modes of theological thought and teaching.[4]

[1] When we speak of the *apostolic* doctrine in general, we must not forget that we do not refer to the *twelve* Apostles, of whose doctrinal views we possess but very imperfect knowledge. For it is yet contested whether the James and Jude, whose Epistles are in the canon, belonged to the twelve apostles, and whether they are the brothers of our Lord. On the doctrinal system of James, see Dorner, u. s. p. 91 sq. (Comp. *Herder*, Briefe zweier Brüder Jesu in unserm Kanon; *Wieseler*, in the Studien und Kritiken, 1842, I. p. 71, ss.; * *Schaff*, das Verhältniss des Jacobus, Bruders des Hernn, zu Jacobus Alphæi, Berl. 1842; and the commentaries.) [*Lardner*, vi. 162–202; *Wright*, *W.*, in Kitto, Cyclop. of Bibl. Literat.] On his relation to Paul, see Neander, Gelegenheitschriften, 3d ed., p. 1 sq. Accordingly, *Peter* and *John* alone remain; but the second epistle of the one, and the second and third epistles of the other, were very early reckoned amongst the Antilegomena [*Wright*, *W.*, in Kitto, l. c. sub voce]; the genuineness of the second epistle of Peter in particular has again been impugned in modern times; and even his first epistle, though without sufficient basis, has been the subject of doubts. Comp. *De Wette's* Einleitung ins N. Test. § 172, 173. [*Neander*, Hist. of the Plant. and Train. of the Ch. ii. p. 33, 34. *Wright*, *W.*, in Kitto, l. c. sub voce.]

[2] If the first epistle of Peter is genuine, it is undoubtedly of greater importance in a dogmatic point of view, than that of James, who gives a greater prominence to practical Christianity, and seems to ignore its christological aspects, though he occasionally evinces a profound acquaintance with the nature of faith and the Divine economy (ch. i. 18, ss. 25; ii. 10, etc). [*Dorner*, l. c. contests this position; but Hagenbach says that he attributes views to James which are not distinctly his.] But dogmatic ideas appear even in the writings of Peter more as a large mass of materials as yet in their rough state. "*In vain do we look in his writings for those definite peculiarities, so manifestly impressed upon the works of John and Paul.*" *De Wette*, l. c. Comp. however, *Rauch*, Rettung der Originalität des ersten Briefes Petri, in Winer's and Engelhardt's Kritische Journal, viii. p. 396. *Steiger*, l. c. and *Dorner*, p. 97, ss., and especially *Weiss*, Der Petrinische Lehrbegriff, Beitrag zur biblischen Theologie, Berlin, 1855. "*It bears upon it the impress of the apostolic spirit*," *Neander*, l. c. ii. p. 33.]

[3] *John* and *Paul* are then the prominent representatives of the doctrinal peculiarities of primitive Christianity. In estimating the views of the former, besides his epistles, we have to consider the introduction to his gospel, and the peculiarities before alluded to in his relation of the discourses of Christ. (On the book of Revelation, and its relation to the Gospel and the Epistles, the opinions of critics have ever been, and still are different.)*

* While for a long time the Gospel of John was held to be genuine, but not the Apoca-

The manifestation of God in the flesh—union with God through Christ—life from and in God—and victory over the world and sin by means of this life, which is a life of love—these are the fundamental doctrines propounded by John. (Comp. *Lücke's* Commentaries on John's writings; *Rickli's* Predigten über den ersten Brief; *Tholuck's* and *De Wette's* Commentaries on his gospel; *Paulus*, über die 3 Lehrbriefe.) [*Neander*, l. c. p. 240. ss. "*Hence every thing in his view turned on one simple contrast:—Divine life in communion with the Redeemer—death in estrangement from him.*"] *Paul* differs from John materially and formally. *a. Materially:* John rather presents the outlines of *theology* and *christology*, Paul those of *anthropology* and *the doctrine of redemption;* nevertheless, the writings of John are also of the highest importance for anthropology, and those of Paul for theology and christology. But the central point of John's theology is the incarnation of the Logos in Christ; the working element of the Pauline doctrine is justification by faith. *b. Formally:* Paul lets his thoughts rise up before the soul of the reader, reproduces them in him in a genetic order, and unfolds all the resources of dialectic art, not obliterating the traces of his former rabbinical education. John proceeds thetically and demonstratively, drawing the reader into the depths of mystic vision, and announces Divine things in the tone of a seer, and addresses himself more to the believing mind than to the understanding. John styles his readers *children*, Pauls calls them his *brethren*. (Comp. on the difference between Paul and John, *Staudenmaier* on Joh. Scot. Erigena, p. 220, ss.) A peculiar theological tendency is represented, in fine, *in the Epistle to the Hebrews*. It is related to the Pauline doctrine with a prevailing leaning toward the typical; as to its form, it holds the medium between the modes of Paul and John. [*Neander*, Hist. of Plant. and Train. ii. p. 212–229.] (On the conjectures respecting its author, comp. the Commentaries of *Bleek*, [*Stuart*], *Tholuck* [translat. into English by J. Hamilton and J. E. Ryland, Edinb. 1842, 2 vols.; and *Alexander*, *W. L.*, in Kitto, l. c. sub voce]. On the three primary biblical forms (the Jacobo-Petrine, the Johannine, and the Pauline), *see Dorner*, l. c. p. 77.

[4] The further development of the History of Doctrines will show that the tendency represented by *John* prevailed during the first period, as seen in the unfolding of the doctrine of the Logos, and in its christology; it was not until the second period that Augustine put the *Pauline* doctrine in the foreground. This statement would need to be entirely changed, and such a view would be a mere optical deception, if the results of the criticisms of the Tübingen school (Baur) were as well made out, as they might seem to be on a superficial inspection. According to this scheme, Christianity could not have had any such primitive purity and dignity; that is, it could not have had

lypse (*Lücke*), the latest negative criticism has reversed the relation (*Schwegler*); and in opposition to this, the genuineness of both works, including the Epistles of John, has been recently defended by *Ebrard*. Comp., however, *Bleek*, Beiträge zur Evangelienkritik, Berl 1846, i. a. 182, sq.; and *Lücke*, in the second edition of his work on John. We can not regard the acts upon this matter as by any means closed, for, from a wholly impartial stand-point, much may be said in favor of the identity of the evangelist and the author of the Apocalypse. [Comp. *J. T. Zobler*, Ursprung des vierten Evang. in Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theol. 1860.]

for its chief object to defend from the beginning its character, as a specific divine revelation, against any possible corruptions and perversions; but it, first of all, would have had to unwind the swaddling bands of a prosaic Ebionitism before it became etherialized, passing through the Pauline tendency into the spiritual *gnosis* of John; a process, for which, according to that theory, a full century was needed. We should not then find at first any common organism, spreading itself out on various sides in the fullness of a rich life, but only a small series of differing phenomena, mutually dissolving each other. But, now, history shows that great epochs (*e. g.*, the Reformation) wake up the mind in all directions, and call out different tendencies at *one* stroke; though they may occur in a relative succession, yet they follow one another so rapidly that we can comprise them in a synchronistic picture. Thus, De Wette says [Wesen des Christl. Glaubens. Basil, 1846, p. 256]: "A more exact acquaintance with the New Testament documents shows us that the primitive Christianity here described had already run through three stadia of its development; that at first (according to the representation of the first three Gospels, particularly that of Matthew) it is a Jewish Christianity; then, with the Apostle Paul, it comes into conflict with the Jewish particularism; until at last, in John, it wholly overcomes its antagonism with the law." It must also be conceded, that in the course of this historical process, now one, and now another, of the tendencies preformed in primitive Christianity, obtains the leading influence; and that a series of centuries not yet closed is necessary, in order that what has actually been revealed in principle may be worked over in all its relations to the individual and to society at large. Thus the Pauline type of Christianity remained for a long time a hidden treasure in the vineyard of the Lord, until in the period of the Reformation it was seen in its full significancy. So, too, the more recent philosophy of religion has recurred to the profound spiritual vision of John. Lastly, in respect to the striking contrast between the apostolic times and the post-apostolic—so much less productive in the sphere of doctrines, it is not unnatural that a period of stagnation should succeed one in which men's souls were thoroughly aroused in all directions; and to this there are also analogies in history, *e. g.*, that of the Reformation. Besides this, it has been remarked that the office of the post-apostolic times was not so much to form doctrines as to build up the church; next, with the period of apologetics, commences the real work in the elaboration of the doctrinal system. Comp. Dorner, ubi supra, p. 130 sq.

§ 19.

CULTURE OF THE AGE AND PHILOSOPHY.

Souverain, Le Platonisme dévoilé, Amst. 1700; in German, über den Platonismus der Kirchenväter, mit Anmerkungen von Löffler, 2 edit. 1792. In reply: *Keil*, De Doctoribus veteris Ecclesiæ, Culpa corruptæ per Platonicos Sententias Theologiæ liberandis, Comment. xii. (in his Opusc. Acad. Pars. II). *Fichte, Im.*, De Philosophiæ Novæ Platonicæ Origine, Berol. 1818, 8. *Ackermann*, Das Christliche im Plato und in der Platonischen Philosophie, Hamb. 1835. *Dähne, A. F.*, Geschichtliche Darstellung der Judisch-Alexandrinischen Religionsphilosophie, in 2 parts, Halle, 1834. *F. C. Baur*, Das Christliche des Platonismus, oder Socrates und Christus, Tübingen, 1837. *Gfrörer*, Kritische

Geschichte des Urchristenthums, vol. i; also under the title: Philo und die Alexandrinische Theosophie, 2 parts. Stuttgart, 1831. *By the same:* Das Jahrhundert des Heils, 2 parts. Stuttg. 1836 (zur Geschichte der Urchristenthums). *Georgii*, über die neuesten Gegensätze in Auffassung der Alexandrinischen Religionsphilosophie, insbesonders des Jüdischen Alexandrinismus, in *Illgens* Zeitschrift für Historische Theologie, 1838, part 3, p. 1, sq. part 4, p. 1, sq. *Tennemann*, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. vii. *Ritter*, vol. iv. p. 418. *Schleiermacher*, Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 154, sq. [*Ritter*, Die Christliche Philos. (1858), i. Kapitel 2 and 3. *Susemihl*, Genetische Entwicklung d. Platon. Phil. 1855. Plato contra Athcos; x. Book on Laws, by *Tayler Lewis*, New York, 1845; cf. President *Woolsey*, in Bib. Sacra, 1845. *Cæsar Morgan*, The Trinity of Plato and Philo. *F. Robiou*, de la Philos. chez les Romains, 6 articles in the Annales de la Philos. Chrét. Paris, 1857, '8. R. Ehlers, Vis atque potestas quam Philosophia Antiqua imprimis Platonica et Stoica in Doctrina Apologetarum Seculi II. habuerit. Cöttin. 1859.]

Though the peculiar character of Christianity can not be understood, if it is considered, not as an actual revelation of salvation, but merely as a new system of philosophy, yet, on the other hand, it must be admitted that, in its forms of thought, it attached itself to what was already in existence, though it filled it with its new and quickening spirit, and thus appropriated it to itself.[1] This was especially the case with the Alexandrian culture, which was principally represented by *Philo*.[2] This already appears in some of the New Testament writings, especially in the doctrine concerning the Logos,[3] although in the most general outlines; but afterward it exercised a decisive influence upon Christian speculation.[4]

[1] "It is a thoroughly unhistorical and untenable assumption, that the primitive Christianity was unphilosophical, and, as such, undogmatic, and that it had to be indebted to the world for the faculty of philosophizing and of forming dogmas." *Lange* Dogmatik, p. 41. But it is also historically true that, before Christianity created a new philosophy by its own living energies, it attached itself to the prevalent forms of thought, and that so far the world did "hasten before" the church in the process of forming doctrines. Comp. Lange, l. c. p. 42, and Gieseler, Dogmengesch. 44, sq. [Gieseler here defends the early Christian teachers in making use of philosophy; 1. Because the times demanded a philosophical treatment of Christianity. 2. That this became injurious only when these philosophical opinions were held to be matters of faith, and not speculations. 3. The Christian philosophers did not intentionally, but unconsciously, introduce philosophical postulates into the Christian system.]

[2] Comp. *Grossmann*, Quæstiones Philoneæ, Lips. 1829. *Theile*, Christus und Philo, in Winer's und Engelhardt's kritisches Journal, vol. ix. part 4, p. 385. *Scheffer*, Quæst. Philon, Sect. 2, p. 41, ss. *Lücke*, Commentar zum Joh. i. p. 249. (Comp. § 41 on the Logos.) *Editions of Philo:* Turnebus (1552), Höschel (1613), the Parisian (1640), *Mangey (1742), Pfeiffer (5 vol. Erl. 1820), Richter, 1828–'30; Tauchnitz's edition, 1851, sq. Compare the Commentary to Philo's book, De Opificio Mundi, by J. G. Müller, Berlin, 1841. [Philo Judæus, transl. in Bohn's Eccles. Library, by Yonge, 4 vols.] *Edw. von Muralt*, Untersuchungen über Philo in Beziehung auf die der

(Petersburger) Akademie gehörigen Handschriften, 1840. [*Creuzer* in the Studien u. Kritiken, 1831. *M. Wolff*, Die Philon 'sche Philos, Lpz. 1849; 2d ed. 1858. *Philonis Judæi* Paralipomena Armena, Venet. 1826; *ibid.* Sermones Tres, ed. Venet. 1832. Articles on Philo, in Christ. Rev. 1853; North British, 1855; Eclectic (Lond.) Nov. 1855; Journal of Class. and Sacred Philol. 1854. Comp. also *Michel Nicholas*, Des Doctrines Religieuses des Juifs pendant les deux Siècles antérieurs à l'éré chrétienne, Paris, 1860. *S. Klein*, Le Judaisme, ou la Verité sur le Talmud. Paris 1859. Lutterbeck, Neutestamentliche Lehrbegriffe, i., p. 393–437.]

[3] That which was a mere abstract and ideal notion in the system of Philo became a concrete fact in Christianity—a spiritual and historical fact in the sphere of the religious life; on this account "*it is alike contrary to historical truth, to deny the influence of the age upon the external phenomena and the didactic development of the gospel, and to derive its internal origin and true nature from the age.*"—*Lücke*, l. c. Comp. *Dorner*, l. c. Introd. p. 21, ss.

[4] Much of that which was formerly (from the time of *Souverain*) called "the Platonism of the Fathers," is by modern research reduced to this, "*that the general influence exerted by Platonism was the stronger and more definite influence of the general heathen culture.*" *Baumgarten-Crusius*, Compendium, i. p. 67. Comp. *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. p. 44. Thus the charge of Platonism often brought forward against Justin M. is found on closer examination to be untenable; comp. *Semisch*, Justin der M. ii. p. 227, ss. It appears more just in the case of the Alexandrian theologians, especially Origen. But here, too, as well as in reference to the partial influence exerted by Aristotelianism and Stoicism upon certain tendencies of the age, it ought not to be overlooked, that during this period "*philosophy appears only in a fragmentary way, and in connection with theology.*" *Schleiermacher*, l. c. p. 154; comp. also *Redepenning*, Origenes (Bonn, 1841), vol. i. p. 91, ss. [Comp. *Fr. Michelis*, Die Philos. Platons in ihrer inneren Beziehung zur geoffenbarten Wahrheit. 1 Abth. Münster, 1859.]

§ 20.

RULE OF FAITH. THE APOSTLES' CREED.

* *Marheineke*, Ursprung und Entwicklung der Orthodoxie und Heterodoxie in den ersten 3 Jahrhunderten (in Daub und Creuzer's Studien, Heidelb. 1807, vol. iii. p. 96, ss.) † *Möhler*, Einheit der Kirche oder Princip des Katholicismus im Geiste der Kirchenväter der ersten 3 Jahrhundorte, Tüb. 1825. *Vossius, J. G.*, De Tribus Symbolis Dissertt. Amstel. 1701, fol. *King, Lord*, History of the Apostles' Creed, with critical observations, 5 edit. Lond. 1738. (Latin translation by *Olearius*, Lips. 1706, Bas. 1768.) *Rudelbach*, die Bedeutung des Apostol. Symbolums, Lpz. 1844. *Stockmeier, J.*, über Entstehung des Apostolischen Symbolums, Zürr. 1846. [Bishop *Pearson* on the Apostles' Creed. *Witsius, H.*, Dissertation on what is commonly called the Apostles' Creed. Transl. from the Latin by *D. Fraser*, Edinb. 1823, Dissert. i.—*Heylyn, P.*, The Summe of Christian Theology, contained in the Apostles' Creed, London, 1673, fol.—*Barrow, J.*, Exposition of the Creed, (Theolog. works, vol. v.) Oxf. 1838, Sect. 1. *Meyers*, De Symbol. Apostol. Treviris, 1849. *Hahn*, Bibliothek. d. Symbole. 1842. *W. W. Harvey*, History and Theology of the Three Creeds, 2 vols., 1855. Articles on the Apostles' Creed, in Mercersburg Review, 1849, and Princeton Review, 1852.]

Before scientific theology, under the form of γνῶσις, developed itself with the aid of philosophical speculation, the faith of the Apostles was firmly and historically established as πίστις, by bringing together those elements (στοιχεῖα) of Christian doctrine which were accounted essential. The κήρυγμα ἀποστολικόν, the παράδοσις ἀποστολική, was first transmitted by oral tradition, and afterward appeared in a written form.[1] What is commonly called the Apostles' Creed (apostolic symbol), is most probably composed of various confessions of faith, used by the primitive church in the baptismal service. Though it did not proceed from the Apostles themselves, yet it preserved the principles of apostolic tradition in broad general outlines.[2]

[1] Comp. the rules of faith of Irenæus, Adv. Hær. i. c. 10, (*Grabe*, c. 2.) *Tertull.* De Virgin. vel. c. 1; De Præscript. Hær. c. 13; Advers. Prax. c. 2. *Orig.* De Princip. procem. § 4. *Münscher* edit. by von Cölln, i. 16–19. On the importance of tradition and its relation to Holy Scripture, comp. below § 33 and 37. "The rule of faith was not gained by the interpretation of the Scriptures, but taken from the apostolic tradition handed down in the churches." Gieseler, Dogmengesch. p. 50.

[2] The fable about its apostolic origin, mentioned by Rufinus Exposit. Symb. Apost. (in Baron. Annal. anno 44. No. 14 [*Witsius*, l. c. p. 3], was doubted by Laur. Valla, and afterward by Erasmus; some of the earlier Protestants, however, *e. g.*, the Magdeb. Centur. (Cent. I. l. 2, p. 66), still attached credit to it. Comp. *Basnage*, Exercitationes Histor. crit. ad annum 44, No. 17. *Buddei*, Isagoge, p. 441, where the literature is given. *Neander* (*Torrey's*) i. p. 306. *Marheineke*, l. c. p. 160 [*Heylyn*, l. c. p. 8, sq. *Barrow*, l. c. 218, 219, Gieseler's Text-Book, i. 80, 152.]

§ 21.

HERESIES.

Ittig, Th. de Hæresiarchis Ævi Apostolici, Lips. 1690, 1703, 4. [*Burton*, *Edw.*, Theolog. Works, vol. iii.: The Bampton Lecture on the Heresies of the Apostolic age. Oxf. 1837. Comp. the Introduction where the literature is given. [*Lardner's* Hist. of Heresies. *Sartori*, Die . . . Secten. 1855. *J. B. Marsden*, Christ. Churches and Sects, 2 vols. 1854, 1859. G. Volkmar, Die Quellen der Ketzergesch. 1855.]

Every departure from the apostolic canon of doctrine was considered, in relation to the church, as αἱρεσις, heresy.[1] Even in the apostolic age we find false teachers, some of whom are mentioned in the New Testament itself,[2] others in the works of early ecclesiastical writers.[3] Concerning their personal history and doctrine many points are still involved in obscurity, which, in the absence of trustworthy historical evidence, can not be easily and satisfactorily cleared up.

[1] Αἵρεσις (from *αἱρεῖσθαι*), and *σχίσμα*, were at first synonymous (1 Cor. xi. 18, 19), but in later times the one was used to denote a departure from the faith, the other to designate a disruption in consequence of differences of opinion concerning liturgy, discipline, or ecclesiastical polity. The word *αἵρεσις* did not originally imply blame; it is used in the New Test. as a *vox media*; comp. Acts v. 17: xv. 5; xxv. 5. [*Burton*, l. c. p. 8.] Ecclesiastical writers themselves call Christianity a *secta* (Tertull. Apol. i. 1, and in many other places); and even Constantine gives the Catholic church the name *αἵρεσις* (Euseb. x. c. 5). On the contrary, in Gal. v. 20, the same term is used in connection with *ἐριθεῖαι*, *διχοστασίαι*, etc. comp. 2 Pet. ii. 1 (*ψευδοδιδάσκαλοι*). Synonymous terms are: *ἑτεροδιδασκαλία*, 1 Tim. i. 3; vi. 3; *ψευδώνυμος γνῶσις*, ch. vi. 20; *ματαιολογία*, ch. i. 6; the adject. *αἱρετικός*, Tit. iii. 10. Comp. *Wetstein*, N. T. ii. 147. *Suicer* Thesaurus, sub voce. On the various etymologies of the German word *Ketzer* (Ital. Gazzari, whether from *καθαρός*, or from the Chazares—like *bougre* from the Bulgares? or even from Katze?) comp. *Mosheim*, Unparteiische und gründliche Ketzergeschichte, Helmst. 1746, p. 357, ss. and *Wackernagel*, Altdeutsches Lesebuch, p. 1675; *Jac. Grimm's* review of Kling's edition of Berthold's sermons, in the Wiener Jahrb. Bd. xxxviii. On the use which heresies may be to science, *Orig.* Hom. 9 in Num. Opp. T. ii. p. 296, says: Nam si doctrina ecclesiastica simplex esset et nullis intrinsecus hæreticorum dogmatum assertionibus cingeretur, non poterat tam clara et tam examinata videri fides nostra. Sed idcirco doctrinam catholicam contradicentium obsidet oppugnatio; *ut fides nostra non otio torpescat, sed exercitiis elimetur.* Comp. *August.* De Civit. Dei xviii. c. 51.

[2] On the different parties in the church of Corinth (which, however, caused only schisms *in*, but not separations *from* the church), comp. *Schenkel*, *Dan.*, de Ecclesia Corinthia primæva factionibus turbata, Bas. 1838. *F. Ch. Baur*, die Christuspartei. [*Neander*, History of the Plant. and Train. i. p. 268–282. *Billroth*, Comment. on the Corinth. transl. by *Alexander*, i. p. 11. *Alexander*, *W. L.*, in Kitto, Cyclop. of Bibl. Lit. sub voce.] With respect to the heretics mentioned in the N. T., the attention of critics has chiefly been directed to those alluded to in the Epistle to the Colossians, and in the Pastoral Epistles. Concerning the former (were they theosophic Jewish Essenes, or Jewish Christians?) comp. *Schneckenburger* in the appendix to his treatise on the Proselytentaufe, p. 213. *Böhmer*, Isagoge in Epist. a Paulo ad Coloss. datam, 1829, p. 131. *Neander*, Apostolische Gesch. vol. ii. [History of the Plant. and Train. i. p. 374–381. *Alexander*, *W. L.*, in Kitto, l. c. sub voce.] Among the latter, *Hymenæus* and *Philetus* only are mentioned by name, as denying the doctrine of resurrection, 2 Tim. ii. 17, 18. [*Burton*, l. c. p. 135, ss. *Ryland*, *J. E.*, in Kitto, l. c. sub voce.] But the inquiry relative to the character of these heretics is intimately connected with the critical examination of the epistles themselves. Comp. *Baur*, *F. Ch.*, die sogenannten Pastoralbriefe des Apostels Paulus, aufs neue kritisch untersucht, Stuttg. 1835. On the other side: *Baumgarten*, *Mich.*, die Aechtheit der Pastoralbriefe, Berlin, 1837; comp. also the reply of Baur in his treatise: Ueber den Ursprung des Episcopats, Tüb. 1838, p. 14, ss. Comp. also *Schwegler*, l. c. and *Dietlein*, Urchristenthum.

[*Alexander, W. L.*, in Kitto, l. c. art. Timothy, Titus. *C. E. Scharling*, die neuesten Untersuchungen über die sogenannten Pastoralbriefe. Aus dem Dänischen übersetzt, Jena, 1845.] Concerning the *Nicolaitans*, Rev. ii. 6, 15, and those that held the doctrine of Balaam, Rev. ii. 14 (comp. Iren. i. 26, and the erroneous derivation from Nicholas, Acts vi. 5), see the commentaries on the Book of Revelation [comp. *Davidson, S.*, in Kitto, l. c.] (Ewald, p. 110). *Torrey's Neander*, i. p. 452, sq. History of the Plant. and Train. ii. 50. Giesseler, i. 88. *Burton*, l. c. Lect. v. p. 145, sq. *Lee, R.*, in Kitto, l. c. Schaff, p. 671. *Stuart*, Comm. on the Apoc. ii. p. 62, sq.]

[3] The heresiarch *Simon Magus*, who is described in the New Testament (Acts viii.) as a man of an immoral character, but not as a heretic, is nevertheless represented by Clem. Al. (Strom. ii. 11, vii. 17), and Orig. (Contra Cels. i. p. 57), as the founder of a sect; by Irenæus (Adv. Hær. i. 23, 24), and Epiphanius (Hær. 21), even as the author of all heresies. Concerning his adventures and disputation with Peter, many fictitious stories were current among the earlier writers (see the Clementine Homilies, and Justin M. Apol. l. c. 56.)—On Simon Magus and the two Samaritans *Dositheus* and *Menander* (Euseb. iii. 26), comp. *Neander*, i. 395, 454. [History of the Plant. and Train. i. 67–74.—*Burton*, l. c. Lect. iv. p. 87–118, and note 40; *by the same:* Lectures on the Ecclesiast. Hist. of the First Cent. p. 77, sq. *Schaff*, 215, 276, 655. *Gieseler*, i. 56, § 18, note 8, where the literature is given. *Alexander, W. L.*, in Kitto, l. c.] (*Marheineke* in Daub's Studien, l. c. p. 116). *Dorner* says, l. c. p. 144: "*The accounts given of Simon Magus, Menander, and Dositheus, who have become almost mythical, at least prove that in Syria Gnostic tendencies made their appearance at an early period.*" [Volckmar, Simon Magus, in Theol. Jahrbücher, 1856, 2d Heft.] The assertion of Hegesippus (Euseb. iii. 32, iv. 22), that the church had not been stained with any heresy previous to the time of Trajan (*παρθένος γὰρ καθαρὰ καὶ ἀδιάφθορος ἔμεινεν ἡ ἐκκλησία*), is not to be understood, as if no heresies at all existed, but that, till the death of Simon (A. D. 108), the poison of heresies had not penetrated into the church. The judgment of Hegesippus, too, refers to the locality of Palestine. Comp. Vatke in Jahrb. f. wiss. Kritik, 1839, a. 9 sq. *Dorner*, u. s. 223. *Mangold*, Die Irrlehrer d. Pastoralbriefe, 1856, s. 108, ff.

§ 22.

JUDAISM AND ETHNICISM.

There were two errors which the new born Christianity had to guard against, if it was not to lose its peculiar religious features, and disappear in one of the already existing religions: against a relapse into Judaism on the one side, and against a mixture with paganism and speculations borrowed from it, and a mythologizing tendency, on the other. Accordingly the earliest heresies, of which we have any trustworthy accounts, appear either as *judaising* or as *ethnicising* (hellenizing) tendencies. But as Jewish and pagan elements were

blended with each other at the time of the rise of Christianity, manifold modifications, and transitions from the one to the other, would be likely to occur.

Concerning the different forms of heathenism (occidental and oriental), as well as the earlier and later periods of the Jewish dispensation, comp. *Dorner*, Entwickelungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi, p. 4. ss. [Dean *Trench*, Hulsean Lectures on the Unconscious Prophecies of Heathenism, Am. ed. 1853. *Maurice*, The Religions of the World, 1853.]

§ 23.

EBIONITES AND CERINTHUS. DOCETÆ AND GNOSTICS.

Gieseler, von den Nazaräern und Ebioniten, in Ständlins und Tzschirners Archiv. vol. iv. st. 2. *Credner*, über Essäer und Ebioniten und einen theilweisen Zusammenhang derselben (in Winers Zeitschrift für wissenschaftl. Theol. 1827, parts 2 and 3). *Lange, Lobeg.*, Beiträge zur ältern Kirchengeschichte, Leipzig, 1826, 1st vol. *Baur*, De Ebionitarum Origine et Doctrina ab Essenis repetenda, Tüb. 1831. *Schneckenburger*, Beiträge zur Einleitung ins Neue Testament, Stuttg. 1832. *A. Schliemann*, Die Clementinen nebst den verwandten Schriften und der Ebionitismus, ein Beitrag zur Kirchen-und Dogmengeschichte der ersten Jahrhunderte, Hamb. 1844. *Schwegler*, ubi supra. *A. Hilgenfeld*, die Clement. Recognitionen und Homilien. Jena, 1848. [*Bunsen's* Hippdytus, vol. 3. *A. Ritschl*, in Allg. Monatsschrift, Jen. 1852. *Hilgenfeld*, in the (Tübingen) Theol. Jahrb. 1854. Clementinorum Epilomæ Duæ, ex Tischendorf. (ed. A. R. H. Dressel. Lips. 1859. *Rössel's* Theologische Schriften Bd. i. Clement. Homiliæ, ed. Dressel, 1853.] *Schmidt*, Cerinth, ein Judaisirender Christ, in his Bibliothek für Kritik und Exegetik, vol. i. p. 181, ss. *Paulus*, Historia Cerinthi, in Introductio in N. Test. Capit. selectiora, Jen. 1799. *Niemeyer, A. H.*, De Docetis, Hal. 1823. 4to. *Lewald*, De Doctrina Gnostica, Heidelberg, 1819. *Lücke, F.*, in the Theologische Zeitschrift, Berlin, 1820, part 2, p. 132. **Neander*, Genet. Entwicklung der Vornehmsten Gnostischen Systeme, Berlin, 1818. *Matter*, Histoire Critique du Gnosticisme, Paris, 1828, ii. [2d ed. 1840. *Gieseler*, review of *Neander*, in the Hall. Lit. Zeitung, 1823, and of *Matter*, in the Stud. u. Krit. 1830. *Möhler*, Ursprung d. Gnosticismus, Tüb. 1831. *Lutterbeck*, Neutest. Lehrbegriffe, B. ii. pp. 3–79.] **Baur*, Christliche Gnosis, oder die Christliche Religionsphilosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Tüb. 1835. [Comp. *Gieseler*, i. § 43, ss. *Neander*, i. 344–50, 396–99, 630. *Hase*, § 35, 75. *Schleiermacher*, Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 160–65. *Schaff.* 653. *Burton*, Bampton Lecture, Lect. ii. to be comp. with *Potter, J.*, in Kitto, Cyclop. on Gnosticism. *Norton, A.*, on the Genuineness of the Gospels, vols. ii. and iii. 1844. The articles in Herzog's Encyclopedia. Especially *Niedner*, Kirchengesch. a. 215–257. *Ritter*, Gesch. d. Christ. Phil. i. 109 sq., and Christl. Phil. i. s. 263 sq.]

The Judaising tendency was chiefly represented by the *Ebionites*,[1] of whom the *Nazarenes*[2] were a variety more nearly approaching the orthodox faith, and with whom were connected other Judaizing sects of a more indefinite character.[3] *Cerinthus*[4] also belonged to this tendency, and makes the transition to that form of Judaism, blended with heathen Gnosis, which we find represented in the *Clementine Homilies*.[5] A strict opposition to the Jewish-Ebionitic tendency manifested itself first in the *Docetæ*,[6] and afterward in various rami-

fications of the *Gnostics*.[1] Of the latter, some were more sharply opposed to Judaism[a], others even returned to Ebionitish errors,[a] while *Marcion*, who occupied a peculiar position, endeavored to go beyond the antagonism between Judaism and heathenism, but, despising all historical mediation, he built up a purely imaginary system of Christianity.[10]

[1] On the derivation of Ebionites from אֶבְיוֹן, and their history, comp. *Orig.* Contra Celsum II. toward the commencement; *Irenæus*, Adv. Hær. I. 26. *Tert.* Præscr. Hær. 33, De Carne Christi, c. 14. *Euseb.* iv. 27. *Epiph.* Hær. 29, 30. *Hieron*, in Matth. viii. 9; xix. 20; (c. 66) xviii. in Jesai.; Cat. Script. Eccles. c. 3; and the works on ecclesiast. history. [*Torrey's Neander*, i. 344. *Niedner*. s. 215. *Burton*, l. c. Lect. vi. p. 183, ss.] Different opinions as to the origin of the Ebionites; *Schliemann*, p. 459, ss. (according to Hegesippus in Euseb. III. 32, and IV. 22) dates it after the death of Simeon of Jerusalem. According to the school of Tübingen (*Schwegler*), Ebionitism is as old as Christianity. Christ himself was an Ebionite, and Paul took the first step beyond Ebionitism. The Judaizing tendency, which was firmly rooted in Ebionitism, may indeed be traced back to primitive Christianity: not all Christians were, like Paul, able to comprehend the universal character of their religion. But this Jewish-Christian tendency existed for some time, along with the Pauline, as a more imperfect form of Christianity, without being regarded as heresy. But having once been out-flanked by the freer spirit of the Pauline doctrine,* it had either gradually to wear out (its adherents withering into a Jewish sect), or to grow rank, blended with other (Gnostic) elements (as was the case with the Ebionitism of the Clementine Homilies, comp. note 5). The former kind of Ebionitism has been called "vulgar Ebionitism." Its adherents were characterized by their narrow attachment to Jewish tradition, seeking to impose the yoke of the law upon Christians, and this prevented them from forming a higher idea of Christ than that involved in the Jewish conception of the Messiah. Accordingly, when they declared Jesus to be the son of Joseph and Mary, this opinion did not proceed (as in the case of the Artemonites, § 24), from a rationalistic source, but had its root in their spiritual poverty and narrow-mindedness. With their Jewish notions concerning the law and the Messiah would accord the sensual, millennial expectations of which Jerome (l. c. but no other writer) accuses them.

[a] *Origen* (Contra Cels. v. Opp. i. p. 625) mentions two different kinds of Ebionites, of whom the one class approached the orthodox doctrine of the church more nearly than the other. These more moderate Ebionites were for a long time held to be the same, to whom Jerome and Epiphanius give the name *Nazarenes*, which was earlier applied to all Christians. They taught that the law (circumcision in particular) was obligatory on Jewish Christians only, and believed Jesus to be the son of the Virgin, though a mere man; of course they rejected his pre-existence. Comp. the treatise of

* "Orthodoxy, when surpassed by the culture of the age, and deserted by public opinion, becomes heresy."—*Hase*. And since there is no standing still, it is natural to infer that Ebionitism became retrograde, in the direction of Judaism. *Dorner*, ubi supra, p. 304, sq.

Gieseler, l. c. [*Burton*, l. c. p. 184]. According to the most recent researches (of *Schliemann*), however, the Nazarenes were never brought into the same class with the Ebionites, and Origen's distinction refers only to the difference between the common and the Gnostic Ebionites (comp. note 5). Different are the opinions of *Schwegler*, Nachapostolische Zeitalter, p. 179, ss., and *Dorner*, l. c. 301, ss. According to Schwegler (Nachapost. Zeitalter, i. p. 179 sq.), the position of the Nazarenes was only "the earliest primitive stage of development of Ebionitism." He, as well as Hilgenfeld (l. c.) rejects the distinction made by Schliemann. It is simplest, with Dorner (ubi supra, p. 301 sq.), to assume that the Ebionites degenerated into Judaism, and thus became heretical Nazarenes (Jewish Christians).

[3] *Elcesaites*, *Sampsæi*, etc. Epiph. Hær. 19, 1–30, 3, 17 (Euseb. iv.). "*It seems impossible accurately to distinguish these different Jewish sects, which were perhaps only different grades of the order of the Essenes, assisted, as we are, merely by the confused reminiscences of the fourth century.*" (Hase, l. c. p. 7, 90.) [*Ritschl* on Elkesaiten in Zeitschrift f. hist. Theol. 1853; and *Uhlhorn* in Herzog's Real Encycl. article, Elkesaiten.]

[4] Iren. i. 26, Euseb. H. E. iii. 28 (according to Caius of Rome, and Dionysius of Alexandria), Epiph. Hær. 28, comp. *Olshausen*, Hist. Eccles. Veteris Monumenta Præcipua, vol. i. p. 223–225. [*Burton*, l. c. Lect. vi. p. 174, ss.] According to Irenæus, Cerinthus is allied to Gnosticism, and remote from Ebionitism, maintaining that the world was not created by the supreme God. He denies, however, in common with the Ebionites, that Christ was born of the Virgin, but on different, viz., rationalistic grounds (*impossible enim hoc ei visum est*). According to the accounts given by Eusebius, his principal error consisted in gross millennarianism, *i. e.*, in a Judaistic tendency. Comp. the treatises of *Paulus* and *Schmid*, and, on his remarkable, but not inexplicable, mixture of Judaism and Gnosticism, *Baur*, Gnosis, p. 404, 405. *Dorner*, l. c. p. 310, claims that there was a peculiar class of Cerinthian Ebionites, who, in his opinion, form the transition to the Clementine Homilies.

[5] As Cerinthus blended Gnostic elements with Jewish notions, so did that section of the Ebionites represented in the Clementine Homilies (*i. e.*, homilies of the Apostle Peter, which are said to have been written by Clement of Rome). Comp. *Neander's* Appendix to his work on the Gnostic systems, and Church History (Torrey), i. 353, 395. [*Lardner*, *N.*, Works, ii. 376, 377. *Norton*, l. c. ii. note B. p. xxiii.–xxxvii.] *Baur*, Gnosis, p. 403, and App. p. 760, and his programme referred to above. *Schenkel*, however, has broached a different opinion in his Dissert. (cited § 21, note 2), according to which the Clementine tendency would belong, not to the Judaizing, but to a rationalizing Monarchian tendency (comp. § 24) in Rome (comp. *Lücke's* review in the Göttinger gelehrte Anzeigen, 1838, parts 50 and 51, and Schliemann, u. s. p. 357 sq.) Dorner, l. c. p. 324, ss., gives a striking description of this tendency, which passes over from Judaism into Paganism. The investigations upon the Clementina are by no means concluded: comp. *Hilgenfeld*, ubi supra, where, too, in the Introduction, is a review of what has thus far been done.

[6] The Docetæ whom Ignatius, Ad. Eph. 7–18, Ad Smyrn. c. 1–8, already

opposed, and probably even the Apostle John (1 John i. 1–3; ii. 22; iv. 2, ss., 2 John 7; on the question whether he also alludes to them in the prologue to his gospel, comp. *Lücke*, l. c.) may be considered as the rude forerunners of the Gnostics; for, although they have the general Gnostic character, yet the Docetæ are sometimes spoken of as a special Gnostic sect; *Baur*, in his Christ. d. drei ersten Jahrh. p. 207. [*Burton*, l. c. Lect. vi. p. 158, ss.] The Docetæ form the most decided contrast with the Ebionites, so far as this, that they not only maintain (in opposition to them) the divinity of Christ, but also volatilize his human nature, to which the Ebionites were exclusively attached, into a mere phantasm (denying that he possessed a *real* body). Ebionitism (Nazareism) and Docetism form, according to *Schleiermacher* (Glaubenslehre, vol. i. p. 124), *natural* heresies, and complete each other, as far as this can be the case with one-sided opinions; but they quite as easily pass over the one to the other. Comp. *Dorner*, Geschichte der Christologie, p. 349, ss.

[1] What Docetism did in the doctrine concerning Christ alone, the more completely developed system of Gnosticism carried out, in its whole spiritualizing tendency, into the extreme most opposed to Judaizing Ebionitism. It not only contains docetic elements (comp. the Christology in the special History of Doctrines), but in its relation to the Old Test. it possesses a character more or less antinomian, and in its eschatology it is adverse to millennarianism. It opposes the spiritualistic to the literal, the idealistic to the realistic. To resolve history into myths, to dissipate positive doctrines by speculation, and thus to make an aristocratic distinction between those who only believe, and those who know, to overrate *knowledge*, especially that which is ideal and speculative (γνῶσις) in religion—these are the principal features of Gnosticism. On the different usages of γνῶσις in a good and a bad sense (γνῶσις ψευδώνυμος), γνωστής, γνωστικός,) comp. *Suicer*, Thesaurus. *Sources:* Irenæus Adv. Hær. (i. 29, ii.) Tertullian Adv. Marcion. lib. v; Adv. Valentinianos; Scorpiace contra Gnosticos. Clem. Al. Strom. in different places, especially lib. ii. iii. vi. Euseb. iv.

[2] The different classifications of the Gnostics according to the degree of their opposition to Judaism (*Neander*); according to countries, and the preponderance of dualism, or emanation, Syrian and Egyptian Gnostics (*Gieseler*); or Gnostics of Asia Minor, Syrian, Roman (sporadic) and Egyptian Gnostics (*Matter*); or lastly, Hellenistic, Syrian, and Christian Gnostics (*Hase*), present, all of them, greater or less difficulties, and require additional classes (as the Eclectic sects of Neander, and the Marcionites of Gieseler). But *Baur* justly remarks that the mere classification according to countries, is too external (Gnosis, p. 106; comp. too Dorner, p. 355), and hence designates the position on which Neander's classification is based, as the only correct one, "*because it has regard not only to one subordinate element, but to a fundamental relation which pervades the whole*," p. 109. The particular objections to the division of Neander, see *ibidem*. The three essential forms into which Gnosticism falls, according to Baur, are: 1. The *Valentinian*, which admits the claims of Paganism, together with Judaism and Christianity. 2 The *Marcionite*, which makes Christianity preponderant; and, 3, the *Pseudo-*

Clementine, which espouses the cause of Judaism in particular (see p. 120). But respecting the latter, it is yet doubtful whether it should be reckoned among the Gnostic tendencies. *Schwegler* (Montanismus iv. s. 216), in making Judaism the common root of Elionitism and Gnosticism, is correct, so far as this, that Gnosticism was shaped in divers ways by the Jewish philosophy. But this philosophy was struggling to get beyond what was merely Jewish and legal. The peculiar and fundamental characteristic of Gnosticism remains in its Paganism, though this, too, might react into Judaism, as well as the latter wander off into Paganism. "*Common to all Gnostic sects is their opposition to that merely empirical faith with which they charge the church, as being founded on authority alone.*" *Dorner*, p. 353. [Further particulars will be found in the special history of heresies (comp. § 6), and in the history of the particular systems of *Basilides* (A. D. 125–140), *Valentinus* 140–160), the *Ophites*, *Carpocrates and Epiphanes*, *Saturninus*, *Cerdc*, *Marcion* (150), *Bardesanes* (170), etc.] The element of knowledge (the speculation) in religion is the chief matter; and so far it has its correlate in the Jewish law-works (Dorner, s. 354). On the great importance of Gnosticism in the development of theological science and of ecclesiastical art (see Dorner, s. 355 sq.). On particular points, see further, *Gundert*, Das System des Gnostikers Basilides, in Zeitschrift f. d. luth. Theol. Bd. vi. and vii.; Uhlhorn, Das Basilidianische System mit Rücksicht auf die Angaben des Hippolytus dargestellt, Götting., 1855.

[Hilgenfeld on Basilides, in the Theol. Jahrb. 1856, and *Baur*, ibid. 1856. J. L. Jacobi, Basilidis. . . . Sententiæ ex Hippolyti libro. Berol. 1852. Pistis Sophia, Opus Gnosticum Valentino adjudicatum e. codice MS. Coptico . . . ed. *J. H. Petermann*, Berol. 1852; comp. Köstlin in Theol. Jahrb. 1854. Colorbasus-Gnosis (the Valentinian Kol-arbas), *Volkmar* in Zeitschrift f. d. hist. Theol. 1855. On Bardesanes, in *Cureton's* Spicilegium Syriac. see Journal of Sacred Lit. 1856. Die Philosophumena und die Peraten (Ophites), R. Baxmann in Zeitschrift f. d. hist. Theol. 1860. On the general subject comp. *Bunsen's* Hippolytus, and especially *Niedner*, in his Gesch. d. Kirche, s. 217–253. Niedner's division is the best: 1. Most numerous (in Valentinus and others); Christianity has the primacy, but other religions, Jewish and heathen, are different degrees of the development of the true religion. 2. (Marcion) Christianity sundered from its historical connections; the only revelation. 3. A syncretism, identifying heathenism and Christianity (Carpocrates), or Judaism and heathenism (the Clementina). Gnosticism is an attempt at a philosophy of religion, identifying the history of the world and the history of religion. Comp. Neander's Dogmengesch. i., 43–59.]

[9] Comp. *Dorner*, I. i. p. 391, ss.

[10] Ibid. p. 381, ss. [Ritschl, d. Evang. Marcions, 1847: *Volckmar*, cf. Gersdorf Rep. 1852. *Franck*, d. Evang. M. in Stud. u. Kritiken, 1855. Hilgenfeld, Das Apostolikon Marcions, in Zeitschrift f. d. hist. Theol. 1855.]

§ 24.

MONTANISM AND MONARCHIANISM.

Wernsdorf, de Montanistis, Gedani, 1751, 4. *Kirchner*, de Montanistis, Jen. 1852. * *Heinichen*, de Alogis, Theodotianis Artemonitis, Lips. 1829. *A. Ritschl*, Entstehung der altkath. Kirche. Bonn. 1850, s. 176 sq. *F. C. Baur*, Das Wesen des Mont. in Zeller's Jahrb. 1851. *Gieseler*, Hippolytus, die Monarchianer, und d. römische Kirche, in Stud. u. Krit. 1853. *Schwegler*, *F. C.*, der Montanismus und die christliche Kirche des zweiten Jahrhunderts, Tüb. 1841–8. [*Neander*, Hist. of the Church, i., 509 sq., 575 sq. *Hase*, §67. *Niedner*, 253 sq.]

Besides this antagonism of Judaism and Ethnicism, another might be formed on the basis of the general Christian system; and its contrasted extremes likewise run out into heretical tendencies. In the establishment of the peculiar doctrines of the religion of Christ, questions necessarily arose, not only concerning the relation of Christianity to former historical forms of religion, but also about its relation to the nature of man and his general capacities of knowledge. Two opposite tendencies might ensue. On the one hand, an exaggerated supernaturalism might manifest itself, passing the boundaries of the historical revelation, making the essence of the inspiration of the Spirit to consist in extraordinary excitement, interrupting the course of the historical development, and endeavoring to keep up a permanent disagreement between the natural and the supernatural. This is seen in what is called *Montanism*,[1] which took its rise in Phrygia. On the other hand, an attempt might be made to fill the chasm between the natural and the supernatural, by trying to explain the wonders and mysteries of faith, adapting them to the understanding, and thus leading to a critico-skeptical rationalism. This appears in one class of the *Monarchians* (Alogi ?)[2] whose representatives in the first period are *Theodotus* and *Artemon*.[3] The Monarchians, *Praxeas*, *Noëtus*, and *Beryllus*,[4] commonly styled Patripassians, differ from the preceding in having more profound views of religion, and form the transition to Sabellianism, which comes up in the following period, introducing a new (more speculative) mode of thought.

[1] *Montanus* of Phrygia (in which country the fanatical worship of Cybele prevailed from an early period) made his appearance as a prophet (Paracletc) about the year 170, in Ardaban, on the frontiers of Phrygia and Mysia, and afterward in Pepuza. He was rather distinguished as an enthusiastic and eccentric character, than for any particular dogmatic heresy; and thus he is the forerunner of all the fanaticism which pervades the history of the church. "*If any doctrine was dangerous to Christianity, it was that of Montanus. Though noted in other respects only for a strict external morality, and agreeing with the Catholic church in all its doctrines, he yet attacked the funda-*

mental principle of orthodoxy. For he regarded Christianity, not as complete, but as allowing and even demanding further revelations, as seen in Christ's words about the promised Paraclete." *Marheineke* (in Daub and Creuzer's Studien), p. 150, where he also points out the contradiction in which the positive Tertullian involved himself by joining this sect. Millennarianism, which the Montanists professed, was in accordance with their carnally minded tendency. In this respect they were allied to the Ebionites, (*Schwegler*). Notwithstanding their Anti-gnostic tendencies, they agreed with the Gnostics in going beyond the simple faith of the church; but still, their eccentricities were seen not so much in speculation as in practical Christianity. Yet Montanism could not keep clear of Gnosticism; but here its peculiarity consists in the position, that this *gnosis* is attained, not by man's faculty of thought, but in an ecstatic state. "*Catholic truth is an evenly flowing stream, gradually swelling from many tributaries; the Montanistic illumination is a spring, suddenly gushing up from the ground; the former is conditioned by the idea of a complex continuity, the latter clings to a disconnected and atomistic view of spiritual influences.*" *Schwegler*, p. 105. This sect (called also Cataphrygians, Pepuzians) existed down to the sixth century, though condemned by ecclesiastical synods. On its connection with the general tendencies of the times, see *Baur*, ubi supra. This does not interfere with a recognition of the individuality of Montanus as an essential element (Neander describes him from this point of view). *Sources*: Eusebius (following Apollonius), Epiphanius, Hæres. 48. *Torrey's Neander*, i., 508–537. *Neander's* Dogmengesch., p. 49 (against Baur). [Gieseler's Church History, i., 140.]

[2] This term occurs in Epiph. Hær. 51, as a somewhat ambiguous parcnomasia on the word Logos (men void of understanding notwithstanding their understanding!), because the Alogi rejected the doctrine concerning the Logos, and the Gospel of John in which it is principally set forth, as well as the book of Revelation, and the millennarian notions which it was used in vindicating. It may be generalized in dogmatic usage so as to be applied to all *those* who rejected the idea of the Logos, or so misunderstood it, as either to regard Christ as a mere man, or, if they ascribed a divine nature to Christ, identified it with that of the Father. It is difficult to decide to which of these two classes the proper Alogi mentioned by Epiphanius belong, comp. *Heinichen*, *l. c.*; on the other hand, *Dorner*, p. 500, defends them from the charge of denying Christ's divinity, and considers them as being the point of departure for the twofold shape in which Monarchianism showed itself. At all events, we must not lose sight of these two classes of Monarchians (comp. *Neander*, Church Hist. (Torrey) i, 577; Antignosticus, p. 474. *Schwegler*, Montanismus, p. 268; Dorner, l. c.), though it is difficult to make a precise distinction between the one and the other.

[3] *Theodotus*, a worker in leather (ὁ σκυτεὺς) from Byzantium, who resided at Rome about the year 200, maintained that Christ (though born of a Virgin) was merely a man; and was excommunicated by the Roman bishop, Victor, Euseb. v. 28. Theodoret, Fab. Hær. ii. 5. Epiph. Hæret. 54 (*ἀπόσπασμα τῆς ἀλόγου αἱρέσεως*). He must not be confounded with another Theodotus (*τραπεζίτης*), who was connected with a party of the Gnostics, the Melchisedekites. Theodor. Fab. Hær. II. 6. *Dorner*, p. 505, ss. *Artemon* (Artemas)

charged the successor of Victor, the Roman bishop Zephyrinus, with having corrupted the doctrine of the church, and smuggled in the doctrine of the divinity of Christ. Comp. *Neander*, i. 580. See § 45, below. *Heinichen*, l. c. p. 26, 27. [*Burton*, Lectures on the Ecclesiast. Hist. of the Second and Third Cent. (Works, vol. v.) p. 211, ss. 236, ss. 265, ss. 387, and Bampton Lect. Notes 100 and 101.] The prevailing rationalistic tendency of this sect (Pseudo-Rationalism) may be seen from Euseb. l. c. (*Heinichen*, ii. p. 139). *Οὐ τί αἱ θεῖαι λέγουσι γραφαὶ ζητοῦντες ἀλλ' ὁποῖον σχῆμα συλλογισμοῦ εἰς τὴν τῆς ἀθεότητος εὑρεθῇ σύστασιν, φιλοπόνως ἀσκοῦντες . . . . καταλιπόντες δὲ τὰς ἁγίας τοῦ θεοῦ γραφὰς, γεωμετρίαν ἐπιτηδεύουσιν, ὡς ἂν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ὄντες καὶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς λαλοῦντες καὶ τὸν ἄνωθεν ἐρχόμενον ἀγνοοῦντες.* The homage they rendered to Euclid, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Galen, *ὡς ἴσως ὑπό τινων καὶ προσκυνεῖται.*

[a] *Praxeas*, from Asia Minor, had gained under Marcus Aurelius the reputation of a confessor of Christianity, but was charged by Tertullian with Patripassianism, and combated by him. Tertull. Advers. Praxeam. lib. II. [translated in the Christ. Examiner, Boston, 1843, No. 119]. *Noëtus*, at Smyrna, about the year 230, was opposed by Hippolytus on account of similar opinions. Hippol. contra Hæresin Noëti. Theodoret. Fab. Hær. iii. 3. Epiph. Hær. 57.—As to *Beryllus*, bishop of Bostra, in Arabia, whom Origen compelled to recant, Euseb. vi. 33; comp. *Ullmann*, de Beryllo Bostreno, Hamb. 1835, 4. Studien und Kritiken, 1836, part 4, p. 1073 (comp. § 42 and 46). [Praxeas in *Neander*, i. 513, 525. *Burton*, l. c. p. 221, ss. 234, ss. Noëtus in *Neander*, i. 584. *Burton*, l. c. p. 312, 364.—Beryllus in *Neander*, i. 593. *Burton*, l. c. p. 312, 313. Schleiermacher on the above in his Essay on Sabellianism, transl. in Am. Bibl. Repos. i. 322–339; cf. his Kirchengesch. 131 sq. 154. *Baur*, Dreieinigkeit, i. 132–341, and in the Jahrb. f. Theologie, 1845. *Bunsen's* Hippolytus.]

§ 25.

THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE.

The Catholic doctrine[1] was unfolded in opposition to these heresies. Though the orthodox teachers endeavored to avoid heretical errors, and to preserve the foundation laid by Christ and his Apostles by holding fast to the pure tradition, yet they could not wholly free themselves from the influence which the civilization of the age, personal endowments, and preponderating mental tendencies have ever exerted upon the formation of religious ideas and conceptions. On this account we find in the Catholic church the same contrasts, or at least similar diversities and modifications, as among the heretics, though they manifest themselves in a milder and less offensive form. Here, too, is, on the one hand, a firm, sometimes painful adherence to external rites and historical tradition, akin to legal Judaism (positive tendency), combined in some cases, as in that of Tertullian, with the Montanist tendency. On the other hand, we

find a more free and flexible tendency allied to the Hellenistic; sometimes more ideal and speculative, kindred to the Gnosticism (the *true* Gnosis contrasted with the false), and, again, critico-rationalistic, like Monarchianism, even when not identical with it.[2]

[1] On the term *catholic* in opposition to *heretic*, see *Suicer*, Thesaurus, sub voce καθολικός. comp. ὀρθόδοξος, ὀρθοδοξία. *Bingham*, Origg. Eccles. i. 1, sect. 7. *Vales.* ad Euseb. vii. 10. Tom. ii. p. 333: Ut vera et genuina Christi ecclesia ad adulterinis Hæreticorum cœtibus distingueretur, *catholicæ* cognomen soli Orthodoxorum ecclesiæ attributum est.—Concerning the negative and practical, rather than theoretical, character of earlier orthodoxy, see *Marheineke* (in Daub und Creuzer) l. c. p. 140, ss.

[2] This was the case, *e. g.*, with *Origen*, who now and then shows sobriety of understanding along with Gnostic speculation. On the manner in which the philosophizing Fathers were able to reconcile *gnosis* with *paradosis* (disciplina arcani), comp. *Marheineke*, l. c. p. 170.

§ 26.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE FATHERS.

Steiger, De la Foi de l'Église Primitive d'après les Écrits des premiers Pères, in the Mélanges de Théologie Réformée, edited by himself and Hävernick, Paris, 1833, 1er cahier. [*Bennet, J.*, The Theology of the Early Christian Church, exhibited in Quotations from the Writers of the First Three Centuries, Lond. 1842.] *Dorner*, l. c., *Schwegler*, Nachapostolisches Zeitalter. *A. Hilgenfeld*, Die Apostolischen Väter; Untersuchung über Inhalt und Ursprung der unter ihrem Namen erhaltenen Schriften, Halle, 1853. [Patrum Apostol. Opera, ed. *Dressel*, Lpz. 2d ed. 1864. *J. Chevallier*, Epist. of Clem. Rom., Ign. etc. 2d ed. Lond. 1851. *Norton's* Genuineness Gospels, vol. i. Note F. pp. ccxxxix.–cclxxi. *J. H. B. Lübkert*, Theol. d. Apost. Väter, in Zeitschrift f. d. Hist. Theol. 1854. *Hilgenfeld*, Das Urchristenthum, in Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theol. 1858. *E. de Pressensé*, Hist. des trois premiers Siècles de l'Église Chrétienne, 2. Paris, 1858. *J. J. Blunt*, Lectures on Study of Early Fathers, 2d ed. 1856; *ibid.* Right Use of Fathers, 1858. *Ginoulhiac*, Hist. du Dogme Cathol. dans les trois prem. Siècles, 2. Paris, 1850. *R. Reuss*, Hist. de la Théol. Chrét. 2. 1853, 2d ed. 1860. *Ritschl*, Die Altkath. Kirche, 2d ed. 1857. *Joh. Huber*, Phil. d. Kirchen-Väter, 1859. *Abbé Frepel*, Les Pères Apostoliques et leur Époque, Paris, 1859. Anti-Nicene Lib. i. 1867.]

While the so-called Apostolical Fathers (with few exceptions) were distinguished for direct practical efficiency, preserving and continuing the apostolic tradition,[1] the philosophizing tendency allied to Hellenism was in some measure represented by the apologists, *Justin Martyr*,[2] *Tatian*,[3] *Athenagoras*,[4] *Theophilus* of Antioch,[5] and *Minucius Felix*,[6] in the West. On the contrary, *Irenæus*,[7] as well as *Tertullian*,[8] and his disciple *Cyprian*,[9] firmly adhered to the positive dogmatic theology and the compact realism of the church, the former in a milder and more considerate, the latter in a strict, sometimes sombre manner. *Clement*[10] and *Origen*,[11] both belonging to the Alexandrian school, chiefly developed the speculative aspect of theology.

But these contrasts are only relative; for we find, e. g., that Justin Martyr manifests both a leaning toward Hellenism and also a Judaizing tendency; that the idealism and criticism of Origen are now and then accompanied with a surprising adherence to the letter; and that Tertullian, notwithstanding his Anti-gnosticism, strives in a remarkable way after philosophical ideas.

[1] The name *Patres Apostolici* is given to the Fathers of the first century, who, according to tradition, were disciples of the Apostles. Concerning their personal history and writings, much room is left to conjecture.

1. *Barnabas*, known as the fellow-laborer of the Apostle Paul from Acts iv. 36 (Joses); ix. 27, etc. On the epistle ascribed to him, in which is shown a strong tendency to typical and allegorical interpretations—though in a very different spirit from, *e. g.*, the canonical Epistle to the Hebrews—comp. *Henke, Ern.*, De Epistolæ quæ Barnabæ tribuitur Authentia, Jenæ, 1827. *Rördam*, De Authent. Epist. Barnab, Hafn. 1828 (in favor of its genuineness). *Ullmann*, Studien and Kritiken, 1828, part 2. *Hug*, Zeitschrift für das Erzbisth. Freiburg, part 2, p. 132, ss., part 3, p. 208, ss. *Twesten*, Dogmatik, i. p. 101. *Neander*, i. p, 657, *against* it: "*a very different spirit breathes throughout it from that of an apostolical writer.*" *Bleek*, Einleitung in den Brief an die Hebräer, p. 416, note (undecided). *Schenkel*, in the Studien u. Kritiken, x. p. 652 (adopting a middle course, and considering one part as genuine and another as interpolated), and on the other side [*Hefele, C. T.*, Das Sendschreiben des Apostels Barnabas aufs Neue untersucht, übersetzt und erklärt. Tüb. 1840.—*Lardner, N.*, Works, II. p. 17–20; iv. 105–108; v. 269–275 (*for* its authenticity). *Cave, W.*, Lives of the most eminent Fathers of the Church, Oxf. 1840, i. p. 90–105. *Burton*, Lect. on the Ecclesiast. History of the First Cent. (Works, iv. p. 164, 343 (*against* it). *Davidson, S.*, Sacred Hermeneutics, Edinb. 1843, p. 71 (*for* it). *Ryland, J. E.*, in Kitto, Cyclop. of Bibl. Liter. art. Barnabas (*against* it). [William Lee, Discourses on the Inspiration of Holy Scrip. repr. New York, 1857, Appendix E.]
2. *Hermas* (Rom. xvi. 14), whose ποιμήν (Shepherd) in the form of visions enjoyed a high reputation in the second half of the second century, and was even quoted as Scripture (γραφή). Some critics ascribe the work in question to a later Hermas (Hermes), brother of the Roman bishop, Pius I., who lived about the year 150. Comp. *Gratz*, Disqu. in Past. Herm. Part I. Bonn, 1820, 4. *Jachmann*, Der Hirte des Hermas. Königsb. 1835. "*The immense difference between the apostolical writings and the immediate post-apostolic literature is more apparent in the work of Hermas than in any other;*" Schliemann, Clement. s. 421. *Schwegler*, in his Nachapost. Zeitalter, s. 328, sq., judges differently. Comp. *Dorner*, s. 185, sq. There is a variety of opinion about the relation of this work to Montanism, Ebionitism, and the Elcesaites; cf. *Uhlhorn*, in Herzog's Realwörterb. On the manuscript discovered by Simonides, and published by Anger and Dindorf, 1856, see *Uhlhorn*,

u. s. Comp. below, Note 6. [Dressel's edition, after Tischendorf, 1856. On these editions, compare Gersdorf's, Leipz. Repert. Jan. and Aug. 1856. *Dindorf*, in Gersdorf, 1856, and Jan. 1857. *Hagemann*, Der Hirt des Hermas, in the Theol. Quartalshrift, 1860. *Anger*, on the Æthiopean version of Hermas, in Gersdorf's Rep. Oct. 1858. Comp. *Neander*, p. 660. *Lardner*, iv. 97, 98, etc. *Ryland, J. E.*, in Kitto, l. c. *Stuart*, Comment. on the Apocalypse, I. p. 113–121, where an outline of the whole work is given.]

3. *Clement of Rome* (according to some the fellow-laborer of Paul, mentioned Phil. iv. 3), one of the earliest bishops of Rome (Iren. iii. 3, Euseb. iii. 2, 13, 15). The first epistle to the Corinthians, ascribed to him, is of dogmatic importance in relation to the doctrine of the resurrection. *Editions:* Clementis Romani quæ feruntur Homil. xx. nunc primum integræ, ed. Alb. R. M. Dressel, Gött. 1853. Comp. *R. A. Lipsius*, De Clem. Rom. Ep. ad Cor. priore, Lips. 1855. [E. Ecker, Disquisitio—de Cl. Rom. prior. ad Rom. Epist. Traj. ad Rhenum. 1853.] The so-called second epistle is a fragment, probably by another (Ebionite?) author. [*Lardner*, l. c. ii. 33–35.] Comp. also *Schneckenburger*, Evangel. der Ægypter, p. 3, 13, ss. 28, ss. *Schwegler*, Nachapostolisches Zeitalter, p. 449; on the other side, *Dorner*, p. 143. In the dogmatic point of view, those writings would be of greatest importance, which are now universally considered as suppositious, viz., the Pseudo-Clementine Homilies (ὁμιλίαι Κλήμεντος, cf. § 23), the Recognitiones Clementis (ἀναγνωρισμοί), the Constitutiones Apostolicæ, and the Canones Apostolici; on the latter, comp. *Krabbe*, über den Ursprung und Inhalt der Apostol. Constit. des Clemen. Rom. Hamb. 1829; and †*Drey*, neue Untersuchungen über die Constitutiones und Canones der Apostol. Tüb. 1832. *Uhlhorn*, Die Homilien u. Recognitionen des Clem. Rom. Götting. 1854. [*Hilgenfeld*, Kritische Untersuchungen, 1850. *E. Gundert*, in Zeitschrift f. d. Luth. Theol. 1853, '4. *W. Cureton*, Syriac version of Clem. Recognitions, Lond. 1849. *G. Volkmar*, Clem. von Rom. und d. nächste Folgezeit, in Theol. Jahrb. 1856. Clem. Rom. Epistolæ Binæ de Virginitate, ed. J. T. Beele, Lovan. 1856, comp. Theol. Quartalschrift, 1856. *Neander*, i. 658. *Lardner*, ii. p. 29–35; 364–378. *Burton*, l. c. p. 342–344. *Ryland, J. E.*, in Kitto, l. c. art. Epistles of the Apostolical Fathers.]

4. *Ignatius* (θεοφόρος), bishop of Antioch, concerning whose life comp. Euseb. iii. 36. On his journey to Rome, where he suffered martyrdom under Trajan (116), he is said to have written seven epistles to different churches (Ephesus, Magnesia, Tralles, Rome, Philadelphia, Smyrna), and to Polycarp, which are extant in two recensions, the one longer, the other shorter. On their genuineness, and the relation of the longer to the shorter, comp. *J. Pearson*, Vindiciæ epp. S. Ign. Cant. 1672 [new edition by Archdeacon Churton, in Lib. of Anglo-Cath. Theol. 2 vols. 8vo. 1852, with preface and notes adapted to the present state of the controversy]. *J. E. Ch. Schmidt*, Die doppelte Recension der Briefe des Ign. (Henke's Magazin. iii. p. 91, ss). *K. Meier*, Die doppelte Recension der Briefe des Ignat. (Stud. und Kritiken, 1836, part 2). *Rothe*, Die Anfänge der Christlichen Kirche, Witt. 1837. *Arndt*, in Studien

und Kritiken, 1839, p. 136. *Baur*, Tübinger Zeitschrift, 1838, part 3, p. 148. *Huther*, Betrachtung der wichtigsten Bedenken gegen die Ächtheit der Ignatianischen Briefe, in *Illgen's* Zeitschrift für historische Theolog. 1841–4. Comp. § 23. *Ch. Düsterdieck*, Quæ de Ignatianarum Epp. Authentia, duorumque Textuum Ratione hucusque prolatæ sunt enarruntur, Götting. 1843, 4to.—The whole investigation has entered into a new stadium in consequence of the discovery of a Syriac version, by *W. Cureton*, The Ancient Syriac Version of the Ep. of S. Ignatius, etc., Lond. 1845. Comp. *C. C. J. Bunsen*, Die Drei ächten und die vier unächten Briefe des Ign. 4to. Hamb. 1847; ibid. Ignat. von Antioch, u. seine Zeit. Sieben Sendschreiben an Neander, 4to. Hamb. 1847. Against Bunsen, *F. C. Baur*, Die Ignat. Briefe, Tüb. 1848. On the Catholic side, *G. Denzinger*, Die Ächtheit des Textus der Ign. Briefe, Würzb. 1849. Against the genuineness, *Vancher*, Recherches Critiques, Gött. 1856. *Latest Editions: J. H. Petermann*, Lps. 1849; Corpus Ignatianum, by William Cureton, 4to. Berl. 1849. Most important for the History of Doctrines is the polemic against the Docetæ (cf. § 23, and *Dorner*, p. 145). [*W. Cureton*, Vindiciæ Ignatianæ, the genuine Writings of Ign. vindicated against the charge of Heresy, Lond. 1846. Comp. the discussion in *Hilgenfeld's* Apostol. Väter., and *Uhlhorn* on the Relation of the Greek to the Syriac Recension in Zeitschrift f. d. Hist. Theol. 1851, epitomised in the Theol. Critic, 1852. *Weiss*, in Reuter's Repertorium, Sept. 1852, and in Deutsche Zeitschrift, 1859 (Nov.). *R. A. Lipsius*, in the Zeitschrift f. d. Hist. Theologie, 1856, condensed in the Journal for Sacred Lit. (Lond.), 1857; Die Zeitschrift f. Luth. Theologie, 1848 and 1852. See also articles in the Quarterly (Lond.), 1851; the Church Review (New Haven), 1849; the Edinburg Review, 1849; the British Quarterly, 1856; the Christian Remembrancer, 1857. On the Epistles of Ignatius among the Armenians, see Neumann, Gesch. d. Arm. Lit. s. 73 sq. Ante-Nicene Lib. i. 1867.]

5. *Polycarp*, bishop of Smyrna, according to tradition a disciple of the Apostle John, suffered martyrdom under Marcus Aurelius (169). Comp. Euseb. iv. 15. One of his epistles to the Philippians is yet extant, but only a part of it in the original Greek. Comp. *Wocher* die Briefe der apost. Väter Clemens und Polycarp, mit Einleitung und Commentarien, Tübingen, 1830. [*Lardner*, ii. p. 94–109. *Ryland, J. E.*, in Kitto, l. c.]

6. *Papias* (*σφόδρα σμικρὸς ὢν τὸν νοῦν*, Euseb. iii. 39), bishop of Hierapolis in the first half of the second century, of whose treatise *λογίων κυριακῶν ἐξήγησις* we have only fragments in Euseb. l. c. and Irenæus (v. 53). As a millennarian he is of some importance for eschatology. [Fragments of Papias in Lardner's Credibility, vol. ii.; supposed fragments in Spicileg. Solesmense, i. Transl. in Ante-Nicene Lib. i. 1867.]

Complete editions of the writings of the Apostolical Fathers: * Patrum, qui temporibus Apostolorum floruerunt, Opp. ed. *Cotelerius*, Par. 1672, rep. *Clericus*, Amst. 1698, 1724, 2, T. f. Patrum App. Opp. genuina, ed. *B. Russel*, Lond. 1746, ii. 8. Clementis Romani, S. Ignatii, S. Polycarpi, patrum apostolicorum quæ supersunt, accedunt S. Ignatii et S. Polycarpi martyria, ed. *Guil. Jacobson*, Oxon. 1838 [3d ed. 1847.]

J. L. Frey, Epistolæ Sanctorum Patrum Apostolicorum Clementis, Ignatii et Polycarpi, atque duorum posteriorum Martyria, Bas. 1742, 8. Patrum Apostolorum Opera, textum ex editt. præstantt. repetitum recognovit, brevi annotat. instruxit et in usum prælect academicar edid. †**C. J. Hefele*, Tüb. 1839, 4th ed. 1856. Comp. Codex N. T. deuteronomius s. Patres Apostolici, rec. ed. *De Muralto*, vol. i. (Barnabæ et Clementis Epistolæ) Tur. 1847. Patrum apostol. Opera ed. *A. R. M. Dressel*, accedit Hermæ Pastor, ex. frag. græcis, auctore *C. Tischendorf*, Lips. 1863. *Ittig*, Bibl. Patr. apost. Lips. 1690, 8. [*Wake*, Archbishop, the genuine Epistles of the Apostolical Fathers, transl. Lond. 1737, 7th ed. 1840, New York, 1810. W. Chevallier, Epist. of Apost. Fathers, and Apolog. of Just. Mart. and Tertull., translated 1822; 2d ed. 1851.]

As to the extent to which we can speak of a *theology* of the Apostolical Fathers, s. *Baumgarten-Crusius*, i. p. 81, note. It is certain that some of them *e. g.*, Hermas, entertained notions which were afterward rejected as heterodox. The older divines, and those of the Roman Catholic church in particular, endeavored to evade this difficulty by calling those doctrines *archäisms*, in distinction from *heresies*.*

[1] *Justin Martyr* (born about the year 89, died 176), of Sychem (Flavia Neapolis) in Samaria, a philosopher by vocation, who even after he had had become a Christian, retained the τρίβων, made several missionary journeys, and suffered martyrdom, probably at the instigation of the philosopher Crescens. His *two Apologies* are of special importance; the first designed for Antoninus Pius, the second probably for Marcus Aurelius (yet the numbering varies, see *Neander*, i. 665, and Semisch, ubi supra, p. 911). He is the first ecclesiastical writer whose works manifest an acquaintance with the Grecian philosophy (in which he had formerly sought in vain for the full truth and peace of mind.)† Though he is anxious to prove the superiority of the religion of Christ, and even of the Old Testament dispensation, to the systems of philosophers (by showing that the latter derive their views from Moses), he also perceives something divine in the better portion of the Gentile world. It must, however, be admitted that the tone prevailing in the apologies is much more liberal than that which is found in the Cohortatio and Græcos (παραινετικὸς πρὸς Ἕλληνας). *Neander*, i. 666, is therefore inclined to consider the latter as spurious, on account of the hard terms in which paganism is spoken of, and *Möhler* (Patrologie, p. 225) agrees with him. Yet the state of mind in which the author wrote his apologies would naturally be very different from that in which he composed a controversial treatise, especially if, as Neander suggests, the latter was written at a later period of

* It is certain that Pseudo-Dionysius, whom some writers number among the Apostolical Fathers, belongs to a later period. On the other side, *Möhler* and *Hefele* reckon the author of *the Epistle to Diognetus* among the Apostolical Fathers, which was formerly ascribed to Justin. *Hefele*, PP. App. p. 125. *Möhler*, Patrologie, p. 164; Kleine Schriften, i. p. 19. On the other side: *Semisch*, Justin M. p. 186. [Comp. Just. M. Ep. ad Diogn. ed. Hoffmann, 1851, and Otto's review in Geridorf's Rep. 1852. Translation of this Epistle in Journal of Sac. Lit. 1852 and in the Princeton Rep. 1853. *Otto* ed. 1852.]

† On his philosophical tendency, see *Schleiermacher*, l. c. p. 155.

his life. These writings, as well as the doubtful λόγος πρὸς Ἕλληνας (Oratio ad Græcos) and the Ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Διόγνητον falsely ascribed to Justin M. (see note p. 67), and also the treatise περὶ μοναρχίας consisting in great part of Greek excerpts, set the relative position of Christianity and Paganism in a clear light. The Dialogus cum Tryphone Judæo has reference to Judaism, which it opposes on its own grounds; its genuineness was doubted by *Wetstein* and *Semler*, but without sufficient reason, comp. *Neander*, i. 668, ss. The principal edition is that published by the Benedictines under the care of **Prud. Maran*, Paris, 1742, which also includes the writings of the following three authors, along with the (insignificant) satire of Hermias. Otto's edition, 1846, iii. see § 14, note 1 A. Comp. Justin Martyr, his Life, Writings, and Doctrines, by *Carl Semisch*. Transl. by *J. E. Ryland*, Edin. 1844. [*Lardner*, ii. p. 126–128, 140, 141.] *Otto*, de Justini Martyris scriptis et doctrina commentatio, Jen. 1841. *Schwegler*, nachapostolisches Zeitalter, p. 216, ss. [*John Kaye*, bp. of Lincoln, Some Account of the Opinions and Writings of Just. M., 2d ed. *A. Kayser*, De Doctrina Just. M. 1850. *Volkmar*, Ueber Just. M. 1853, and Die Zeit Just. M. in Theol. Jahrb. 1855. *Hilgenfeld*, ibid. 1852. The Oratio ad Græcos, not by Just. *Nolte* in Theol. Quartalschrift, 1860. Prof. *Stowe*, Sketch of Just. M. in Bib. Sacra, 1852. *W. Reeves*, Transl. of the Apologies, with those of Tertullian and Minucius Felix, etc., 2 vols. Lond. 1716; *H. Browne's* of the Dial. cum Tryphone, Lond. 1755. Just. M.'s Opinions in A. Lamson's Church of first Three Cent. pp. 1–68, Boston, 1865.]

[3] *Tatian* (*Dorner*, i., 437, calls him "the Assyrian Tertullian"), a disciple of Justin M., became afterward the leader of those Gnostics who are called the Encratites. In his work entitled: λόγος πρὸς Ἕλληνας (Ed. *Worth*, Oxon. 1700), he defends the "*philosophy of the barbarians*" against the Greeks. Comp. *Daniel*, *H. A.*, Tatianus der Apologet, ein Beitrag zur Dogmengeschichte. Halle, 1837, 8vo. [*Neander*, i., 672. *Lardner*, ii. p. 147–150. Otto's Corpus Apologet. 1851. Transl. by Dr. Giles, Lond. 1837.]

[4] Little is known of the personal history of *Athenagoras*, who was born at Athens in the last half of the second century. Comp. however, *Clarisse*, De Athenagoræ Vita, Scriptis, Doctrina, Lugd. 1819, 4, and *Möhler*, l. c. p. 267. His works are: Legatio pro Christianis (πρεσβεία περὶ Χριστιανῶν) and the treatise: De Resurrectione Mortuorum. [*Lardner*, ii. p. 193–200. *Torrey's Neander*, i., 78 and 673. *J. C. Otto* in Zeitschrift f. d. hist. Theol. 1856; his *Supplicatio*, ed. by L. Paul, Hal. 1856; works in Otto Corpus Apolog vol. vii.; translated in full in *Giles'* Writings of Christ. of Second Century, Lond. 1837; and in Ante-Nicene Lib. ii. 1867.]

[5] *Theophilus*, bishop of Antioch (170–180). The work which he wrote against *Autolycus*: περὶ τῆς τῶν Χριστιανῶν πίστεως, manifests a less liberal spirit, but also displays both genius and power as a controversialist. *Rössler*, Bibliothek der Kirchenväter, i. p. 218, numbers it among the most worthless works of antiquity, and *Hase* calls it a narrow-minded controversial writing, while *Möhler* praises its excellencies. There is a German translation of it with notes by *Thienemann*. Leipz. 1834. [Edition by J. J. Humphrey, Lond. 1852. On his use of the N. Test. see *Otto* in Zeitschrift f. d. hist. Theol. 1859.]

[6] Ecclesiastical writers vary in their opinions concerning the period in which *Minucius Felix* lived. *Van Hoven*, *Rössler*, *Russwurm*, and *Heinrich Meier*, (Commentatio de Minucio Felice, Tur. 1824), suppose him to have been contemporary with the Antonines. *Tzschirner* (Geschichte de Apologetik, i. p. 257–282), thinks that he lived at a later time (about 224–230); this seems to be the more correct opinion. Comp. Hieron. Cat. Script. c. 53, 58. Lactant. Inst. v. 1. A comparison of the treatise of Minucius, entitled Octavius, with the Apology of Tertullian, and with the work of Cyprian, De Idolorum Vanitate, favors the view that he wrote *after* the former, but *before* the latter. This work of Cyprian appears in some parts to be a copy of the writing of Minucius; that of Tertullian bears the marks of an original. The dialogue between Cæcilius and Octavius is of importance in the history of apologetics, as it touches upon all the objections which we find separately treated by the other apologists, and adds some new ones. In his doctrinal opinions, Minucius is distinguished by a liberal, Hellenistic manner of thinking; but his views are less decidedly Christian than might well be wished. We seek almost in vain in his book for direct christological ideas. *Editions:* Edit. princeps by *Baldwin*, 1560; before this, considered as the 8th book of Arnobius. Since that time, editions by *Elmenhorst* (1612), *Cellarius* (1699), *Davisius* (1707), *Ernesti* (1773), *Russwurm* (with Introduct. and Notes, 1824), *Lübkert* (with Translation and Commentary, Leipz. 1836.) [The Octavius of Minucius Felix, ed. by Rev. *H. A. Holden*, Oxf. 1853. Earlier English versions, *James*, Oxf. 1636; *Combe*, 1703; Reeves, 1719 (in "Apologies of Fathers"); Dalrymple, Edinb. 1781. Edition in Gersdorf's Bibliotheca, vol. xii., xiii.]

[7] *Irenæus*, a disciple of Polycarp, bishop of Lyons, about the year 177, died in the year 202, "*a clear-headed, considerate, philosophical theologian*" (*Hase, Guericke*). Except a few letters and fragments, his principal work alone is extant, viz., five books against the Gnostics: Ἔλεγχος καὶ ἀνατροπὴ τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως; the first book only has come down in the original language, the greater part of the remaining four books is now known only in an old Latin translation. The best editions are those of *Grabe*, Oxon. 1702, and * *Massuet*, Paris, 1710; Venet. 1734, '47. A. Stieren, Lips. 2. '53. Comp. Euseb. v. 4, 20–26. *Möhler*, Patrologie, p. 330. [*Neander*, i., 671. *Davidson*, l. c. p. 83, ss. *Lardner*, ii. p. 165–193. *Burton*, v. p. 185, and passim. *Bennett*, l. c. 28–33.] *Duncker*, des heil. Irenæus Christologie, im Zusammenhange mit dessen theologischen und anthropologischen Grundlehren, Gött. 1843. Comp. also what *Dorner* says concerning him, ii. 1, p. 465. [The best edition of Irenæus, by *W. W. Harvey*, 2 vols. Cambr. 1857. Schaff's Kirchenfreund, 1852, on Irenæus; *Böhringer's* Kirchengesch. in Biographieen, i. Supposed fragments in Spicileg. Solesm. i. 1852. Life and Writings of L, Eclectic (Lond.) Sept. 1854. *J. Beaven*, Account of Life and Writings of St. Iræn. Lond. 1841. Hüber's Phil. der. Kirchenväter, 1859, pp. 73–100.]

[8] *Tertullian* (Quintus Septimius Florens) was born in Carthage about the year 160, and died 220; in his earlier life he was a lawyer and rhetorician, and became afterward the most conspicuous representative of the anti-speculative, positive tendency. Comp. *Neander*, Antignosticus, Geist des Tertullian

und Einleitung in dessen Schriften, Berlin, 1825, 2d ed. 1849, especially the striking characteristic which he there gives of Tertullian, p. 28 of first edition, cf. p. 9 and following of the new ed., and Neander's Hist. i., 683, Torrey's translation). *Münter*, Primordia Ecclesiæ Africanæ, Havn. 1829, 4. Hesselberg, Tertullian's Lehre, aus seinen Schriften, Gotha. 1851.) "*A gloomy, fiery character, who conquered for Christianity out of the Punic Latin a literature, in which ingenious rhetoric, a wild imagination, a gross, sensuous perception of the ideal, profound feeling, and a juridical understanding, struggle with each other.*" (*Hase*). Gfrörer calls him the Tacitus of early Christianity. "*Notwithstanding his hatred against philosophy, Tertullian is certainly not the worst of Christian thinkers.*" *Schwegler*, Montanismus, p. 218; compare his further characteristics, ibid. His declaration: "ratio autem divina in medulla est, non in superficie" (De Resurrec. c. 3), may give us the key to many of his strange assertions, and to his remarkably concise style (quot pene verba, tot sententiæ, Vinc. Lir. in Comm. 1). Of his numerous writings the following are the most important for the History of Doctrines: Apologeticus—Ad nationes—(Advers. Judæos)—*Advers. Marcionem—*Advers. Hermogenem—*Advers. Praxeam—*Advers. Valentinianos—*Scorpiace advers. Gnosticos—De Præscriptionibus advers. Hæreticos)—De Testimonio Animæ—*De Anima—*De Carne Christi—*De Resurrectione Carnis—(De Pœnitentia)—(De Baptismo)—De Oratione etc.; his moral writings also contain much that is doctrinal, *e. g.*, the treatises: De Corona Militis—De Virginibus velandis—De Cultu Feminarum, etc. Editions of his complete works were published by **Rigaltius*, Paris, 1635, fol.; by *Semler* and *Schütz*, Hall. 1770, 6 vols. (with a useful Index Latinitatis); by *Leopold*, Lips. 1841; by Oehler, Lips. 1854, iii. [*Neander*, l. c. ii. p. 362–366; p. 293–296. *Burton*, l. c. v. p. 223. a. passim. *Lardner*, ii. p. 267–272, a. passim.] The later church did not venture to number Tert., zealous as he was for orthodoxy, among the orthodox writers, on account of his Montanistic views. In the opinion of Jerome (adv. Helvid. 17), he is not a *homo ecclesiæ* (comp. also Apol. contra Ruffin. iii. 27), and though he praises his ingenium, he still condemns his heresy (Apol. contra Rufinum, iii. 27.) [A portion of Neander's Antignostikon is published in Bohn's edition of Neander's Planting and Training. Tertullian in Böhringer's Kirchengesch. in Biographieen, Bd. i. Various treatises translated in the (Oxford) Lib. of Fathers, vol. x. (2d ed.) Bishop *Kaye*, Eccl. Hist. of Second and Third Centuries, illustrated in the Life of Tertullian, 3d ed. 1848. *Engelhardt*, Tertullian als Schriftsteller in Zeitschrift f. d. hist. Theol. 1852. T.'s De Corona Militis, ed. *G. Curry*, Cambr. 1853. Apology, transl. by *H. B. Brown*, Lond. 1655; *W. Reeves*, 1716; edited with English notes by *H. A. Woodham*, 2d ed. Cambr., and Chevallier. Prescriptions, transl. by *T. Betty*. Oxf. 1772. Address to Scap. Tert. transl. by Dalrymple, Edinb. 1790. Oeuvres de Tert. en Français, par *M. de Genoude*, 2d ed. iii., 1852. On Oehler's edition see *Klussmann* in Zeitschrift für wiss. Theol. 1860; and

*The works marked with * were written after his conversion to Montanism, those included in ( ) at least tinged with Montanism; comp. *Nösselt*, de Vera ætate Tertulliani Scriptorum (Opusc. Fasc. iii. 1–198).

Zeitschrift f. luth. Theol. 1856. *Leopold*, Doctrina Tertull. de Baptismo, in Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theol. 1854. *A. Crés*, Les Idees de Tertull. sur la Tradition. Strasb. 1855. Tertullian and his Writings, Christ. Review, July, 1856. Huber, Phil. d. Kirchenväter, pp. 100–129.]

[9] *Cyprian* (Thascius Cæcilius) was first a teacher of rhetoric in Carthage; was converted to Christianity in 245; became bishop of Carthage 248, and suffered martyrdom 258. He possessed more of a practical than doctrinal tendency, and is, therefore, of greater importance in the history of polity than of doctrines, to which he contributed but little. He did not so much theoretically develop the doctrines respecting the *church* and the *sacraments*, as practically carry them out in his life, upholding them in the midst of storms. In his doctrinal opinions he rested on the basis laid by Tertullian, but also sympathized with Minucius Felix, as in his work, De Idolorum Vanitate. Accordingly, along with his numerous letters, his work entitled De Unitate Ecclesiæ, is of the first importance. Besides these there are: Libri III. Testimoniorum, De Bono Patientiæ, De Oratione Dominica, etc. Comp. *Rettberg*, Cyprian nach seinem Leben und Wirken, Göttingen, 1834. *Huther* (*Ed.*), Cyprians Lehre von der Kirche, Hamburg, 1839. *Editions: Rigaltius*, Paris, 1648, fol. **Fell*, Oxon, 1682, and the Benedictine edition by *Steph. Baluze* and *Prud. Maran*, Paris, 1726, fol. Goldhorn, Lips. 1838, 9, 2 vols. in Gersdorf Bibliotheca. [*Krabinger's* edition of Cyprian, De Unitate, etc., 1853, and of his Libri ad Donatum, De Domin. Orat., etc. 1859. Life and Times of C., by Geo. Ayliffe Poole, Oxf. 1840. *Shepherd*, Hist. of Church of Rome, Lond. 1852, contests the authenticity of all Cyprian's Epistles; ibid. Five Letters to Dr. Maitland, 1853–4; cf. Christ. Remembrancer, 1853 and 1857; Dublin Review, 1852; Quarterly Review (Lond.), 1853; and Journal of Sacred Lit. 1856. *Nevin* on Cyprian and his Times, Mercersb. Review, 1852–3. Cyprian's Treatises and Epistles, in Oxford Lib. of Fathers, vols. 3 and 17. Articles on Cyprian in *Rudelbach*, christl. Biog., and in *Böhringer*, Kirchengesch. in Biograph. *Dodwell*, Dissertationes Cyprianicæ, 1704. Bp. *Sage*, Principles of Cyprianic Age, 2, 8vo., Edinb. 1846. C.'s Unity of the Church, by J. Fell, Oxf. 1681; Disc. to Donatus, by J. Tunstall, 1716; whole Works, by N. Marshall, 1717. Annales Cyprianici a *J. Pearsono*, rep. in Fell's edition of Cyprian, fol. 1700.]

Novatian, the contemporary and opponent of Cyprian (*ὁ τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς ἐπιστήμης ὑπεραπιστής*, Euseb. vi. 43), must also be considered as belonging to the extreme limit of this period, if the treatise, De Trinitate, De Regula Veritatis s. Fidei, which goes under his name, proceeded from him. It is by no means correct, as Jerome would have it, that this treatise contains nothing but extracts from Tertullian. "*This author was at all events more than a mere imitator of the peculiar tendency of another; on the contrary, he shows originality; he does not possess the power and depth of Tertullian, but more spirituality.*" *Neander*, i. 560. *Editions: Whiston*, in his Sermons and Essays upon Several Subjects, Lond. 1709, p. 327. *Welchman*, Oxon. 1724, 8. *Jackson*, Lond. 1728. [*Lardner*, iii. p. 3–20. *Bennett*, l. c. p. 47–49.]

[10] *Clement* (*Tit. Flav.*), surnamed *Alexandrinus*, in distinction from Clement of Rome (note 3), a disciple of Pantænus at Alexandria, and his

successor in his office, died between 212 and 220. (Comp. Euseb. v. 11, vi. 6, 13, 14. Hieron. De Vir. Ill. c. 38.) Of his works the following three form a whole: 1. Λόγος προτρεπτικὸς πρὸς Ἕλληνας. 2. Παιδαγωγὸς in three books; and 3. Stromata (τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν γνωστικῶν ὑπομνημάτων στρωματεῖς)—so called from the variety of its contents, like a piece of tapestry—in 8 books: the eighth of which forms a special homily, under the title: τίς ὁ σωζόμενος πλούσιος, Quis dives salvetur. The ὑποτυπώσεις in 8 books, an exegetical work, is lost. Concerning his life and writings, comp. *Hofstede de Groot*, de Clemente Alex. Gröning. 1826. *Von Cölln*, in Ersch and Gruber's Encyclopædia, xviii. p. 4, ss. *Daehne*, de γνώσει Clem. et de Vestigiis Neoplatonicæ Philos. in ea obviis. Leipz. 1831. *Eylert*, Clemens als Philosoph und Dichter, Leipz. 1832. *Baur*, Gnosis, p. 502. *Möhler*, Patrologie, p. 430.) [*Lardner*, Works, ii. 220–24. *Neander*, i. 691. *Bennett*, l. c. p. 33–36.] *Editions* by *Sylburg*, Heidelberg, 1592. **Potter*, Oxon. 1715, fol. Ven. 1757. *R. Klotz*, Lips. 1831, 3 vols. 8. [Bishop *Kaye*, Account of Writings and Opinions of Clem. of Alex., Lond. 1839. Christ. Rev., July, 1852. Journal of Sacred Lit., 1852. *Leutzen*, Erkennen und Glauben. Cl. v. Alex. und Anselm v. Cant. Bonn, 1848. *Reinkens*, De Clem. Alex. Vratislav. 1851. *Reuter*, Clem. Alex. Theol. Moralis. Berol. 1853. *H. Laemmer*, Clem. Alex. de Logo doctrina, Leips. 1855. Clement and the Alexandrian School, in North British Review, Aug. 1855. Abbé *Herbert-Duperron*, Essai sur la Polémique et la Philos. de Clém. d'Alex. Paris, 1855. Alleged fragments of Clem., *Nolte* in Theol. Quartalschrift, 1859, s. 597 sq. Opinions of Cl. Alex. in Huber's Phil. d. Kirchenväter, 1859, pp. 130–184. *Lamson's* Church of First Three Cent., Boston, 1865. Abbé *J. Cognat*, Clément d'Alexandrie, sa doctrine et sa polémique. 8vo. Paris, 1859. *Frepel*, Paris, 1865.]

[11] *Origen*, surnamed ἀδαμάντινος, χαλκέντερος, was born at Alexandria, about the year 185, a disciple of Clement, and died at Tyre in the year 254. He is undoubtedly the most eminent writer of the whole period, and the best representative of the spiritualizing tendency, though not wholly free from great faults into which he was led by his genius. "*According to all appearance he would have avoided most of the weaknesses which disfigure his writings, if understanding, wit, and imagination had been equally strong in him. His reason frequently overcomes his imagination, but his imagination obtains more victories over his reason.*" *Mosheim* (Translat. of the treatise against Celsus, p. 60). Accounts of his life are given in Euseb. vi. 1–6, 8, 14–21, 23–28, 30–33, 36–39, vii. 1. Hieron. De Viris Illustr. c. 54. Gregory Thaumaturg. in Panegyrico. *Huetius* in the Origeniana. *Tillemont*, Mémoires, art. Origène, p. 356–76. *Schröckh*, iv. p. 29. [*Neander*, i. 593. *Lardner*, ii. p. 469–486 and passim.] On his doctrines and writings, comp. *Schnitzer*, Origenes, über die Grundlehren der Glaubenswissenschaft, Stuttg. 1835. * *Thomasius* (*Gottf.*), Origenes, ein Beitrag zur Dogmengeschichte des 3 Jahrhunderts, Nürnberg, 1837. *Redepenning*, Origenes, eine Darstellung seines Lebens und seiner Lehre, 2 Bde. Bonn, 1841–'6. The labors of Origen embraced a wide sphere. We can only refer to what he did for biblical criticism (Hexapla), and exegesis (σημειώσεις, τόμοι, ὁμιλίαι, cf. Philocalia), as well as for homiletics (which appears in his writings in the simplest forms).

His two principal works of doctrinal importance: περὶ ἀρχῶν (De Principiis, libri iv.) edit. by *Redepenning*, Lips. 1836, and *Schnitzer's* translation before mentioned; and κατὰ Κέλσου (contra Celsum) lib. viii. (translated, with notes by *Mosheim*, Hamb. 1745). Minor treatises: De Oratione, De Exhortatione Martyrii, etc. *Complete editions* of his works were published by * *Car. de la Rue*, Paris, 1733, ss. 4 vols. fol. and by *Lommatzsch*, Berl. 1831–'48.

[*Fischer*, Commentatio de Origenis Theologia et Cosmologia. 1846, Greg. Nyss. Doctrina de hominis Natura cum Origen. comparata, *E. G. Moeller*, Halle, 1854. Origen and the Alex. School, North British, 1855. *Mosheim's* Comment. in Murdock's edition, ii. pp. 143–209. Articles on Origen, by *R. Emerson*, in Bib. Repos. iv.; *B. Sears*, in Bib. Sacra, iii.; British Quarterly, by R. A. Vaughan, 1845; *A. Lamson*, in Christ. Examiner, x. and xi., rep. in his Church of first Three Centuries, Bost. 1860. Abbé *E. Joly*, Etudes sur Origène, 1860. Huber's Phil. d. Kirchenväter, 1859. pp. 150–184.] The doctrinal systems of Clement and Origen unite under a more general aspect, and form what is called the theology of the *Alexandrian* school. The distinguishing characteristics of this theology, in a formal point of view, are a leaning to speculation and allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures; as to their matter, they consist of an attempt to spiritualize the ideas, and idealize particular doctrines, and they thus form a striking contrast with the peculiarities of Tertullian in particular. Comp. *Guericke*, De Schola quæ Alexandriæ floruit Catechetica. Halæ, 1824, 2 vols. [*Neander*, l. c. ii. p. 195–234. *Baur*, Gnosis, p. 488–543.]

The *Philosophumena*, ascribed to Origen, and published by Edm. Müller, Oxf. 1851, under his name (Ὠριγένους φιλοσοφούμενα ἢ κατὰ πασῶν αἱρέσεων ἔλεγχος, e codice Paris. nunc primum ed.), is with greater probability assigned to *Hippolytus*, who had been held to be a bishop of Arabia, (misled by Eusebius, vi., 20) but who died, as bishop of Portus Romanus, a martyr's death, it is said, under Maximin (236–238). This work would then be the same with the ἔλεγχος κατὰ πασῶν αἱρέσεων, ascribed to Hippolytus (edited by Duncker and Schneidewin, Gött. 1856–'9), which is by others attributed to the Roman presbyter, Caius (*Baur*, in the Theolog. Jahrb. 1853), which is also found under the name λαβύρινθος (*Photius*, c. 48). Comp. Opp. et Fragmenta, ed. *J. A. Fabricius*, Hamb. 1716–'18, 2 vols. *Haenel*, De Hippolyt. Gött. 1839. * *Jos. Bunsen*, Hippolytus u. seine Zeit. Leipz. 1852–'3. [English edition, 7 vols. 8vo.] *Gieseler*, ubi supra. *Jacobi* in Neander's Dogmengesch. p. 54, and in Zeitschrift f. christl. Wissenschaft, 1831. * *Döllinger*, Hippol. und Callistus. Regensb. 1853. *Ritschl*, in Theol. Jahrb. 1854. *Volkmar*, Hippolytus, 1855. [Comp. articles in Theo. Critic, 1852; Edinburgh Rev. 1852–'53; Christ. Rembr. 1853; Dublin Review, 1853, 1854; North British, 1853; Christ. Review, 1853; North American, 1854; Journal of Class. and Sacred Philol. 1854; New Brunswick Review, 1854; British Qu. 1853; Westminster Review, 1853. Comp. also, *Ch. Wordsworth*, Church of Rome in Third Cent. 2d ed. 1855. *Lenormant*, Controverse sur les Philos. Paris, 1853. *Cruice*, Etudes sur les Philos. 1852.]

§ 27.

THE GENERAL DOCTRINAL CHARACTER OF THIS PERIOD.

It is the characteristic feature of the apologetic period, that the whole system of Christianity, as a religious and moral fact, is considered and defended on all sides, rather than particular doctrines. Still certain doctrines are more discussed, while others receive less attention. Investigations of a theological and christological nature are unquestionably more prominent than those of an anthropological character. The Pauline type of doctrine does not come to its rights as fully as does that of John.[1] Hence, too, the emphatic prominence given to the doctrine of human freedom, to an extent which could not afterward be approved.[2] Next to theology and christology, eschatology was more fully developed in the struggle with millenarianism on the one side, and the skepticism of Grecian philosophers on the other.[3]

[1] Comp. § 18, note 4.

[2] Origen expressly mentions the doctrine concerning the freedom of the will as a part of the prædicatio ecclesiastica; De Princ., procem. § 4, ss.; comp. the Special History of Doctrines, below.

[3] This has its natural grounds. The doctrine of the *Messianic Kingdom* ruled the first period. This turned upon the point that the Lord was twice to come; once in his manifestation in the flesh, and in his future coming to judgment. The doctrine of the resurrection of the body was treated with special predilection. And yet much was left open. Thus Origen expressly says that angelology and demonology, as well as various cosmological questions, had not been adequately defined in the doctrine of the church; De Princip. procem. § 6, 7, 10.

B. SPECIAL HISTORY OF DOCTRINES DURING THE FIRST PERIOD.

FIRST DIVISION.

APOLOGETICO-DOGMATIC PROLEGOMENA.

TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY.—REVELATION AND SOURCES OF REVELATION.—SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.

§ 28

TRUTH AND DIVINITY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION IN GENERAL

*Tzschirner, Geschichte der Apologetik, vol. i. Leipz. 1808. By the same: der Fall des Heidenthums, vol. i. Leipz. 1829. *Clausen, H. N.*, Apologetæ ecclesiæ Christianæ ante-Theodosiani, Havn. 1817, 8. *G. H. van Senden*, Geschichte der Apologetik von den frühesten Zeiten bis auf unsere Tage. Stuttg. II. 8. [*Bolton*, Apologists of Second and Third Centuries, repr. Boston, 1853. *Giles*, Heathen Records and the Script. History, 1857. *Ehrenfeuchter*, Apologetik, in Jahrb. f. deutsche Theologie, 1857. *Frepel*, Les Apologistes, 2. Paris, 1861. *De Pressensé*, Hist. de l'Église, iii., iv. *Werner*, Gesch. d. Apologetik, 3. 1862–5.]

The principal task of this period was to prove the Divine origin of Christianity as the true religion made known by a revelation,[1] and to set forth its internal and external character in relation to both Gentiles and Jews. This was attempted in different ways, according to the different ideas which obtained regarding the nature of the Christian religion. The Ebionites considered the principal object of Christianity to be the realization of the Jewish idea of the Messiah,[2] the Gnostics regarded it as consisting in breaking away from the traditional connection with the Old Test.[3] Between these two extremes the Catholic church endeavored, on the one hand, to preserve this connection with the old revelation; on the other, to point out the new and more perfect elements which constituted the peculiarity of the Christian system.

[1] Here we must not expect to find a distinction made between religion itself and the Christian religion (natural and revealed), or look for a precise definition of the term "religion." Such definitions of the schools did not make their appearance until later, when science and life being separated, learned men

speculated on the objects of science, and reduced experimental truths to general ideas. With the first Christians, Christianity and religion were identical (*Augusti*, p. 197); as, again, in modern times, the principal object of apologetics must be the proof that Christianity is *the* religion, *i. e.*, the only one which can satisfy man (comp. *Lechler*, über den Begriff der Apologetik, in the Studien und Kritiken, 1839, part 3). This view corresponds with the saying of *Minucius Felix*, Oct. c. 38, toward the end: Gloriamur non consequutos, quod illi (Philosophi) summa intentione quæsiverunt nec invenire potuerunt. Ignatius ad Rom. iii.: Οὐ πεισμονῆς ἔργον ἀλλὰ μεγέθους ἐστὶν ὁ χριστιανισμός, ὅταν μισῆται ὑπὸ κόσμου (cf. *Hefele* on the passage). *Justin M.* also shows that revealed truth, as such, does not stand in need of any proof, Dial. c. Tryph. c. 7, p. 109: Οὐ γὰρ μετὰ ἀποδείξεως πεποίηνταί ποτε (οἱ προφῆται) τοὺς λόγους, ἅτε ἀνωτέρω πάσης ἀποδείξεως ὄντες ἀξιόπιστοι μάρτυρες τῆς ἀληθείας. Fragm. de Resurr. ab init.: Ὁ μὲν τῆς ἀληθείας λόγος ἐστὶν ἐλεύθερος καὶ αὐτεξούσιος, ὑπὸ μηδεμίαν βάσανον ἐλέγχου θέλων πίπτειν, μηδὲ τὴν παρὰ τοῖς ἀκούουσι δι' ἀποδείξεως ἐξέτασιν ὑπομένειν. Τὸ γὰρ εὐγενὲς αὐτοῦ καὶ πεποιθὸς αὐτῷ τῷ πέμψαντι πιστεύεσθαι θέλει...Πᾶσα γὰρ ἀπόδειξις ἰσχυροτέρα καὶ πιστοτέρα τοῦ ἀποδεικνυμένου τυγχάνει· εἰ γε τὸ πρότερον ἀπιστούμενον πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἐλθεῖν, ταύτης κομισθείσης ἔτυχε πίστεως, καὶ τοιοῦτον ἐφανη, ὁποῖον ἐλέγετο. Τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας ἰσχυρότερον οὐδὲν, οὐδὲ πιστότερον· ὥστε ὁ περὶ ταύτης ἀπόδειξιν αἰτῶν ὅμοιός ἐστι τῷ τὰ φαινόμενα αἰσθήσεσι, λόγοις θέλοντι ἀποδείκνυσθαι, διότι φαίνεται. Τῶν γὰρ διὰ τοῦ λόγου λαμβανομένων κριτήριόν ἐστιν ἡ αἴσθησις· αὐτῆς δὲ κριτήριον οὐκ ἔστι πλὴν αὐτῆς. Nor do we find any definitions about the nature and idea of *revelation* (contrasted with the truths which come to us by nature and reason), nor the abstract possibility and necessity of revelation, etc., because such contrasts did not then exist. Christianity (in connection with the Old Test.) was considered as the true revelation; even the best ideas of earlier philosophers, compared with it, were only the glimmer of anticipation. Comp. *Justin, M.*, Dial c. Tr. ab initio. *Tert.* Apolog. c. 18 (De Testim. Animæ, c. 2), speaks very decidedly in favor of the positive character of the Christian religion (*fiunt*, non *nascuntur* Christiani), though he also calls the human soul, naturaliter christiana (Apol. c. 17), and ascribes to it instinct preceding all teaching, by which it can, as a pupil of nature, attain to a knowledge of the Divine in nature; De Testim. An. 5. *Clement of Alexandria* also compares the attempt to comprehend the Divine without a higher revelation, to the attempt to run without feet (Cohort. p. 64); and further remarks, that without the light of revelation we should resemble hens that are fattened in a dark cage in order to die (ibid. p. 87). We become a divine race only by the religion of Christ (p. 88, 89), comp. Pæd. i. 2, p. 100, i. 12, p. 156, and in numerous other places. Clement indeed admits that wise men before Christ had approached the truth to a certain extent (compare the next section); but while they sought God by their own wisdom, others (the Christians) find him (better) through the Logos; comp. Pæd. iii. 8, p. 279. Strom. i. 1, p. 319, ibid. i. 6, p. 336. The Clementine Homilies, however, depart from this idea of a positive revelation (17, 8, and 18, 6), and represent the *internal* revelation of the heart as the true revela-

tion, the *external* as a manifestation of the divine ὀργή. Com. *Baumgarten-Crusius*, ii. p. 783; on the other side. *Schliemann*, p. 183, ss. 353, ss.

[2] According to the Clementine Homilies, there is no specific difference between the doctrine of Jesus and the doctrine of Moses. Comp. *Credner*, l. c. part 2, page 254. *Schliemann*, p. 215, ss. *Hilgenfeld*, p. 283 (?).

[3] As most of the Gnostics looked upon the demiurge either as a being that stood in a hostile relation to God, or as a being of limited powers; as they, moreover, considered the entire economy of the Old Test. as a defective and even a perverted institution, they could, consistently, look upon the blessings of Christianity only as a deliverance from the bonds of the demiurge (Comp. the §§ on God, the Fall and Redemption.)

§ 29.

MODE OF ARGUMENT.

[Comp. *Baur*, Dogmengesch. s. 76–9; and his Christenthum in d. drei ersten Jahrhund. s. 357–451.]

Accordingly, the Christian apologists, in opposition to the heathen, defended the history, laws, doctrines, and prophecies of the Old Test. against the attacks of those who were not Jews.[1] On this basis they proceeded to prove the superiority of Christianity in contrast with the Jewish as well as the Pagan systems, by showing how all the prophecies and types of the O. Test. had been fulfilled in Christ;[2] not unfrequently indulging in arbitrary interpretations and fanciful typologies.[3] But as the apologists found in the Old Test. a point of connection with Judaism, so they found in the Grecian philosophy a point of connection with Paganism; only with this difference, that whatever is divine in the latter, is for the most part derived from the Old Test.[4] corrupted by the craft of demons,[5] and appearing, at all events, very imperfect in comparison with Christianity, however great the analogy.[6] Even those writers who, like Tertullian, discarded a philosophical proof of Christianity because they saw in philosophy only an ungodly perversity,[7] could not but admit a profound psychological connection between human nature and the Christian religion (the testimony of the soul),[8] and acknowledged, with the rest, that a leading argument for the divine origin of Christianity was to be derived from its moral effects.[9] Thus the external argument from miracles[10] was adduced only as a kind of auxiliary proof, and it was even now no longer acknowledged in its full authority.[11] Another auxiliary proof was derived from the Sibylline oracles,[12] while the almost miraculous spread of Christianity in the midst of persecutions,[13] and the accomplishment of the prophecy relative to the destruction of Jerusalem,[14] were, like the moral argument, taken from what was occurring at the time.

[1] This argument was founded especially upon the high antiquity of the sacred books, and the wonderful care of God in their preservation; *Josephus* had argued in a similar manner against *Apion*, i. 8. Comp. the section on the Scriptures.

[2] Comp. *Justin, M.*, Apol. i. c. 32–35, Dial. cum Tryphone, § 7, 8, 11. *Athenag.* Leg. c. 9. *Orig.* Contra. Cels. i. 2; Comment. in Joh. T. ii. 28. Opp. iv. p. 87.

[3] Ep. Barn. c. 9: The circumcision of the 318 persons by Abraham (Gen. xvii.) is represented as a prophesy about Christ. The number three hundred and eighteen is composed of three hundred, and eight, and ten. The numeral letters of ten and eight are I and H. (η) which are the initials of the name Ἰησοῦς. The numeral letter of three hundred is T, which is the symbol of the cross. And *Clement of Rome*, in his first Epistle to the Corinthians, which is generally sober enough, says that the scarlet line which Rahab was admonished by the spies to hang out of her house, was a type of the blood of Christ, c. 12. So, too, *Justin M.*, Dialog. cum. Tryph. § 111. According to the latter the two wives of Jacob, Leah and Rachel, are types of the Jewish and Christian dispensations, the two goats on the day of atonement types of the two advents of Christ, the twelve bells upon the robe of the high priest types of the twelve apostles, etc. Justin carries to an extreme length the symbolism about the cross, which he sees, not only in the O. T. (in the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the rod of Aaron, etc.), but also in nature, in the horn of the unicorn, in the human countenance, in the posture of a man engaged in prayer, in the vessel with its sails, in the plow, in the hammer. Comp. Apol. i. c. 55, Dial. cum. Tryph. § 97, and elsewhere. Comp. *Minuc. Felix*, c. 29, who, however does not make it the basis of any further argument. *Irenæus* sees in the three spies of Jericho the three persons of the Trinity, Advers. Hæret. iv. 20. It would be easy to multiply these examples ad infinitum (comp. § 33, note 3). As to the way in which the Septuagint translation was used by Christians in the interpretation of Messianic passages, see *Gieseler* Dogmengesch. p. 61, sq. [Thus *Clement of Rome*, Epist. § 42, cites the passage Isaiah, lx., 17, as referring to bishops and deacons; while it reads, ἀρχοντάς and ἐπισκόπους—which may be only because cited incorrectly from memory. The Christians, too, often accused the Jews of falsifying the Hebrew; for example, the noted passages in Justin, Dial. cum Tryphone, where he says that they left out in Psalm 95 (Hebr. 96, 10)—ἀπὸ τοῦ ξύλου, after ὁ κύριος ἐβασιλευσεν; and Tertullian and Irenæus both cite the passage after Justin; and so in similar passages, alleged to be in Ezra and Jeremiah.]

[4] *Justin, M.*, Apol. i. c. 59. Cohort. ad Græc. c. 14. *Theophil.* Ad Autol. iii. 16, 17, 20, 23. *Tatian* Contra Græc. ab init. and c. 25. *Tertullian*, Apol. c. 19: Omnes itaque substantias, omnesque materias, origines, ordines, venas veterani cujusque stili vestri, gentes etiam plerasque et urbes insignes, canas memoriarum, ipsas denique effigies litterarum indices custodesque rerum, et puto adhuc minus dicimus, ipsos inquam deos vestros, ipsa templa et oracula et sacra, unius interim prophetæ scrinium vincit, in quo videtur thesaurus collocatus totius Judaici sacramenti, et inde etiam nostri. *Clem. Alexand.* Pæd. ii. c. 1, p. 176; c. 10, p. 224; iii. c. 11, p. 286. Stromata, i. p. 355;

vi. p. 752, and many other passages, He therefore calls Plato outright, *ὁ ἐξ Ἑβραίων φιλόσοφος*, Strom. i. 1. Comp. *Baur*, Gnosis, p. 256. *Orig.* Contra Cels. iv. ab init. *Tzschirner*, Geschichte der Apologetik, p. 101, 102.

[5] *Justin M.* Apol. i. c. 54. Thus the demons are said to have heard Jacob when he blessed his sons. But as the heathen could not interpret the passage, Gen. xlix. 11: Binding his foal unto the vine, in its true Messianic sense, they referred it to Bacchus, the finder of the vine, and out of the foal they made Pegasus (because they did not know whether the animal in question was a horse or an ass). In a similar manner a misinterpretation of the prophecy relative to the conception of the virgin (Is. vii. 14), gave rise to the fable of Perseus, etc. (comp. § 49).

[6] *Justin M.* calls in a certain sense Christians all those who live according to the laws of the Logos (reason?) Apology, i. c. 46. The Platonic philosophy is in his opinion not absolutely different (*ἀλλοτρία*) from Christianity. But before the coming of Christ there existed in the world only the scattered seeds (*λόγος σπερματικός*) of what was afterward manifested in Christ as absolute truth, comp. Apol. ii. c. 13. *Clem. Alex.* Strom. i. c. 20, p. 376: *Χωρίζεται δὲ ἡ ἑλληνικὴ ἀλήθεια τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς, εἰ καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετείληφεν ὀνόματος, καὶ μεγέθει γνώσεως καὶ ἀποδείξει κυριωτέρᾳ, καὶ θεία δυνάμει καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους.* (He speaks, however, of philosophy as such, and not of the Stoic, Platonic, Epicurean, Aristotelian, or any other particular system, Strom. i. 7, p. 338); comp. *Baur*, p. 520, ss. On the other contradictions found in *Clement of Alexandria*, in judging of paganism more favorably at one time and less so at another, comp. Baur, p. 532. *Minucius Felix*, c. 16, in opposition to the scholastic wisdom of the ancient philosophers, recommends the philosophy of good sense which is accessible to all (ingenium, quod non studio paratur, sed cum ipsa mentis formatione generatur), and speaks with disdain of mere reliance on authorities; nevertheless, he himself appeals to the doctrines of philosophers, and their partial agreement with Christianity, c. 19, c. 21, c. 34. Such language forms a remarkable contrast with the attack he makes upon Socrates (scurra Atticus) c. 38, to whom others assigned the highest rank among the ancient philosophers.

[7] *Tert.* De Præscr. 7, 8: Hæ sunt doctrinæ hominum et dæmoniorum, prurientibus auribus natæ de ingenio sapientiæ secularis, quam Dominus stultitiam vocans, stulta mundi in confusionem etiam philosophorum ipsius elegit Ea est enim materia sapientiæ secularis, temeraria interpres divinæ naturæ et dispositionis. Ipsæ denique hæreses a philosophia subornantur . . . Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosoloymis? quid Academiæ et Ecclesiæ? quid hæreticis et Christianis? Nostra institutio de porticu Salomonis est, qui et ipse tradiderat Dominum in simplicitate cordis esse quærendum. Viderint, qui Stoicum et Platonicum et dialectum christianismum protulerunt. Nobis curiositate opus non est post Christum Jesum, nec inquisitione post Evangelinum. Cum credimus, nihil desideramus ultra credere. Tertullian calls the philosophers—patriarchæ hæreticorum (De Anima 3; Adv. Hermog. 8), and Plato, omnium hæreticorum condimentarius (De Anima, 23).

[8] *Tert.* De Test. Anim. 1: Novum testimonium advoco, immo omni litteratura notius, omni doctrina agitatius, omni editione vulgatius, toto homine majus, i. e., totum quod est hominis. Consiste in medio, anima . . . . Sed

non eam te advoco, quæ scholis formata, bibliothecis exercitata, academicis et porticibus Atticis pasta, sapientiam ructas. Te simplicem et rudem et impolitam et idioticam compello, qualem te habent qui te solam habent, illam ipsam de compito, de trivio, de textrino totam. Imperitia tua mihi opus est, quoniam aliquantulæ peritiæ nemo credit. Ea expostulo, quæ tecum hominis infers, quæ aut ex temet ipsa, aut ex quocunque auctore tuo sentire didicisti. Ibid: Non es, quod sciam, Christiana: fieri enim, non nasci soles Christiana. Tamen nunc a te testimonium flagitant Christiani, ab extranea adversus tuos, ut vel tibi erubescant, quod vos ob ea oderint et irrideant, quæ te nunc conscium detineant. Non placemus Deum prædicantes hoc nomine unico unicum, a quo omnia et sub quo universa. Dic testimonium, si ita scis. Nam te quoque palam et toto libertate, quia non licet nobis, domi ac foris audimus ita pronuntiare: Quod Deus dederit, et si Deus voluerit, etc. Comp. Apol. c. 17; De Virgin. veland. c. 5 (tacita conscientia naturæ). *Neander*, Antignosticus, p. 86–89. *Schwegler*, Montanismus, p. 28, ss.

[9] *Justin M.* Apology, i. c. 14: Οἱ πάλαι μὲν πορνείαις χαίροντες, νῦν δὲ σωφροσύνην μόνην ἀσπαζόμενοι· οἱ δὲ καὶ μαγικαῖς τέχναις χρώμενοι, ἀγαθῷ καὶ ἀγεννήτῳ θεῷ ἑαυτοὺς ἀνατεθεικότες· χρημάτων δὲ καὶ κτημάτων οἱ πόρους παντὸς μᾶλλον στέργοντες, νῦν καὶ ἃ ἔχομεν εἰς κοινὸν φέροντες, καὶ παντὶ δεομένῳ κοινωνοῦντες· οἱ μισάλληλοι δὲ καὶ ἀλληλοφόνοι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς οὐχ ὁμοφύλους διὰ τὰ ἔθη ἑστίας κοινὰς μὴ ποιούμενοι, νῦν μετὰ τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὁμοδίαιτοι γινόμενοι, καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν εὐχόμενοι καὶ τοὺς ἀδίκως μισοῦντας πείθειν πειρώμενοι, ὅπως οἱ κατὰ τὰς τοῦ Χριστοῦ καλὰς ὑποθημοσύνας βιώσαντες εὐέλπιδες ὦσι, σὺν ἡμῖν τῶν αὐτῶν παρὰ τοῦ πάντων δεσπόζοντος Θεοῦ τυχεῖν. Dial. cum Tryph. § 8, 30. Orat. ad Græcos, 5. Epist. ad Diognetum, 5. *Athenag.* Leg. c. 11. *Tert.* Apol., ab init. *Minucius Felix*, c. 31, 37, 38. *Orig.* contra Cels. i. c. 26. Opp. i. p. 345. They were in practice compelled to have recourse to this argument by the accusations of the heathen, which they endeavored to refute. [Comp. *Tholuck*, Wunder in d. Kirche, in his Vermischte Schriften, i. 28 sq.; the works of *Middleton* and *Warburton*; *Newman's* Essay, prefixed to his translation of Fleury i., in opposition to *Isaac Taylor's* Ancient Christianity. Bp. *Kaye* on the Cessation of Miracles, in the preface to his Life of Justin Martyr. *Blunt* on the Early Fathers. Comp. Christ. Rembr. 1858. Christian Review (New York) on Ecclesl. Miracles, April, 1860. Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. iv. 3, preserves the argument of Quadratus: "The deeds of our Saviour were always at hand, for they were true; those who were healed, those who were raised from the dead, were not merely seen cured and raised, but they were always at hand; and that, not merely while our Saviour was on earth, but after he had gone away they continued a considerable time, so that some of them reached even to our times." See Bolton's Apologists, u. s.]

[10] Not only were those miracles adduced which are mentioned in Scripture, but also some which still took place. (*Just. M.* Dialog. c. Tryph. c. 39, 82, 88. *Iren.* ii. 31, 32. *Orig.* Contra Cels. iii. 24, Opp. i. p. 461.) At the same time the Christians did not directly deny the existence of miracles in the heathen world, but ascribed them to the influence of demons (ibid.

and *Minucius Fel.* Oct. c. 26); the heathen, on the other hand, attributed the Christian miracles to magic. Comp. *Tatian* Contra Græcos, c. 18. *Orig.* Contra Cels. i. 38, 67, 68, iii. 24–33. We find, however, that Minucius Felix denies the reality of miracles and myths in the pagan world, on the ground of the physical impossibility of such supernatural events, a ground which might, with equal propriety, have been taken by the opponents of Christianity. Octav. c. 20: Quæ si essent facta, fierent; quia fieri non possunt, ideo nec facta sunt; and c. 23: Cur enim si nati sunt, non hodieque nascuntur?

[11] Though *Origen*, in speaking of the evidence derived from miracles, as compared with that from prophecy, calls the former the evidence of power, and the latter the evidence of the spirit (Contra Cels. i. 2), yet he subordinates the former to the latter. He was well aware that a miracle has its emphatic effect only upon the person we wish to convince, only when it is performed in his presence, but that it loses its direct force as evidence with those whose minds are prejudiced against the veracity of the narrative, and who reject miracles as myths; comp. Comment. in Joh. Opp. iv. p. 87. So, too, the Clementine Homilies do not admit miracles as evidences, while they lay greater stress upon prophecies. (*Credner*, l. c. part 3, p. 278, comp. with p. 245). Origen spoke also of *spiritual* and *moral* miracles, of which the visible miracles (admitting their importance as facts) may be considered as symbols; Contra Cels. ii. p. 423: "I may say that, according to the promise of Jesus, his disciples have performed greater miracles than himself; for still the blind in spirit have their eyes opened, and those deaf to the voice of virtue, listen eagerly to the doctrine concerning God and eternal life; many who were lame in the inner man, skip like the hart," etc. Comp. Contra Cels. iii. 24; where he speaks of the healing of the sick and of prophesying as an indifferent thing (*μέσον*), which considered in itself does not possess any moral value.

[12] *Theophilus* Ad Autolycum, ii. 32, 36, 38. *Clem.* Cohort. p. 86; Stromata, vi. 5, 762. Celsus charged the Christians with having corrupted the Sibylline books (Origen Contra Cels. vii. 32, 34). *Editions* of the Sibyll. oracles were published by *Servatius Gallœus*, Amstel. 1699, 4, and by *Angelo Mai*, Mediolani, 1817, 8. On their origin and tendency, comp. *Thorlacius*, Libri Sibyllistarum veteris ecclesiæ, etc. Havniæ, 1815, 8, and *Bleek*, in the Berliner theolog. Zeitschrift, i. 120, ss. 172, ss. [*Mai* published Books, ix.–xiv. in his Script. Veterum nova Collectio, vol. iii. *Lücke* Einleitung in die Offenbarung Johan. 2d ed. *M. Stuart* on the Apocalypse, vol. i. *Blondel* on Sibyl. Oracles, transl. by *Davies*, Lond 1661. Oracula Sibyllina, ed. *P. L. Courier*, Paris, 1854; ed. with a German version by *Friedlob*, Lpz. 1852; ed. by *Alexander*, 2 Tom. Paris, 1841–'53. *Volckmann*, De Orac. Sibyl. 1853.] The case of the Ὑστάσπης, to which Justin M. Apol. i. 20, and Clem. l. c. appeal, is similar to that of the Sibylline books. Comp. *Walch*, *Ch. F. W.*, de Hystaspide in vol. i. of the Comment. Societ. Reg. Götting. But the oracles of the heathen though a partial use was made of them, as well as of their miracles, were attributed to demoniacal agency; Minuc. Fel. c. 26, 27, Clement. Homil. iii. 9–13.

[13] *Origen* Contra Cels. i. p. 321, ii. 361, De Princip. iv. *Justin, M.*, himself

(and many others) had been converted by witnessing the firmness which many of the martyrs exhibited. Comp. his Apology, ii. p. 96, and Dialog. cum Tryph. § 121: Καὶ οὐδένα οὐδέποτε ἰδεῖν ἔστιν ὑπομείναντα διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον πιστιν ἀποθανεῖν, διὰ δὲ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἐκ παντὸς γένους ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπομείναντας καὶ ὑπομένοντας πάντα πάσχειν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ἀρνήσασθαι αὐτὸν ἰδεῖν ἔστι κ. τ. λ.

[14] Origen contra Celsum, ii. 13, Opp. i. p. 400.

§ 30.

SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE.

Orelli, J. C., Selecta patrum ecclesiæ capita ad εἰσηγητικὴν sacram pertimentia, Turici, 1820. Comp. his essay: Tradition und Scription, in *Schulthess* über Rationalism. und Supranaturalism. *Christmann, W. L.*, über Tradition und Schrift, Logos und Kabbala, Tübingen, 1825. *Schenkel, D.*, über das ursprüngliche Verhältniss der Kirche zum Kanon, Basel, 1838. *Sack, Nitzsch* und *Lücke*, Ueber d. Ansehen d. heiligen Schrift und ihr Verhältniss zur Glaubensregel . . . drei Sendschreiben an Prof. Delbrück. Bonn. 1827. *J. L. Jacobi*, Die Kirchliche Lehre von der Tradition, etc. 1 Abth. Berlin, 1847. [*J. H. Friedlieb*, Schrift, Tradition und kirchliche Auslegung (for the first five centuries), Bresl. 1854. *Kuhn*, Die Tradition (early testimonies) in Theol. Quartalschrift, 1848, *Daniel*, Theolog. Controversen. *William Goode*, Divine Rule, repr. Phil. 2 vols. 1843. *Palmer* on the Church, vol. 2, pp. 11–93. *E. B. Pusey*, Rule of Faith. *Perrone*, Protest. and Rule of Faith, 3 vols. Rome, 1853; in French, 1854. Wiseman (Cardinal), in his Essays, ii., p. 108, sq. *H. J. Holtzman*, Canon und Tradition, 1859.]

The original living source of the knowledge of all Christian truth was the Spirit of Christ himself, who, according to his promise, guided the Apostles, and the first heralds of Christianity, into all truth. The Catholic Church, therefore, considered herself from the first as possessing this spirit; and consequently, that the guardianship of the true tradition, and the development of the doctrines which it teaches, were committed to her.[1] A work which only the first church could perform, was to preserve the oral tradition, and to collect the written apostolical documents into a canon of Scripture. It was not until this canon was nearly completed that the tradition of the church, both oral and written, came to be considered, along with the sacred canon, as a distinct branch of the one original source.[2]

[1] The doctrine concerning the Scripture and tradition can, then, be fully understood only when taken in connection with the dogma concerning the church (§ 71).

[2] On this account it is not correct to represent Scripture and tradition as two sources flowing alongside of each other. On the contrary, *both* flow from one *common* source, and separate only after some time. The same term κανών (regula scil. fidei) was first applied to both. For its usage comp. *Suicer* (Thesaurus Ecclesiast. sub voce) and *Planck, H.*, Nonnulla de Significatu Canonis in Ecclesia Antiqua ejusque Serie recte constituenda, Gött.

1820. *Nitzsch*, System der christlichen Lehre, § 40, 41. [*Lardner*, Works, v. p. 257.]

According to the Montanists, there are various historical stages or periods of revelation, viz., 1. *The law and the prophets;* the period of primitive revelation, which extends to the manifestation of Christ, and corresponds to the *duritia cordis*. 2. *The period of the Christian revelation*, ending with the person of Christ, and in the circle of the Apostles, and corresponding to the *infirmitas carnis*. 3. *The period of the revelation of the Paraclete*, extending to the end of time, and corresponding to the *sanctitas spiritualis*. Comp. Tertull. De Monogam. 14; *Schwegler*, Montanismus, p. 87. (This, however, refers primarily to the moral, and not to the doctrinal.)

§ 31.

CANON OF THE SACRED SCRIPTURES.

[*Cosin*, Scholastic History of the Canon, 4to, Lond. 1657, 1672. *Du Pin*, History of the Canon and Writers of the Books of the Old and New Test., 2 vols. fol. Lond. 1699–1700. *Schmid*, Historia Antiq. et Vindicatio Canonis V. et N. T. Lips. 1775. *Jones*, New and Full Method of settling the Canonic. Authority of the N. Test. 3 vols. *Alexander*, Canon of the O. and N. Test. ascertained. Philad. 1826. **Lardner*, *N.*, Credibility of the Gospel History (Works, i. to iv. and v. to p. 251). *Alexander*, *W. L.*, on the Canon, in *Kitto*, Cycl. of Bibl. Liter. where the literature is given.] *J. Kirchhofer*, Quellensammlung zur Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Kanons bis auf Hieronymus, Zur. 1844, II.

[F. C. Baur, on the primitive sense of Canon (not, having the force of law, but, writings definitely set apart) in Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theol. 1858. *W. J. Thiersch*, Die Kirche im apost. Zeitalter, und die Entstehung der N. Test. Schriften, 1852. *Oehler*, art. Kanon in Herzog's Realencycl. *B. F. Westcott*, Hist. of Canon of N. T. Lond. 1845. Testimonia Ante-Nicæna pro Auctoritate S. Script, in Routh's Reliquiæ Sacræ, Tom. v. 1848, pp. 336–354. Most Ancient Canon of New Test. *R. Cresswell*, in Theol. Critic, Sept. 1852. *Credner*, Die ältesten Verzeichnisse der heil. Schriften, in Theol. Jahrb. 1857. *Jan. Van Gilse*, Disp. de antiquis. Lib. Sacr. Nov. Test. Catalog. Amstelod. 1852. *P. Bötticher*, Versuch einer Herstellung des Canon Muratorianus, in Zeitschrift f. d. luth. Theol. 1854. *C. Credner*, Gesch. d. N. Test. Canon, ed. Volckmar, Berlin, 1860.]

Before the formation of the Canon of the New Testament, that of the Old Testament,[1] long since closed, was held in high esteem in the Catholic church. The Gnostics, however, and among them the Marcionites in particular, rejected the Old Test.[2] Gradually the Christian Church felt the need of having the writings of the apostles and evangelists in a collective form. These writings owed their origin to different causes. The apostolical epistles were primarily intended to meet the exigencies of the times; the narratives of the so-called evangelists[3] had likewise been composed with a view to supply present wants, but also with reference to posterity. These testimonies of primitive and apostolical Christianity, in a collected form, would serve as an authoritative standard, and form a barrier

against the introduction of all that was either of a heterogeneous nature, or of a more recent date, which was trying to press into the church (apocryphal and heretical). *The Canon of the New Testament,* however, was only gradually formed, and closed. In the course of the second century the four gospels were received by the church in the form in which we now have them,[4] with a definite exclusion of the gospels favored by the heretics.[5] In addition, at the close of our present period, besides the Acts of the Apostles by Luke, there were also recognized 13 Epistles of Paul, the Epistle to the Hebrews, which, however, only a part of the church considered to be a work of Paul,[6] together with the first Epistle of John, and the first Epistle of Peter. With regard to the second and third Epistles of John, the Epistles of James, Jude, and the second of Peter, and, lastly, the Book of Revelation, the opinions as to their authority were yet for some time divided.[7] On the other hand, some other writings, which are not now considered as forming a part of the Canon, viz., the Epistles of Barnabas and Clement, and the Shepherd of Hermas, were held by some (viz. Clement and Origen) in equal esteem with the Scriptures, and quoted as such.[8] The whole collection, too (so far as it was had), was already called by Tertullian, Novum Testamentum (Instrumentum); and by Origen ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη.[9]

[4] A difference of opinion obtained only in reference to the use of Greek writings of later origin (Libri Ecclesiastici, Apocrypha). The Jews themselves had already made a distinction between the Canon [?] of the Egyptian Jews and the Canon of the Jews of Palestine, comp. *Münscher*, Handbuch, vol. i. p. 240, ss., *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. p. 86 sq., and the introductions to the O. Test. Melito of Sardis (in Euseb. iv. 26), and Origen (ibid. vi. 25), give enumerations of the books of the O. Test., which nearly coincide. [*Lardner*, ii. p. 158, 159; 493–513. *Stuart*, Critical Hist. and Defense of the O. Test. Canon, p. 431, ss.] The difference between what was original, and what had been added in later times, was less striking to those Christians who, being unacquainted with the Hebrew, used only the Greek version. Yet Justin M. does not quote the apocrypha of the O. Test., though he follows the Septuagint version; comp. *Semisch*, II. p. 3, ss. On the other hand, other church writers cite even the fourth Book of Ezra, and Origen defends the tale about Susanna, as well as the books of Tobias and Judith (Ep. ad Julium Africanum); although he also expressly distinguishes the Book of Wisdom from the canon, and assigns to it a lower authority (Prolog. in Cant.). [Comp. *Fritzsche*, Kurzgef. Comm. zu den Apocryph. des alt. Test. 1853–6. *J. H. Thornwell*, Arguments of Rome in behalf of the Apocrypha, 1845. *Stowe*, on Apoc. in Bib. Sacra, 1854. Book of Judith, in Journal of Sac. Lit. 1856. *Volckmar*, Composition des Buchs Judith, Theol. Jahrb. 1857; and on Book of Ezra, Zürich, 1858, comp. *Hilgenfeld*, in Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theol. 1858. *R. A. Lipsius*, Das Buch Judith, Zeitschrift

f. wiss. Theol. 1859. *A. von Gutschmidt*, Apokalypse des Esra, ibid. 1860. *Bleek*, Die Stellung d. Apocryphen, in Stud. u. Krit. 1853.]

[2] Comp. *Neander's* Gnostiche Systeme, p. 276, ss. *Baur*, Christliche Gnosis, p. 240, ss. The Clementine Homilies also regarded many statements in the O. Test. as contrary to truth, and drew attention to the contradictions which are found there, Hom. iii. 10, 642, and other passages. Comp. *Credner*, l. c. and *Baur*, p. 317, ss. pp. 366, 367. [*Lardner*, viii. 485–489. *Norton*, l. c. iii. p. 238.]

[3] It is well known that the words *εὐαγγέλιον*, *εὐαγγελιστής*, had a very different meaning in primitive Christianity; comp. the lexicons to the N. Test. and *Suicer*, Thes. pp. 1220 and 1234.—*Justin, M.*, however, remarks (Apol. i. c. 66), that the writings which he called *ἀπομνημονεύματα* of the Apostles, were also called *εὐαγγέλια*. But it has been questioned whether we are to understand by *εὐαγγέλια* the four canonical gospels; see *Schwegler*, Nachapostol. Zeitalter, p. 216, ss. (Against him, *Semisch*, Denkw. des Justin, Hamb. 1848.) Concerning these *ἀπομνημ.*, and the earliest collections of the Gospel-narratives (*ὁ κύριος*), the Diatessaron of Tatian, etc. comp. the Introductions to the N. Test. [*Gieseler*, Ueber die Entstehung und frühesten Schicksale der Evangel. 1818. *Lardner, N.*, On the Credibility of the Gospel history. (Works, i. iv. v. to p. 251.) *Norton, A.*, On the Genuineness of the Gospels, vol. i. *Tholuck, A.*, in *Kitto*, l. c. art. Gospel.]

[4] *Irenæus*, adv. Haer. iii. 11, 7, attempts to explain the number four on cosmico-metaphysical grounds: *Ἐπειδὴ τέσσαρα κλίματα τοῦ κοσμοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἐσμὲν, εἰσὶ, καὶ τέσσαρα καθολικὰ πνεύματα, κατέσπαρται δὲ ἡ ἐκκλησία ἐπὶ πάσης τῆς γῆς. Στύλος δὲ καὶ στήριγμα ἐκκλησίας τὸ εὐαγγέλιον καὶ πνεῦμα ζωῆς κ. τ. λ.* Tertull. adv. Marc. iv. 2, 5. Clement of Alex. in Euseb. vi. 13. Origen in tom i. in Johan, Opp. iv. p. 5. For further testimonies of antiquity comp. the Introductions (*de Wette*, p. 103) [and the works of *Lardner* in particular].

[5] Orig. Hom. i. in Luc. Opp. T. iii. p. 933, multi conati sunt scribere evangelia, sed non omnes recepti, etc. [The principal spurious gospels are the following: The Gospel of the Infancy of Jesus; the Gospel of Thomas the Israelite; the Prot-evangelion of James; the Gospel of the Nativity of Mary; the Gospel of Nicodemus, or the Acts of Pilate; the Gospel of Marcion; the Gospel of the Hebrews (most probably the same with that of the Nazarenes), and the Gospel of the Egyptians.] On these uncanonical Gospels, and on the Apocryphal Gospels of the Infancy and Passion of Christ, compare the introductions to the N. Test. and the treatises of *Schneckenburger*, *Hahn*, etc., *Fabricius*, Codex. Apocryph. N. Test. iii. Hamb. 1719, and *Thilo, D. I. C.*, Cod. Apocr. N. Test. Lipsiæ, 1832. *Ullmann*, historisch oder mythisch. [*Lardner*, Works, ii. 91–93, 236, 250, 251; iv. 97, 106, 131, 463; viii. 524–535. *Norton*, l. c. iii. p. 214–286. *Wright, W.*, in Kitto, l. c. art. Gospels, spurious, where the literature is given.] The Acts of the Apostles became generally known at a later period. Justin Martyr does not refer to it, nor does he cite any Pauline epistle, though Pauline reminiscences are found in his works; see *Semisch*, p. 7, sq., and also his Apostolische Denkwürdigkeiten. On the Gospels of Marcion see the treatises of *Franck* (Studien und Kritiken, 1855), and Volckmar, Das Evang. Marcion's, Leipz. 1852.

[*D. Harting*, Quæst. de Marcione, Trajecti ad Rhenum, 1849. *Hilgenfeld*, Untersuchungen, Halle, 1850, and in Niedner's Zeitschrift, 1855. *Ritschl*, Das Evang. Marcion und die Kanon. Evang. Tübing. 1817. Marcion and his Relation to St. Luke, in Church Review, Oct. 1856. Rud. Hofmann, Das Leben Jesu nach den Apokryphen, Leipz. 1851; comp. O. B. Frothingham in Christ. Exam. 1852. Evangelia Apocrypha, ed *C. Tischendorf*, Lipz. 1853; comp. Ellicott in Cambridge Essays, 1856. *Giles*, The Uncanonical Gospels, etc., collected, 2, 8vo. Lond. 1853. *C. Tischendorf*, Acta Apost. Apoc. 1851; comp. Kitto's Journal of Sac. Lit. 1852.]

[6] Comp. *Bleek's* Einleitung zum Briefe an die Hebräer. Berlin, 1828. *De Wette*, Einleitung ins N. Test. ii. p. 247. [*Stuart's* Comment. on the Epistle to the Heb. 2d. ed. Andov. 1833. *Alexander, W. L.*, in Kitto, l. c. sub voce, where the literature is given.]

[7] The Canon of Origen in Euseb. vi. 25. [*Lardner*, ii. 493–513.] The controversy on the Book of Revelation was connected with the controversy on millennarianism. Comp. *Lücke*, Versuch einer vollständigen Einleitung in die Offenbarung Johannis, und die gesammte apokryphische Litteratur. Bonn, 1832, p. 261, ss. and 2d ed. [* *Davidson, S.*, in Kitto, l. c. sub voce Revelation. *Stuart*, Comment. on the Apocalypse, i. p. 290, ss. *A. Hilgenfeld*, Die jüdische Apokalyptik in ihrer gesch. Entwicklung. Jena. 1857.]

[8] Clem. Strom. i. 7, p. 339, ii. 6, p. 445, ii. 7, p. 447 (ii. 15, ii. 18), iv. 17, p. 609, v. 12, p. 693, vi. 8, pp. 772, 773. Orig. Comment. in Epist. ad Rom. Opp. iv. p. 683. (Comment. in Matth. Opp. iii. p. 644.) Hom. 88, in Num. T. ii. p. 249. Contra Celsum i. 1, §63, Opp. i. 378. (Comment. in Joh. T. iv. p. 153), De Princ. ii. 3, T. i. 82. Euseb. iii. 16. *Münscher*, Handbuch, i. p. 289. *Möhler*, Patrologie, i. p. 87. [*Lardner*, ii. 18, 247, 528; ii. p. 186, 187; 249, 303, 304, 530–532.] The Apocryphal book of Enoch was put by Tertullian on a line with Scripture; De Cultu. Fem. i., 3. [On Enoch, comp. the treatises of Dillman and Ewald, 1854; *Köstlin* in Theo. Jahrb., 1856.]

[9] Tertullian Adv. Marc. iv., 1. Origen De Princip. iv. 1. Gieseler in Dogmengesch. p. 93.

§ 32.

INSPIRATION AND EFFICACY OF THE SCRIPTURES.

Sonntag, G. F. N., Doctrina Inspirationis ejusque Ratio, Historia et usus popularis, Heidelberg, 1810, 8. *Rudelbach, A. G.*, die Lehre von der Inspiration der heiligen Schrift, mit Berücksichtigung der neuesten Untersuchungen darüber von *Schleiermacher, Twesten*, und *Steudel*. (Zeitschrift für die gesammte lutherische Theologie und Kirche, edited by Rudelbach and Guerike, 1840, i. 1.) *Credner*, De Librorum N. T. Inspiratione quid statuerint Christiani ante seculum tertium medium, Jen. 1828, and his Beiträge zur Einleitung in die Bibl. Schriften, Halle, 1832. *W. Grimm*, Inspiration, in Gruber and Ersch, Encyclop. sect. ii. vol. xix. [*B. F. Westcott*, Catena on Inspiration, in his Elements of Gospel Harmony, 1851, and Introd. to Gospels, 1860.] *C. Wordsworth*, Insp. of Holy Script., 2d ed. 1851 (also on the Canon). *William Lee*, The Insp. of Holy Scripture, Lond. 1854; New York, 1857. Patristic Test. to Inspiration, in Princeton Review, 1851. *A. Tholuck*, Die Inspirationslehre, in Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theol. (transl. in Journal of Sac. Lit. 1854), and in Herzog's Realencyclopädie. *R. Rothe*, Studien und Kritiken, 1859, 1860; and, Zur Dogmatik, 1863.

That the prophets and apostles taught under the influence of the Holy Spirit, was the universal belief of the ancient church, founded in the testimony of Scripture itself.[1] But this living idea of inspiration was by no means confined to the written letter. The Jews, indeed, had come to believe in the verbal inspiration of their sacred writings, before the canon of the New Testament was completed, at a time when, with them, the living source of prophecy had ceased to flow. This theory of verbal inspiration may have been, in its external form, mixed up to some extent with the heathen notions concerning the μαντική (art of soothsaying),[2] but it did not spring from them. It showed itself in an adventurous form in the fable about the origin of the Septuagint version, which was current even among many Christian writers.[3] The fathers, however, in their opinions respecting inspiration, wavered between a more and less strict view.[4] Verbal inspiration is throughout referred by them more distinctly to the scriptural testimonies found in the Old, rather than in the New Testament;[5] and yet we already find very positive testimonies as to the inspiration of the latter.[6] They frequently appeal to the connection existing between the Old and the New Testaments,[7] consequently implying that the two parts of Scripture belong together. *Origen* goes to the opposite extreme, and maintains that there had been no sure criterion of the inspiration of the Old Testament before the coming of Christ; that this inspiration only follows from the Christian point of view.[8] All, however, insisted on the practical importance of the Scripture, its richness of Divine wisdom clothed in unadorned simplicity, and its fitness to promote the edification of believers.[9]

[1] 2 Tim. iii. 16; 2 Pet. i. 19–21.

[2] *Philo* was the first writer who transferred the ideas of the ancients concerning the μαντική (comp. Phocylides, v. 121, Plutarch, De Pythiæ Oraculis, and De Placitis Philosophorum, v. 1), to the prophets of the O. Test. (De Spec. Legg. iii. ed. *Mangey*, ii. 343, Quis div. rerum Her; *Mangey*, i. 510, 511; De Præm. et Pœn. ii. 417, comp. *Gfrörer*, l. c. p. 54, ss. *Dähne*, l. c. p. 58). *Josephus*, on the other hand, adopts the more limited view of verbal inspiration, Contra Apion, i. 7, 8. [For a full view of the opinions of Philo and Josephus, see Lee, u. s. Append. F.] The influence of heathenism is wholly denied by *Schwegler* (Montan. p. 101 sq.); against this, *Semisch*, Justin Mart. ii. p. 19; Baumgarten-Crusius, Comp. ii. p. 52 and 53, with the remarks of Hase. At any rate, "the Jewish and heathen notions of prophecy only gave the forms, into which flowed the church idea of the Holy Spirit in the Scriptures." The idea of the μαντική was carried out in all its consequences by one section of the Christian church, viz., the Montanists, who attached chief importance to the unconscious state of the person filled with the Spirit, comp. *Schwegler*, Montanismus, p. 99. Allusions to it are also found in the writings of some fathers, especially *Athenagoras*, Leg. c. 9.

Κατ' ἐκστασιν τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς λογισμῶν κινήσαντος αὐτοὺς τοῦ θείου πνεύματος. Comp. Tert. Advers. Marc. iv. c. 22. *Origen* speaks very decidedly against it; Contra Cels. vii. 4. Opp. i. p. 596.

[8] The fable given by Aristeas was repeated with more or less numerous additions and embellishments by other writers, comp. *Josephus*, Antiq. xii. c. 2. Philo, De Vita Mos. 660. *Stahl*, in Eichhorn's Repertorium für biblische und morgenländische Litteratur, i. p. 260, ss. *Eichhorn*, Einleitung ins Alte Test. § 159–338. *Rosenmüller*, Handbuch für Litteratur der biblischen Kritik und Exegese, ii. p. 334, ss. *Jahn*, Einleitung ins Alte Test. § 33–67. *Berthold*, § 154–190. *De Wette*, i. p. 58. *Münscher*, Handbuch, i. p. 307, ss. *Gfrörer*, p. 49. *Dähne*, i. 57, ii. 1, ss. [*Davidson, S.*, Lectures on Biblical Criticism, Edinb. 1839, p. 35–44. The same in *Kitto*, Cyclop. of Bibl. Literat. art. Septuagint.] According to Philo, even the grammatical errors of the LXX. are inspired, and offer welcome material to the allegorical interpreter, *Dähne*, i. p. 58. Comp. Justin M. Coh. ad Græc. c. 13. Irenæus, iii. 21. Clem. of Alex. Strom. i. 21, p. 410. *Clement* perceives in the Greek version of the original the hand of Providence, because it prevented the Gentiles from pleading ignorance in excuse of their sins, Strom. i. 7, p. 338.

[4] Philo had already taught degrees in inspiration, comp. De Vita, Mos. iii. (Tom. ii., p. 161, ed. Mangey). The apostolical Fathers speak of inspiration in very general terms; in quoting passages from the O. Test., they use indeed the phrase: λέγει τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, or similar expressions, but they do not give any more definite explanation regarding the manner of this inspiration. Comp. *Clement of R.* in several places; *Ignat.* ad Magn. c. 8, ad Philadelph. c. 5, etc. *Sonntag*, Doctrina Inspirationis, § 16. *Justin M.* is the first author in whose writings we meet with a more definite, doctrinal explanation of the process, in the locus classicus, Cohort. ad Græc. § 8: Οὔτε γὰρ φύσει οὔτε ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἐννοίᾳ οὕτω μεγάλα καὶ θεῖα γινώσκειν ἀνθρώποις δυνατὸν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἄνωθεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἁγίους ἄνδρας τηνικαῦτα κατελθούσῃ δωρεᾷ, οἷς οὐ λόγων ἐδέησε τέχνης, οὐδὲ τοῦ ἐριστικῶς τι καὶ φιλονείκως εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καθαροὺς ἑαυτοὺς τῇ τοῦ θείου πνεύματος παρασχεῖν ἐνεργείᾳ, ἵν' αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον ἐξ οὐρανοῦ κατιὸν πλῆκτρον, ὥσπερ ὀργάνῳ κιθάρας τινὸς ἢ λύρας, τοῖς δικαίοις ἀνδράσι χρώμενον, τὴν τῶν θείων ἡμῖν καὶ οὐρανίων ἀποκαλύψῃ γνῶσιν· διὰ τοῦτο τοίνυν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος καὶ μιᾶς γλωττης καὶ περὶ θεοῦ, καὶ περὶ κόσμου κτίσεως, καὶ περὶ πλάσεως ἀνθρώπου, καὶ περὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς ἀθανασίας καὶ τῆς μετὰ τὸν βίον τοῦτον μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι κρίσεως, καὶ περὶ πάντων ὧν ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἐστιν εἰδέναι, ἀκολούθως καὶ συμφώνως ἀλλήλοις ἐδίδαξαν ἡμᾶς, καὶ ταῦτα διαφόροις τόποις τε καὶ χρόνοις τὴν θείαν ἡμῖν διδασκαλίαν παρεοχηκότες. Whether Justin here maintains a pure passivity on the part of the writer, or whether the peculiar structure of the instrument, determining the tone, is to be taken into consideration, see *Semisch*, p. 18, who identifies the view of Justin and the Montanistic; *Schwegler*; Montanism, p. 101; and *Neander*, Dogmengesch. p. 99. ["Justin transfers the Platonic relation of the Νοῦς to the νοερόν in man, to the relation of the λόγος to the σπέρμα λογικόν, the human reason allied to the divine."] From the conclusion at which Justin arrives, it is also apparent that he limits inspiration to what is religious, to what is necessary

to be known in order to be saved.—The theory proposed in the third book of *Theophilus ad Autolycum*, c. 23, has a more external character; he ascribes the correctness of the Mosaic Chronology, and subjects of a similar nature, to Divine inspiration; [lib. iii. c. 23 : *ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κτίσεως, ἣν ἀνέγραψε Μωσῆς ὁ θεράπων τοῦ θεοῦ διὰ πνεύματος Ἁγίου.*] Comp. also *Athenag.* Leg. c. 7, and c. 9 (where the same figure occurs; *ὡσεὶ αὐλητὴς αὐλὸν ἐμπνεύσαι*).—The views of *Irenæus* on inspiration were equally strict and positive, Advers. Hæret. ii. 28: Scripturæ quidem perfectæ sunt quippe a verbo Dei et Spiritu ejus dictæ, and other passages contained in the third book. *Tertullian* De præscript. Hæret. 8, 9, Advers. Marc. iii. 6. Apol. c. 18 (comp. however, § 34).—*Clement of Alexandr.* calls the sacred Scriptures in different places *γραφὰς θεοπνεύστας*, or quotes *τὸ γὰρ στομα κυριου, τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα ἐλάλησε ταῦτα*, etc. Coh. ad Gr. p. 66, 86; ibidem, p. 67, he quotes Jeremiah, and then corrects himself in these words: *μᾶλλον δὲ ἐν Ἱερεμιᾷ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα*, etc., and likewise Pæd. i. 7, p. 134: *Ὁ νόμος διὰ Μωσέως ἐδόθη, οὐχὶ ὑπὸ Μωσέως, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ μὲν τοῦ λόγου, διὰ Μωσέως δὲ τοῦ θεράποντος αὐτοῦ.* [Clement, Pæd. lib. i. § 6 : *Διὰ τοῦτο ἄρα μυστικῶς τὸ ἐν τῷ Ἀποστόλῳ Ἅγιον πνεῦμα, τῇ τοῦ Κυρίου ατοχρώμενον φωνῇ, Γάλα ὑμας ἐπότισα* (1 Cor. iii., 2), *λέγει.*] On the infallibility of the inspired writings, see Strom. ii. p. 432, vii. 16, p. 897. *Cyprian* calls all the books of the Bible divinæ plenitudinis fontes, Advers. Jud. præf. p. 18, and uses in his quotations the same phraseology which Clement employs, De Unit. Eccles. p. 111, De Opere et Eleem. p. 201. [De Op. et Eleem.; "Loquitur in Script. Divinis Spiritus Sanctus;" "Item beatus Apostolus Paulus dominicæ inspirationis gratia plenus." De Unit. Eccl.: "Per Apostolum præmonet Spiritus Sanctus et dicit: (1 Cor. xi., 19), Oportet et hæreses esse."]

[5] Thus, Justin Mart. speaks only of the inspiration of the Old Test. with emphatic interest, although he undoubtedly carried over the idea of inspiration to the New Test., see *Semisch*, ii., p. 12. That he held the evangelists to be inspired, see ibid. p. 22 (against Credner). Comp. Jacobi, ubi supra. p. 57, sq.

[6] The doctrine about inspiration, as set forth in the N. Test. writings, stood in close connection with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit and his work. But the fathers did not think so much of the apostles as *writers*, as of the power which was communicated to them to *teach*, and to perform miracles. It was only by degrees, and after the writings of the N. Test. had also been collected into *one* Codex (see § 31, 9), that they adopted concerning the N. Test. those views which had long been entertained about the verbal inspiration of the O. Test. *Tertullian* first makes mention of this Codex as *Novum Instrumentum*, or (quod magis usui est dicere) *Novum Testamentum*, adv. Marc. iv. 1; and he lays so much stress upon the reception of the entire Codex as a criterion of orthodoxy, that he denies the Holy Spirit to all who do not receive Luke's Acts of the Apostles as canonical (De Præscr. Hær. 22). The general terms in which Justin Martyr speaks of the divine inspiration and miraculous power of the Apostles, as in Apol. i. c. 39, and of the spiritual gifts of Christians, Dialog. cum Tryph. § 88; and the more general in which he describes the inspiration of the old poets and philosophers (cited in Sonn-

tag, u. s. 6 and 9) belong to this subject only in a wide sense. Tertullian, however (from his Montanistic stand point!) draws a distinction between the two kinds of inspiration, viz., the apostolical, and that which is common to all believers (De Exhort. Castit. c. 4), and represents the latter as only partial; but he does not refer the former kind of inspiration to the mere act of writing. But in the writings of *Irenæus* we find a more definite allusion to *the extraordinary assistance of the Holy Spirit in writing the books*, with a special reference *to the New Testament writers;* Adv. Hær. iii. 16, § 2: Potuerat dicere Matthæus: *Jesu* vero generatio sic erat; sed prævidens spiritus sanctus depravatores, et præmuniens contra fraudulentiam eorum per Matthæum ait: *Christi* autem generatio sic erat. [Comp. Westcott on Gospels, 1860, p. 383 sq.]

[7] *Iren.* adv. Hær. iv. 9, p. 237: Non alterum quidem vetera, alterum vero preferentem nova docuit, sed unum et eundem. Paterfamilias enim Dominus est, qui universæ domni paternæ dominatur, et servis quidem et adhuc indisciplinatis condignam tradens legem; liberis autem et fide justificatis congruentia dans præcepta, et filiis adaperiens suam hæreditatem. . . . . Ea autem, quæ de thesauro proferuntur nova et vetera, sine contradictione duo Testamenta dicit: vetus quidem, quod ante fuerat, legislatio; novum autem, quæ secundum Evangelium est conversatio, ostendit, de qua David ait: *Cantate Domino canticum novum*, etc. Comp. iii. 11, and other passages. In his fragments (p. 346, *Massuet*), he compares the two pillars of the house under the ruins of which Sampson buried himself and the Philistines, to the two Testaments which overthrew Paganism. Yet still Irenæus had an open eye for the human side of the Bible. He wrote an essay upon the peculiarities of the style of Paul, in which, among other things, he explains the syntactic defects in the sentences of the Apostle by the velocitas sermonum suorum, which again he connects with the "impetus" of his soul. Comp. *Neander*, Church Hist. 3d ed. p. 171. Clem. Al. Paed. p. 307; Ἄμφω δὲ τὼ νόμω διηκόνουν τῷ λόγῳ εἰς παιδαγωγίαν πῆς ἀνθρωπότητος, ὁ μὲν διὰ Μωσέως, ὁ δὲ δι' Ἀποστόλων. Comp. Strom. i. 5, p. 331, iii. 10, p. 543.

[8] *Orig.* De Princip. iv. c. 6, Opp. i. p. 161: Ακτέον δὲ, ὅτι τὸ τῶν προφητικῶν λόγων ἔνθεον καὶ τὸ πνευματικὸν τοῦ Μωσέως νόμου ἔλαμψεν ἐπιδημήσαντος Ἰησοῦ. Ἐναργῆ γὰρ παραδείγματα περὶ τοῦ θεοπνεύστους εἶναι τὰς παλαιὰς γραφὰς πρὸ πῆς ἐπιδημίας τοῦ Χρίστοῦ παραστῆσαι οὐ πάνυ δυνατὸν ἦν, ἀλλ' ἡ Ἰησοῦ ἐπιδημία δυναμένους ὑποπτεύεσθαι τὸν νόμον καὶ τοὺς προφήτας ὡς οὐ θεῖα, εἰς τοὐμφανὲς ἤγαγεν, ὡς οὐρανίῳ χάριτι ἀναγεγραμμένα. From this point of view Origen acknowledges the inspiration of both the Old and the New Testaments, De Princ. procem. c. 8, Opp. i. p. 18, lib. iv. ad. init.; Contra Cels. v. 60. Opp. i. p. 623; Hom. in Jerem. Opp. T. iii. p. 282: Sacra volumina spiritus plenitudinem spirant, nihilque est sive in lege, sive in evangelio, sive in apostolo, quod non a plenitudine divinæ majestatis descendat. In the 27th Hom. in Num. Opp. T. ii. p. 365, he further maintains that (because of this inspiration) nothing superfluous could have found its way into the sacred Scriptures, and that we must seek for divine illumination when we meet with difficulties. Comp. Hom. in Exod. i. 4, Opp. T. ii. p. 131: Ego credens verbis Domini mei Jesu Christi, in lege et Prophetis iota quidem unum aut apicem non puto esse mysteriis vacuum, nec puto aliquid horum transire posse, donec omnia fiant. Philoca-

lia (Cantabrig. 1658), p. 19: Πρέπει δὲ τὰ ἅγια γράμματα πιστεύειν μηδεμίαν κεραίαν ἔχειν κενὴν σοφίας Θεοῦ· ὁ γὰρ ἐντειλάμενος ἐμοὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ λέγων· Οὐκ ὀφθήσῃ ἐνώπιόν μου κενός (Exod. xxxiv. 20), πολλῷ πλέον αὐτὸς οὐδὲν κενὸν ἐρεῖ. Comp. *Schnitzer*, p. 286. But yet the historical and chronological difficulties attending the attempt to harmonize the gospels did not escape the critical sagacity of Origen. He acknowledges that, taken verbally, there are insoluble contradictions in the narration of the Evangelists (comp. Hom. X. in Joh. Opp. Tom. iv. p. 162, ss.), but comforts himself with the idea that truth does not consist in the σωματικοῖς χαρακτῆρσιν. Thus, for example, he notices the difference in the accounts of the healing of the blind men (Matth. xx. 30 sq. Mark x. 46 sq. Luke, xviii. 35 sq.). But in order not to concede inexactitude, he takes refuge in strange allegories (compare Comm. in Matth. Opp. Tom. iii. p. 372). Another way of escape in respect to doctrinal difficulties was open to him, in the assumption of a condescension of God, training his people, as a teacher, in conformity with their state of culture at each period (Cont. Celsum, iv. 71; Tom. i. p. 556). Like Irenæus, Origen also grants that there are inaccuracies and solecisms in the style of the Biblical writers (Opp. iv. p. 93), and so, too, different styles of writing in Paul (Ep. ad Rom. x. Opp. iv. p. 678, 6). "In general," says Giesseler (Dogmengesch. p. 98), "Origen appears to understand by inspiration, not the pouring in of foreign thoughts, but an exaltation of the powers of the soul, whereby prophets [and apostles] were elevated to the knowledge of the truth; and this view was held fast in the school of Origen." Comp. also the passages there cited, from which it appears that Origen, with all his exaggerated views of inspiration, also admitted that there were uninspired passages in the Scripture, and thus distinguished between its divine and human elements. [The passages are such as 1 Cor. vii. 6, 10, etc. And Gieseler adds, that Origen "did not follow out such hints any farther, but in other passages declared all the Holy Scriptures, including the writings of the Apostles, to be unconditionally inspired."]

[9] *Irenæus* compares the sacred Scriptures to the treasure which was hid in a field, Adv. Hær. iv. 25, 26, and recommends their perusal also to the laity, but under the direction of the presbyters, iv. 32. *Clement of Alexandr.* describes their simplicity, and the beneficial effects which they are calculated to produce, Coh. p. 66: Γραφαὶ δὲ αἱ θεῖαι καὶ πολιτεῖαι σώφρονες, σύντομοι σωτηρίας ὁδοί, γυμναὶ κομμωτικῆς καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς καλλιφωνιας καὶ ττωμυλίας καὶ κολακείας ὑπάρχουσαι ἀνιστῶσιν ἀγχόμενον ὑπὸ κακίας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὑπεριδοῦσαι τὸν ὄλισθον τὸν βιωτικὸν, μιᾷ καὶ τῇ αὐτῇ φωνῇ πολλὰ θεραπεύουσαι, ἀποτρέπουσαι μὲν ἡμᾶς τῆς ἐπιζημίου ἀπάτης, προτρέπουσαι δὲ ἐμφανῶς εἰς προὔπτον σωτηρίαν. Comp. ibid. p. 71: Ἱερὰ γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὰ ἱεραποιοῦντα καὶ θεοποιοῦντα γράμματα κ. τ. λ. Clement did not confine this sanctifying power to the mere letter of Scripture, but thought that the λογικοὶ νόμοι had been written, not only ἐν πλαξὶ λιθίναις, ἀλλ' ἐν καρδίαις ἀνθρώπων, Paed. iii. p. 307; so that at least the effects produced by the Bible depend upon the susceptibility of the mind. The language of Origen is similar, contra Cels. vi. 2, p. 630: Φησὶ δ' ὁ θεῖος λόγος, οὐκ αὐταρκες εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον (κἂν καθ' αὐτὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ πιστικώτατον ᾖ) πρὸς τὸ καθικέσθαι ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δύναμίς τις

θεόθεν δοθῇ τῷ λέγοντι, καὶ χάρις ἐπανθήσῃ τοῖς λεγομένοις, καὶ αὕτη οὐκ ἀθεεὶ ἐγγινομένη τοῖς ἀνυσίμως λέγουσι. Accordingly, the use of the Scripture was universally recommended by the old Christian teachers, and the apologists call upon the heathen to convince themselves out of the Scriptures of the truth of what was told to them. [Comp. *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. § 23, on the General Use of the Bible: Justin, in his Coh. ad Græcos, calls upon the heathen to read the prophetic Scriptures. Athenagoras, in his Apology, presupposes that the emperors Marcus Aurelius and his son have the Old Testament. All the Scriptures were read in the public services of Christians: Tertull. Apol. c. 39. Origen against Celsus (vii.) defends the Bible from the charge that it was written in a common style, by the statement that it was written for the common man. Comp. *C. W. F. Walch*, Kritische Untersuchung vom Gebrauch der heiligen Schrift unter den Christen in den vier ersten Jahrh. Leipz. 1779. *W. Goode's* Divine Rule, etc., ubi supra.]

§ 33.

BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION.

Olshausen, über tiefern Schriftsinn, Königsberg, 1824. *Rosenmüller*, Historia Interpretat. N. Test. T. iii. *Ernesti, J. A.*, De Origene Interpretationis grammaticæ Auctore, Opusc. Crit. Lugd. 1764. *Hagenbach*, Observat. circa Origenis methodum interpretandæ S. S. Bas. 1823, cf. the review by *Hirzel*, in Winer's Krit. Journal, 1825, Bd. iii. *Thomasius*, Origenes, Appendix I. [*Davidson, S.*, Sacred Hermeneutics, developed and applied; including a Hist. of Biblical Interpretation from the earliest of the Fathers to the Reform. Edinb. 1843. Comp. also *Credner, K. A.*, in *Kitto's* Cyclop. of Biblical Literature, sub voce. Fairbairn's Hermeneutics, 1858. *Frankel*, Einfluss der palestin. Exegese auf d. Alexandr. Hermeneutik, Leipz. 1851.]

The tendency to allegorical interpretation[1] was connected in a twofold manner with the theory of verbal inspiration. Some writers endeavored to *bring* as much as possible *into* the letter of the sacred writings, either on mystical and speculative, or on practical religious grounds; others, from a rationalistic and apologetical tendency, were anxious to *explain away* all that might lead to conclusions alike offensive to human reason, and unworthy of the Deity, if taken in their literal sense. This may be best seen in the works of *Origen*, who, after the example of *Philo*,[2] and of several of the fathers, especially of *Clement*,[3] first set forth a definite system of interpretation, which allowed a three-fold sense to Scripture; and accordingly they distinguished the anagogical and the allegorical interpretation from the grammatical.[4] The sober method of *Irenæus*, who defers to God all in the Scripture that is above human understanding,[5] is in striking contrast with this allegorizing tendency, which makes every thing out of the Scriptures.

[1] "*With their high opinion about the inspiration of the sacred writings, and the dignity of a revelation, we should expect, as a matter of course, to*

meet with careful interpretation, diligently investigating the exact meaning. But the very opposite was the fact. Inspiration is done away with by the most arbitrary of all modes of interpretation, the allegorical, of which we may consider Philo the master." (*Gfrörer*, Geschichte des Urchristenthums, i. p. 69, in reference to Philo.) However much this may surprise us at first sight, we shall find that the connection between this theory of inspiration, and the mode of interpretation which accompanies it, is by no means unnatural; both have one common source, viz., the assumption that there is a very great difference between the Bible and other books. That which has come down from heaven must be interpreted according to its heavenly origin; must be looked upon with other eyes, and touched with other hands than profane. Comp. *Dähne*, on Philo, p. 60. Here it is with the Word, as it was afterward with the Sacraments. As baptismal water was thought to avail more than common water, and the bread used in the Lord's supper to be different from common bread, so the letter of the Bible, filled with the Divine Spirit, became to the uninitiated a hieroglyph, to decipher which a heavenly key was needed.

[3] Comp. *Gfrörer*, *Dähne*, l. c. [and *Conybeare*, *J. J.* The Bampton Lecture for the year 1824, being an attempt to trace the history and to ascertain the limits of the secondary and spiritual interpret. of Script., Oxf. 1824].

[4] Examples of allegorical and typical interpretation abound in the writings of the apostolical and earlier Fathers, see § 29, note 3. [Comp. *Davidson*, Sacred Hermen. p. 71, ss. Barnabas, l. 7: The two goats (Levit. xvi.) were to be fair and perfectly alike; both, therefore, typified the one Jesus, who was to suffer for us. The circumstance of one being driven forth into the wilderness, the congregation spitting upon it and pricking it, whilst the other, instead of being accursed, was offered upon the altar to God, symbolized the death and sufferings of Jesus. The washing of the entrails with vinegar, denoted the vinegar mixed with gall which was given to Jesus on the cross. The scarlet wool, put about the head of one of the goats, signified the scarlet robe put upon Christ before his crucifixion. The taking off the scarlet wool, and placing it on a thorn-bush, refers to the fate of Christ's church. Clement of Alex. lib. v. p. 557: "The candlestick situated south of the altar of incense signified the movements of the seven stars making circuits southward. From each side of the candlestick projected three branches with lights in them, because the sun placed in the midst of the other planets gives light both to those above and under it by a kind of divine music. The golden candlestick has also another enigma, not only in being a figure of the sign of Christ, but also in the circumstance of giving light in many ways and parts to such as believe and hope in him, by the instrumentality of the things at first created." Comp. also pp. 74, 75, 79, 80.] For a correct estimate of this mode of interpretation, comp. *Möhler*, Patrologie, i. p. 64: "*The system of interpretation adopted by the earlier fathers may not in many respects agree with our views; but we should remember that our mode of looking at things differs from theirs in more than one point. They knew nothing, thought of nothing, felt nothing, but Christ —is it, then, surprising that they met him every where, even without seeking him? In our present state of culture we are scarcely able to form a correct*

idea of the mind of those times, in which the great object of commentators was to show the connection between the Old and the New Covenant in the most vivid manner." The earlier fathers indulged unconsciously in this mode of interpretation; but *Clement of Alex.* attempts to establish a theory, asserting that the Mosaic laws have a threefold, or even a fourfold sense, τετραχῶς δὲ ἡμῖν ἐκληπτέον τοῦ νόμου τὴν βούλησιν. Strom. i. 28 (some read τριχῶς instead of τετραχῶς). [Comp. *Davidson*, l. c. p. 79.]

[4] *Origen* supposes that Scripture has a threefold sense corresponding to the trichotomistic division of man into body, soul, and spirit (comp. § 54); and this he finds, too (by a petitio principii), in the Scripture itself, in Prov. xxii. 20, 21; and in the Shepherd of Hermes, which he values equally with Scripture. This threefold sense may be divided into: 1. The *grammatical* [σωματικός]=body. 2. The *moral* [ψυχικός]=soul; and 3. The *mystical* [πνευματικός]=spirit. The literal sense, however, he asserts can not always be taken, but in certain cases it must be spiritualized by allegorical interpretation, especially in those places which contain either something indifferent in a religious aspect (genealogies, etc.); or what is repulsive to morality (*e. g.*, in the history of the patriarchs); or what is unworthy of the dignity of God (the anthropomorphitic narratives in the book of Genesis, and several of the legal injunctions of the Old Testament). Comp. Philo's method, Gfrörer, u. s. Davidson, p. 63. But Origen found stumbling-blocks not only in the Old, but also in the New Testament. Thus he declared that the narrative of the temptation of our Saviour was not simple history, because he could not solve the difficulties which it presents to the historical interpreter. [The gospels also abound in expressions of this kind; as when the devil is said to have taken Jesus to a high mountain. For who could believe, if he read such things with the least degree of attention, that the kingdoms of the Persians, Scythians, Indians, and Parthians, were seen with the bodily eye, and with as great honor as kings are looked upon? *Davidson*, l. c. p. 99.] He also thought that some precepts, as Luke x. 4, Matth. v. 39, 1 Cor. vii. 18, could be taken in their literal sense only by the simple (ἀκεραίοις). He does not indeed deny the reality of most of the miracles, but he prizes much more highly the allegory which they include (comp. § 29, note 10); see besides the De Princ. lib. iv. § 8–27, where he gives the most complete exhibition of his theory, his exegetical works, and the above-mentioned treatises, with the passages there cited. Both tendencies above spoken of, that of interpreting into, and that of explaining away, are obviously exhibited in the writings of Origen. Therefore the remark of *Lücke* (Hermeneutik, p. 39), "*that a rationalistic tendency, of which Origen himself was not conscious*" may account in part for his addiction to allegorical interpretation, can be easily reconciled with the apparently contrary supposition, that the cause of it was mysticism, based on the pregnant sense of Scripture. "*The letter kills, but the spirit quickens; this is the principle of Origen. But who does not see that the spirit can become too powerful, kill the letter, and take its place?*" *Edgar Quinet* on Strauss (Revue des deux Mondes, 1838).

[5] *Irenæus* also proceeded on the assumption that the Scriptures throughout were pregnant with meaning, Adv. Hær. iv. 18: Nihil enim otiosum, nec sine signo, neque sine argumento apud eum, and made use of typical

interpretation. Nevertheless, he saw the dangers of allegorizing, and condemned it in the Gnostics, Adv. Hær. i. 3, 6. We are as little able to understand the abundance of nature as the superabundance of Scripture, ibid. ii. 28: Nos autem secundum quod minores sumus et novissimi a verbo Dei et Spiritu ejus, secundum hoc et scientia mysteriorum ejus indigemus. Et non est mirum, si in spiritualibus et cœlestibus et in his quæ habent revelari, hoc patimur nos: quandoquidem etiam eorum quæ ante pedes sunt (dico autem quæ sunt in hac creatura, quæ et contrectantur a nobis et videntur et sunt nobiscum) multa fugerunt nostram scientiam, et Deo hæc ipsa committimus. Oportet enim eum præ omnibus præcellere..... *Εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς κτίσεως ἕνια μὲν ἀνάκειται τῷ θεῷ, ἕνια δὲ καὶ εἰς γνῶσιν ἐλήλυθε τὴν ἡμετέραν, τί χαλεπὸν, εἰ καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς ζητουμένων, ὅλων τῶν γραφῶν πνευματικῶν οὐσῶν, ἕνια μὲν ἐπιλύομεν κατὰ χάριν θεοῦ, ἕνια δὲ ἀνακείσεται τῷ θεῷ, καὶ οὐ μόνον αἰῶνι ἐν τῷ νυνὶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι; ἵνα ἀεὶ μὲν ὁ θεὸς διδάσκῃ, ἄνθρωπος δὲ διὰ παντὸς μανθάνῃ παρὰ Θεοῦ.*

§ 34.

TRADITION.

Pelt, über Tradition, in the Theologische Mitarbeiten, Kiel, 1813; K. R. Köstlin, Zur Gesch. des Urchristenthums, in Zeller's Jahrb. 1850. Jacobi, ubi supra. Comp. § 30.

Notwithstanding the high esteem in which Scripture was held, the authority of tradition was not put in the background. On the contrary, in the controversies with heretics, Scripture was thought to be insufficient to combat them, because it maintains its true position, and can be correctly interpreted (*i. e.*, according to the spirit of the church) only in close connection with the tradition of the church.[1] Different opinions obtained concerning the nature of tradition. The view taken by *Irenæus* and *Tertullian* was of a positive, realistic kind; according to them, the truth was dependent upon an external, historical, and geographical connection with the mother churches.[2] The Alexandrian school entertained a more ideal view; they saw in the more free and spiritual exchange of ideas the fresh and ever-living source from which we must draw the wholesome water of sound doctrine.[3] It must, however, be acknowledged, that the idea of a secret doctrine,[4] favored by the Alexandrian school, which was said to have been transmitted along with the publicly received truth from the times of Christ and his Apostles, betrayed a Gnostic tendency, which might easily endanger the adaptation of Christianity to all classes of society. On the other hand, the new revelations of the Montanists in like manner broke loose from the basis of the historical (traditional) development.[5] In contrast with these tendencies it was insisted, that tradition is to be measured by Scripture, as well in respect to doctrine as to the usage of the church;[6] this particularly appears in Cyprian.

[1] On the necessity of tradition see *Irenæus*, i. 10 (p. 49, M.), ii. 35, p. 171, iii. Pref. c. 1–6, c. 21, iv. 20, 26, 32. (*Orelli*, i. Program. p. 20.) Especially remarkable is the declaration, iii. 4, that the nations had been converted to Christianity, not in the first instance by the *Scriptures* (sine charta et atramento), but by means of the Holy Spirit in their hearts, and the faithfully preserved tradition. See *Tert.* Adv. Marc. 6, v. 5, and particularly De Præscriptione Hæreticorum, where he denies to heretics the right of using Scripture in argument of the orthodox.* Comp. c. 13, seq.; and c. 19, he says: Ergo non ad scripturas provocandum est, nec in his constitutendum certamen, in quibus aut nulla, aut incerta victoria est, aut par (*var.* parum) incertæ. Nam esti non ita evaderet conlatio scripturarum, ut utramque partem parem sisteret, ordo rerum desiderabat, illud prius proponi, quod nunc solum disputandum est: quibus competat fides ipsa: cujus sint scripturæ; a quo et per quos et quando et quibus sit tradita disciplina, qua fiunt Christiani. Ubi enim apparuerit esse veritatem et disciplinæ et fidei christianæ, illic erit veritas scripturarum et expositionum et omnium traditionum Christianarum. Comp. c. 37: Qui estis? quando et unde venistis? quid in meo agitis, non mei? The renouncing of tradition is, according to Tertullian, the source of the mutilation and corruption of Scripture; comp. c. 22 and 38. But even in its integrity Scripture *alone* is not able to ward off heresies; on the contrary, according to God's providential arrangement, it becomes to heretics a source of new errors; comp. c. 40, 42.—*Clement of Alex.* expresses himself thus (Stromata, vii. 15, p. 887): As an honest man must not lie, so must we not depart from the rule of faith which is handed down by the church; it is necessary to follow those who already have the truth. As the companions of Ulysses, bewitched by Circe, behaved like beasts, so he who renounces tradition ceases to be a man of God; Strom. 16, p. 890, comp. p. 896.—*Origen*, De Princ. procem. i. p. 47: Servetur vero ecclesiastica prædicatio per successionis ordinem ab Apostolis tradita et usque ad præsens in ecclesiis permanens; illa sola credenda est veritas, quæ in nullo ab ecclesiastica et apostolica discordat traditione.

[2] *Iren.* iii. 4 (2, p. 178, M.): Quid enim? Et si de aliqua modica quæstione disceptatio esset, nonne oporteret in antiquissimas recurrere ecclesias, in quibus Apostoli conversati sunt, et ab iis de præsenti quæstione sumere quod certum et re liquidum est? Quid autem, si neque Apostoli quidem scripturas reliquissent nobis, nonne oportebat ordinem sequi traditionis, quam tradiderunt iis, quibus committebant ecclesias? ete. *Tertul.* Præscr. c. 20: Dehinc (Apostoli) in orbem profecti eandem doctrinam ejusdem fidei nationibus promulgaverunt, et proinde ecclesias apud unamquamque civitatem condiderunt, a quibus, traducem fidei et semina doctrinæ ceteræ exinde ecclesiæ mutuatæ sunt et quotidie mutuantur, ut ecclesiæ fiant, et per hoc et ipsæ apostolicæ deputantur, ut soboles apostolicarum ecclesiarum. Omne genus ad originem suam censeatur necesse est. Itaque tot ac tantæ ecclesiæ: una est illa ab Apostolis prima, ex qua omnes, etc. Comp. c. 21.

* On the expression *Præscriptio*, Semler, in the Index Latin. p. 482: Ex usu forensi significant refutationem, qua, qui postulatur, adversarii accusationem disjicit aut in eum retorquet; and Tertull. himself, Præscr. c. 35

[3] *Clem. Alex.* Strom. i. 1, p. 323 : Τὰ φρέατα ἐξαντλούμενα διειδέστερον ὕδωρ ἀναδίδωσι· τρέπεται δὲ εἰς φθορὰν, ὧν μεταλαμβάνει οὐδείς· καὶ τὸν σίδηρον ἡ χρῆσις καθαρώτερον φυλάσσει, ἡ δὲ ἀχρηστία ἰοῦ τούτῳ γεννητική. Συνελόντι γὰρ φάναι· ἡ συγγυμνασία ἕξιν ἔμποιεῖ ὑγιεινὴν καὶ πνεύμασι καὶ σώμασιν.

[4] Ibid : Αὐτίκα οὐ πολλοῖς ἀπεκάλυψεν (ὁ Ἰησοῦς) ἃ μὴ πολλῶν ἦν, ὀλίγοις δὲ οἷς προσήκειν ἠπίστατο, τοῖς οἵοις τε ἐκδέξασθαι καὶ τυπωθῆναι πρὸς αὐτὰ· τὰ δὲ ἀπόῤῥητα, καθάπερ ὁ θεὸς, λόγῳ πιστεύεται, οὐ γράμματι . . . . ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὰ μυστήρια μυστικῶς παραδίδοται, ἵνα ᾖ ἐν στόματι λαλοῦντος καὶ ὃ λαλεῖται· μᾶλλον δὲ οὐκ ἐν φωνῇ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ νοεῖσθαι κ. τ. λ. Comp. Euseb. Hist. Eccl. ii. 1 (from the 7th book of the Hypotyposes), and the notes of *Valesius* and Heinichen. *Origen*, Contra Cels. vi. § 6. Opp. T. i. p. 633. The so-called Disciplina Arcani stands in a somewhat wider connection with this; comp. *Frommann*, *G. C. L. Th.*, De Disciplina Arcani, quæ in Vetere Ecclesia Christiana obtinuisse fertur, Jen. 1833, 8; and Rothe in Herzog's Realencykl. [also, Heidelb. 1841, and Gieseler, Text-Book, i. 232, note.]

[5] Comp. § 24, § 30, note 2. *Jacobi*, u. s. p. 125, sq. On the Gnostic tradition, see *Kostlin*, ubi supra, p. 6, sq.

[6] Comp. Clem. Alex. Strom. vi. p. 786; vii. p. 891. Origen, Hom. in Jerem. i. (Opp. iii. p. 129): Μάρτυρας δεῖ λαβεῖν τὰς γραφάς· ἀμάρτυροι γὰρ αἱ ἐπιβολαὶ ἡμῶν καὶ αἱ ἐξεγήσεις ἄπιστοί εἰσιν (this in relation to the doctrine of the divinity of Christ). Hippolytus, Contra Noctum, c. 9 (in relation to the doctrine respecting God).

The opinion of *Cyprian* was developed in the controversy with the Romish bishop Stephen, who appealed to the Romish tradition in support of his views concerning the baptism of heretics. Cyprian, on the contrary, justly went back from the dried up canal to the source, to the oldest tradition, viz., the Sacred Scriptures (divinæ traditionis caput et origo), Ep. 74, p. 215. In the same place, and in the same connection, he says: Consuetudo sine veritate vetustas erroris est. Comp. Ep. 71, p. 194 : Non est de consuetudine præscribendum, sed ratione vincendum. It is interesting to observe that, *e. g.*, Irenæus does not as yet know any traditio humana within the church which could in any way contradict the traditio apostolica; such a tradition is known by Irenæus only among the heretics; and Tertullian (as Montanist) had already combated the authority of custom with almost the same weapons as Cyprian; comp. De Virgin. Veland. 1 : Christus veritatem se, non consuetudinem cognominavit. Quodcunque adversus veritatem sapit, hoc erit hæresis, etiam vetus consuetudo. *Huther*, Cyprian, p. 139, ss. *Rettberg*, p. 310. *Pelt*, l. c. *Gess*, Die Einheit der Kirche im Sinne Cyprians, in the Studien der Evangelischen Geistlichkeit Würtembergs, 1838, ii. 1, p. 149, ss. On the ambiguity of the word Tradition (a doctrinal, Gnostic, and ritual tradition may be distinguished), see Gieseler, Dogmengesch. p. 103. [The Alexandrians claimed to have the Gnostic tradition, which was not the common property of all Christians: this was opposed by Irenæus and Tertullian. Tertullian advocated the authority of tradition in respect to rites, but demanded (De Jejunio, c. 10.), Tanto magis dignam rationem affere debemus, quanto carent Scripturæ auctoritate. Cyprian, Ep. 74, ad Pompejum, against the Roman

claim, says that, ea facienda esse, quæ scripta sunt; and continues: Si ergo aut in Evangelio præcipitur, aut in Apostolorum Epistolis aut Actibus continetur, observetur divina hæc et sancta traditio. And he compares divine tradition to a canal, saying, that when it dries up, the priests must go back to the fountain and the Holy Scriptures; and this in respect to church rites.]

It was held that *faith* (πίστις, fides) is the medium by which we apprehend the revelations made known to us, either by Scripture or by tradition. The question, however, arose in what relation the πίστις stands to the more developed γνῶσις? While *Irenæus* does not go beyond faith, but without excluding its scientific exposition (comp. *Duncker*, p. 16), the theologians of the Alexandrian school, *e. g.*, *Clement*, endeavored to assign a higher position to the γνῶσις. But we should mistake him, if we were to conclude, from some of his expressions, that he attached an inferior value to the πίστις. In a certain sense he looked upon it rather as the perfection of knowledge (τελειότης μαθήσεως), Pæd. i. 6, p. 115. Faith does not want anything, it does not limp (as arguments do); it has the promise, etc. Also, according to Strom. i. 1, p. 320, faith is necessary to attain unto knowledge. It anticipates knowledge, ii. 1, p. 432; comp. ii. 4, p. 436: Κυριώτερον οὖν τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἡ πίστις καὶ ἐστὶν αὐτῆς κριτήριον. In the same place he distinguishes faith from mere opinion, εἰκασία, which is related to faith, as a flatterer to a true friend, or a wolf to a dog.—Revelation (διδασκαλία) and faith depend on each other, as the throwing and catching of a ball in a game; Strom. ii. 6, p. 442.—On the other hand, Clement maintained the necessity of a *well instructed* faith (πίστις περὶ τὴν μάθησιν), Strom. i. 6, p. 336; and insisted, in general, on an intimate connection between πίστις and γνῶσις, ii. 4, p. 436: Πιστὴ τοίνυν ἡ γνῶσις· γνωστὴ δὲ ἡ πίστις· θείᾳ τινὶ ἀκολουθίᾳ τε καὶ ἀντακολουθίᾳ γίνεται. Faith is described as an abridged knowledge of necessary truth; γνῶσις is characterized as a firm and stable demonstration of the things already apprehended by faith; Strom. vii. 10, p. 865, sq. From this point of view he valued knowledge more highly than faith, Strom. vi. 14, p. 794. Πλέον δέ ἐστι τοῦ πιστεῦσαι τὸ γνῶναι. Nevertheless, he could distinguish this true gnosis from the false gnosis of the Gnostics; Strom. v. 6. p. 689, 12, p. 695, vi. 7, p. 771, vii. 10, p. 864 (here again faith appears as the basis of true knowledge). On the different names and kinds of knowledge, see Strom. vi. 17, p. 820. Comp. *Neander*, De Fidei Gnoseosque Idea secundum Clementem Alex. Heidelberg, 1811, 8. *Baur*, Gnosis, p. 502, ss. *Origen*, De Princ. in Procem. 3; Opp. i. 47, concedes that the Apostles, who preached to the unlettered, left the investigation of the grounds and reasons of their positions to those who should be endowed by the Holy Spirit with special gifts, particularly with eloquence, wisdom, and science: Illud autem scire oportet, quoniam Sancti Apostoli fidem Christi prædicantes de quibusdam quidem, quæcunque necessaria crediderunt, omnibus manifestissime tradiderunt, rationem scilicet assertionis eorum relinquentes ab his inquirendam, qui Spiritus dona excellentia mererentur: de aliis vero dixerunt quidem, quia sint; quomodo autem, aut unde sint, siluerunt, profecto ut studiosiores quique ex posteris suis, qui amatores essent sapientiæ, exercitium habere possent, in quo ingenii sui fructum ostenderent, hi videlicet qui dignos se et capaces ad recipiendam sapientiam præpararent. Comp. the conclusion, p. 49.

SECOND DIVISION.

THEOLOGY.

THE DOCTRINE RESPECTING GOD (INCLUDING THE DOCTRINE OF THE CREATION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD; THE DOCTRINE ABOUT ANGELS AND DEMONS).

§ 35.

THE BEING OF GOD.

It can never be the object of a positive religion to prove the existence of God, inasmuch as it always presupposes the knowledge that there is a God. Christianity stood on the basis of the Old Testament idea of a God,—now purified and carried beyond the limits of national interests,—as a personal God, who, as the creator of heaven and earth, rules over the human race; who had given the law, sent the prophets, and manifested himself most perfectly, and in the fullness of his personal presence, in his Son, *Jesus Christ*.[1] Consequently the believing Christian needed as little, as his Jewish contemporary, a proof of the being of God. But in the further development of the Christian system, it became necessary, on the one hand, that Christians should defend themselves (apologetically) against the charge of atheism which was frequently brought against them ;[2] on the other, they had to demonstrate to the heathen (polemically), that their pagan worship was false, and consequently in its very foundation was a denial of the living God (atheism).[3] When, therefore, the writings of the fathers contain any thing like a proof of the existence of God, it is either the spontaneous expression of religious feeling in a rhetorical and hymnological form,[4] or it is intimately connected with other definitions about the nature of God, with the doctrine of his unity, or with the doctrine concerning the creation and government of the world.[5] But the fathers of this period generally recurred to the innate knowledge of God (testimonium animæ, λόγος σπερματικός), which may be traced even in the heathen,[6] and on the purity of which the knowledge of God depends.[7] With this they connected, but in a popular rather than a strictly scientific form, what is commonly called the physico-theological, or teleological proof, inferring the existence of a

Creator from the works of creation.[1] More artificial proofs, such as the cosmological and the ontological, were unknown in this period. Even the more profound thinkers of the Alexandrian school frankly acknowledged the impossibility of a strict proof of the existence of God, and the necessity of a revelation on God's part.[2]

[1] The distinction, therefore, between *Theology* and *Christology* is only relative, and made for scientific purposes. The Christian idea of God always depends on faith in the Son, in whom the Father manifests himself. "*The doctrine of the Logos was the stock out of which Christian theology grew: the divine nature in itself was treated only incidentally and in fragments;*" *Semisch*, Just. Mart. ii., p. 247. We find, however, in the writings of some of the earliest fathers (especially Minucius Felix) a kind of theology which bears much resemblance to what was subsequently called *natural* theology, being more reflective than intuitive. Others (*e. g.* Clement) looked at every thing as mediated by the Logos; Strom. v. 12, p. 696, comp. also note 9.

[2] Comp. *e. g.* Minuc. Fel. Oct. c. 8, and with it cc. 17, 18, also the Edict. Antonini, in Euseb. iv. 13; the phrase ὡς ἀθέων κατηγοροῦντες, however, may be differently interpreted. Comp. *Heinichen*, i. p. 328.

[3] This was done by all the apologists, each in his turn; comp. as examples of all, Minuc. Fel. c. 20, ss.; Tertullian, Apol. c. 8, De Idolotatria. Cyprian, De Idolorum Vanitate, etc.

[4] Thus the passage in *Clem. of Alex.* Cohort. 54: Θεὸς δὲ πῶς ἂν εἴποιμι ὅσα ποιεῖ; ὅλον ἰδὲ τὸν κόσμον. Ἐκεῖνον ἔργον ἐστὶν καὶ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἥλιος καὶ ἄγγελοι καὶ ἄνθρωποι, ἔργα τῶν δακτύλων αὐτοῦ. Ὅση γε ἡ δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ; Μόνον αὐτοῦ τὸ βούλημα κοσμοποιΐα· μόνος γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ μόνος ὄντως ἐστὶ Θεός. Ψιλῷ τῷ βούλεσθαι δημιουργεῖ, καὶ τῷ μόνον ἐθελῆσαι αὐτὸν ἕπεται τὸ γεγενῆσθαι κ. τ. λ. Comp. Tertull. Apol. c. 17, 18.

[5] Comp. the following §§.

[6] *Tertullian*, Advers. Judæos c. 2: Cur etenim Deus universitatis conditor, mundi totius gubernator, hominis plasmator, universarum gentium sator, legem per Moysen uni populo dedisse credatur, et non omnibus gentibus attribuisse dicatur? et seq. Comp. Apol. c. 17: Vultis ex operibus ipsius tot ac talibus quibus continemur, quibus sustinemur, quibus oblectamur, etiam quibus exterremur? vultis ex animæ ipsius testimonio comprobemus? Quæ licet carcere corporis pressa, licet institutionibus pravis circumscripta, licet libidinibus ac concupiscentiis evigorata, licet falsis deis exancillata, cum tamen resipiscit ut ex crapula, ut ex somno, ut ex aliqua valetudine, et sanitatem suam potitur, Deum nominat, hoc solo nomine, quia proprio Dei veri: Deus magnus, Deus bonus, et: quod Deus dederit, omnium vox est. Judicem quoque contestatur illum: Deus videt, et: Deo commendo, et; Deus mihi reddet. O testimonium animæ naturaliter christianæ! Denique pronuntians hæc, non ad capitolium, sed ad cœlum respicit, novit enim sedem Dei vivi.—De Testim. Animæ, c. 2: Si enim anima aut divina aut a Deo data est, sine dubio datorem suum novit. Et si novit, utique et timet, et tantum postremo adauctorem. An non timet, quem magis propitium velit quam iratum? Unde igitur naturalis timor animæ in Deum, si Deus non vult irasci? Quomodo timetur

qui nescit offendi? Quid timetur nisi ira? Unde ira nisi ex animadversione? Unde animadversio nisi de judicio? Unde judicium nisi de potestate? Cujus potestas summa nisi Dei solius? Hinc ergo tibi, anima, de conscientia suppetit domi ac foris, nullo irridente vel prohibente, prædicare: Deus videt omnia, et: Deo commendo, et: Deus reddet, et: Deus inter nos judicabit, et seq. Comp. *Neander*, Antignosticus, p. 88, 89. *Justin M.* also speaks of an innate idea of God, Apol. II. 6: Τὸ Θεὸς προσαγόρευμα οὐκ ὄνομά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πράγματος ὄνσεξηγήτου ἔμφυτος τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξα. Comp. Did. c. Tr. c. 93.—*Clem of Alex.* Coh. vi. 59: Πᾶσιν γὰρ ἁπαξαπλῶς ἀνθρώποις, μάλιστα δὲ τοῖς περὶ λόγους ἐνδιατρίβουσιν (qui in studiis literarum versati sunt) ἐνέστακταί τις ἀπόῤῥοια θεϊκή. Οὗ δὴ χάριν καὶ ἄκοντες μὲν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἕνα τε εἶναι Θεὸν, ἀνώλεθρον καὶ ἀγέννητον· τοῦτον ἄνω που περὶ τὰ νῶτα τοῦ οὐμανοῦ εν τῇ ἰδίᾳ καὶ οἰκείᾳ περιωπῇ ὄντως ὄντα ἀεί. Comp. Strom. v. 12, p. 698: Θεοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἔμφασις ἐνὸς ἦν τοῦ παντοκράτορος παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εὐφρονοῦσι πάντοτε φυσικὴ καὶ τῆς ἀϊδίου κατὰ τὴν θείαν πρόνοιαν ἐνεργεσίας ἀντελαμβάνοντο οἱ πλεῖστοι, οἱ καὶ μὴ τέλεον ἀπηρυθριακότες πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

[7] *Theophilus* ad Autolycum, at the beginning: "If thou sayest, Show me thy God; I answer, Show me first thy man, and I will show thee my God. Show me first, whether the eyes of thy soul see, and the ears of thy heart hear. For as the eyes of the body perceive earthly things, light and darkness, white and black, beauty and deformity, etc., so the ears of the heart and the eyes of the soul can see God. God is seen by those who can see him, when they open the eyes of their soul. All men have eyes, but the eyes of some are blinded, that they can not see the light of the sun. But the sun does not cease to shine, because they are blind, they must ascribe it to their blindness that they can not see. Thus is it with thee, O man! The eyes of thy soul are darkened by sin, even by thy sinful actions. Like a bright mirror, man must have a pure soul. If there be any rust on the mirror, man can not see the reflection of his countenance in it: likewise, if there be sin in man, he can not see God. Therefore, first examine thyself, whether thou be not an adulterer, fornicator, thief, robber, etc., for thy crimes prevent thee from perceiving God." Comp. Clem. of Alex. Pæd. iii. 1, p. 250: Ἑαυτὸν γάρ τις ἐὰν γνῷ, Θεὸν εἴσεται. Minuc. Fel. c. 32: Ubique non tantum nobis proximus, sed infusus est (Deus). Non tantum sub illo agimus, sed et cum illo, prope dixerim vivimus.

[8] *Theophil.* ad Autol. 5: "When we see a well appointed vessel on the sea, we conclude that she has a pilot on board; so, too, from the regular course of the planets, the rich variety of creatures, we infer the Creator." Clem. of Alex. (comp. note 4). *Minuc. Fel.* c. 32: Immo ex hoc Deum credimus, quod eum sentire possumus, videre non possumus. In operibus enim ejus et in mundi omnibus motibus virtutem ejus semper præsentem adspicimus, quum tonat, fulgurat, fulminat, quum serenat, etc. Comp. c. 18: Quod si ingressus aliquam domum omnia exculta, disposita, ornata vidisses, utique præesse ei crederes dominum, et illis bonis rebus multo esse meliorem: ita in hac mundi domo, quum cœlum terramque perspicias, providentiam, ordinem, legem, crede esse universitatis dominum parentemque, ipsis sideribus et totius mundi partibus pulchriorem. Novat. ab init.

[4] *Clem. of Alex.* Strom. v. 12, p. 695: Καὶ μὴν ὁ δυσμεταχειριστότατος περὶ Θεοῦ λόγος οὗτός ἐστιν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς πράγματος δυσεύρετος, πάντως που ἡ πρώτη καὶ πρεσβυτάτη ἀρχὴ δύσδεικτος, ἥτις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν αἰτία τοῦ γενέσθαι κ. τ. λ. Ib. in calce et 696: Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμῃ λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ· αὕτη γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων συνίσταται· τοῦ δὲ ἀγεννήτου οὐδὲν προϋπάρχει· λείπεται δὴ θείᾳ χάριτι καὶ μόνῳ τῷ παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγῳ τὸ ἄγνωστον νοεῖν. Strom. iv. 25, p. 635: Ὁ μὲν οὖν Θεὸς ἀναπόδεικτος ὤν, οὐκ ἐστιν ἐπιστημονικός· ὁ δὲ υἱὸς σοφία τε ἐστὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμη κ. τ. λ. Likewise *Origen*, Contra Cels. vii. 42 (Opp. T. 1, p. 725), maintains in reference to the saying of Plato, that it is difficult to find God: Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀποφαινόμεθα, ὅτι οὐκ αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ὁπωσποτανοῦν ζητῆσαι τὸν θεὸν, καὶ εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν καθαρῶς, μὴ βοηθηθεῖσα ὑπὸ τοῦ ζητουμένου· εὑρισκομένου τοῖς ὁμολογοῦσι μετὰ τὸ παρ' αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν, ὅτι δέονται αὐτοῦ, ἐμφανίζοντος ἑαυτὸν οἷς ἂν κρίνῃ εὔλογον εἶναι ὀφθῆναι, ὡς πέφυκε θεὸς μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ γινώσκεσθαι, ἀνθρώπου δὲ ψυχὴ ἔτι οὖσα ἐν σώματι γιγνώσκειν τὸν θεόν.

§ 36.

THE UNITY OF GOD.

Since Christianity adopted the doctrine of one God as taught in the Old Testament, it became necessary to defend it, not only against the polytheism of the heathen, but also against the dualistic doctrine (borrowed from heathenism), and the Gnostic theory of emanation.[1] Some proved the necessity of one God,[2] though not in the most skillful manner, from the relations of space,[3] or even from analogies in the rational and also in the animal creation.[4] The more profound thinkers, however, were well aware that it is not sufficient to demonstrate the mere numerical unity of the Divine Being, and tried to give expression to this feeling by transporting the transcendental unity into a sphere above the mathematical *monas*.[5]

[1] Both the hypothesis of a δημιουργός, ἄρχων, Jaldabaoth, etc., who is subordinate to the Supreme God (θεὸς ἀκατονόμαστος, βυθός), and that of the unfolding of the one God into manifold simple æons, or pairs of æons, is contrary to monotheism. On the more fully developed systems of Basilides and Valentinus, comp. Irenæus, Clem. of Alexandria, and the works quoted § 23 on the Gnostic systems. Against the Gnostic dualism especially, Irenæus (ii. 1); Origenes De Princ. ii, i.; Tert. Adv. Marcion. i. (As to the mode in which the orthodox church tried to unite the belief in the Trinity with monotheism, see below.)

[2] *Justin M.* simply acknowledges this necessity, by considering the unity of God as an innate idea, which was afterward lost. In his opinion monotheism is the first true criterion of religious principles, Coh. ad Græc. c. 36: Δυνατὸν μανθάνειν ὑμᾶς ἕνα καὶ μόνον εἶναι θεὸν, ὃ πρῶτόν ἐστι τῆς ἀληθοῦς θεοσεβείας γνώρισμα.

[3] To this class belongs the proof adduced by *Athenagoras*, Legat. pro Christianis, c. 8: "If there had been two or several gods from the beginning, they would either be in one and the same place, or each would occupy a separate space. They cannot be in *one* and the same place, for if they be gods, they are not identical (consequently they exclude each other). Only the created is equal to its pattern, but not the uncreated, for it does not proceed from any thing, neither is it formed after any model. As the hand, the eye, and the foot are different members of *one* body, as they conjointly compose that body, so God is but one God. Socrates is a compound being, since he is created, and subject to change; but God, who is uncreated, and can neither be divided nor acted upon by another being, can not consist of parts. But if each god were supposed to occupy a separate space, what place could we assign to the other god, or the other gods, seeing that God is *above* the world, and *around* all things which he has made? For as the world is round, and God surrounds all beings, where would then be room for any of the other gods? For such a god can not be *in* the world, because it belongs to another; no more can he be around the world, for the Creator of the world, even God, surrounds it. But if he can be neither *in* the world, nor *around* it (for the first God occupies the whole space around it), where is he? Perhaps above the world, and above God? *in* another world? or *around* another world? But if he is *in* another world, and *around* another world, he does not exist for us, and does not govern our world, and his power, therefore, is not very great, for then he is confined within certain boundaries [after all, a concession!]. But as he exists neither *in* another world (for the former God fills the universe), nor *around* another world (for the above God holds all the universe), it follows that he does not exist at all, since there is nothing in which he can exist."

[4] *Minuc. Fel.* c. 18: Quando unquam regni societas aut cum fide cœpit, aut sine cruore desiit? Omitto Persas de equorum hinnitu augurantes principatum, et Thebanorum præmortuam fabulam transeo; ob pastorum et casse regnum de geminis memoria notissima est; generi et soceri bella toto orbe diffusa sunt, et tam magni imperii duos fortuna non cepit. Vide cetera: rex unus apibus, dux unus in gregibus, in armentis rector unus. Tu in cœlo summam potestatem dividi credas, et scindi veri illius ac divini imperii potestatem? quum palam sit, parentem omnium Deum nec principium habere nec terminum, etc. Comp. *Cyprian*, De Idolorum Vanitate, p. 14.

[5] *Clem.* Pæd. i. 8, p. 140: Εν δὲ ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν μονάδα. Along with the idea of the *unity* of God, *Origen* speaks of the more metaphysical idea of his *simplicity*, De Princ. i. 1, 6 (Opp. T. i. p. 51, Redepenning, p. 100): Non ergo aut corpus aliquid, aut *in* corpore esse putandus est Deus (against this, compare Athenagoras), sed intellectualis natura simplex, nihil omnino adjunctionis admittens: uti ne majus aliquid et inferius in se habere credatur, sed ut sit ex omni parte μονάς et ut ita dicam ἑνάς, et mens et fons, ex quo initium totius intellectualis naturæ vel mentis est. *Strauss*, in his Glaubenslehre (i. 404 sq.), gives a compressed sketch of the attempts of the fathers to prove the unity of God. [Origen, Contra Cels. i. 23, in the *a posteriori* method; from the analogy of armies and states. Lactantius, Div. Inst. i. 3: Quod si in uno exercitu tot fuerint imperatores,

quot legiones, quot cohortes, quot cunei, quot alæ, etc. Cyprian, De Idol. Van. 5: Nec hoc tantum de homine mireris, quum in hoc omnis natura consentiat. Rex unus est apibus, et dux unus in gregibus, et in armentis rector unus: multo magis mundi unus est rector, etc. They also derived an *a priori* argument from the infinitude and absolute perfection of the divine essence.]

§ 37.

WHETHER GOD CAN BE NAMED AND KNOWN.

The idea of a *revealed* religion implies that so much of the nature of God should be made *manifest* to man, as is necessary to the knowledge of salvation; the church, therefore, has always cultivated the λόγος περὶ Θεοῦ (theology). On the other hand, the inadequacy of human conceptions has always been acknowledged (in opposition to the pride of speculation), and the unfathomable divine essence admitted to be past finding out; some even entertained doubts about the propriety of giving God any name. Much of what the church designated by the term *mystery*, is founded partly on a sense of the insufficiency of our ideas and the inaptitude of our language, and partly on the necessity of still employing certain ideas and expressions to communicate our religious opinions.

When the martyr *Attalus*, in the persecution of the Gallican Christians under Marcus Aurelius, was asked by his judges what was the name of God, he replied: Ὁ θεὸς ὄνομα οὐκ ἔχει ὡς ἄνθρωπος, Euseb. v. 1 (edit. *Heinichen*, t. ii. p. 29, comp. the note). Such was also the opinion of *Justin M.*, Apology, ii. 6; whatever name may be given to God, he who has given a name to a thing must always be anterior to it. He, therefore, draws a distinction (with *Philo*, De Confus. Ling. p. 357) between *appellatives* (προσρήσεις) and *names* (ὀνόματα). The predicates πατήρ, θεός, κύριος, δεσπότης, are only appelatives. Therefore, he also calls God ἄῤῥητος πατήρ; other passages are given by *Semisch*, ii. p. 252, ss. When Justin further says (Dial. c. Tryph. c. 3) that God is not only above all *names*, but above all *essence* (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας), it is to be remembered that he is there speaking as a heathen from the Platonic standpoint. But elsewhere he speaks of an οὐσία of God, *e. g.*, Dial. c. Tryph. c. 128, and even ascribes to him (in a certain sense) a μορφή. Apol. i. 9; comp. *Semisch*, ii. p. 252. *Theoph. ad Autol.* i. 3: Ἄκουε, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, τὸ μὲν εἶδος τοῦ θεοῦ, ἄῤῥητον καὶ ἀνέκφραστον, καὶ μὴ δυνάμενον ὀφθαλμοῖς σαρκίνοις ὁραθῆναι· δόξῃ γάρ ἐστιν ἀχώρητος, μεγέθει ἀκατάληπτος, ὕψει ἀπερινόητος, ἰσχύϊ ἀσύγκριτος, σοφίᾳ ἀσυμβίβαστος, ἀγαθοσύνῃ ἀμίμητος, καλοποιΐᾳ ἀνεκδιήγητος· εἰ γὰρ φῶς αὐτὸν εἶπώ, ποίημα αὐτοῦ λέγω· εἰ λόγον εἶπω, ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ λέγω (comp. the note to this passage by Maran)· νοῦν ἐὰν εἶπω, φρόνησιν αὐτοῦ λέγω· πνεῦμα ἐὰν εἶπω, ἀναπνοὴν αὐτοῦ λέγω· σοφίαν ἐὰν εἶπω, γέννημα αὐτοῦ λέγω· ἰσχὺν ἐὰν εἶπω, κράτος αὐτοῦ λέγω· πρόνοιαν ἐὰν εἶπω, ἀγαθοσύνην αὐτοῦ λέγω

*βασιλείαν ἐὰν εἴπω, δόξαν αὐτοῦ λέγω· κύριον ἐὰν εἴπω, κριτὴν αὐτὸν λέγω· κριτήν ἐὰν εἴπω, δίκαιον αὐτὸν λέγω· πατέρα ἐὰν εἴπω, τὰ πάντα αὐτὸν λέγω· πῦρ ἐὰν εἴπω, τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ λέγω κ. τ. λ.** Comp. i. 5: *Εἰ γὰρ τῷ ἡλίῳ ἐλαχίστῳ ὄντι στοιχείῳ οὐ δύναται ἄνθρωπος ἀτενίσαι διὰ τὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν θέρμην καὶ δύναμιν, πῶς οὐχὶ μᾶλλον τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξῃ ἀνεκφράστῳ οὔσῃ ἄνθρωπος θνητὸς οὐ δύναται ἀντωπῆσαι* [comp. Scherer, Le Ditheisme de Just. Rév. de Theol. 1856]. According to *Iren.* ii. 25, 4, God is indeterminabilis, nor can any one fully comprehend his nature by thinking; comp. *Duncker*, p. 11. *Minuc. Fel.* c. 18: Hic (Deus) nec videri potest, visu clarior est, nec comprehendi, tactu purior est, nec æstimari, sensibus, major est, infinitus, immensus et soli sibi tantus quantus est notus; nobis vero ad intellectum pectus angustum est, et ideo sic eum digne æstimamus, dum inæstimabilem dicimus. Eloquar, quemadmodum sentio: magnitudinem Dei, que se putat nosse, minuit; qui non vult minuere, non novit. Nec nomen Deo quæras: DEUS nomen est! Illic vocabulis opus est, quum per singulos propriis appellationum insignibus multitudo dirimenda est. Deo, qui solus est, Dei vocabulum totum est. Quem si patrem dixero, terrenum opineris; si regem, carnalem suspiceris; si dominum, intelliges utique mortalem. Aufer additamenta nominum, et perspicies ejus claritatem. *Clement of Alexandria* shows very distinctly, Strom. vii. p. 689, that we can attain to a clear perception of God only by laying aside, *δι' ἀναλύσεως*, all finite ideas of the divine nature, till at last nothing but the abstract idea of unity remains. But lest we should content ourselves with the mere negation, we must throw ourselves (*ἀποῤῥίψωμεν ἑαυτούς*) into the greatness of Christ, in whom the glory of God was manifested, in order to obtain to some extent (*ἀμηγέπη*) the knowledge of God (*i. e.*, in a practical and religious manner, not by speculation); for even then we learn only what God is *not*, not *what* he is (that is to say, if we speak of absolute knowledge). Comp. also the 12th and 13th chapters of the 5th book, from p. 692; in particular, p. 695, and c. i. p. 647: *Δῆλον γὰρ μηδένα δύνασθαι παρὰ τὸν τῆς ζωῆς χρόνον τὸν θεὸν ἐναργῶς καταλαβέσθαι*; he, therefore, gives the advice, ibid. p. 651: *Τὸ δὲ ἄρα ζητεῖν περὶ θεοῦ ἂν μὴ εἰς ἔριν, ἀλλὰ εἰς εὕρεσιν τείνῃ, σωτήριόν ἐστι.* Compare on this, Baur, Trinitätslehre, p. 191, sq., who remarks, that what is *abstract* in the idea of God is not declared by any of the older teachers of the church, Origen himself not excepted, more strongly and definitely than by Clement. But he by no means confined himself to the abstract. *Origen*, Contra Cels. vi. 65, Opp. i. p. 681, sq. shows that what is individual can not be described; for who in words could tell the difference between the sweetness of figs and the sweetness of dates? And De Princ. i. 1, 5, p. 50; Redepenning, p. 89, he says: Dicimus secundum veritatem, Deum incomprehensibilem esse atque inæstimabilem. Si quid enim illud est, quod sentire vel intelligere de Deo potuerimus, multis longe modis eum meliorem esse ab eo quod sensimus necesse est credere. "As much as the brightness of the

* From these expressions we must not infer that the name of God was indifferent to Christians; on the contrary, the names given to God in the Scriptures were held to be most sacred: hence Origen contends against the position of Celsus, that one might call the highest being, Jupiter, or Zeus, or Sabaoth, or any Egyptian or Indian name: Contra Cels. vi. Opp i. p. 320.

sun exceeds the dim light of a lantern, so much the glory of God surpasses our idea of it." Likewise *Novatian* says, De Trinit. c. 2: De hoc ergo ac de eis, quæ sunt ipsius et in eo sunt, nec mens hominis quæ sint, quanta sint et qualia sint, digne concipere potest, nec eloquentia sermonis humani æquabilem majestati ejus virtutem sermonis expromit. Ad cogitandam enim et ad eloquendam illius majestatem et eloquentia omnis merito muta est et mens omnis exigua est: major est enim mente ipsa, nec cogitari possit quantus sit: ne si potuerit cogitari, mente humana minor sit, qua concipi possit. Major est quoque omni sermone, nec edici possit: ne si potuerit edici, humana sermone minor sit, quo quum edicitur, et circumiri et colligi possit. Quidquid enim de illo cogitatum fuerit, minus ipso erit, et quidquid enuntiatum fuerit, minus illo comparatum circum ipsum erit. Sentire enim illum taciti aliquatenus possumus; ut autem ipse est, sermone explicare non possumus. Sive enim illum dixeris lucem, creaturam ipsius magis quam ipsum dixeris, etc. . . . . Quidquid omnino de illo retuleris, rem aliquam ipsius magis et virtutem quam ipsum explicaveris. Quid enim de eo condigne aut dicas aut sentias, qui omnibus et sermonibus major est? etc. This Christian scholasticism which pervades the first period, forms a striking contrast with the modern assurance of the old and new scholastic mode and style! Nevertheless, the fathers (and Origen in particular) also admit a spiritual vision of God, which is now mediated by Christ, but will at last be direct. Comp. infra, on Eschatology.

§ 38

IDEALISM AND ANTHROPOMORPHISM. CORPOREITY OF GOD

The educated mind desires to abstract from the nature of God every thing that reminds it of the finite or composite; sometimes it has even taken offense at the idea of the substantiality of God, out of a refined fear of reducing him to the level of created beings; but thus it runs into danger of dissipating the Deity into a mere abstract negation. In opposition to this idealizing tendency, the necessities of religion demand a real God *for* the world, *for* man, and *for* the human heart; and the bold and figurative language of pious emotion, as well as popular symbolical and anthropomorphitic expressions, compensated for what the idea of God lost in the way of negation. Both these tendencies, which have always advanced equal claims in the sphere of religious thought,[1] have their respective representatives in the first period of the History of Doctrines. On the one hand, the Alexandrian school, and *Origen* in particular, endeavored to remove from God every thing that seemed to draw him within the atmosphere of the earthly, or in any way to make him like men.[2] On the other hand, *Tertullian* insisted so much on the idea of the substantiality of God, that he confounded it with his corporeity (though he by no means ascribed to him a gross, material body, like that of man).[3]

[1] On this subject even the ancient philosophers entertained differing opinions. The popular, polytheistic form of religion was founded (as is every religion) on anthropomorphism. Xenophanes of Colophon, the founder of the Eleatic school, endeavored to combat anthropomorphism as well as polytheism. Comp. *Clem. Alex.* Strom. v. 14, p. 714 (Sylb. 601, c.):

> Εἷς θεὸς ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρωποῖσι μέγιστος,
> Οὔ τι δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίιος οὐδὲ νόημα, κ. τ. λ.

and Strom. vii. 4, p. 841; other passages in *Preller*, Hist. Phil. Græco-Rom. Hamb. 1838. *Ritter*, i. p. 450. [English translat. by *Morrison*, i. p. 430.] *Schleiermacher*, p. 60.—The Epicureans (though it is doubtful whether Epicurus himself seriously meant to teach this doctrine) imagined that the gods possessed a quasi human form, but without the wants of men, and unconcerned about human sufferings and pleasures. Thus they retained only what is negative in (the ghost of) anthropomorphism, and lost sight of its more profound signification (the human relation of God to man). Comp. Cic. de Natura Deorum, i. 8–21. *Reinhold*, i. p. 367, note. *Ritter*, iii. 490. [Engl. transl. iii. 442.]—Different views were adopted by the Stoics, who represented God as the vital force and reason which govern the universe; but though they avoided anthropomorphitic notions, they regarded him as clothed in an ethereal robe. Cic. de Nat. D. ii. 24. *Ritter*, iii. p. 576. [English translation, iii. p. 520, ss.]

[2] *Clement* opposes anthropomorphism in different places: "Most men talk and judge of God from their own limited point of view, as if cockles and oysters were to reason out of their narrow shells, and the hedgehog out of his rolled up self." Strom. v. 11, p. 687; comp. vii. 5, p. 845; c. 7, p. 852, '53: Ὅλος ἀκοὴ καὶ ὅλος ὀφθαλμὸς, ἵνα τις τούτοις χρήσηται τυῖς ὀνόμασιν, ὁ Θεός. Καθ' ὅλου τοίνυν οὐδεμίαν σώζει θεοσέβειαν, οὔτε ἐν ὕμνοις οὔτε ἐν λόγοις, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν γραφαῖς ἡ δόγμασιν ἡ μὴ πρέπουσα περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑπόληψις, ἀλλ' εἰς ταπεινὰς καὶ ἀσχήμονας ἐκτρεπομένη ἐννοίας τε καὶ ὑπονοίας· ὅθεν ἡ τῶν πολλῶν εὐφημία δυσφημίας οὐδὲν διαφέρει διὰ τῆν τῆς ἀληθείας ἄγνοιαν κ. τ. λ. (on prayer). *Origen* begins his work, περὶ ἀρχῶν, immediately after the Procem. with objections to anthropomorphitic or material ideas of God: "I know that many appeal even to Scripture to prove that God is a corporeal being; because they read in Moses that he is a consuming fire, and in John, that he is a Spirit (πνεῦμα=רוּחַ). They can not think of fire and spirit but as something corporeal. I should like to ask them what they say of the passage in 1 John i. 5: "God is light?" He is a light to enlighten those who seek the truth (Ps. xxxvi. 9); for "the light of God" is nothing other than divine power, by means of which he who is enlightened perceives truth in all things, and apprehends God himself as the truth. In this sense it is also said, in thy light we shall see light, *i. e.* in the Logos, in the Wisdom, which is thy Son, we see thee, the Father. Is it necessary to suppose that God resembles the sunlight, because he is called *light?* Can any sensible meaning be attached to the idea, that knowledge and wisdom have their source in "the corporeal light?" (Schnitzer's translation, p. 13, sq.) But the spiritualizing tendency of Origen led him frequently so to explain

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§ 39.

THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

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...e of God, as we have already seen, nor his ...rst defined with scientific precision.[1] The ...adopted the concrete idea of a personal God, ...Old Test., though in a somewhat modified ...taphysical ideas, borrowed from the schools ...sferred to the God of the Christians; and ... are found to oscillate between the philoso-

...4, adduces this passage to show that Tertullian is ...morphism. It rather proves the contrary. It must ...rporeity of God and anthropomorphism are by no ... conceive of God as incorporeal, and yet in a very ...ted spirit, like the spirit of man. On the other ... taken in so abstract a manner as to exclude all ...toics). Tertullian combines both these modes of ...been said, it is the awkwardness of his style and ...ive religious views, that has brought him into the ... [This may be clearly seen from the following ... to the Deity by means of figures borrowed from ... with corporeal qualities: when eyes are ascribed ... when ears, that he hears all things; the speech ...f prayer; hands, creation; arms, power; feet, ...performs no office for which they are required, ...s will. How can he require eyes, who is light ...an he require hands, who is the silent creator ... is to command? Those members are neces- ... the counsels of man would be inefficacious ...; but not to God, whose operations follow ... in *Kitto*, Cyclop. of Bibl. Literat. art. An- ...as struggling after more profound views ...f his theology in depreciating terms. For ...n, by *Rettberg*, u. a. Comp. *Baur's* Trinitäts- ...nthropomorphism and anthropopathism,

even the more profound sayings of Scripture, as to leave only an abstract idea; this appears in what follows the above extract, where, in order to exclude all conceptions of a divisibility of the Spirit (of God), he compares a participation in the Holy Spirit to "a participation in the medicinal art," although further on he grants that the comparison is inadequate. Here manifestly "the understanding prevails altogether too much over the imagination" (comp. the judgment of Mosheim, cited § 26, note 11.) *Novatian* also expresses himself in very strong and decided terms against anthropomorphism, De Trin. c. 6: Non intra hæc nostri corporis lineamenta modum aut figuram divinæ majestatis includimus. . . . Ipse totus oculus, quia totus videt, totus auris, quia totus audit, etc.—Even the definition, that God is a spirit, has, according to him, only a relative validity: Illud quod dicit Dominus (John iv.) spiritum Deum, puto ego sic locutum Christum de patre, ut adhuc aliquid plus intelligi velit quam spiritum Deum. He thinks that this is only figurative language, as it is said elsewhere, God is light, etc., omnis enim spiritus creatura est.

[a] The first Christian writer who is said to have ascribed a body to the Deity, is *Melito of Sardis*, in his treatise περὶ ἐνσωμάτου θεοῦ, which is no longer extant; comp. Orig. Comment. in Genes., (Opp. T. ii. p. 25); Euseb. iv. 26, and *Heinichen* on the passage; Gennadius De Dogm. Eccles. c. 4; and *Piper*, über Melito, in the Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 1838, i. p. 71, where a similar view is cited from the Clementine Homilies. [*Cureton*, in his Spicilegium Syriacum, Lond. 1855, publishes an apology under the name of Melito, which is free from anthropomorphism; but it is the work of a later author. Comp. *Jacobi* in *Neander's* Hist. Doctr. p. 103 of Ryland's translation, and in the Deutsche Zeitschrift, 1856.] It is more certain that *Tertullian* ascribed to God (as also to the soul) a body, which he did not, however, represent as a human body, but as the necessary form of all existence (comp. *Schleiermacher*, Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 165, and Schwegler's Montanism, p. 171 note), De Carne Christi, c. 11: Ne esse quidem potest, nisi habens per quod sit. Cum autem (anima) sit, habeat necesse est aliquid per quod sit. Si habet aliquid per quod est, hoc erit corpus ejus. Omne quod est, corpus est sui generis. Nihil est incorporale, nisi quod non est. Advers. Praxeam, c. 7: Quis enim negabit Deum corpus esse, etsi Deus spiritus est? Spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie. Sed et invisibilia illa quæcunque sunt, habent apud Deum et suum corpus et suam formam, per quæ soli Deo visibilia sunt; quanto magis quod ex ipsius substantia missum est, sine substantia non erit! Comp. *Neander*, Antignosticus, p. 451, and Dogmengesch. p. 109 (p. 110 of Ryland). But Tertullian himself draws a definite distinction, which excludes all grosser forms of anthropomorphism, between the divine and the human *corpus*, Advers. Marc. ii. 16: Discerne substantias et suos eis distribu sensus, tam diversos, quam substantiæ exigunt, licet vocabulis communicare videantur. Nam et dexteram et oculos et pedes Dei legimus, nec ideo tamen humanis comparabuntur, quia de appellatione sociantur. Quanta erit diversitas divini corporis et humani, sub eisdem nominibus membrorum, tanta erit et animi divini et humani differentia, sub eisdem licet vocabulis sensuum, quos tam corruptorios efficit in homine corruptibilitas substantiæ humanæ, quam incorruptorios in

Deo efficit incorruptibilitas substantiæ divinæ.* On the anthropomorphism of Cyprian, see *Rettberg*, p. 300. *Irœneus*, with great sobriety, rejects both anthropomorphism properly so called, and false anthropopathism. In no respect is God to be compared to human frailty; though his *love* justifies us in using human phraseology when speaking of him, nevertheless we feel that, as to his *greatness* and his true nature, he is elevated above all that is human. God is simple, and in all things like himself (simplex, et non compositus et simili membrius, et totus ipse sibimet ipsi simites et æqualis.) Comp. Adv. Hær. ii. 13, 4, and iv. 5, 20. *Duncker*, l. c. p. 25. *Baur*, Christ. Gnosis, p. 466; Trin. Lehre, p. 190.

§ 39.

THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

[Comp. Dorner, Die Unveränderlichkeit Gottes, in Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie, i. 2, ii. 3. iii. 3.]

Neither the existence of God, as we have already seen, nor his attributes, were at first defined with scientific precision.[1] The Catholic church simply adopted the concrete idea of a personal God, as propounded in the Old Test., though in a somewhat modified form.[2] But by degrees metaphysical ideas, borrowed from the schools of philosophers, were transferred to the God of the Christians; and on this point, too, opinions are found to oscillate between the philoso-

* *Münscher*, ed. by Cölln, i. p. 134, adduces this passage to show that Tertullian is justly chargeable with real anthropomorphism. It rather proves the contrary. It must also be borne in mind that the corporeity of God and anthropomorphism are by no means synonymous. It is possible to conceive of God as incorporeal, and yet in a very anthropomorphic way as a very limited spirit, like the spirit of man. On the other hand, the substantiality of God may be taken in so abstract a manner as to exclude all that is human and personal (so the Stoics). Tertullian combines both these modes of representation; but after all that has been said, it is the awkwardness of his style and mode of thinking, rather than any defective religious views, that has brought him into the repute of being a crude anthropomorphist. [This may be clearly seen from the following passage: "Divine affections are ascribed to the Deity by means of figures borrowed from the human form, not as if he were indued with corporeal qualities: when eyes are ascribed to him, it denotes that he sees all things; when ears, that he hears all things; the speech denotes the will; nostrils, the perception of prayer; hands, creation; arms, power; feet, immensity; for he has no members, and performs no office for which they are required, but executes all things by the sole act of his will. How can he require eyes, who is light itself? or feet, who is omnipresent? How can he require hands, who is the silent creator of all things? or a tongue, to whom to think is to command? Those members are necessary to men, but not to God, inasmuch as the counsels of man would be inefficacious unless his thoughts put his members in motion; but not to God, whose operations follow his will without effort." Comp. *Wright, W.*, in *Kitto*, Cyclop. of Bibl. Literat. art. Anthropomorphism.] Tertullian undoubtedly was struggling after more profound views than are even suspected by many who speak of his theology in depreciating terms. For the same reason too much is conceded to Cyprian, by *Rettberg*, u. s. Comp. *Baur's* Trinitätslehre, p. 188 note. On the distinction between anthropomorphism and anthropopathism, see *Neander*, Dogmengesch. [p. 106 of Ryland].

phical tendencies above described. Some connected their notions of the *omnipresence* of God with conceptions of his corporeity, as space-filling and displacing other bodies; others, on the contrary, maintained that he was exalted above space, or that he is to be conceived as abolishing it and taking its place.[4] The doctrine of *omniscience* was to some extent mixed up with anthropomorphitic ideas, and even Origen put limits to this attribute of God,[5] as well as to his *omnipotence*.[6] In harmony with the spirit of Christianity, along with the *holiness* of God,[7] his *love* and mercy were made specially prominent.[8] But it was to be expected that collisions would arise, which could be harmonized only by the attempt to take more comprehensive and elevated views; as, for example, to reconcile the omniscience (especially the foreknowledge) of God with his omnipotence and goodness,[9] or his punitive justice with his love and mercy.[10]

[1] Thus "*Justin Martyr generally makes only a passing reference to the divine attributes, and in contrast with the common humanizing of deity found in the poetic and plastic mythology.*" *Semisch*, ii. p. 258. Justin, too, emphasizes the immutability of God, as one of his fundamental attributes, calling him (Apol. i. 13) *τὸν ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀεὶ ὄντα θεόν.*

[2] The Catholic church preserved a right medium between the anti-judaizing Gnostics, who spoke of the *demiurge* as a being either subordinate to the Supreme God, or standing in a hostile relation to him; and the judaizing Ebionites, who, retaining the rigid physiognomy of Judaism, misapprehended the universality of the Christian doctrine of God. But here, as elsewhere, there is a wide difference between the North African and the Alexandrian schools.

[3] Comp. (§ 36, note 2) the passage cited from Athenagoras on the unity of God. With him agrees Theophilus (Ad Autol. I. 5), who compares the world to a pomegranate; as this is surrounded by its peel, so is the world by the Spirit of God, and kept together by his hand. *Cyprian*, De Idol. Vanit. p. 15, finds fault with the heathen because they attempt to confine the infinite God within the narrow walls of a temple, whilst he—ubique totus diffusus est,—the image of a space-filling substance apparently floating before his mind.

[4] *Philo* had previously identified God with absolute space,* and called him his own limit (comp. the passages bearing on this subject in the work of *Dähne*, p. 281–284, and p. 193, 267, ss); *Theophilus*, too, Ad Autol. ii. 3, calls God his own space (*αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ τόπος ἐστίν*). He does not confine the omnipresence of God to his local presence in one or another spot, but considers it as his uninterrupted activity known only from his works; comp. i. 5. *Clem. of Alex.*, too, opposes the localizing of God, Strom. ii. 2, p. 431: *Οὐ γὰρ ἐν γνόφῳ* (a needless conjecture of Rössler's here is, *ἐν χρόνῳ*) *ἢ τόπῳ*

* Comp. the opinions of the Peripatetics (Sextus Empiricus adv. Physicos, x. p. 639, ed. Fabricius).

ὁ Θεὸς, ἀλλ' ὑπεράνω καὶ τόπου καὶ χρόνου καὶ τῆς τῶν γεγονότων ἰδιότητος· διὸ οὐδὲ ἐν μέρει καταγίνεταί ποτε, οὔτε περίεχων οὔτε περιεχόμενος, ἢ κατὰ ὁρισμόν τινα ἢ κατὰ ἀποτομήν. According to *Origen*, God sustains and fills the world (which Origen, like Plato, conceives to be an animate being) with his power, but he neither occupies space, nor does he even move in space, comp. De Princ. ii. 1, Opp. i. p. 77. For an explanation of popular and figurative expressions, which suggest the occupying of space and change of place, vide Contra Cels. iv. 5, Opp. i. p. 505. and comp. also p. 686. Concerning the expression that God is all in all, see De Princ. iii. 6 (Opp. i. p. 152, 153). *Schnitzer*, p. 239 sq.

* *Just* M. Dial. c. Tryph. c. 127: Ὁ γὰρ ἀῤῥητος πατὴρ καὶ κύριος τῶν πάντων οὔτε ποι ἀφῖκται, οὔτε περιπατεῖ, οὔτε καθεύδει, οὔτε ἀνίσταται, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ χώρᾳ ὅπου ποτὲ μένει, ὀξῦ ὁρῶν καὶ ὀξῦ ἀκούων, οὐκ ὀφθαλμοῖς σὐδὲ ὠσὶν, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει ἀλέκτῳ· καὶ πάντα ἐφορᾷ καὶ πάντα γίνωτκει, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν λέληθεν αὐτόν. *Clement*, Strom. vi. 17, p. 821: Ὁ γάο τοι Θεὸς πάντα οἶδεν, οὐ μόνον τὰ ὄντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα καὶ ὡς ἔσται ἕκαστον· τάς τε ἐπὶ μέρους κινήσεις προορῶν πάντ' ἐφορᾷ καὶ πάντ' ἐπακούει, γυμνὴν ἔσωθεν τὴν ψυχὴν βλέπων, καὶ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τὴν ἑκάστου τῆς κατὰ μέρος ἔχει δι αἰῶνος· καὶ ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν θεάτρων γίνεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἑκάστου μερῶν, κατὰ τὴν ἐνόρασίν τε καὶ περιόρασιν καὶ συνόρασιν, τοῦτο ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ γίνεται. Ἀθρόως τε γὰρ πάντα καὶ ἕκαστον ἐν μέρει μιᾷ προσβολῇ προσβλέπει. *Origen* De Princ. iii. 2, Opp. i. p. 49, proves that the world is finite, because God could not comprehend it, if it were infinite; for that only may be understood which has a beginning. But it were impious to say, that there is any thing which God does not comprehend.

* Origen De Princ. ii. c. 9, p. 97 (*Redep.* p. 10.): Ἐν τῇ ἐπινοουμένῃ ἀρχῇ τοσοῦτον ἀριθμὸν τῷ βουλήματι αὐτοῦ ὑποστῆσαι τὸν θεὸν νοερῶν οὐσιῶν, ὅσον ἠδύνατο διαρκέσαι· πεπερασμένην γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὴν δύναμίν τοῦ θεοῦ λεκτέον κ. τ. λ. But in other places Origen expresses himself in a very appropriate way concerning the Divine omnipotence; Contra Cels. v. (Opp. i. p. 595), he shows that God can do all things, but wills nothing which is contrary to nature (παρὰ φύσιν), οὔτε τὰ ἀπὸ κακίας, οὔτε τὰ ἀλόγως γενόμενα.

† The holiness of the divine will is the highest law in Tertullian's view. His highest moral law is, not to do the good for the sake of the good, but because it is commanded by God. (Comp. De Pœnit. c. 4).

* The notion of Clement of Alexandria is remarkable, evidently borrowed from the Gnostic doctrine of an ἀῤῥενόθηλυς, viz., that the compassion of God presents the female aspect of his character, Quis Div. Salv. p. 956; to which there is an analogy in the Old Test., Is. xlix. 15; comp. *Neander's* Gnostische Systeme, p. 209. The works of Clement, in particular, abound with passages referring to the love and mercy of God. He loves men because they are kindred with God, Coh. p. 89: Πρόκειται δὲ ἀεὶ τῷ Θεῷ τὴν ἀνθρώπων ἀγέλην σώζειν. Comp. Strom. vii. p. 832. God's love follows men, seeks them out, as the bird the young that has fallen from its nest, Coh. 74, Pæd. i. p. 102.

* Origenes contra Cels. II., Opp. i. p. 405, Comment in Gen. Opp. ii. p.

10, 11. For more particulars, comp. the doctrine respecting Human Liberty, § 57.

[10] Here, too, was another point of distinction between Gnosticism and the orthodox Christian's view of God; the former did not know how to reconcile the agency of God in inflicting punishment, with his character as loving and redeeming; on this account they felt compelled to separate objectively the just God of the Old Test. from the loving Father of Christians (so Marcion). In opposition to this unwarrantable separation, Irenæus, Tertullian, Clement, Origen, etc., insist particularly on the penal justice of God, and show that it can very well be reconciled with his love. According to *Irenæus*, Adv. Hær. v. 27, penalty does not consist in anything positive which comes from God, but in the separation of the sinner from God (*χωρισμὸς δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ θάνατος*). God does not punish *προηγητικῶς*, but *ἐπακολουθούσης δι' ἐκείνης (τῆς ἁμαρτίας) τῆς κολάσεως*. *Tertullian* considers the penal justice of God first from the judicial standpoint of the inviolability of law; distinguishing between true love and benevolent weakness, he shows that the goodness and justice of God are inseparable; Contra Marc. i. 25, 26; ii. 12: Nihil bonum, quod injustum, bonum autem omne quod justum est. Ita si societas et conspiratio bonitatis atque justitiæ separationem earum non potest capere, quo ore constitues diversitatem duorum deorum in separatione? seorsum deputans deum bonum et seorsum deum justum? Illic consistit bonum, ubi et justum. A primordio denique creator tam bonus quam justus....Bonitas ejus operata est mundum, justitia modulatum est, etc. Comp. c. 13–16 (negabimus Deum, in quo non omnia, quæ Deo digna sint, constent). Then he draws a distinction between, malis supplicii s. pœnæ, and malis culpæ s. peccati. God is the author only of the former; the devil is the author of the latter.—To defend himself against the charge of anthropomorphism he says: Stultissimi, qui de humanis divina præjudicant, ut quoniam in homine corruptoriæ conditionis habentur hujusmodi passiones, idcirco et in Deo ejusdem status existimentur, etc.—*Clement* of Alexandria adopts partly the same juridical view, Strom. iv. 24, p. 634; but, in enumerating the causes which induce God to inflict penalties, he speaks of the legal principle as being the last. He puts first the educational design, to make men better, and to warn and restrain others; comp. Pæd. i. 8, p. 40. This is distinctly set forth, Strom. vii. p. 895: *Ἀλλ' ὡς πρὸς τοῦ διδασκάλου ἢ τοῦ πατρὸς οἱ παῖδες, οὕτως ἡμεῖς πρὸς τῆς προνοίας κολαζόμεθα. Θεὸς δὲ οὐ τιμωρεῖται· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ τιμωρία κακοῦ ἀνταπόδοσις· κολάζει μέντοι πρὸς τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ τοῖς κολαζομένοις*. *Origen*, moreover, says, that God is more ready to do good than to punish; Hom. I. in Jerem. (Opp. iii. p. 125): *Ὁ θεὸς εἰς ἀγαθοποιΐαν πρόθυμός χειρός ἐστιν, εἰς δὲ τὸ κολάσαι τοὺς ἀξίους κολάσεως μελλητής*. He gives the sinner always space for repentance; eodem loco. *Origen* refutes at great length the objections of the Gnostics, De Princ. ii. 5 (Opp. t. i. p. 102, *Schnitzer*, p. 109), by proving (in agreement with Tertullian) that their distinction between "benevolent" and "just" is altogether untenable, and showing that the Divine penalties are inflicted for paternal objects by a wise physician; at the same time, he applies the allegorical interpretation to those

passages of the Old Test. which speak in an anthropomorphitic way of the wrath and vengeance of God; comp. also Contra Cels. iv. 71, 72, p. 556, (see also § 48).

§ 40.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE LOGOS.

a. The Doctrine before the Christian Era, and in other Systems.

*Lücke, Historical Examination of the Idea of the Logos in his Commentar. über das Evangelium Joh. vol. i. 3d ed. p. 249, ss. [*Tholuck*, Commentar zum Evang. Joh. ch. i. Die Logoslehre. 7th ed. p. 52, ss. transl. by C. P. Krauth, Phil. 1859.] **Dorner*, Entwicklungsgeschichte der Christologie. Stuttg. 1845, pp. 1–65; [comp. Bibliotheca Sacra, vi. 156, sq.; vii. 696–732, by Prof. Stuart.] *Von Bohlen*, Das alte Indien mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Ægypten (ii. Königsb. 1830), i. p. 201, ss. *Stuhr*, Die Religionssysteme der heidnischen Völker des Orients, p. 99, ss. *Kleuker*, Zendavesta im Kleinen. Th. ii. p. 1, ss. **Bäumlein*, Versuch die Bedeutung des Johann. Logos aus den Religionssystemen des Orients zu entwickeln. Tüb. 1828. [*Colebrooke's* Essays. *J. R. Ballantyne*, Christ. contrasted with Hindu Philos. 1859. *J. Mullens*, Relig. Aspects of Hindu Phil. (prize essay), 1860. *C. F. Kœppen*, Die Religion Buddhas. ii. 1858, '9. *Barthélemy St. Hilaire*, Bonddha, 1860.] *J. Bucher*, Des Apostels Johannes Lehre von Logos, Schaffh. 1856. [*Burton, E.*, the Bampton Lecture on the Heresies of the Apostolic Age, Lect. vii. Comp. also *Pye Smith*, Scripture Testimony to the Messiah, 3d edit. i. 522–529, ii. 415, 432, et passim.]

F. Ch. Baur, Die Christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Tüb. 1841–43, 3 vols. vol. i. p. 1–128. **G. A. Meier*, Die Lehre von der Trinität. Hamb. 1844, i. p. 1, ss. *Hellway*, Die Vorstellung ven der Præxistenz Christi in der ältesten Kirche, in Zeller's Jahrb. 1848. *Duncker, Zur Gesch. der Logoslehre Justin des Märt. (reprint from the Göttinger Studien, 1847), Gött. 1848. *Læmmer*, Clement. Alexandr. de λόγω doctrina, Lips. 1855. [*König*, Die Menschwerdung, 1846. *R. J. Wilberforce*, Doctrine of the Incarnation in Relation to Mankind and the Church, 1851. *Maurice*, Religions of the World. *Trench*, Unconscious Prophecies of Heathenism. *Robert Gordon*, Christ as made known to the Ancients, 2, 8vo. Edinb. 1854. *Cæsar Morgan*, Trinity of Plato and Philo Judæus, new ed. by Holden, 1853. *John Oxlee*, Trinity and Incarnation on the Principles of Judaism, 3 vols. Lond. 1815–1850. Comp., also, *Liebner's* Christologie, i. 1849; *Thomasius*, Christi Person und Werk, 1853, sq.; *Nägelsbach*, der Gottmensch, i. 1854; *Kuhn*, Kath. Dogmatik, ii. s. 9–41.]

We are obliged to conceive of God, on the one hand, as a purely spiritual essence exalted above all that is finite, and, on the other hand, since he reveals and imparts himself to the world, as having a definite relation to the created universe. This double necessity, in the progress of thought, led to the idea of an *organ* (medium) by which God creates the world, works upon it, and reveals himself to it. This organ was supposed, on the one side, to have its ground in the divine nature itself, to stand in the most intimate connection with it, and, on the other, to be somehow or other distinct from it. In order to ascertain the origin of this idea, we need not go either to remote oriental sources, the wisdom of India and the religion of Zend,[1] nor to the occidental systems of philosophy, that of Plato in particu-

lar.[2] We may find traces of it in the more definite and concrete form which, at the time when the apocryphal writings were composed, was given to the personifications of the divine Word and the divine Wisdom found in the Old Test,[3] especially, however, in the doctrine of Philo concerning the Logos,[4] and in some other ideas then current.[5] Here is prefigured the form into which Christianity was destined to bring the living and fructifying spirit, in giving expression to the profoundest truths of the Christian faith.

[1] "*It is easy to see that the Christian idea can not be explained by an appeal to the Indian religion.*" *Dorner*, p. 7. The *Trimurti* of the Indian Brahmanism:

Brahma	Vishnoo	Seeva (Kala)
Sun (Light)	Water (Air?)	Fire
Creator	Preserver (progressive development)	Destroyer
Power	Wisdom	Justice
Past	Present	Future
Matter	Space	Time.

Comp. *Von Bohlen* and *Stuhr*, l. c. Among the Egyptians we find the following, corresponding with these deities:

Brahma = Phtha
Vishnoo = Kneph
Seeva = Neith.

The word by which Brahma created the world is Om (Oum), see *Von Bohlen*, i. p. 159, ss. 212. In the system of Zoroaster, Honover is represented as the Word by which the world was created (Duncker, Logosl. Just. Mart. Gött. 1847), the most immediate revelation of the god Ormuzd; see *Kleuker*, l. c. and *Stuhr*, i. p. 370, 371. [*Burton*, l. c. Lect. ii. p. 14–48.] "*Since, in the pagan systems of religion, the natural is most intimately blended with the divine, their triads are altogether different from the Christian doctrine of the Trinity; in the former the triads only denote the elements (moments) of a developing process, and are therefore most fully found in those religions which occupy a very low position, but disappear when the identification of the divine with the natural is got rid of in the further development of the religious system.*" *Meier*, l. c. p. 4. Comp. Dorner, l. c.

[2] The relation in which Plato (especially in Timæus) imagined God to stand to the creating *νοῦς*, presents only a remote analogy; likewise the passage bearing on the *λόγος* from the Epinomis, p. 986, which Euseb. Præp, Evang. xi. 16, professes to quote from Epimenides (given by *De Wette*, biblische Dogmatik, § 157). Comp. *Tennemann*, das platonische Philosophem vom göttlichen Verstande, in *Paalus'* Memorabilien, Stück i. and his System der platonischen Philosophie, vol. iii. p. 149, ss. 174, ss. *Böckh*, über die Bildung der Weltseele im Timæus des Plato (in Daub und Creuzer's Studien, vol. iii. p. 1, ss. *Ritter*, Geschichte der Philosophie, ii. p. 291,

ss. 318, ss. [*Burton*, l. c. Lect. vii. and note 90 in particular.] Neander, Hist. Doctrines (Ryland), i. 132. On the doctrine of the Logos among the Stoics (*σπερματικὸς λόγος*), see *Duncker*, Logoslehre, p. 28 sq.

[3] The oldest form of revelation which we find in the Old Test. is the direct *Theophany*, which, however, was adapted only to the age of childhood. In later times God speaks to his people in general, or to individuals, sometimes by angels (especially the מַלְאַךְ יְהוָה), sometimes by human mediators (Moses and the prophets). But the intercourse of God with the prophets is carried on by the medium of the Word of the Lord, דְּבַר יְהוָה which descends upon them. This *λόγος* (*ῥῆμα τοῦ θεοῦ*, *τοῦ κυρίου*) is poetically personified in several places; Ps. cxlvii. 15; Is. lv. 11; in an inferior degree, Ps. xxxiii. 4; cxix. 89, 104, 105; Is. xl. 8; Jer. xxiii. 29; comp. Lücke, l. c. p. 257, 258. Like the Word, so the Wisdom of God (חָכְמָה *σοφία*) is personified: Job xxviii. 12–28, and in very significant terms (in contrast with folly), Prov. ch. viii. and ix. On קָנָנִי (Prov. viii. 22) and the signification of אָמוֹן (viii. 30), comp. *Umbreit's* Comment. p. 102, 106; on the personification of Wisdom in the apocryphal writings (Sir. i. 4, 24; Baruch iii. 15, ss. iv. 1; Wisdom, vi. 22, to ch. ix.) see *Lücke*, l. c. p. 221, ss., and *Bretschneider*, Systematische Darstellung der Dogmatik der Apokryphen. Leipzig, 1805, p. 191, ss. The strongest example of personification is in the Book of Wisdom, so that it is difficult to define exactly the distinction between this personification and the hypostasis, properly so called, especially ch. vii. 22, ss. On the relation of this hypostasis to that of Philo, see Lücke, l. c. *Dorner*, p. 15 sq. *Grimm*, Comm. über d. Buch d. Weisheit, Leipz. 1837. [*Gfrörer's* Urchristenthum, Bd. i. See the discussion between *Lücke* and *Nitzsch*, in the Theol. Stud. und Kritiken, 1840, 1. On the *Angel of Jehovah*, Christ. Rev. New York, 1859, and Bib. Sacra, 1859. On *Wisdom* as a Person, Prof. E. P. Barrows, in Bib. Sacra, 1858. On the *Logos*, Daub in Stud. u. Krit. Bd. vi.; Journal of Sac. Lit. iii.; Journal of Class. and Sacred Philol. Lond. vol. i.; Zeitschrift f. hist. Theol. 1849.]

[4] "*Philo's doctrine of the Logos is the immediate prelude to the Christian idea of the Logos*"; *Semisch*, Just. Mart. ii. p. 267. [Comp. *Jordan Bucher*, Philonische Studien, Tübing. 1848, who discusses in particular the question of the personality of the Logos in Philo.] On the question whether Philo ascribed personality to the Logos, see *Dorner*, i. p. 21, ss.; while most writers reply in the affirmative, Dorner entertains the opposite opinion. Thus much is certain, that Philo makes a distinction between the *ὄν* as such, and the *λόγος τοῦ ὄντος*, who is superior to the *δυνάμεις*, *λόγοι*, and *ἄγγελοι*. This Logos he also calls *δεύτερος θεός*, even *θεός*, directly but without the article,—*υἱὸς πρεσβύτερος*, *υἱὸς μονογενής*, *πρωτόγονος*,—*εἰκών*, *σκιά*, *παράδειγμα*, *δόξα*, *σοφία*, *ἐπιστήμη τοῦ θεοῦ*. According to Philo, the Logos is the essence and seat of the ideal world (*ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν ὁ θεοῦ λόγος*). As an artist first makes a model of that which he purposes to make, so God first shaped the world ideally; see his De Mundi Opif. § 5, and the explanations of *J. G. Müller* (Philo's Buch von der Weltschöpfung, Berl. 1841), p. 149, ss. In the same manner the Logos is the mediator of the revelations of God; the theophanies were possible through him; he is called the *παράκλητος*, *ἀρχιερεύς*, *ἱκέτης*, *πρεσβευτὴς ὀπαδὸς τοῦ θεοῦ*. He takes care of all that

is good, as ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ καλῶν πράξεων. Philo was acquainted with the distinction between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and the λόγος προφορικός, though he employs these terms only in anthropological relations, De Vita Moys. lib. iii. (Paris, p. 672, c.): Ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ δ' ὁ μὲν (λόγος) ἐστὶν ἐνδιάθετος, ὁ δὲ προφορικὸς, καὶ ὁ μὲν οἷά τις πηγὴ, ὁ δὲ γεγωνὸς ἀπ' ἐκείνου ῥέων. But he represents the Divine Logos as analogous to the human. Inasmuch as the Logos is the Divine idea, all spiritual and sensuous existence derives its origin from him; as a power of nature he pervades the world, is immanent in it as the world-spirit. That Philo frequently personifies the Logos, does not necessarily imply that he ascribes to him a real hypostasis, and hence there should be great caution in the interpretation of single passages. But the most recent researches (since *Dorner*) have shown that Philo, in some places certainly, comes up to the idea of a real hypostasis (Alleg. iii. 93; De Somn. i. 584, 585; Quis Rer. Div. Hær. 509, and elsewhere); comp. *F. Kefersteïn*, Philo's Lehre von den göttlichen Mittelwesen, Leipz. 1846; also *Semisch*, Justin der M., p. 274. *Baur*, Dreieinigkeits-Lehre, i. p. 59, ss. *Meier*, Trinitätslehre, i. p. 20, ss.; and the works of *Grossmann*, *Scheffer*, *Gfrörer*, *Däkne*, and *Ritter*, referred to in § 19. [*Michel Nicholas*, Les Doctrines religieuses des Juifs, Paris, 1860, Part 2d, Chap. 2, pp. 178–216, contends that the doctrine respecting the Word (Logos) could not have been derived from either Babylonian or Platonic sources; that it had its origin in Palestine, and passed thence to Alexandria. It is a result of the Jewish views respecting God. "The doctrine of an intermediate being between God and the world is a part of the theology of the Talmud; but this intermediate being is there designated, not by the name of the Word, but by that of the Shekinah,"—p. 215.]

[1] Traces of the doctrine of the Logos are also found in the Samaritan theology, and in the writings of Onkelos and Jonathan, comp. *Lücke*, l. c. p. 244. Concerning the Adam Kadmon of the Cabbalists, and the Memra and Shekinah, vide *Bretschneider*, l. c. p. 233, 236. *Baur*, Gnosis, p. 332. *De Wette*, biblische Dogmatik, § 157. [*Burton*, l. c. Lect. ii. p. 51–55.] *Dorner*, u. s. *Gfrörer*, das Jahrhundert des Heils, Stuttg. 1838, p. 272 sq.

§ 41.

b. The Christian Doctrine of the Logos in the Writings of John.

Bucher, des Apostel Johannes Lehre vom Logos (§ 40).

Christianity first gave to the speculative idea of the Logos practical and religious relations and significance.[1] The Gospel of John, in accordance with the doctrine of Paul,[2] which differs only in the form of expression, applied the term *Logos* to the complete and personal revelation of God in Christ. This Christian Logos of John was no longer a mere abstract idea, but with all its ideality it was at the same time a great religious truth and historical fact; and

on this account it was from the first the peculiar and living root of Christian theology.

[1] It is true that Philo himself made use of the idea of the Logos for practical and religious purposes, inasmuch as he accommodated it to the Hebrew religion in connecting it with the idea of the Messiah. But this connection was nevertheless very loose, and the idea of the Messiah itself was altogether abstract, and in the sense of the Jews, not historically realized. ("*The idea of the Messiah becomes in Philo but a dead coal; only the phlegm remains,*" Dorner, p. 49.) In contrast with this the Christian idea of the Logos on the one hand (the speculative and divine), and the idea of the Messiah on the other hand (the national and human), both appear historically realized in the person of Jesus of Nazareth ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο). *Bucher*, ubi supra, p. 214: "*The Logos (in John) is not a mere mediating principle, but also an independent creator of the world.*" In Philo the Logos is υἱὸς πρωτόγονος, in John υἱὸς μονογενής: ibid. p. 211. On the relation of the Christian doctrine of the Logos to the heathen systems of emanation, see *Duncker*, l. c. p. 23.

[2] Though the term λόγος does not occur in the writings of Paul in the sense in which it is understood by John, yet the idea of a divine pre-existence of Christ is clearly expressed by him, especially Col. i. 15–17; ii. 9. Similar expressions are found in the Epistle to the Hebrews, chap. i. 4, sq. (Comp. 1 Cor. xv. 47; 2 Cor. iv. 4; Rom. viii. 29.) Concerning the doctrine of the Trinity, as propounded in the New Test. see *Meier*, l. c. p. 24; ss., and *Hellway*, ubi supra.

§ 42.

c. *The Theologumenon of the Church concerning the Logos, to the Times of Origen.*

[*Burton, E.*, Testimonies of the Ante-Nicene Fathers to the Divinity of Christ, etc. (Works, ii.)]

But Christian theology in its further history did not stand still with this idea of the Logos, as historically manifested in the Messiah. That which appears in historical manifestation, it endeavored to grasp as having its ground in the very nature of God. A deep religious interest was unquestionably here at work, but it frequently yielded to speculation, and was mixed up with foreign philosophemes. Those heretics who adhered more closely to Judaism (the Ebionites), as well as the Alogi, *Theodotus* and *Artemon*, were most remote from speculations of this nature, since they set aside the very substance of this Christian gnosis, the idea of the Logos, by denying the divinity of Christ. The distinction between God the Father and the Logos was likewise abolished by the other section of the Monarchians, *Praxeas, Noëtus*, and *Beryllus*, with-

out, however, denying the actual revelation of God in Christ, which they insisted upon with all emphasis.[1] The Gnostics, on the contrary, connected the idea of the Logos with their fanciful doctrine of emanation and of æons, and thus played over into the realm of speculative mythology.[2] And so it became incumbent upon the fathers to defend the speculative element in opposition to the former class of heretics, the historical in opposition to the latter, and to preserve both these elements for the practical religious interests of the church.[3] *Justin*,[4] *Tatian*,[5] *Athenagoras*,[6] *Theophilus*,[7] *Clement of Alexandria*,[8] endeavored to illustrate the existence of the Logos, and his relation to the Father, by the aid of figures and analogies, borrowed from the external world and the nature of man. *Tertullian*[9] strove to explain the mystery, wrestling hard with language; while *Irenæus*, opposed to all *gnosis*, on the one hand set aside hair-splitting queries, and on the other held fast to the trinitarian faith of the church as the direct expression of the Christian consciousness.[10]

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addition, ἀλλ' οὐ τοιοῦτον, is not genuine, see the note in the edit. of Maran: Si quis tamen retineat hæc verba, scribenda sunt cum interrogationis nota, ut in edit. Lond.) On the other hand, he rejects (Dial. c. Tryph. 128) the illustration taken from the sun and its beams; we can neither speak of an ἀποτέμνεσθαι, nor of an ἐκτείνεσθαι; see *Dorner*, ii. 1, p. 428. On the different understanding of the word *Logos*, now as the creative Word, and now as reason, and on the relation of Justin's doctrine of the Logos, on the one hand to the Old Test. conceptions, and on the other to the Platonic and Stoic philosophy, see *Duncker*, Logoslehre Just. p. 14, sq. [Comp. Bull, Judicium Eccles. Cath., App. ad. c. vii., § 6. *Faber's* Apostolicity of Trinitarianism, 1832, i., 48, sq., 89 sq.; 143, ii., 144, et passim.]

[6] *Tatian* Contra. Græc. c. 5, uses illustrations similar to those of Justin. The Logos was immanent (ὑπέστησε) in the Father (God), but derived his existence (προπηδᾷ) from his will, and thus was the ἔργον πρωτότοκον of the Father, ἀρχὴ τοῦ κόσμου. He is begotten κατὰ μερισμόν, not κατ' ἀποκοπήν.

[6] *Athen.* Leg. c. 10. calls the Son of God (in contrast with the sons of the heathen gods) λόγος τοῦ πατρὸς ἐν ἰδέᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ· πρὸς αὐτοῦ γὰρ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐγένετο, ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ. The distinction between ἐν ἰδέᾳ and ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ corresponds to that between λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός. Comp. *Baur*, p. 170, sq. *Dorner*, p. 440, sq.

[7] *Theoph.* ad Autol. ii. 10, treats most fully of the going forth of the Logos from God, and he is the first writer who uses the distinction between the λ. ἐνδιάθετος and λ. προφορικός in this definite form (*Baur*, p. 167): Ἔχων οὖν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον ἐνδιάθετον ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις σπλάγχνοις, ἐγέννησεν αὐτὸν μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας ἐξερευξάμενος* πρὸ τῶν ὅλων. Likewise c. 22: Οὐχ ὡς οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ μυθογράφοι λέγουσιν υἱοὺς θεῦν ἐκ συνουσίας γεννωμένους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀλήθεια διηγεῖται τὸν λόγον, τὸν ὄντα διαπαντὸς ἐνδιάθετον ἐν καρδίᾳ θεοῦ. Πρὸ γὰρ τι γίνεσθαι, τοῦτον εἶχε σύμβουλον, ἑαυτοῦ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν ὄντα· ὁπότε δὲ ἠθέλησεν ὁ θεὸς ποιῆσαι ὅσα ἐβουλεύσατο, τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐγέννησε προφορικὸν, πρωτότοκον πάσης κτίσεως· οὐ κενωθεὶς αὐτὸς τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ λόγον γεννήσας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ διαπαντὸς ὁμιλῶν.

[8] In the writings of *Clement* the doctrine of the Logos forms the central point of his whole system of theology, and the mainspring of his religious feelings and sentiments. Without the Logos there is neither light nor life (Coh. p. 87). He is the divine instructor of man (παιδαγωγός). Pæd. iii. 12, p. 310: Πάντα ὁ λόγος καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ διδάσκει καὶ παιδαγωγεῖ· ἵππος ἄγεται χαλινῷ καὶ ταῦρος ἄγεται ζυγῷ· θηρία βροχῳ ἁλίσκεται· ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος μεταπλάσσεται λόγῳ· ᾧ θηρία τιθασσεύεται καὶ νηκτὰ δελεάζεται καὶ πτηνὰ κατασύρεται κ. τ. λ. Comp. the beautiful hymn εἰς τὸν παιδαγωγόν at the end of his work. [*Bennett*, l. c. app. K. p. 268, where both the original and an English translation are given.] God has created the world by the Logos; yea, the Logos is the creator himself (ὁ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἀνθρώπου δημιουργὸς); he gave the law, inspired the prophets; from him proceeded the theophanies; Pæd. i. 7, p. 132–134; ii. 8, p. 215; ii. 10, p.

* With reference to Psalm xlv. (xliv.) 1; ἐξηρεύξατο ἡ καρδία μου λόγον ἀγαθόν.

224, 229; iii. 3, p. 264; iii. 4, p. 269; comp. 273, 280, 293, 297, 307. Strom. i. 23, p. 421, 422; vii. i. p. 833. In his view (as in that of Philo), the Logos is the *ἀρχιερεύς*, even apart from the incarnation, Strom, ii. 9, p. 433, 500. He is the face (*πρόσωπον*), of God, by which God is seen, Paed. i. 7, p. 132. The Logos is superior to men and angels, but subordinate to the Father; *principal passage*, Strom. vii. 2, p. 831: On earth the righteous man is the most excellent being; in heaven, the angels, because they are yet purer and more perfect. *Τελειωτάτη δὴ καὶ ἁγιωτάτη καὶ κυριωτάτη καὶ ἡγεμονικωτάτη καὶ βασιλικωτάτη καὶ εὐεργετικωτάτη ἡ υἱοῦ φύσις, ἡ τῷ μόνῳ παντοκράτορι προσεχεστάτη. Αὕτη ἡ μεγίστη ὑπεροχὴ, ἣ τὰ πάντα διατάσσεται κατὰ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἄριστα οἰακίζει, ἀκαμάτῳ καὶ ἀτρύτῳ δυνάμει πάντα ἐργαζομένη, δι' ὧν ἐνεργεῖ τὰς ἀποκρύφους ἐννοίας ἐπιβλέπουσα. Οὐ γὰρ ἐξίσταταί ποτε τῆς αὐτοῦ περιωπῆς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐ μεριζόμενος, οὐκ ἀποτεμνόμενος, οὐ μεταβαίνων ἐκ τόπου εἰς τόπον, πάντη δὲ ὢν πάντοτε, καὶ μηδαμῆ περιεχόμενος, ὅλος νοῦς, ὅλος φῶς πατρῷον, ὅλος ὀφθαλμὸς, πάντα ὁρῶν, πάντα ἀκούων, εἰδὼς πάντα, δυνάμει τὰς δυνάμεις ἐρευνῶν. Τούτῳ πᾶσα ὑποτέτακται στρατιὰ ἀγγέλων τε καὶ θεῶν, τῷ λόγῳ τῷ πατρικῷ τὴν ἁγίαν οἰκονομίαν ἀναδεδειγμένῳ διὰ τὸν ὑποτάξαντα, δι' ὧν καὶ πάντες αὐτοῦ οἱ ἄνθρωποι· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν, οἱ δὲ οὐδέπω καὶ οἱ μὲν ὡς φίλοι, οἱ δὲ ὡς οἰκέται πιστοὶ, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἁπλῶς οἰκέται.* (The true knowledge of the Logos is the privilege of the true Gnostics.) Divine worship is due to the Loges, vii. 7, p. 851, Quis Div. Salv. p. 956. [Comp. *Bennett*, l. c. p. 123–126. *Burton, E.*, Testimony of the Antenicene Fathers to the Divinity of Christ (Works, ii. p. 171, ss.)] On the mode of generation Clement speaks less explicitly than the before-mentioned writers. (On his relation to them, see *Münscher*, Handbuch, i. 422.) He attaches more importance to the immanence of the Logos. In his opinion, the Logos is not only the word of God spoken at the creation, but the *speaking* and creative Word; see *Dorner*, p. 446. He also holds along with the concrete idea of the individuality of the Logos, another notion of a more general import, according to which the Loges is identical with the higher spiritual and rational life, the life of ideas in general; by this idea of the Logos the ante-Christian world was moved, comp. Strom. v. p. 654; hence the charge of Photius (Bibl. Cod. 109), that Clement taught the existence of a twofold Logos of the Father, only the inferior of whom appeared on earth; see *Baur*, Trinit. Lehre, p. 195. Accordingly he who studies the writings of Clement merely for the purpose of deducing a strictly doctrinal system, will not be satisfied, and like *Münscher* (Handbuch, i. p. 418), he will see in him "*mere declamation, from which no definite idea can be derived.*" On the contrary, he who takes in his total religious system would feel more inclined to adopt the language of *Möhler*, that Clement has "*has treated and sung about the dogma concerning the Logos with greater clearness than all the other fathers of this period, but especially with unusual depth of feeling, and the most ardent enthusiasm.*" (Patrologie, p. 460, 61.) Comp., also, *Læmmer*, l. c.

[a] *Tert.* adv. Prax. c. 2: Nos unicum quidem Deum credimus, sub hac tamen dispensatione, quam œconomiam dicimus, ut unici Dei sit et filius sermo ipsius, qui ex ipso processerit, per quem omnia facta sunt, et sine quo factum est nihil. C. 5: Ante omnia enim Deus erat solus, ipse sibi

et mundus et locus et omnia. Solus autem, quia nihil aliud extrinsecus præter illum. Ceterum ne tunc quidem solus: habebat enim secum, quam habebat in semetipso, rationem suam scilicet, etc. C. 8: Protulit enim Deum sermonem, sicut radix fruticem et fons fluvium et sol radium; nam et istæ species probole sunt earum substantiarum, ex quibus prodeunt. In c. 9, the Son is even called a *portio* of the Father. Comp. Neander's Antignosticus, p. 476, ss. "We find in Tertullian, on the one hand the effort to hold fast the entire equality of the Father and the Son—on the other hand, the inequality is so manifestly conceded or presupposed, it is every where expressed in so marked, and, as it were, involuntary a way, and it strikes its roots so deeply into his whole system, and modes of expression, that it must doubtless be considered as the real and inmost conception of Tertullian's system;" *Schwegler*, in his Montanismus, p. 41 [but comp. *Meier*, Gesch. d. Trin. i. 80, sq.; *Dorner*, i. 477, 564–601.] According to *Dorner*, p. 588, Tert. uses the word *filiatio* in a threefold sense; that which is new in the system of Tertullian, and of importance in reference to later times, is this, that he employs the term "Son" (instead of "Word") in order to denote the personal existence of the Logos; see p. 600. At the same time there is in Tertullian this peculiarity, that he distinguishes the three factors (*momenta*) of the Trinity as so many periods of time; Adv. Praxeas c. 12, 13; *Baur*, p. 176; *Meier*, p. 80, sq.

[1] *Iren.* Advers. Hær. ii. 28, p. 158: Si quis itaque nobis dixerit: Quomodo ergo filius prolatus a patre est? dicimus ei: Quia prolationem istam sive generationem sive nuncupationem sive adapertionem, aut quolibet quis nomine vocaverit generationem ejus inenarrabilem existentem, nemo novit, non Valentinus, non Marcion, neque Saturninus, neque Basilides, neque Angeli, neque Archangeli, neque Principes, neque Potestates, nisi solus qui generavit, Pater, et qui natus est, Filius. Inenarrabilis itaque generatio ejus quum sit, quicunque nituntur generationes et prolationes enarrare, non sunt compotes sui, ea, quæ inenarrabilia sunt, enarrare promittentes. Quoniam enim ex cogitatione et sensu verbum emittitur, hoc utique omnes sciunt homines. Non ergo magnum quid invenerunt, qui emissiones excogitaverunt, neque absconditum mysterium, si id quod ab omnibus intelligitur, transtulerunt in unigenitum Dei verbum, et quem inenarrabilem et innominabilem vocant, hunc, *quasi ipsi obstetricaverint*, primæ generationis ejus prolationem et generationem enuntiant, assimilantes eum hominum verbo emissionis (scilicet λόγῳ προφορικῷ). In the opinion of Irenæus, faith in the *Son* rests simply on the παράδοσις. The Logos is both reason (wisdom), and the Word (adv. Hær. iv. 20, 1): Adest enim ei (Deo) semper Verbum et Sapientia (Fil. et Spirit.), per quos et in quibus omnia libere et sponte fecit, ad quos et loquitur dicens: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. The Son is in every respect equal to the Father; Adv. Hær. ii. 13: Necesse est itaque, et eum, qui ex eo est Logos, imo magis autem ipsum Nun, cum sit Logos, perfectum et inpassibilem esse.—In accordance with his practical tendency, Irenæus has less to say of the Logos *prior* to his incarnation, than of Christ the God-man (of which, infra). In his opinion, the Father is the invisible of the Son, and the Son the visible of the Father (iv. 6, 6); or (after an unnamed author) the Son is the measure of the

Father (mensura Patris filius, quoniam et capit eum), iv. 2, 2; he even calls the Son and the Spirit the hands of God. Comp. *Möhler*, Patrologie, 357, ss. *Münscher*, Handbuch, i. p. 411, ss. *Dorner*, p. 467, ss. *Baur*, p. 172, ss. [*Burton*, l. c. pp. 75, 77, 102, etc.; *Bull's* Judicium; *Faber's* Apostolicity of Trin.]

§ 43.

d. Origen's Doctrine of the Logos.

After *Tertullian* had employed the term Son in reference to the personality of the Logos more distinctly than had previously been done,[1] *Origen* decisively adopted this terminology.[2] and was led to the idea of an eternal generation.[3] Though he kept clear with all strictness from any notion of physical emanation,[4] yet he was, on the other hand, pressed to a subordination of the Son to the Father.[5] Consequently his definitions by no means satisfied the consciousness of the church, but led to new misunderstandings, and were the source of new, wide-reaching controversies.[6] [Comp. *Niedner*, Kirchengesch., 279-282.]

[1] Comp. § 42, note 9

[2] Tom. i. in Joh. App. iv. p. 22, ss. He finds fault with those who, in a onesided manner, merely adopt the term Logos (*ἐπὶ δὲ μόνης τῆς λόγος προσηγορίας ἱστάμενοι*), and are not able to infer the identity of the terms Logos and Son from the other predicates applied to Christ; who also restrict the term *Logos* to the *Word*, imagining that the *προσφορὰ πατρική* consists *οἱονεὶ ἐν συλλαβαῖς*. In his opinion the Logos is not merely the Word, but a transcendent, living hypostasis, the sum of all ideas, the independent personal Wisdom of God; comp. in Joh. i. 39, l. c. p. 39: *Οὐ γὰρ ἐν ψιλαῖς φαντασίαις τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει ἡ σοφία αὐτοῦ, κατὰ τὰ ἀνάλογα τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις ἐννοήμασι φαντάσματα. Εἰ δέ τις οἷός τέ ἐστιν ἀσώματον ὑπόστασιν ποικίλων θεωρημάτων, περιεχόντων τοὺς τῶν ὅλων λόγους, ζῶσαν καὶ οἱονεὶ ἔμψυχον ἐπινοεῖν εἴσεται τὴν ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν κτίσιν σοφίαν τοῦ θεοῦ, καλῶς περὶ αὐτῆς λέγουσαν· Ὁ θεὸς ἔκτισέ με, κ. τ. λ.* Comp. De Princ. i. 2, 2: Nemo putet, nos *insubstantivum* dicere, cum filiam Dei sapientiam nominamus, etc.; and thus he calls (Contra Cels. vi. 64) the Logos, *οὐσίαν οὐσιῶν, ἰδέαν ἰδεῶν*; comp. *Thomasius*, p. 113. What is true of the *Logos* in relation to creation holds good also of the *Son*. He is the organ for the creation of the world. As the architect builds a house, or a vessel, according to his ideas, so God created the world according to the ideas which are contained in Wisdom; comp. Hom. xxxii. in Joh. (Opp. ix. p. 449), and De Princ. i. 2 (Opp. i. p. 53). God never existed without the Wisdom (the Son); for, to maintain the contrary, would virtually amount to the assertion, that God either *could* not beget, or *would* not beget, either of which is absurd and impious. With all his love for abstractions, Origen here calls images to his aid. Besides the already used-up

comparison with the sun and its beams, he employs a new one of a statue and a copy on a reduced scale; this comparison, however, he refers rather to the incarnate Son (Christ in the flesh), than to the ante-mundane (the Logos). But with him both run into each other.

[3] It is difficult to determine whether this idea of generation is consistently carried out, since it is not quite evident whether Origen refers it to the *nature* or the *will* of the Father; see *Baur*, p. 204; on the other side, comp. *Dorner*, p. 640, ss.

[4] De Princ. i. 4 (Opp. i. p. 55): Infandum autem est et illicitum, Deum patrem in generatione unigeniti Filii sui atque in substantia ejus exæquare alicui vel hominum vel aliorum animantium generanti, etc.; and again (Redepenning, p. 112): Observandum namque est, ne quis incurrat in illas absurdas fabulas eorum, qui prolationes quasdam sibi ipsis depingunt, ut divinum naturam in partes vocent, et Deum patrem quantum in se est dividant, cum hoc de incorporea natura vel leviter suspicari non solum extremæ impietatis sit, verum etiam ultimæ insipientiæ, nec omnino ad intelligentiam consequens, ut incorporeæ naturæ substantialis divisio possit intelligi. "As the will of man proceeds from his reason, and the one is not to be separated from the other, so the Son proceeds from the Father. Origen did not make use of the comparison with the human word (speech), which was previously employed. He also considers the generation of the Son as *eternal*, because God did not at any time begin to be a Father, like fathers among men. Comp. *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. p. 143 [the passage is in a fragment in Eusebius, contra Marcellum, l. c. 4. In another passage (in Athanasius De Decretis Conc. Nic. § 27) he says: "As light can not be without its brightness, so God can never have been without the Son, the brightness of his majesty."]

[5] See below, § 46.

[6] Particularly was the expression υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, which, in the New Testament, is undeniably used in respect to the historical Christ,* confounded with the metaphysical and dogmatic usage of the schools; and here were the germs of new controversies, which in the end led to a recognition of the difference on the biblical basis. On the other hand, from the speculative standpoint, we may, with Dorner, in this doctrine of the eternal generation, descry a thankworthy progress. To attain to this "*mystery, which contains the very kernel of Christianity, subordination has the character of an auxiliary doctrine.*" It is (Dorner says in his first edition, p. 42), "*a necessary aid in the substitution of several actual hypostases in God, for the doctrine of the Logos, as previously held, which only vaguely maintained the distinction of hypostases in God.*"

* "*The more I endeavor to realize the manner of thinking and speaking in the New Testament, the more decided is my opinion, that the historical Son of God, as such, can not be directly and absolutely called God in the New Test., without completely destroying the monotheistic system of the Apostles.*" *Lücke, Studien und Kritiken*, 1840, i. p. 91. [But see, in reply, Nitzsch in the same journal, 1841. Comp. also, *G. L. Hahn*, Die Theologie des N. Test., 1854, § 87.]

§ 44.

THE HOLY GHOST.

Keil, ob die ältesten Lehrer einen Unterschied zwischen Sohn und Vater gekannt? in Flatts Magazin für christliche Dogmatik und Moral, vol. iv. p. 34, ss. [*Burton*, *E.*, Testimonies of the Antenicene Fathers to the Trinity, the Divinity of the Holy Ghost (Works, ii.), comp. the Introduct. where the literature is given.] *Georgii*, dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchungen über die Lehre vom h. Geist bei Justin M. in the Studien der Geistlichkeit Würtembergs, x. 2, p. 69, ss. *Hasselbach*, in the theologische Studien und Kritiken, 1839, p. 376, ss. *Kahnis*, Die Lehre vom heiligen Geiste. i. Halle, 1847. [*Hare's* Mission of the Comforter, new ed. 2 vols. 1851.]

The doctrine concerning the Holy Ghost, like that of the Son, was considered important from the practical point of view,[1] in reference to his prophetic agency (in the more comprehensive sense of the word), to the witness which he bears in the hearts of believers, and, in fine, to his living power in the church.[2] As soon, however, as the attempt was made to go beyond the Trinity of revelation (*i. e.* the Trinity as it manifests itself in the work of redemption), and to conceive of the essence of the Holy Spirit in itself, and the relation in which he stands to the Father and the Logos, difficulties sprung up, the solution of which became problems of speculative theology. By some, the Wisdom of the Old Testament, from which the doctrine of Logos was developed, was called πνεῦμα ἅγιον, and made coördinate with the Word.[3] Others either identified the Logos with the Spirit, or expressed themselves in a vague manner as to the distinction between them,[4] and the Holy Ghost (impersonally viewed) appears as a mere divine attribute, gift or agency.[5] But the pressure of logical consistency led gradually to the view of the personality of the Holy Ghost, and his definite distinction from the Logos.[6]

[1] In the Old Test. the רוּחַ אֱלֹהִים (Gen. i. 3) appear at first as the creative power of life, comp. Psalm civ. 30, and other passages; as the Spirit of heroism, Judges, vi. 34, xi. 29, xiii. 25, etc.; as the Spirit of insight and wisdom, Exod. xxxi. 3, xxxv. 31, Job xxxii. 8, Isaiah xi. 2; especially as the Spirit of prophecy, Numb. xxiv. 2, 1 Sam. x. 6, 10, xix. 20, 23, etc.; also as the good, holy Spirit, Psalm li. 13, cxliii. 10. In the New Test., too, the πνεῦμα ἅγιον is made equivalent to the δύναμις ὑψίστου, Luke i. 35, and to the σοφία, Acts vi. 3, 10. Specifically Christian is the making the Holy Spirit equivalent to the Spirit of Christ, as when it is said that the Spirit descends upon Christ (Matt. iii. 10, and the parallel places), and is given to him without measure (John iv. 34), or that he proceeds from Christ and is given to the disciples (John xx. 22), or is promised to them as the Paraclete, John xv. 26, etc. It has been held essential to the Christian faith (from the time of the pen-

tecostal outpouring, Acts ii.), to believe that the Spirit abides in the church (2 Cor. xiii. 13), and thus that all believers have part in the Spirit, who manifests himself as one, externally in the different gifts (*charismata*, 1 Cor. xii. 4, etc.), and internally working as the Spirit of sanctification, of trust, and of love; and who is also a pledge and seal of the grace of God, 2 Cor. i. 22, v. 5, Eph. i. 14, etc. Compare the works on Biblical Theology.

[2] It is not to be forgotten that the *trias of revelation* was held in a complete form long before the church came to clear statements about the *essential trias*. (Comp. Note 1 of the next section.) In the former the Holy Ghost has his definite position along (coördinate) with the Father and the Son, 2 Cor. xiii. 13, Matt. xviii. 19. In the apostolic fathers, we find only isolated declarations as to the Holy Ghost. *Justin M.* makes particular mention of the *πνεῦμα προφητικὸν* (the term in question occurs twenty-two times in his Apology, nine times in Trypho, see *Semisch*, ii. p. 335, Note), while he does not speak of the influence which he continues to exert upon believers (ibid. p. 329). On the other hand, in Justin the Logos, as the *λόγος σπερματικός*, takes the place of the Holy Spirit, since to him are ascribed good impulses in the minds of believers. (Comp. *Duncker*, Christl. Logoslehre, p. 37.) *Irenæus*, iii. 24, 1, calls the Holy Ghost the "communitas Christi, confirmatio fidei nostræ, scala ascensionis ad Deum;"* comp. iii. 17, v. 6, v. 10, and § 71. At the same time, he considers him as the prophetic Spirit, and makes a distinction between him as the principle which animates and inspires, and that animation and inspiration itself, Adv. Hær. v. 12, 2: *Ἕτερόν ἐστι πνοὴ ζωῆς, ἡ καὶ ψυχικὸν ἀπεργαζομένη τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἕτερον πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν, τὸ καὶ πνευματικὸν αὐτὸν ἀποτελοῦν . . . . ἕτερον δέ ἐστι τὸ ποιηθὲν τοῦ ποιήσαντος· ἡ οὖν πνοὴ πρόσκαιρος, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ἀένναον.* Comp. *Duncker*, p. 60, sq.; Kahnis, p. 255, sq.

[3] *Theoph.* ad Autol. i. 7: *Ὁ δὲ θεὸς διὰ τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς σοφίας ἐποίησε τὰ πάντα*; here *σοφία* is either synonymous with *λόγος*, or forms the second member; in the former case, there would be no mention of the Spirit; in the latter, he would be identified with the *σοφία*; and this agrees with ii. 15, where *θεός*, *λόγος* and *σοφία* are said to compose the Trinity; comp. § 45. *Iren.* iv. 20, p. 253: Adest enim ei (Deo) semper verbum et sapientia, Filius et Spiritus . . . . ad quos et loquitur, dicens: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; and again: Deus omnia *verbo* fecit et *sapientia* adornavit. [*Burton*, l. c. p. 49–51.] Comp. iv. 7, p. 236: Ministrat enim ei ad omnia sua progenies et figuratio sua, *i. e.*, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, verbum et sapientia, quibus serviunt et subjecti sunt omnes angeli. *Tert.* Adv. Prax. c. 6: Nam ut primum Deus voluit ea, quæ cum Sophiæ ratione et sermone disposuerat intra se, in substantias et species suas edere, ipsum primum protulit sermonem, habentem in se individuas suas, Rationem et Sophiam, ut per ipsum fierent universa, per quem erant cogitata atque disposita, immo et facta jam, quantum in Dei sensu. Hoc enim eis deerat, ut coram quoque in suis speciebus atque substantiis cognoscerentur et tenerentur. Comp. cap. 7, and the formula De Orat. i. ab initio: Dei Spiritus

* A similar image is made use of by Ignatius, Ep. ad Ephes. 9, when he says: *Ἀναφερόμενοι εἰς τὰ ὕψη διὰ τῆς μηχανῆς Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὅ ἐστιν σταυρὸς, σχοινίῳ χρώμενοι τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ.*

et Dei sermo et Dei ratio, sermo rationis et ratio sermonis et spiritus utrumque Jesus Christus, domius noster.

[4] From the time of *Souverain* (Platonismus der Kirchenväter, p. 329, ss.), most historians of doctrines have supposed that the fathers in general, and Justin M. in particular, made no real distinction between the Logos and the Spirit. Several of the more recent investigators have also come to the same conclusion. Thus *Georgii* (in the work referred to above), p. 120: "This much is evident, that in Justin the relation between the Logos and the Pneuma is indefinite, in flowing lines; as in him the Spirit has little, if any, different functions from those of the Logos, so a distinction between them could not, in his view, be demanded by any dogmatic necessity, but could only be occasioned by the conflict, in which the doctrine of the Spirit, as handed down by the Fathers, stood in relation to that of the Logos." Comp. *Hasselbach*, ubi supra. On the other hand, *Semisch* and *Kahnis* (p. 238, sq.) have tried to defend the Martyr against this objection. One of the principal passages is, Apol. I. 33: Τὸ πνεῦμα οὖν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδὲν ἄλλο νοῆσαι θέμις, ἢ τὸν λόγον, ὅς καὶ πρωτότοκος τῷ θεῷ ἐστι, comp. c. 36. He indeed there speaks of the πνεῦμα in Luc. i. 35; and it can not be inferred that he always identifies the Logos with the Spirit. But still there is here this confounding of the two; and it can not be explained by saying that the Spirit means spiritual nature in general, nor by assuming that the Logos forms the body for himself in the womb of Mary. And when Tertullian, Adv. Prax. c. 26, uses similar expressions, this goes to prove that other fathers besides Justin are chargeable with the same want of distinctness. The same is true as regards the manner in which Justin ascribes the inspiration of the prophets, sometimes to the Logos, sometimes to the Pneuma, Apol. I. 36, and elsewhere. (Only it should not be forgotten that, even in the biblical usage, the distinction is not held with sharp doctrinal consistency.) The confusion of agencies leads to a (relative) confounding of the Persons. That Justin (in opposition to the baptismal formula and the common confession of the church) formally put a dyas (two persons) in place of the triad, can not be justly alleged; for he himself in other passages names the Father, Son, and Spirit (Apol. I. 6, 20, 66), and assigns the third place to the Spirit (comp. 646): "*but still it is none the less true, that his philosophical principles, logically carried out, lead only to a dyas, and that he could not doctrinally establish the difference between the Son and the Spirit,*" *Duncker*, u. s. 38. There is unquestionably a real confusion in *Theophilus*, ad Aut. ii. c. 10: Οὗτος (ὁ λόγος) ὢν πνεῦμα θεοῦ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ σοφία καὶ δύναμις ὑψίστου κατήρχετο εἰς τοὺς προφήτας, καὶ δι' αὐτῶν ἐλάλει τὰ περὶ τῆς ποιήσεως τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἁπάντων· οὐ γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ προφῆται, ὅτε ὁ κόσμος ἐγίνετο· ἀλλὰ ἡ σοφία ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ οὖσα ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ ἅγιος αὐτοῦ, ὁ ἀεὶ συμπαρὼν αὐτῷ. Comp. the passage in Note 3, above.

[5] *Justin M.* incidentally calls the Holy Ghost simply δωρεά, Coh. ad Græc. c. 32, though he assigns to him (Apol. i. 6), the third place in the Trinity. On the question: what relation was the Holy Spirit thought to sustain to the angels? comp. *Neander*, Church History, and History of Doctrines, p. 172 (Ryland's translation); Studien und Kritiken, 1833, p. 773,

ss.; the latter essay was written in opposition to *Möhler*, Theolog. Quartalschrift, 1833, part i. p. 49, ss. (comp. § 50, below). *Athenagoras* calls the Holy Spirit *ἀπόῤῥοια*, Leg. c. 10 and 24, comp. Kahnis, p. 245. In general, there are many passages in the fathers, "which bring the Holy Spirit very near to the creature;" *Kahnis*, p. 249.

[1] *Tert.* Adv. Prax. 8: Tertius est Spiritus a Deo et Filio, sicut tertius a radice fructus ex frutice, et tertius a fonte rivus ex flumine, et tertius a sole apex ex radio. Ibid. 30: Spiritus S. tertium nomen divinitatis et tertius gradus majestatis. But a subordinate position is assigned to the Spirit, when he is considered as—Dei villicus, Christi vicarius, Præscr. 28: comp. *Schwegler*, Montanismus, p. 14. *Origen*, Comm. in Joh. T. ii. 6, Opp. T. iv. p. 60, 61, acknowledges the personality of the Holy Spirit, but subordinates him to both the Father and the Son, by the latter of whom he is *created*, like all other things, though distinguished from all other creatures by divine dignity: Ἡμεῖς μέντοιγε τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις πειθόμενοι τυγχάνειν, τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, καὶ ἀγέννητον μηδὲν ἕτερον τοῦ πατρὸς εἶναι πιστεύοντες, ὡς εὐσεβέστερον καὶ ἀληθὲς προσιέμεθα, τὸ πάντων διὰ τοῦ λόγου γενομένων, τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα πάντων εἶναι τιμιώτερον, καὶ τάξει πάντων τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς διὰ Χριστοῦ γεγενημένων. [*Burton*, l. c. p. 99, ss.] Comp. T. xiii. 25, p. 234; and 34, p. 244: Οὐκ ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα τρέφεσθαι λέγειν. Nevertheless, there is an infinite chasm between the Spirit of God, and other spirits created by God; comp. Comm. in Ep. ad. Rom. vii. (Opp. iv. p. 593). But in another passage, (which is extant only in the translation of Rufinus, De Princ. i. 3, 3, Opp. i. 1, p. 61, Redep. p. 123), Origen says, that he had not as yet met with any passage in the Sacred Scriptures in which the Holy Spirit was called a created being; though afterwards Epiphanius, Justinian, etc., blamed him for maintaining this opinion; comp. Epiphan, 64, 5, Hieron. ad Avit. Ep. 94, quoted by *Münscher*, ed by Cölln, p. 194. *Schnitzer*, p. 43. *Neander*, History of Church (by Torrey), i. p. 593. *Thomasius*, p. 144, ss. (*Redepenning*, Origenes, ii. p. 309, sq., and the other passages there adduced. [*Burton*, l. c. p. 89.]

§ 45.

THE TRIAD.

[The works of *Dorner*, *Baur*, *Meier*, and *Burton*, previously referred to. *D. Waterland's* Works, new ed. Oxford, 1842, vols. ii. and iii. *G. S. Faber*, Apostolicity of Trinitarianism, 2 vols. Lond. 1832. *William Jones* (of Nayland) Works, new ed. 1826, vol. i. The Catholic Doctrine of the Trinity. *W. Berriman*, Historical Account. 1725. Bp. *Bull*, Defensio Fidei Nicænæ, and his Judicium Eccl. Cath.; Works by *Burton*, 8 vols. 1846.]

The doctrine of God *the Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, is the doctrine of primitive Christianity,[1] but has in the New Test. a bearing only upon the Christian economy, without any pretension to speculative significance, and therefore cannot be rightly under-

stood but in intimate connection with the history of Jesus, and the work which he accomplished.[1] Accordingly, the belief in the *Father, Son,* and *Holy Ghost* belonged to the *Regula fidei,* even apart from any speculative development of the doctrine of the Logos, and appears in what is commonly called the Apostles' creed, in this historico-epic form, without being summed up in a unity. The Greek word τριάς was first used by Theophilus ;[2] the Latin term *trinitas,* of a more comprehensive doctrinal import, is found in Tertullian.[4]

[1] Matth. xxviii. 19 (if the baptismal formula be genuine); 1 Cor. vii. 4–6; 2 Cor. xiii. 14, and elsewhere. Comp. the commentaries on these passages, *de Wette's* biblische Dogmatik, § 238, 267, and especially *Lücke* in the Studien und Kritiken, 1840, 1 part. [*Pye Smith,* the Script. Testim. to the Messiah, iii. p. 13, ss.; iii. p. 258, ss.; *Knapp,* l. c. p. 119, ss., 132, ss.] *Gieseler,* Dogmengesch. p. 118, and *Neander,* Hist. Dogmas, p. 130, also distinguish correctly the practical element of the doctrine and its relation to the economy of the divine dispensations, from its speculative construction. [*Neander:* "This doctrine of God, the Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier of humanity in Christ was essential to the Christian consciousness, and therefore has existed from the beginning in the Christian church."]

[2] On this account some of the more recent writers on doctrinal theology, as *Schleiermacher* and *Hase* (2d ed. p. 626) handle the Trinity at the end of the system. A purely economic view of the doctrine is found in *Ignatius,* Epistle to the Ephesians, 9, where he says, "We are raised on high to the Father by the cross of Christ, as by an elevating engine, the Holy Spirit being the rope"—a massive, but striking comparison. See above § 44.

[3] *Theoph.* ad Autol. ii. 15: Αἱ τρεῖς ἡμέραι [πρὸ] τῶν φωστήρων γεγονυῖαι τύποι εἰσὶν τῆς τριάδος τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῦ. Τετάρτῳ δὲ τύπῳ [τόπῳ] ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος ὁ προσδεὴς τοῦ φωτὸς. Ἵνα ᾖ θεὸς, λόγος, σοφία, ἄνθρωπος. Here we have indeed the word τριὰς, but not in the ecclesiastical sense of the term Trinity; for as ἄνθρωπος is mentioned as the fourth term, it is evident that the τριὰς can not be taken here as a perfect whole, consisting of three joined in one; besides, the term σοφία is used instead of τὸ πνεῦμα ἅγιον. Comp. *Suicer,* Thesaurus s. v. τριάς, where the passage from the (spurious) treatise of Justin, De Expositione Fidei, p. 379, is cited (Μονὰς γὰρ ἐν τριάδι νοεῖται καὶ τριὰς ἐν μονάδι γνωρίζεται κ. τ. λ.); this passage, however, proves as little concerning the use of language during that period, as the treatise φιλόπατρις erroneously ascribed to Lucian, from which passages are cited. Clem. Strom. iv. 7, p. 588, knows a ἁγία τριάς, but in an anthropological sense (faith, love, hope). On the terminology of Origen, comp. *Thomasius,* p. 285. [Comp. *Burton,* l. c. p. 34–36, where the subject is treated at great length.]

[4] *Tertullian* De Pudic. c. 21: Nam et ecclesia proprie et principaliter ipse est spiritus, in quo est *Trinitas* unius divinitatis, Pater et Filius et Spiritus S.; accordingly, the Holy Spirit is the principle which constitutes the unity

of the persons; or (according to *Schwegler*, Montanism, p. 171), the spiritual substance common to the persons; comp. Adv. Praxeam, 2 and 3. [*Burton*, l. c. p. 68, ss.] *Cyprian* and *Novatian* immediately adopted this usage. Cypr. Ep. 73, p. 200 (with reference to baptism). Novat. de Trinitate. [*Burton*, l. c. p. 107–109; p. 116–123.]

§ 46.

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The strict distinction which was drawn between the hypostases (persons) in the Trinity, led, in the first instance, to that system of *Subordination*, in which the Son was made inferior to the Father, and the Holy Spirit to both the Father and the Son;[1] which system also carried with it the appearance of tritheism. The orthodox were obliged to clear themselves from all appearance of tritheism, in opposition to the Monarchians, who abandoned the personal distinctions in order to hold fast the unity of the Godhead, and thus exposed themselves to the charge of confounding the persons (Patripassianism), or even to the imputation of a heretical tendency denying the divinity of Christ.[2] *Origen* now carried to such an extreme the system of hypostases, including the subordination scheme, that orthodoxy itself threatened to run over into heterodoxy, and thus gave rise to the Arian controversy in the following period.

[1] *Justin M.*, Apol. i. c. 13: .....νίὸν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντως Θεοῦ μαθόντες (scil. τὸν Ιησοῦν Χριστὸν) καὶ ἐν δευτέρᾳ χώρᾳ ἔχοντες, πνεῦμά τε προφητικὸν ἐν τρίτῃ τάξει, comp. i. 6, and i. 60. There are also passages in the writings of *Irenæus* which appear favorable to the idea of subordination, *e. g.*, Adv. Hær. ii. 28, 6, 8; v. 18, 2: Super omnia quidem pater. et ipse est caput Christi; but elsewhere he represents the Logos as wholly God, and no subordinate being (comp. § 42, note 9). "*It can not be denied that Irenæus here contradicts himself, and it would be a useless labor to remove this contradiction by artificial interpretation.*" *Duncker*, p. 56; comp. p. 70, ss. *Dorner*, p. 409, ss. *Tert.* Advers. Prax. c. 2: Tres autem non statu, sed gradu, nec substantia, sed forma, nec potestate, sed specie: unius autem substantiæ et unius status et unius potestatis, quia unus Deus, ex quo et gradus isti et formæ et species in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti deputantur. Comp. c. 4, ss.

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[3] Concerning the different classes of Unitarians, comp. § 24, and § 42.* It is self-evident, that all who held Christ to be a mere man could know nothing of any Trinity. These may be called deistico-rationalistic *Antitrinitarians;* God in his abstract unity was, in their view, so remote from the world, and confined to his heaven, that there was no abode for him even in Christ. Widely different were those who, apprehensive of lessening the dignity of Christ, taught that God himself had assumed humanity *in* him, but did not think it necessary to suppose the existence of a particular hypostasis. The name *modalistic* Antitrinitarians would be more appropriate in their case (thus *Heinichen*, de Alogis, p. 34); or, if the relation of God to Christ be compared to that in which he stands to the world, they might be called *pantheistic* Antitrinitarians, for they imagined God, as it were, expanded or extended into the person of Christ. Among their number are *Praxeas* and *Beryllus*, the forerunners of *Sabellius*, the former of whom was combated by Tertullian, the latter by Origen. The opinion of Praxeas, that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one and the same (ipsum eundemque esse), which virtually amounted to the later ὁμοούσιος, was interpreted by Tertullian as implying, ipsum patrum passum esse, Adv. Prax. c. 20, 29, whence the heretical appellation *Patripassiani.* [*Burton*, Bampton Lecture, note 103, p. 588, and Testim. of the Antenic. Fathers to the Trinity, etc., p. 68–83. *Neander*, l. c. ii. p. 260–262.] Philastr. Hær. 65. The views of *Noëtus* were similar: Theod. Fab. Hær. iii. 3: Ἕνα φασὶν εἶναι θεὸν καὶ πατέρα, τῶν ὅλων δημιουργόν, ἀφανῆ μὲν ὅταν ἐθέλῃ, φαινόμενον δὲ ἡνίκα ἂν βούληται· καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀόρατον εἶναι καὶ ὁρώμενον, καὶ γεννητὸν καὶ ἀγέννητον· ἀγέννητον μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, γεννητὸν δὲ ὅτε ἐκ παρθένου γεννηθῆναι ἠθέλησε· ἀπαθῆ καὶ ἀθάνατον, καί πάλιν αὖ παθητὸν καὶ θνητόν. Ἀπαθὴς

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γὰρ ὄν, φησί, τὸ τοῦ σταυροῦ πάθος ἐθελήσας ὑπέμεινε· τοῦτον καὶ υἱὸν ὀνομάζουσι καὶ πατέρα, πρὸς τὰς χρείας τοῦτο κἀκεῖνο καλούμενον. Comp. Epiph. Hær. vii. 1. [*Burton*, Bampton Lect., note 103, p. 589, 590.] *Dorner*, p. 532: "It is worthy of recognition, that Noëtus already completes patripassianism, and takes away from it the pagan illusion, whereby the divine nature is made directly finite, which we find in the system of Praxeas." *Beryllus* endeavored to evade the inferences which may be drawn alike from Patripassianism and from Pantheism, by admitting a difference *after* the assumption of humanity, Euseb. vi. 33: Βήρυλλος ὁ μικρῷ πρόσθεν δεδηλωμένος Βοστρῶν τῆς Ἀραβίας ἐπίσκοπος, τὸν ἐκκλησιαστικὸν παρεκτρέπων κανόνα, ξένα τινὰ τῆς πίστεως παρεισφέρειν ἐπειρᾶτο, τὸν σωτῆρα καὶ κύριον ἡμῶν λέγειν τολμῶν μὴ προϋφεστάναι κατ' ἰδίαν οὐσίας περιγραφὴν πρὸ τῆς εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐπιδημίας μηδὲ μὴν θεότητα ἰδίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐμπολιτευομένην αὐτῷ μόνην τὴν πατρικήν. Comp. *Ullmann*, in the Dissert. quoted § 24, note 4, and *Fork*, Diss. Christ. Beryll. Bostr. According to *Baur* (Dreieinigkeitslehre, p. 289), Beryllus ought to be classed with Artemon and Theodotus; *Meier* (p. 114), however, supposes a certain distinction between them. Comp. *Dorner*, p. 545, and *Neander*, Hist. Dogm.: "The most natural conclusion is, that Beryl. did not wholly belong to either of the two classes (of Monarchians), but held an intermediate view, which agrees with his historical position." To those who adopted the tendency of Noetus belong *Beron* and his followers, who were combated by Hippolytus; comp. *Dorner*, p. 536, ss.

[4] On the one hand, *Origen* asserts that the Son is equal to the Father, Hom. VIII. in Jerem. ii., Opp. iii. p. 171: Πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τοῦ θεοῦ, τοιαῦτα ἐν αὐτῷ (υἱῷ) ἐστίν. He also speaks of the three persons in the Trinity as the three sources of salvation, so that he who does not thirst after all three can not find God, ibid. Hom. XVIII. 9, Opp. iii. p. 251, 252. Nevertheless the subordination of the Son is prominently brought forward, and forms, together with the strict hypostatic distinction, the characteristic feature of Origen's doctrine. The Son is called δεύτερος θεός, Contra Cels. v. 608; comp. vii. 735: Ἄξιος τῆς δευτερευούσης μετὰ τὸν θεὸν τῶν ὅλων τιμῆς. De Orat. i. p. 222: Ἕτερος κατ' οὐσίαν καὶ ὑποκείμενός ἐστι ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ πατρός. The kingdom of the Father extends to the whole universe, that of the Son to rational creatures, that of the Holy Spirit to the holy (Christians), De Princ. I., 3, 5: Ὅτι ὁ μὲν θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ συνέχων τὰ πάντα φθάνει εἰς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, μεταδιδοὺς ἑκάστῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου τὸ εἶναι· ὧν γὰρ ἔστιν. Ἐλάττων δὲ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ὁ υἱὸς φθάνων ἐπὶ μόνα τὰ λογικά· δεύτερος γάρ ἐστι τοῦ πατρός. Ἔτι δὲ ἧττον τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐπὶ μόνους τοὺς ἁγίους διϊκνούμενος. Ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτο μείζων ἡ δύναμις τοῦ πατρὸς παρὰ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, πλείων δὲ ἡ τοῦ υἱοῦ παρὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον καὶ πάλιν διαφέρουσα μᾶλλον τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἡ δύναμις παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα ἅγια. Comp. also, In Joh. Tom. ii. 2, Opp. T. iv. p. 50, where stress is laid upon the distinction made by Philo between θεός and ὁ θεός. How far this system of subordination was sometimes carried, may be seen from Origen de Orat. c. 15, Opp. T. i. 222, where he entirely rejects the practice of addressing prayer to Christ (the Son); for, he argues, since the Son is a particular

hypostasis, we must pray either to the Son only, or to the Father only, or to both. To pray to the Son, and not to the Father, would be most improper (*ἀτοπώτατον*); to pray to both is impossible, because we should have to use the plural number: *παρασχέσθε, εὐεργετήσατε, ἐπιχορηγήσατε, σώσατε*, which is contrary to Scripture, and the doctrine of One God; thus nothing remains but to pray to the Father alone. To pray to the Father through the Son, a prayer in an improper sense (invocatio!) is quite a different thing; Contra Cels. v. 4, Opp. i. p. 579: *Πᾶσαν μὲν γὰρ δέησιν καὶ προσευχὴν καὶ ἔντευξιν καὶ εὐχαριστίαν ἀναπεμπτέον τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεῷ διὰ τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀγγέλων ἀρχιερέως, ἐμψύχου λόγου καὶ θεοῦ. Δεησόμεθα δὲ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου, καὶ ἐντευξόμεθα αὐτῷ, καὶ εὐχαριστήσομεν καὶ προσευξόμεθα δὲ, ἐὰν δυνώμεθα κατακούειν τῆς περὶ προσευχῆς κυριολεξίας καὶ καταχρήσεως* (si modo propriam precationis possimus ab impropria secernere notionem). Comp. however, § 43. Redepenning Origenes, ii., p., 303. Neander, Hist. Dogm. 149. On the subordination doctrine of the Trinity in Hippolytus, see ibid., p. 157, Jacobi's Note [and Bunsen's Hippolytus.]

§ 47.

DOCTRINE OF THE CREATION.

C. F. Rösler, Philosophia veteris ecclesiæ de mundo, Tubingæ, 1783, 4. [*Weisse*, Philosophische Dogmatik, 1855, pp. 670–712. *H. Ritter*, Die christliche Philosophie, i. p. 266 sq.]

Concerning the doctrine of creation, as well as the doctrine of God in general, the early Christians adopted the monotheistic views of the Jews, and, in simple faith, unhesitatingly received the Mosaic account of the creation (Gen. i.) as a revelation.[1] Even the definition *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων*, which was introduced late into the Jewish theology (2 Macc. vii. 28), found sympathy in the primitive Christianity.[2] The orthodox firmly adhered to the doctrine that God, the almighty Father, who is also the Father of the Lord Jesus Christ, is at the same time the creator of heaven and of earth,[3] and rejected the notion of the eternity of matter,[4] in opposition to the Gnostics, according to whom the creator of the world is distinct from the Supreme God, as well as to the opinion of some Christian teachers, and of *Hermogenes*,[5] that matter is eternal. But the speculative tendency of the Alexandrian school could not be satisfied with the empirical notion of a creation in time. Accordingly *Origen* resorted to an allegorical interpretation of the work of the six days (Hexaëmeron),[6] and, after the example of *Clement*[7] (who, however, is doubtful, at least, hesitating), he propounded more definitely the doctrine of an *eternal* creation, yet not maintaining the eternity of matter as an independent power.[8] On the contrary, *Irenæus*, from his practical position, reckoned all

questions about what God had done before the creation among the improper questions of human inquisitiveness.[4]

[1] *Theophilus* (Ad Autol. ii, 10, sq.) first gives a fuller exposition of the Mosaic narration of the creation. The Alexandrian school, on the other hand, deviated from his literal interpretation; comp. Notes 6 and 8.

[2] Comp. Hebr. xi. 3, and the commentaries upon that passage. Accordingly the Shepherd of *Hermas* teaches, lib. ii. mand. 1: Πρῶτον πάντων πίστευσον, ὅτι εἷς ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς, ὁ τὰ πάντα κτίσας καὶ καταρτίσας, καὶ ποιήσας ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι τὰ πάντα. Conf. Euseb. v. 8. But the idea of creation does not come out as distinctly in all the fathers. Thus "in Justin the Christian belief in the creation from nothing is never definitely brought forward against the opposing views of emanation and of dualism;" *Duncker*, Zur christl. Logoslehre, p. 19. He uses the expression, δημιουργῆσαι ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης, Apol. i. 10. Yet God produced the material itself, and from this shaped the world; Coh. ad Græc. c. 22.

[3] The popular view was always, that the *Father* is the creator, though the creation *through* the Son also formed a part of the orthodox faith. Accordingly, we find that sometimes the Father, sometimes the Logos, is called the creator of the world (δημιουργός, ποιητής.) Thus *Justin M.* says, Dial. c. Tryph. c. 16: Ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων θεός, comp. Apol. i. 61: Τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων καὶ δεσπότου θεοῦ. On the other hand, Coh. ad Græc. c. 15: Τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον, δι' οὗ οὐρανὸς καὶ γῆ καὶ πᾶσα ἐγένετο κτίσις, comp. Apol. i. 64. Likewise *Theophilus* ad Autol. ii. 10: Ὅτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ ὁ θεὸς πεποίηκε τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἴφη· Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν. The phrase ἐν ἀρχῇ was understood in the same sense as διὰ τῆς ἀρχῆς, and ἀρχή explained to denote the Logos, see *Semisch*, p. 335. Thus *Irenæus* also taught, iii. 11: Et hæc quidem sunt principia Evangelii, unum Deum fabricatorem hujus universitatis, eum qui et per prophetas sit annunciatus et qui per Moysem legis dispositionem fecerit, *Patrem Domini nostri Jesu Christi* annunciantis et præter hunc alterum Deum nescientia, neque alterum patrem. On the other hand, he says, v. 18, 3: Mundi enim factor vere verbum Dei est; hic autem est Dominus noster, qui in novissimus temporibus homo factus est, in hoc mundo existens et secundum invisibilitatem continet quæ facta sunt omnia, et in universa conditione inflexus, quoniam verbum Dei gubernans et disponens omnia et propter hoc in sua venit. Irenæus often speaks of the Son and Spirit as the hands of God, by which he created all things; on this, see *Duncker*, p. 68 against Baur. That *Clement* of Alexandria called the Logos, as such, the creator of the world (with Philo), has already been remarked, § 42, note 8. For the various appellations ποιητής, κτιστής, δημιουργός, see *Suicer* under the latter word. [*Burton*, Bampton Lect., note 21, p. 320; note 50, p. 410.]

[4] *Theoph.* ad. Autol. ii. 4, says against the followers of Plato: Εἰ δὲ θεὸς ἀγέννητος καὶ ὕλη ἀγέννητος, οὐκ ἔτι ὁ θεὸς ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων ἐστί. Comp. iii. 19, sq. and *Iren.* fragm. sermonis ad Demetr. p. 348 (p. 467 in Grabe). [Comp. *Burton*, l. c. note 18.] Tert. adv. Hermogenem, see the following note.

[8] Hermogenes, a painter, lived toward the end of the second century, probably at Carthage. According to Tertullian (Adv. Hermog.), he maintained that God must have created the world either out of himself, or out of nothing, or out of something. But he could not create the world out of himself, for he is indivisible; nor out of nothing, for as he himself is the supreme good, he would have created a perfectly good world; nothing, therefore, remains but that he created the world out of matter already in existence. This matter (ὕλη) is consequently eternal like God himself; both principles stood over against each other from the beginning, God as the creating and working, matter as the receptive principle. Whatever in the matter resists the creating principle, constitutes the evil in the world. In proof of the eternity of matter, Hermogenes alleges that God was *Lord* from eternity, and must, therefore, from eternity have an object for the exercise of his lordship. To this Tertullian replies (Adv. Hermog. c. 3), God is certainly *God* from eternity, but not *Lord;* the one is the name of his essence, the other of power (a relation). Only the essence is to be viewed as eternal. But it was only on this point of the eternity of matter that Hermogenes agreed with the Gnostics; in other respects, and especially in reference to the doctrine of emanation, he joined the orthodox in opposing them. Comp. *Böhmer* (*Guil.*) de Hermogene Africano, Sundiæ, 1832, and *Neander* (Torrey's), i. 565–8. Antignosticus, p. 350–355; 424–442. *Leopold*, Hermogenis de origine mundi sententia, Budissæ, 1844.

[9] De Principiis iv. 16, Opp. i. p. 174, 175: Τίς γὰρ νοῦν ἔχων οἰήσεται πρώτην καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην ἡμέραν, ἑσπέραν τε καὶ πρωΐαν χωρὶς ἡλίου γεγονέναι καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἄστρων, κ. τ. λ. Comp. § 33, note 4.

[1] According to Photius Bibl. Cod. c. 9, p. 89, *Clement of Alex.* is said to have taught that matter had no beginning (ὕλην ἄχρονον); with this statement comp. Strom. vi. 16, p. 812, 813: Οὐ τοίνυν, ὥσπερ τινὲς ὑπολαμβάνουσι τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν τοῦ θεοῦ, πέπαυται ποιῶν ὁ θεός· ἀγαθὸς γὰρ ὤν, εἰ παύσεταί ποτε ἀγαθοεργῶν, καὶ τοῦ θεὸς εἶναι παύσεται. But in other passages Clement most distinctly acknowledges that the world is a work of God; *e. g.*, Coh. p. 54, 55: Μόνος γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ μόνος ὄντως ἐστὶ θεός· ψιλῷ τῷ βούλεσθαι δημιουργεῖ, καὶ τῷ μόνον ἐθελῆσαι αὐτὸν ἕπεται τὸ γεγενῆσθαι.

[2] *Origen*, indeed, opposes the eternity of matter (in the heathen and heretical sense), De Princ. ii. 4 (Redepenning, 164), and in other places, *e. g.*, Comment. in Joh. xxxii. 9, Opp. T. iv. p. 429; but, though from his idealistic position he denied eternity to *matter*, which he held to be the root of evil, he nevertheless assumed the eternal creation of innumerable ideal worlds, solely because he, as little as Clement, could not conceive of God as unoccupied (otiosam enim et immobilem dicere naturam Dei, impium enim simul et absurdum), De Princ. iii. 5, Opp. T. i. p. 149 (Redep. 309): Nos vero consequentur respondebimus, observantes regulam pietatis et dicentes: Quoniam non tunc primum, cum visibilem istum mundum fecit Deus, cœpit operari sed sicut post corruptionem hujus erit alius mundus, ita et antequam his esset, fuisse alios credimus. It might be questioned whether Origen, in the use of the pronoun "*nos*" in the subsequent part of the passage, intended to enforce his own belief as that of the church, or whether he employed the

plural number merely in his character as author; comp. *Rössler*, Bibliothek der Kirchenväter, i. p. 177, and *Schnitzer*, l. c. Comp. also *Thomasius*, p. 153, ss., 169, ss., *Redepenning*, ii. 292 sq.

[9] *Iren.* ii. 28, p. 157 (ii. 47, p. 175, Grabe): Ut puta si quis interroget: Antequam mundum faceret Deus, quid agebat? dicimus: Quoniam ista responsio subjacet Deo. Quoniam autem mundus hic factus est apotelestos a Deo, temporale initium accipiens, Scripturæ nos docent; quid autem ante hoc Deus sit operatus, nulla scriptura manifestat. Subjacet ergo hæc responsio Deo. Respecting the important position which the doctrine of Irenæus concerning the creation of the world occupies in his theological system (in opposition to the Gnostics), see *Duncker*, p. 8.

§ 48.

PROVIDENCE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD.

Though the doctrine that the world exists for the sake of the human race, may degenerate into a selfish happiness scheme, yet it has a deeper ground in the consciousness of a specific distinction between man and all other creatures, at least on this earth, and is justified by hints in the Sacred Scriptures.[1] Accordingly, the primitive Christians considered creation as a voluntary act of divine love, inasmuch as God does not stand in need of his creatures for his own glory.[2] But man, as the end of creation,[3] is also preëminently the subject of divine providence, and the whole vast economy of creation, with its laws and also its miracles, is made subservient to the higher purpose of the education of mankind. The Christian doctrine of providence, as held by the fathers of the church in opposition to the objections of ancient philosophy,[4] is remote, on the one hand, from Stoicism and the rigid dogma of a εἱμαρμένη held by the Gnostics,[5] and on the other from the system of Epicurus, according to which it is unworthy of the Deity to concern himself about the affairs of man.[6] Yet here, again, the teachers of the Alexandrian school in particular endeavored to avoid as much as possible the use of anthropomorphism,[7] in connection with the idea that God takes care even of individuals, and to uphold in their theodicy the liberty of man,[8] as well as the love and justice of God.[9]

[1] Matth. vi. 26; 1 Cor. ix. 9, 10.

[2] *E. g.* Clement of Alex. Pæd. iii. 1, 250: Ἀνενδεὴς δὲ μόνος ὁ Θεὸς καὶ χαίρει μάλιστα μὲν καθαρεύοντας ἡμᾶς ὁρῶν τῷ τῆς διανοίας κοσμῷ.

[3] Justin M. Apol. i. 10: Καὶ πάντα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα δημιουργῆσαι αὐτὸν ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης δι' ἀνθρώπους δεδιδάγμεθα. Comp. Athen. De Resurr. c. 12. Iren. v. 29, 1; iv. 5, 1; iv. 7, 4 (Comp. *Duncker*, p. 78, 79). Tert. Advers. Marc. i. 13: Ergo nec mundus Deo indignus, nihil etenim Deus

indignum se fecit, etsi mundum homini, non sibi fecit. Orig. Contra Cels. iv. 74, p. 558, 559, and ibid. 99, p. 576: Κέλσος μὲν οὖν λεγέτω, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὡς οὐδὲ λέοντι, οὐδ' οἷς ὀνομάζει. Ἡμεῖς δ' ἐροῦμεν· Οὐ λέοντι ὁ δημιουργὸς, οὐδὲ ἀετῷ, οὐδὲ δελφῖνι ταῦτα πεποίηκεν, ἀλλὰ πάντα διὰ τὸ λογικὸν ζῶον.

[4] See the objections of Cæcilius, in Minucius Felix, c. 5, ss., and, on the other hand, the oration of Octavius, c. 17, 18, 20, 32, and especially the beautiful passage, c. 33: Nec nobis de nostra frequentia blandiamur; multi nobis videmur, sed Deo admodum pauci sumus. Nos gentes nationesque distinguimus: Deo una domus est mundus hic totus. Reges tantum regni sui per officia ministrorum universa novere: Deo indiciis non opus est; non solum in occulis ejus, sed et in sinu vivimus. Comp. Athen. Leg. c. 22, in calce.

[5] On the opinion of the Gnostic *Bardesanes* respecting the εἱμαρμένη (fate), and the influence of stars, comp. Photius Bibl. Cod. 223. Euseb. Præp. vi. 10. *Neander*, Gnostiche Systeme, p. 198. [*Neander*, History of the Christ. Relig. and Church during the first three centuries, trans. by *H. J. Rose*, ii. p. 97: "He (Bardesanes), therefore, although, like many of those who inclined to Gnosticism, he busied himself with astrology, contended against the doctrine of such an influence of the stars (εἱμαρμένη) as should be supposed to settle the life and affairs of man by *necessity*. Eusebius, in his great literary treasure house, the Præparatio Evangelica, has preserved a large fragment of this remarkable work; he here introduces, among other things, the Christians dispersed over so many countries, as an example of the absurdity of supposing that the stars irresistibly influenced the character of a people."] *Baur*, Gnosis, p. 234. *C. Kühner*, Astronomiæ et Astrologiæ in doctrina Gnostic. Vestigia, P. I. Bardesanis Gnostici numina astralia. Hildburgh, 1833. [Comp. also *Gieseler*, l. c. i. § 46, n. 2, and *Burton*, Lect. on Ecclesiast. hist. Lect. xx. p. 182, 183.]

[6] Comp. especially the objections of Celsus in the work of Origen: God interferes as little with the affairs of man, as with those of monkeys and flies, etc., especially in lib. iv. Though Celsus was not a disciple of Epicurus, as Origen and Lucian would have him to be, but rather a follower of Plato (according to Neander), yet these expressions savor very much of Epicureanism. [Comp. *Lardner*, Works, vii. 211, 212.]

[7] According to *Clement*, there is no antagonism of the whole and its parts in the sight of God (comp. also Minuc. Fel. note 4): Ἀθρόως τε γὰρ πάντα καὶ ἕκαστον ἐν μέρει μιᾷ προσβολῇ προσβλέπει, Strom. vi. p. 821. Comp. the work of Origen contra Cels.

[8] The doctrine of the *concursus*, as it was afterward termed, is found in Clem. Strom. vi. 17, p. 821, ss. Many things owe their existence to human calculation, though they are kindled by God, as if by lightning (τὴν ἔνανσιν εἰληφότα). Thus health is preserved by medical skill, the carriage of the body by fencing, riches by the industrial art (χρηματιστικὴ τέχνη); but the divine πρόνοια and human συνέργεια always work together.

[9] Comp. § 39, note 8. In opposition to the Gnostics, who derived evil, not from the supreme God, but from the demiurge, *Irenæus* observes, Adv. Hær. iv. 39, p. 285 (iv. 76, p. 380, Gr.), that through the contrast of good

and evil in the world, the former shines the more brightly. Spirits, he further remarks, may exercise themselves in distinguishing between good and evil; how could they know the former, without having some idea of its opposite? But, in a categorical manner, he precludes all further questions: Non enim tu Deum facis, sed Deus te facit. Si ergo opera Dei es, manum artificis tui expecta, opportune omnia facientem: opportune autem, quantum ad te attinet, qui efficeris. Præsta autem ei cor tuum molle et tractabile, et custodi figuram, qua te figuravit artifex, habens in temetipso humorem, ne induratus amittas vestigia digitorum ejus.... And further on: Si igitur tradideris ei, quod est tuum, *i. e.*, fidem in eum et subjectionem, recipies ejus artem et eris perfectum opus Dei. Si autem non credideris ei et fugeris manus ejus, erit causa imperfectionis in te qui non obedisti, sed non in illo, qui vocavit, etc. At all events, the best and soundest theodicy! *Athenagoras* (Leg. c. 24) derives the disorders in the world from the devil and demons (comp. § 51); and *Cyprian* (Ad Demetrianum) from the very constitution of the world, which begins to change, and is approaching its dissolution. To a speculative mind like that of *Origen*, the existence of evil would present a strong stimulus to attempt to explain its origin, though he could not but be aware of the difficulties with which this subject is beset. Comp. especially De Princ. ii. 9 (Opp. i. p. 97, *Redep.* 214, Schnitzer, p. 140); Contra Celsum iv. 62, p. 551 (an extract of which is given by *Rössler*, vol. i. p. 232, ss.). Different reasons are adduced in vindication of the existence of evil in the world; thus it serves to exercise the ingenuity of man (power of invention, etc.); but he draws special attention to the connection between moral and physical imperfections, evil and sin. Comp. the opinion of *Thomasius* on the theodicy of Origen, p. 57, 58.

§ 49.

ANGELOLOGY AND DEMONOLOGY.

Suicer, Thesaurus, s. v. ἄγγελος. *Cotta*, Disputationes 2, succinctam Doctrinæ de Angelis Historiam exhibentes. Tüb. 1765, 4. *Schmid*, Hist. dogm. de Angelis tutelaribus, in Illgens histor. theol. Abhandlungen, i. p. 24–27. *Keil*, De Angelorum malorum et Dæmoniorum Cultu apud Gentiles, Opusc. Acad. p. 584–601. (*Gaab*), Abhandlungen zur Dogmengeschichte der ältesten griechischen Kirche, Jena, 1790, p. 97–136. *Usteri*, Paulin. Lehrbegriff. 4th edit. Appendix 3, p. 421, ss.—[*Dr. L. Mayer*, Scriptural Idea of Angels, in Amer. Biblic. Reposit. xii. 356–388. *Moses Stuart*, Sketches of Angelology in Robinson's Bibliotheca Sacra, No. I. 1843. *Kitto*, Cyclop. of Bibl. Liter. arts. Angels, Demons, Satan. *L. F. Voss*, Zeitschrift f. Luther. Theologie, 1855. *Lücke*, in the Deutsche Zeitschrift, 1851, review of Martensen. *Twesten*, transl. in Bibliotheca Sacra, by H. B. Smith, vols. i. and ii. 1844, 1845.]

The doctrine respecting Angels, the devil, and demons, forms an important appendix to the statements about creation, providence, and the government of the world; partly because the angels (according to the general opinion) belong as creatures to the creation itself; partly because, as others conceive, they took an active part in the

work of creation, or are the agents of special providence. The doctrine of the devil and demons also stands in close connection with the doctrine of physical and moral evil in the world.

§ 50.

THE ANGELS.

Though the primitive church, as *Origen* asserts, did not establish any definite doctrine on this subject,[1] we nevertheless meet with several declarations respecting the nature of angels.[2] Thus many of the earlier fathers rejected the notion that they took part in the work of creation,[3] and maintained, on the contrary, that they are created beings and ministering spirits.[4] In opposition to the doctrine of emanation and of æons,[5] even bodies were ascribed to them, of finer substance, however, than human bodies.[6] The idea of guardian angels was connected in part with the mythical notion of the genii.[7] But no sure traces are to be found during this period of a real worship of angels within the pale of the Catholic church.[8]

[1] De Princ. procem. 10, Opp. i. p. 49: Est etiam illud in ecclesiastica prædicatione, esse angelos Dei quosdam et virtutes bonas, qui ei ministrant ad salutem hominum consummandam; sed quando isti creati sint, vel quales aut quomodo sint, non satis in manifesto designatur.

[2] "*The doctrine respecting angels, though a very wavering element of the patristic dogmatics, is yet handled with manifest predilection,*" *Semisch*, Just. Mart. ii. 339. Comp. Athenagoras Leg. 24, and Note 1 to the next section.

[3] *Iren.* i. 22 and 24 (against the opinions of Saturninus and Carpocrates), comp. ii. 2, p. 117: Si enim (Deus) mundi fabricator est, angelos ipse fecit, aut etiam causa creationis eorum ipse fuit. III. 8, 3: Quoniam enim sive angeli, sive archangeli, sive throni, sive dominationes ab eo, qui super omnes est Deus, et constituta sunt et facta sunt per verbum ejus. Comp. also iv. 6, 7: Ministrat ei (patri) ad omnia sua progenies et figuratio sua *i. e.*, Filius et Spir. S., verbum et sapientia, *quibus serviunt et subjecti sunt* omnes angeli. Comp. *Duncker*, p. 108, ss. and *Baur*, Dreieinigkeit p. 175. The latter, from the manner in which the earliest fathers frequently bring the angels into close connection with the persons of the Trinity, sees evidence that their views respecting this great mystery itself were yet very indefinite.

[4] "*Justin M. regards the angels as personal beings who possess a permanent existence,*" *Semisch*, ii. p. 341. Dial. c. Tryph. c. 128: Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν ἄγγελοι, καὶ ἀεὶ μένοντες, καὶ μὴ ἀναλυόμενοι εἰς ἐκεῖνο, ἐξ οὗπερ γεγόνασιν, ἀποδέδεικται. . . . . *Athenagoras*, Leg. c. 10: Πλῆθος ἀγγέλων καὶ λειτουργῶν φαμεν, οὓς ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ δήμιουργὸς κόσμου θεὸς διὰ τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγου διένειμε καὶ διέταξε περί τε τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶναι καὶ τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τὸν κόσμον καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν τούτων εὐταξίαν. Comp. c. 24, and

Clem. Strom. vi. 17, p. 822, 824; according to him the angels have received charge over provinces, towns, etc. Clement, however, distinguishes *the ἄγγελος* (singular), יחידי שבעה, from the other angels, and connects him in some degree with the Logos, though assigning to him an inferior rank. Comp. Strom. vii. 2, p. 831–833. He also speaks of a mythical Angelus Jesus, Pæd. i. 7, p. 133, comp. *G. Bulli* Def. Fidei Nic. sect. 1, cap. 1 (de Christo sub angeli forma apparente). Opp. Lond. 1703, fol. p. 9. [*Pye Smith*, Script. Test. to the Mess. i. p. 445–464].—On the employments of angels comp. Orig. Contra Cels. v. 29. (Opp. i. p. 598), and Hom. xii. in Luc. Opp. iii. p. 945.

[4] *Philo* had already transformed personal angels (*e. g.*, the Cherubim) into divine powers, see *Dähne*, p. 227, ss. *Justin M.* also informs us, that in his time some had compared the relation in which the angels stand to God to that which exists between the sun and its beams (like the Logos); but he decidedly rejects this opinion, Dial. c. Tryph. c. 128. Comp. *Tert.* Adv. Prax. c. 3 (in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity): Igitur si et monarchia divina per tot legiones et exercitus angelorum administratur, sicut scriptum est: Millies millia adsistebant ei, et millies centena millia apparebant ei: nec ideo unius esse desiit, ut desinat monarchia esse, quia per tanta millia virtutum procuratur, etc.

[5] *Justin M.* attaches most importance to the body of angels as analogous to that of man. Their food is manna, Psal. lxxviii. 25; the two angels who appeared to Abraham (Gen. xviii. 1. ss.) differed from the Logos who accompanied them, in partaking of the meat set before them, in reality and after the manner of men, comp. Dial. c. Tryph. c. 57, and *Semisch*, ii. p. 343. As regards their intellectual powers and moral condition, Justin assigns an inferior position to the angels, *Semisch*, p. 344, 345. *Tertullian* points out the difference between the body of Christ and that of the angels, De Carne Christi, c. 6: Nullus unquam angelus ideo descendit, ut crucifigeretur, ut mortem experiretur, ut a morte suscitaretur. Si nunquam ejusmodi fuit causa angelorum corporandorum, habes causam, cur non nascendi acceperint carnem. Non venerant mori, ideo nec nasci. . . . . Igitur probent angelos illos, carnem de sideribus concepisse. Si non probant, quia nec scriptum est, nec Christi caro inde erit, cui angelorum accommodant exemplum. Constat, angelos carnem non propriam gestasse, utpote naturas substantiæ spiritalis, et si corporis alicujus, sui tamen generis; in carnem autem humanam transfigurabiles ad tempus videri et congredi cum hominibus posse. Igitur, cum relatum non sit, unde sumpserint carnem, relinquitur intellectui nostro, non dubitare, hoc esse proprium angelicæ potestatis, ex nulla materia corpus sibi sumere. . . . . Sed et, si de materia necesse fuit angelos sumpsisse carnem, credibilius utique est de terrena materia, quam de ullo genere cœlestium substantiarum, cum adeo terrenæ qualitatis extiterit, ut terrenis pabulis pasta sit. *Tatian*, Or. c. 15: *Δαίμονες δὲ πάντες σαρκίον μὲν οὐ κέκτηνται, πνευματικὴ δέ ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ἡ σύμπηξις, ὡς πυρὸς, ὡς ἀέρος.* But these ethereal bodies of the angels can be perceived only by those in whom the Spirit of God dwells, not by the natural man (the psychical). In comparison with other creatures they might be called incorporeal beings, and *Ignat.* ad Trall. calls them *ἀσωμάτους φύσεις*. *Clement* also says, Strom. vi. 7, p. 769, that they have neither ears, nor tongues, nor lips, nor entrails, nor organs of respiration, etc. Comp. Orig.

Princ., in procem. § 9. On the question, whether the fathers taught the spiritual nature of the angels at all, see *Semisch*, ii. p. 342.

[7] This idea is already found in the Shepherd of *Hermas*, lib. ii. mand. vi. 2: *Δύο εἰσὶν ἄγγελοι μετὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, εἷς τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ εἷς τῆς πονηρίας· καὶ ὁ μὲν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἄγγελος τρυφερός ἐστι καὶ αἰσχυντηρὸς καὶ πρᾷος καὶ ἡσύχιος. Ὅταν οὖν οὗτος ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν σοῦ ἀναβῇ, εὐθέως λαλεῖ μετὰ σοῦ περὶ δικαιοσύνης, περὶ ἁγνείας, περὶ σεμνότητος καὶ περὶ αὐταρκείας, καὶ περὶ παντὸς ἔργου δικαίου, καὶ περὶ πάσης ἀρετῆς ἐνδόξου. Ταῦτα πάντα ὅταν εἰς τὴν καρδίαν σοῦ ἀναβῇ, γίνωσκε, ὅτι ὁ ἄγγελος τῆς δικαιοσύνης μετὰ σοῦ ἐστιν. Τούτῳ οὖν πίστευε καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐγκρατὴς αὐτοῦ γενοῦ. Ὅρα οὖν καὶ τοῦ ἀγγέλου τῆς πονηρίας τὰ ἔργα. Πρῶτον πάντων ὀξύχολός ἐστι καὶ πικρὸς καὶ ἄφρων, καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ πονηρὰ καταστρέφοντα τοὺς δούλους τοῦ θεοῦ· ὅταν αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν σοῦ ἀναβῇ, γνῶθι αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ.* (Fragm. ex doctr. ad Antioch.) Comp. the Latin text. *Justin Mart.* Apol. II. 5: *Ὁ θεὸς τὸν πάντα κόσμον ποιήσας καὶ τὰ ἐπίγεια ἀνθρώποις ὑποτάξας . . . . τὴν μὲν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν πρόνοιαν ἀγγέλοις, οὓς ἐπὶ τούτοις ἔταξε, παρέδωκεν.* We have already seen (note 4), that Clement and Origen assign to angels the office of watching over provinces and towns; this is connected with the notion of individual guardian angels; comp. Clem. Strom. v. p. 700, and vii. p. 833, and the passages quoted above from Origen. *Schmid*, u. s.

[8] Col. ii. 18, mention is made of a *θρησκεία τῶν ἀγγέλων* which the apostle disapproves; comp. Rev. xix. 10. xxii. 9. The answer to the question, whether *Justin M.* numbered the angels among the objects of Christian worship, depends upon the interpretation of the passage, Apol. i. 6: *Ἄθεοι κεκλήμεθα καὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν τῶν τοιούτων νομιζομένων θεῶν ἄθεοι εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τοῦ ἀληθεστάτου καὶ πατρὸς δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν, ἀνεπιμίκτον τε κακίας θεοῦ· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνόν τε καὶ τὸν παρ' αὐτοῦ υἱὸν ἐλθόντα καὶ διδάξαντα ἡμᾶς τοῦτα καὶ τὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἑπομένων καὶ ἐξομοιουμένων ἀγαθῶν ἀγγέλων στρατὸν, πνεῦμά τε τὸ προφητικὸν σεβόμεθα καὶ προσκυνοῦμεν, λόγῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ τιμῶντες.* The principal point in question is, whether the accusative *τὸν τῶν ἄλλων.... στρατὸν* is governed by *σεβόμεθα καὶ προσκυνοῦμεν*, or by *διδάξαντα*, and, consequently where the punctuation is to fall. Most modern writers adopt the former interpretation, which is probably the more correct one. Thus *Semisch*, p. 350, ss. *Möhler* (Patrologie, p. 240) finds in this passage as well as in Athen. Leg. 10, a proof of the Romish Catholic adoration of angels and saints. But Athenagoras (c. 16) rejects this doctrine very decidedly in the following words: *Οὗ τὰς δυνάμεις τοῦ θεοῦ προσίοντες θεραπεύομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ποιητὴν αὐτῶν καὶ δεσπότην.* Comp. Clem. Strom. vi. 5, p. 760. Orig. Contra Cels. v. 4, 5 (Opp. i. p. 580), and viii. 13 (ib. p. 751), quoted by *Münscher*, ed. by Von Cölln, i. p. 84, 85. [*Gieseler*, i. § 99, and note 33. **Burton*, Testimonies of the Antenic. Fath. to the Trinity, etc., p. 15–23. On the Gnostic worship of angels, comp. *Burton*, Bampton Lect., note 52.]

* In an earlier essay in the Tübingen Quartalschrift, 1833, p. 53 sq., Möhler rejected the interpretation, that the worship of angels is here spoken of.

According to *Origen*, the angels rather pray *with* us and *for* us, comp. Contra Cels. viii. 64, p. 789; Hom. in Num. xxiv. (Opp. iii. p. 362). On the order and rank of the angels in Origen, see Redepenning, ii. p. 348, sq.

§ 51.

THE DEVIL AND DEMONS.

The Bible does not represent the prince of darkness, or the wicked one (Devil, Satan) as an evil principle which existed from the beginning, in opposition to a good principle (dualism); but, in accordance with the doctrine of One God, it speaks of him as a creature, viz., an angel who was created by God in a state of holiness, but voluntarily rebelled against his maker. This was also the view taken by the orthodox fathers.[1] Everything which was opposed to the light of the gospel and its development, physical evils,[2] as well as the numerous persecutions of Christians,[3] was thought to be the work of Satan and his agents, the demons. The entire system of paganism, its mythology and worship,[4] and, according to some, even philosophy,[5] were supposed to be subject to the influence of demons. Heresies[6] were also ascribed to the same agency. Moreover, some particular vices were considered to be the specific effects of individual evil spirits.[7]

[1] Concerning the appellatives שָׂטָן, *σατᾶν*, *σατανᾶς*, *διάβολος*, *ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου*, *δαίμονες*, *δαιμόνια*, *βεελζεβούλ*, etc., the origin of the doctrine and its development in the Scriptures, comp. *de Wette*, biblische Dogmatik, § 142–150; 212–214; 236–238; *Baumgarten-Crusius*, biblische Theologie, p. 295; *Von Cölln*, biblische Theologie, p. 420; *Hirzel*, Commentar zum Hiob, p. 16. The fathers generally adopted the notions already existing. *Justin M.*, Apol. min. c. 5. *Athenag.* Leg. 24: *Ὡς γὰρ θεόν φαμεν καὶ υἱὸν τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ καὶ πνεῦμα ἅγιον . . . οὕτως καὶ ἑτέρας εἶναι δυνάμεις κατειλήμμεθα περὶ τὴν ὕλην ἐχούσας καὶ δι' αὐτῆς, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἀντίθεον, οὐχ ὅτι ἀντιδοξοῦν τι ἐστὶ τῷ θεῷ, ὡς τῇ φιλίᾳ τὸ νεῖκος κατὰ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα, καὶ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ νὺξ κατὰ τὰ φαινόμενα (ἐπεὶ κἂν εἰ ἀνθειστήκει τι τῷ θεῷ, ἐπαύσατο τοῦ εἶναι, λυθείσης αὐτοῦ τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμει καὶ ἰσχύϊ τῆς συστάσεως) ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀγαθῷ, ὃ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐστιν αὐτῷ, καὶ συννυπάρχον, ὡς χρόα σώματι, οὗ ἄνευ οὐκ ἔστιν (οὔχ ὡς μέρους ὄντος, ἀλλ' ὡς κατ' ἀνάγκην συνόντος παρακολουθήματος ἡνωμένου καὶ συγκεχρωσμένου· ὡς τῷ πυρὶ, ξανθῷ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ αἰθέρι, κυανῷ) ἐναντίον ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ὕλην ἔχον πνεῦμα, γενόμενον μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, καθὸ οἱ λοιποὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γεγόνασιν ἄγγελοι, καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ τοῖς τῆς ὕλης εἴδεσι πιστευσάμενον διοίκησιν.* *Iren.* iv. 41, p. 288: Quum igitur a Deo omnia facta sunt, et diabolus sibimet ipsi et reliquis factus est abscessionis causa, juste scriptura eos, qui in abscessione perseverant, semper filios diaboli et angelos dixit maligni. *Tert.* Apol. c. 22·

Atque adeo dicimus, esse substantias quasdam spiritales, nec nomen novum est. Sciunt dæmonas philosophi, Socrate ipso ad dæmonii arbitrium exspectante, quidni? cum et ipso dæmonium adhæsisse a pueritia dicatur, dehortatoriúm plane a bono. Dæmonas sciunt poëtæ, et jam vulgus indoctum in usum maledicti frequentat; nam et Satanam, principem hujus mali generis, proinde de propria conscientia animæ eadem execramenti voce pronuntiat. Angelos quoque etiam Plato non negavit. Utriusque nominis testes esse vel magi adsunt. Sed quomodo de angelis quibusdam sua sponte corruptis corruptior gens dæmonum evaserit damnata a Deo cum generis auctoribus et cum eo quem diximus principe, apud litteras sanctas ordine cognoscitur. Comp. *Orig.* De Princ. procem. 6 (Opp. T. i. p. 48), who, however, leaves all other points problematical, as he does in the doctrine respecting angels; it is sufficient to believe that Satan and the demons really *exist*—quæ autem sint aut quo modo sint, (ecclesia) non clare exposuit. It was not until the following period that the Manichees developed the dualistic view, that the devil is a distinct and essential evil principle, in the form of a regular system, although traces of it may be found in some earlier Gnostic notions, *e. g.* the Jaldabaoth of the Ophites, comp. *Neander's* Gnostische Systeme, p. 233, ss. *Baur*, Gnosis, p. 173, ss. [*Neander*, Hist. of the Ch. (Torrey) i. 345, comp. *Norton*, l. c. iii. p. 57–62.] In opposition to this dualistic view, Origen maintains that the devil and the demons are creatures of God, though not created *as* devils, but as spiritual beings; Contra Cels. iv. 65 (Opp. i. p. 553). —As to the extent in which Platonism and Ebionitism participated in the Christian demonology, see *Semisch*, Just. Mart. p. 387 sq.

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θεὸν, ἅτε μηδέπω εἰδὼς αὐτοῦ τὴν κατάκρισιν (comp. Epiph. in Hær. Sethianor. p. 289); thus the efforts of the powers of darkness against the victorious progress of the Christian religion could be more satisfactorily explained.

[4] Ep. Barn. c. 16, 18; Justin M. Apol. i. 12, and elsewhere; Tatian, c. 12, 20, and elsewhere (comp. *Daniel*, p. 162, ss.); Athen. Leg. c. 26; Tert. Apol. c. 22, De Præscr, c. 40; Minuc. Fel. Octav. c. 27, 1; Clem. Al. Cohort. p. 7; Origen Contra Cels. iii. 28, 37, 69, iv. 36, 92; v. 5; vii. 64; viii. 30. The demons are present in particular at the offering of sacrifices, and sip in the smoke of the burnt-offering; they speak out of the oracles, and rejoice in the licentiousness and excess which accompany these festivals. (Comp. *Keil*, De Angelorum malorum s. Dæmoniorum Cultu apud Gentiles; Opusc. Academ. p. 584–601. *Münscher* edit. by Von Cölln, i. p. 92, ss.)

[5] According to Minuc. Fel., c. 26, the demon of Socrates was one of those evil demons. Clement also says of a sect of Christians, Strom. i. 1. p. 326: Οἱ δὲ καὶ πρὸς κακοῦ ἂν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν εἰσδεδυκέναι τὸν βίον νομίζουσιν, ἐπὶ λύμῃ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πρός τινος εὑρετοῦ πονηροῦ, which is manifestly nothing but an euphemism for διαβόλου; comp. Strom. vi. 822: Πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἄτοπον τὴν ἀταξίαν καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν προσνέμοντας τῷ διαβόλῳ, εναρέτου πράγματος, τοῦτον τῆς φιλοσοφίας, δωτῆρα ποιεῖν; comp. also Strom. i. 17, p. 366, and the note in the edit. of Potter. Astrology, etc., was also ascribed to demoniacal influence; comp. the same note.

[6] Comp. Justin M. Apol. i. 56, 58. *Cyprian*, De Unitate Ecclesiæ, p. 105: Hæreses invenit (diabolus) et schismata, quibus subverteret fidem, veritatem corrumperet, scinderet unitatem, etc.

[7] Hermas, ii. 6, 2, comp. the preceding §. *Justin M.* Apol. ii. c. 5 (Usteri, p. 423)...καὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπους φόνους, πολέμους, μοιχείας, ἀκολασίας καὶ πᾶσαν κακίαν ἐσπειραν. *Clem. of Alex.* designates as the most malicious and most pernicious of all demons the greedy belly-demon (κοιλιοδαίμονα λιχνότατον), who is related to the one that works in ventriloquists (τῷ ἐγγαστριμύθῳ), Pæd. ii. 1, p. 174. *Origen* follows Hermas in classifying the demons according to the vices which they represent, and thus unconsciously prepares the way for more intelligible views, gradually resolving these concrete representations of devils into abstract notions. Comp. Hom. 15, in Jesum Nave (Opp. T. ii. p. 434): Unde mihi videtur esse infinitus quidem numerus contrariarum virtutum, pro eo quod per singulos pene homines sunt spiritus aliqui, diversa in iis peccatorum genera molientes. Verbi causa, est aliquis fornicationis spiritus, est iræ spiritus alius, est avaritiæ spiritus, alius vere superbiæ. Et si eveniat esse aliquem hominem, qui his omnibus malis aut etiam pluribus agitetur, omnes hos vel etiam plures in se habere inimicos putandus est spiritus. Comp. also the subsequent part, where it is said, not only that every vice has its chief demon, but also that every vicious person is possessed with a demon who is in the service of the chief demon. Others refer not only crimes, but also natural desires, as the sexual impulse, to the devil; Origen, however, objects to this, De Princ. iii. 2, 2 (Opp. T. i. p. 139; Redepenning, p. 278 sq.)

§ 52.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

The fathers held different opinions as to the particular sin which caused the apostacy of the demons.[1] Some thought that it was envy and pride,[2] others supposed lasciviousness and intemperance.[3] But it is of practical importance to notice, that the church never held that the devil can compel any soul to commit sin without its own consent.[4] *Origen* went so far, that, contrary to the general opinion, he allowed to Satan the glimmer of a hope of future grace.[5]

[1] The fathers do not agree about the time at which this took place. On the supposition that the devil seduced our first parents, it is necessary to assign an earlier date to his apostasy than to the fall of man. But, according to *Tatian*, Orat. c. 11, the fall of Satan was the punishment which was inflicted upon him in consequence of the part he had taken in the first sin of man (comp. *Daniel*, p. 187 and 196). From the language of *Irenæus* (comp. note 2), one might suspect that he entertained similar views; but it is more probable that he fixed upon the period which elapsed between the creation of man and his temptation, as the time when the devil apostatized. Thus *Cyprian* says, De Dono Patient. p. 218: Diabolus hominem ad imaginem Dei factum impatienter tulit; inde et periit *primus* et perdidit.

[2] Iren. Adv. Hær. iv. 40, 3, p. 287: Ἐζήλωσε τὸ πλάσμα τοῦ θεοῦ, and Cyprian, l. c. Orig. in Ezech. Hom. 9, 2 (Opp. T. iii. p. 389): Inflatio, superbia, arrogantia peccatum diaboli est et ob hæc delicta ad terras migravit de cœlo. Comp. Phot. Bibl. cod. 324, p. 293 (ed Bekker.): Οἱ μὲν λοιποὶ (ἄγγελοι) ἐφ' ὧν αὐτούς ἐποίησε καὶ διετάξατο ὁ θεός ἔμειναν αὐτὸς δέ (sc. ὁ διάβολος) ἐνύβρισε.

[3] The passage in Gen. vi. 2 (according to the reading οἱ ἄγγελοι τοῦ θεοῦ instead of οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ) had already been applied to the demons, and their intercourse with the daughters of men. (Comp. *Wernsdorf*, Exercitatio de Commercio Angelorum cum Filiabus Hominum ab Judæis et Patribus Platonizantibus credito. Viteb. 1742, 4. *Keil*, Opusc. p. 566, ss. *Münscher* edit. by Von Cölln, p. 89, 90. *Suicer* s. v. ἄγγελος i. p. 36, and ἐγρήγορος p. 1003). Thus Philo wrote a special treatise De Gigantibus; and all the fathers of the first period (with the exception of Julius Africanus, see *Routh*, Reliquiæ Sacræ ii. p. 127, ss.) referred the passages in question to the sexual intercourse of the angels with the daughters of men. This, however, holds only of the later demons, who became subject to the devil, and not of the apostasy of Satan himself, which falls in an earlier period (note 1). Concerning the apparent parachronism, comp. *Münscher*, Handb. ii. p. 30, 31. In accordance with this notion, *Clement*, Strom. iii. 7, p. 538, designates ἀκρασία and ἐπιθυμία as the causes of the fall.—The above mentioned

views about pagan worship, and the temptation to sensuality (§ 51, and ibid. note 7), were connected with these notions respecting the intercourse of the demons with the daughters of men. The fallen angels betrayed the mysteries of revelation to them, though in an imperfect and corrupt form, and the heathen have their philosophy from these women. Comp. Clem. Strom. vi. 1, p. 650. [Comp. on Gen. vi. 1–4 *S. R. Maitland*, on False Worship, 1856, p. 19 sq., and in British Magazine, vol. xxi. p. 389. *C. F. Keil*, in the Zeitschrift f. luth. Theol. 1855 and 1859; *Engelhardt*, in the same (against Keil) 1856, for the angels. *Kurtz's* Essay on the subject, 1856, and in his Hist. of the Old Test., and *Delitzsch* in reply to *Kurtz*, in Reuter's Repertorium, 1857. Bibliotheca Sacra, 1850, p. 167. Journal of Sacred Lit. (Lond. 1858, Oct., for the angels.]

[4] *Hermas*, lib. ii. mand 7: Diabolum autem ne timeas, timens enim Dominum dominaberis illius, quia virtus in illo nulla est. In quo autem virtus non est, is ne timendus quidem est; in quo vero virtus gloriosa est, is etiam timendus est. Omnis enim virtutem habens timendus est; nam qui virtutem non habet, ab omnibus contemnitur. Time plane facta Diaboli, quoniam maligna sunt: metuens enim Dominum, timebis, et opera Diaboli non facies, sed abstinebis te ab eis. Comp. 12. 5: Potest autem Diabolus luctari, sed vincere non potest. Si enim resistitur, fugiet a vobis confusus.—[For as a man, when he fills up vessels with good wine, and among them puts a few vessels half full, and comes to try and taste of the vessels, does not try those that are full, because he knows that they are good; but tastes those that are half full, lest they should grow sour: so the devil comes to the servants of God to try them. They that are full of faith resist him stoutly, and he departs from them because he finds no place where to enter into them: then he goes to those that are not full of faith, and because he has a place of entrance, he goes into them, and does what he will with them, and they become his servants. Hermas, 12. 5, Archbp. *Wake's* transl.] Comp. *Tatian*, c. 16: Δαίμονες δὲ οἱ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπιτάττοντες, οὐκ εἰσιν αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαί κ. τ. λ. Iren. ii. c. 32, 4, p. 166. *Tert.* Apol. c. 23: [Omnis hæc nostra in illos dominatio et potestas de nominatione Christi valet, et de commemoratione eorum quæ sibi a Deo per arbitrum Christum imminentia exspectant. Christum timentes in Deo, et Deum in Christo, subjiciuntur servis Dei et Christi.] *Orig.* De Princ. iii. 2, 4; Contra Cels. i. 6, and viii. 36 (Opp. i. p. 769): Ἀλλ' οὐ χριστιανὸς, ὁ ἀληθῶς χριστιανὸς καὶ ὑποτάξας ἑαυτὸν μόνῳ τῷ θεῷ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ πάθοι τι ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν δαιμονίων, ἅτε κρειττων δαιμόνων τυγχάνων, and in lib. Jesu Nave, xv. 6. In the former passage, De Princ., Origen calls those the simple (simpliciores) who believe that sin would not exist if there was no devil. Along with the moral power of faith, and the efficacy of prayer, the magic effects of the sign of the cross, etc, were relied on. But what was at first nothing more than a symbol of the power of faith itself, became afterward a mechanical opus operatum.

[5] Even *Clement*, Strom. i. 17, p. 367, says: Ὁ δὲ διάβολος αὐτεξούσιος ὢν καὶ μετανοῆσαι οἷός τε ἦν καὶ κλέψαι, καὶ ὁ αἴτιος αὐτὸς τῆς κλοπῆς, οὐχ ὁ μὴ κωλύσας κύριος, but from these words it is not quite evident whether he means to say that the devil is yet capable of being converted. The general opinion as earlier held, is expressed by *Tatian*, Orat. c. 15:

Η τῶν δαιμόνων ὑπόστασις οὐκ ἔχει μετανοίας τόπον. Comp. also *Justin M.* Dialog. c. Tryph. c. 141.—*Origen* himself did not very clearly propound his views; De Princ. iii. c. 6, 5 (Opp. i. p. 154): Propterea etiam novissimus inimicus, qui mors appellatur, destrui dicitur (1 Cor. xv. 26), ut neque ultra triste sit aliquid ubi mors non est, neque adversum sit ubi non est inimicus. Destrui sane novissimus inimicus ita intelligendus est, non ut substantia ejus, quæ a Deo facta est, pereat, sed ut propositum et voluntas inimica, quæ non a Deo sed ab ipso processit, intereat. Destructur ergo non ut non sit, sed ut inimicus non sit et mors. Nihil enim omnipotenti impossibile est, nec insanabile est aliquid factori suo. § 6. *Omnia restituentur ut unum sint, et Deus fuerit omnia in omnibus* (1 Cor. xv. 28). Quod tamen non ad subitum fieri, sed paulatim et per partes intelligendum est, infinitis et immensis labentibus sæculis, cum sensim et per singulos emendatio fuerit et correctio prosecuta, præcurrentibus aliis et velociori cursu ad summa tendentibus, *aliis* vero proximo quoque spatio insequentibus, tum deinde aliis longe posterius: et sic per multos et innumeros ordines proficientium ac Deo se ex inimicis reconciliantium pervenitur usque ad novissimum inimicum qui dicitur mors, et etiam ipse destratur ne ultra sit inimicus.] He here speaks of the last enemy, death, but it is evident, from the context, that he identifies death with the devil (this is signified, as cited, *e. g.*, *Münscher* Handbuch. ii. p. 39, by the use of the parenthesis); he speaks of a substance which the Creator would not destroy, but heal. Comp. § 3, and *Schnitzer* in the passage; *Thomasius*, p. 187. On the possibility of the conversion of the other demons, comp. i. 6, 3 (Opp. i. p. 70): Jam vero si aliqui ex his ordinibus, qui sub principatu diaboli agunt, malitiæ ejus obtemperant, poterunt aliquando in futuris sæculis converti ad bonitatem, pro eo quod est in ipsis liberi facultas arbitrii (!)...

THIRD DIVISION.

ANTHROPOLOGY.

§ 53.

INTRODUCTION.

To bring man back to himself and to the knowledge of his own nature, was the essential object of Christianity, and the condition of its further progress.[1] Hence the first office of Christian anthropology must be to determine, not what man is in his natural life in relation to the rest of the visible creation, but what he is as a spiritual and moral being in relation to God and divine things. But since the higher and spiritual nature of man is intimately connected with the organism of both body and soul, a system of *theological* anthropology could be constructed only on the basis of physical and psychical anthropology, which, in the first instance, belongs to natural science and philosophy, rather than to theology. The history of doctrines, therefore, must also consider the opinions held as to man in his natural relations.[2]

[1] Comp. Clem. Pæd. iii. i. p. 250: Ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, πάντων μεγίστων μαθημάτων τὸ γνῶναι αὐτόν· ἑαυτὸν γάρ τις ἐὰν γνῷη, θεὸν εἴσεται.

[2] At first sight it might appear indifferent, so far as theology is concerned, whether man consists of two or three parts; and yet these distinctions are intimately connected with the theological definitions of liberty, immortality, etc. This is the case also with the doctrine of preëxistence, in opposition to traducianism and creatianism, in relation to original sin, etc. Thus it can be explained why *Tatian*, on religious grounds, opposes the common definition, according to which man is a ζῶον λογικόν, Contra Græcos, c. 15: Ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, οὐχ ὥσπερ κορακόφωνοι δογματίζουσιν, ζῶον λογικὸν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν· δειχθήσεται γὰρ κατ' αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἄλογα νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικά. Μόνος δὲ ἄνθρωπος εἰκὼν καὶ ὁμοίωσις τοῦ θεοῦ, λέγω δὲ ἄνθρώπον οὐχὶ τὸν ὅμοια τοῖς ζώοις πράττοντα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πόῤῥω μὲν ἀνθρωπότητος, πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν θεὸν κεχωρηκότα.

§ 54.

DIVISION OF HUMAN NATURE AND PRACTICAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Keil, Opusc. Academ. p. 618–647. *Duncker*, Apologetarum secundi Sæculi de Essentialibus Naturæ humanæ Partibus Placita. P. I. 11, Gött. 1844–50, 4to. [*Franz Delitzsch*, System der biblischen Psychologie, Leipz. 1855. *J. T. Beck*, Umriss d. biblischen Seelenlehre, Stuttg. 1843.]

That man is made up of body and soul, is a fact which we know by experience previous to all speculation, and before we express it in precise scientific terms. But it is more difficult to define the relation between body and soul, and to assign to each its boundaries. Some regarded the *ψυχή* as the medium by which the purely spiritual in man, the higher and ideal life of reason, is connected with the purely animal, the grosser and sensuous principle of the natural life. They also supposed that this human triad was supported by the language of Scripture.[1] Some of the earlier fathers,[2] those of the Alexandrian school in particular,[3] adopted this trichotomistic division, while others, like *Tertullian*, adhered to the opinion, that man consists only of body and soul.[4] Some Gnostic sects, *e. g.*, the Valentinians, so perverted the trichotomistic division, as to divide men themselves into three classes, the *χοϊκοί*, *ψυχικοί*, and *πνευματικοί*, according as one or the other of the three constituents preponderated, to the apparent exclusion of the others. Thus they again sundered the bond of union with which Christ had encircled men as brethren.[5]

[1] בָּשָׂר, נֶפֶשׁ, רוּחַ; *σάρξ*, *ψυχή*, *πνεῦμα*. Comp. the works on Bibl. Theol., and the commentaries on 1 Thess. v. 23; Heb. iv. 12, etc., also *Ackermann*, Studien und Kritiken, 1839, part 4. [*Beck* and Delitzsch, u. s.]

[2] *Justin M.* fragm. de Resurr. § 10: Οἶκος τὸ σῶμα ψυχῆς, πνεύματος δὲ ψυχὴ οἶκος. Τὰ τρία ταῦτα τοῖς ἐλπίδα εἰλικρινῆ καὶ πίστιν ἀδιάκριτον ἐν τῷ θεῷ ἔχουσι σωθήσεται. Comp. Dial. cum Tryph. § 4. *Tatian*, contra Græc. Or. c. 7, 12, 15, *Irenæus*, v. 9, 1: Tria sunt, ex quibus perfectus homo constat, carne, anima et spiritu, et altero quidem salvante et figurante, qui est spiritus, altero, quod unitur et formatur, quod est caro; id vero quod inter hæc est duo, quod est anima, quæ aliquando quidem subsequens spiritum elevatur ab eo, aliquando autem consentiens carni decidit in terrenas concupiscentias. Comp. v. 6, 1, 299: Anima autem et spiritus pars hominum esse possunt, homo autem nequaquam: perfectus autem homo commixtio et adunitio est animæ assumentis spiritum Patris et admixta ei carni, quæ est plasmata secundum imaginem Dei. Accordingly, not every man is by nature made up of three parts, but he only who has received the gift of the Holy Spirit, as the third. Concerning the distinction between Pnoë and Pnuema, comp. § 44, and *Duncker*, p. 97, 98.

[3] *Clement* (Strom. vii. 12, p. 880) makes a distinction between the *ψυχὴ λογικη* and the *ψυχὴ σωματική*; he also mentions a *tenfold* division of man (analogous to the decalogue), ibid. vi. 16, p. 808: *Ἔστι δὲ καὶ δεκάς τις περὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐτὸν· τά τε αἰσθητήρια πέντε καὶ τὸ φωνητικὸν καὶ τὸ σπερματικόν, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ὄγδοον τὸ κατὰ τὴν πλάσιν πνευματικόν, ἔννατον δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ δέκατον τὸ διὰ τῆς πίστεως προσγινόμενον ἁγίου πνεύματος χαρακτηριστικὸν ἰδίωμα κ. τ. λ.*; the more general division into body, soul, and spirit, forms, however, the basis of this. Clement, after the example of Plato (comp. Justin M. Coh. ad Gr. 6), divides the soul itself into these three faculties: *τὸ λογιστικόν (νοερόν), τὸ θυμικόν, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*, Pæd. iii. 1, ab init. p. 250. The knowing faculty he subdivides into four functions: *αἴσθησις, νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, ὑπόληψις*, Strom. ii. 4, p. 435. Clement regards body and soul as *διάφορα*, but not as *ἐναντία*, so that neither is the soul as such good, nor is the body as such evil. Comp. Strom. iv. 26, p. 639. For the psychology of *Origen*, see De Princ. iii. 3 (Opp. i. 145; *Redepenn.* p. 296–306). On the question whether Origen believed in the existence of two souls in man, see *Schnitzer*, p. 219, ss.; *Thomasius*, p. 190, 193–195; Redepenning, ii. p. 369, note 3. In the view of Origen the *ψυχή* as such, which he derives from *ψύχεσθαι*, is intermediate between body and spirit; "*a defective, not fully developed power*" (*Redepen.* ii. 368). He affirms that he has found no passage in the Sacred Scriptures in which the soul, as such, is spoken of with honor; while, on the contrary, it is frequently blamed, De Princ. ii. 8, 3–5 (Opp. i. p. 95, ss. *Redep.* p. 211, ss.). But this does not prevent him from comparing the soul to the Son, when he draws a comparison between the human and the divine triad, ibid. § 5. For the trichotomistic division, comp. also Comment. in Matth. T. xiii. 2 (Opp. iii. p. 570), and other passages in *Münscher* ed. by Von Cölln, i. p. 319, 320. Origen sometimes employs the simple term "man" to designate man's higher spiritual nature, so that man appears not so much to consist of body and soul, as to be the soul itself, which governs the body as a mere instrument; Contra Cels. vii. 38: *Ἄνθρωπος, τουτέστι ψυχὴ χρωμένη σώματι* (comp. Photius Cod. 234, Epiph. Hær. 64, 17). Consequently he calls the soul homo, homo = homo interior, in Num. xxiv.; comp. *Thomasius* and *Redepenning*.

[4] De Anima c. 10, 11, 20, 21, 22: Anima *dei flatu* nata, immortalis, *corporalis*, effigiata, *substantia simplex*, de suo patiens varie precedens, libera arbitrii, accidentiis obnoxia, per ingenia mutabilis, rationalis, dominatrix, divinatrix, ea una redundans; Adv. Hermog. c. 11, and *Neander*, Antignosticus, p. 457. Concerning the value which, from his strong realistic position, he attached to the senses (the key to his theological opinions) comp. ibid. p. 452, ss

[5] Ireu. i. 5, 5 (*Münscher*, edit. by Von Cölln, i. p. 316, 317); comp. also *Neander's* Gnostiche Systeme, p. 127, ss. *Baur*, Gnosis, 158, ss., 168, ss., 489, ss., 679, ss.

§ 55.

ORIGIN OF THE SOUL.

[*Julius Müller*, Lehre von der Sünde, 3te Ausg. ii. 495, sq. *J. Frohschammer*, Ueber den Ursprung d. menschlichen Seelen, München, 1854. *Joh. Marcus*, Lehrmeinungen über d. Ursprung d. menschl. Seelen in d. ersten Jahrh. d. Kirche. 1854. *J. F. Bruch*, Lehre der Präexistenz, Strasb. 1859. *Edward Beecher*, Conflict of Ages, Bost. 1853. Preëxistence of the Soul, from Keil's Opuscula Acad. in Biblioth. Sacra, xii. 1855.]

The inquiry into the origin of the human soul, and the mode of its union with the body, seems to be purely metaphysical, and to have no bearing upon religion.[1] But, in a religious point of view, it is always of importance that the soul should be considered *as a creature of God*. This doctrine was maintained by the Catholic church in opposition to the Gnostic and heretical theory of emanations.[2] *Origen's* hypothesis of the *pre-existence of the soul* is allied with Platonic views.[3] On the other hand, *Tertullian* maintained the propagation of the soul *per traducem* in connection with his realistic and materializing conceptions of its corporeity (*Traducianism*).[4]

[1] Thus, *Origen* says, De Princ. proœm. 5, Opp. i. p. 48: De anima vero utrum ex seminis traduce ducatur, ita ut ratio ipsius vel substantia inserta ipsis seminibus corporalibus habeatur, an vero aliud habeat initium, et hoc ipsum initium si genitum est aut non genitum, vel certe si extrinsecus corpori inditur, necne: non satis manifesta prædicatione distinguitur.

[2] Traces of the theory of emanation are found in the writings of some of the earlier Fathers. *Justin M.*, fragm. de Resurr. 11: Ἡ μὲν ψυχή ἐστιν ἄφθαρτος, μέρος οὖσα τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἐμφύσημα. (Whether this is Justin's own opinion, or a thesis of the Gnostics, which he combats?—See *Semisch*, Just. Mart. p. 364.) Comp. the Clementine Homilies, Hom. xvi. 12. On the other hand, *Clement of Alex.* adheres to the idea of *creation*, in Coh. p. 78: Μόνος ὁ τῶν ὅλων δημιουργὸς ὁ ἀριστοτέχνας πατὴρ τοιοῦτον ἄγαλμα ἔμψυχον ἡμᾶς, τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔπλασεν; and Strom. ii. 16, p. 467, 468, where he rejects the phrase μέρος Θεοῦ, which some employed, in accordance with the principle: Θεὸς οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς ἡμᾶς φυσικὴν σχέσιν. Comp. *Orig.* in Joh. T. xiii. 25 (Opp. T. iv. p. 235): Σφόδρα ἐστὶν ἀσεβὲς ὁμοούσιον τῇ ἀγεννήτῳ φύσει καὶ παμμακαρίᾳ εἶναι λέγειν τοὺς προσκυνοῦντας ἐν πνεύματι τῷ Θεῷ. Comp. De Princ. i. 7, 1.

[3] *Clement*, Coh. p. 6: Πρὸ δὲ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου καταβολῆς ἡμεῖς οἱ τῷ δεῖν ἔσεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ πρότερον γεγεννημένοι τῷ Θεῷ· τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου τὰ λογικὰ πλάσματα ἡμεῖς· δι' ὃν ἀρχαΐζομεν, ὅτι ἐν ἀρχῇ ὁ λόγος ἦν; this perhaps should rather be understood in an ideal sense. [Clement rejects the view that the soul is generated, in Strom. lib. vi., c. 16: .... οὐ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σπέρματος καταβολὴν γενώμενον, ὡς συνάγεσθαι καὶ ἄνευ τούτου τὸν δεκατὸν ἀριθμὸν,

δι' ὧν ἡ πᾶσα ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπιτελεῖται. So, too, Athenagoras, De mort. Resur. c. 17. Comp. Marcus l. c.] But *Origen*, following the Pythagorean and Platonic schools, as well as the later Jewish theology, first spoke of the preëxistence of the soul as something real: (Comp. Epiph Hær. 64, 4: Τὴν ψυχὴν γὰρ τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν λέγει προϋπάρχειν.) He brought his doctrine into connection with that of human liberty and of divine justice, by maintaining that the soul comes into the body as a punishment for former sins: comp. De Princ. i. 7, 4 (Opp. i. p. 72, *Redep.* p. 151, *Schnitzer*, p. 72). —"If the soul of man is formed only with the body, how could Jacob supplant his brother in the womb, and John leap in the womb at the salutation of Mary?" Comp. also T. xv. on Matth. c. 34, 35, in Matth. xx. 6, 7 (Opp. T. iii. p. 703), and Comment. in Joh. T. ii. 25 (Opp. iv. p. 85. *Redep.* ii., 20 sq. [*Origen* says his view is not directly contained in Scripture: De Princ. i. c. 7: Nam per conjecturam facilis assertio esse videbitur; scripturarum autem testimoniis utique difficilius affirmatur. Nam per conjecturas ita possibile est ostendi. He also speaks in some passages as if his opinion was undecided: lib. ii. in Cant. Conticor: Et si ita sit, utrum nuper creata veniat, et tunc primum facta, cum corpus videtur esse formatum, sed causa facturæ ejus animandi corporis necessitas extitisse credatur; an prius et olim facta, ob aliquam causam ad corpus sumendum venire existimetur: et si ex causa aliqua in hoc deduci creditur, quæ illa sit causa ut agnosci possit, scientiæ opus est.]

[4] De Anima, c. 19: Et si ad arbores provocamur, amplectemur exemplum. Si quidem et illis, necdum arbusculis, sed stipitibus adhuc et surculis etiam nunc, simul de scrobibus oriuntur, inest propria vis animæ . . . quo magis hominis? cujus anima, velut surculus quidam ex matrice Adam in propaginem deducta et genitalibus feminæ foveis commendata cum omni sua paratura, pullulabit tam intellectu quam sensu? Mantior, si non statim infans ut vitam vagitu salutavit, hoc ipsum se testatur sensisse atque intellexisse, quod natus est, omnes simul ibidem dedicans sensus, et luce vieum et sono auditum et humore gustum et aëre odoratum et terra tactum. Ita prima illa vox de primis sensuum et de primis intellectuum pulsibus cogitur. . . . Et hic itaque concludimus, omnia naturalia animæ, ut substantiva ejus, ipsi inesse et cum ipsa procedere atque proficere, ex quo ipsa censetur, sicut et Seneca sæpe noster (De Benef. iv. 6): Insita sunt nobis omnium artium et ætatum semina, etc. Comp. c. 27. *Neander*, Antignost. p. 455, and the whole section. [*Tertullian*, De Anima, c. 36: Anima in utero seminata pariter cum carne, pariter cum ipsa sortitur et sexum, ita pariter ut in causa sexus neutra substantia tenetur. Si enim in seminibus utriusque substantiæ, aliquam intercapedinem eorum conceptus admitteret, ut aut caro, aut anima prior seminaretur, esset etiam sexus proprietatum alteri substantiæ adscribere per temporalem intercapedinem seminum; ut aut caro animæ, aut anima carni insculperet sexum.]

§ 56.

THE IMAGE OF GOD.

[*Thomasius*, Christi Person und Work, i., 185 sq. Bp. *Bull*, Treatise on the State of Man before the Fall.]

Man's bodily preëminence, as well as his higher moral and religious nature, frequently referred to by the fathers in a variety of forms,[1] is appropriately described in the simple words of Scripture (Gen. i. 27): "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him." This form of expression has been always employed by the church.[2] But it was a point of no little difficulty to determine precisely in what this image of God consists. As body and soul could not be absolutely separated, it was represented by some, that even the body of man is created after the image of God,[3] now in a more gross, and again in a more refined figurative sense; while others rejected this view altogether. All, however, admitted, as a matter of course, that the image of God has a special reference to the spiritual endowments of man. But, inasmuch as there is a great chasm between the mere natural properties, and their development by the free use of the powers which have been granted to man, *Irenæus*, and especially *Clement* and *Origen*, still more clearly distinguished between the image of God and likeness to God. The latter can only be obtained by a moral conflict (under the ethical point of view), or is bestowed upon man as a gift of grace, through union with Christ (in the religious aspect).[4]

[1] *Iren.* iv. 29, p. 285: Ἔδει δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον πρῶτον γενέσθαι, καὶ γενόμενον αὐξῆσαι, καὶ αὐξήσαντα ἀνδρωθῆναι, καὶ ἀνδρωθέντα πληθυνθῆναι, καὶ πληθυνθέντα ἐνισχῦσαι, καὶ ἐνισχύσαντα δοξασθῆναι, καὶ δοξασθέντα ἰδεῖν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ δεσπότην. Yet in other places Irenæus distinguishes less exactly; see Duncker, u. s. 99, sq. *Min. Fel.* 17 and 18, ab init. *Tatian*, Or. contra Gr. c. 12 and 19. *Clem.* Coh. p. 78. According to the latter, man is the most beautiful hymn to the praise of the Deity, p. 78; a heavenly plant (φυτὸν οὐράνιον) p. 80, and, generally speaking, the principal object of the love of God, Pæd. i. 3, p. 102, comp. p. 158. Pæd. iii. 7, p. 276: Φύσει γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὑψηλόν ἐστι ζῶον καὶ γαῦρον καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ ζητητικόν; ib. iii. 8, p. 292. But all the good he possesses is not innate in such a way, but that it must be developed by instruction (μάθησις). Comp. Strom. i. 6, p. 336; iv. 23, p. 632; vi. 11, p. 788; vii. 4, p. 839, and the passages on human liberty, which will be found below.

[2] Some of the Alexandrian theologians, however, speaking more definitely, taught that man had been created, not so much after the image of *God* himself, as after the image of the *Logos*, an image after an image: Coh. p. 78:

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θεοῦ εἰκὼν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ, καὶ υἱὸς τοῦ νοῦ γνησιος ὁ θεῖος λόγος, φωτὸς ἀρχέτυπον φῶς· εἰκὼν δὲ τοῦ λόγου ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ἀλήθινὸς ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν διὰ τοῦτο γεγενῆσθαι λεγόμενος, τῇ κατὰ καρδίαν φρονήσει τῷ θείῳ παρεικαζόμενος λόγῳ, καὶ ταύτῃ λογικός (remark the play on the word λογικός). Comp. Strom. v. 14, p. 703, and Orig. Comment. in Joh. p. 941 (Opp. T. iv. p. 19, 51); in Luc. Hom. viii. (Opp. T. iii.).

[3] This notion was either connected with the fancy that God himself has a body (see above), or with the idea that the body of Christ was the image after which the body of man had been created. (The author of the Clementine Homilies also thought that *the body in particular* bore the image of God, comp. *Piper* on Melito, l. c. p. 74, 75). *Tert.* De Carne Christi, c. 6; Adv. Marc. v. 8; Adv. Prax. 12. *Neander*, Antign. p. 407, ss. [*Just. Mart.* makes the image to consist in the whole man, including the body. *Tertullian*, Adv. Marcion, lib. ii.: Homo est a Deo conditus, non imperiali verbo, ut cœtera animalia, sed familiari manu, etiam præmisso blandiente illo verbo: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram.] The more spiritual view was, that the life of the soul, partaking of the divine nature, shines through the physical organism, and is reflected especially in the countenance of man, in his looks, etc. *Tatian*, Or. c. 15 (*Worth*, c. 24): Ψυχὴ μὲν οὖν ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πολυμερής ἐστι καὶ οὐ μονομερής. Συνθετὴ (al. συνετὴ according to Fronto Ducæus, comp. *Daniel*, p. 202) γάρ ἐστιν ὡς εἶναι φανερὰν αὐτὴν διὰ σώματος, οὔτε γὰρ ἂν αὐτὴ φανείη ποτὲ χωρὶς σώματος οὔτε ἀνίσταται ἡ σὰρξ χωρὶς ψυχῆς. *Clem.* Coh. p. 52, Strom. v. 14, p. 703: Ψυχὴν δὲ τὴν λογικὴν ἄνωθεν ἐμπνευσθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰς πρόσωπον. On this account the fathers of the Alexandrian school very decidedly oppose the more material conception of a bodily copy of the divine image. Clem. Strom. ii. 19, p. 483: Τὸ γὰρ κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν, ὡς καὶ πρόσθεν εἰρήκαμεν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ σῶμα μηνύεται· οὐ γὰρ θέμις θνητὸν ἀθανάτῳ ἐξομοιοῦσθαι· ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ νοῦν καὶ λογισμόν. On the other hand, it is surprising that the same Clement, Pæd. ii. 10, p. 220, should recognize the image of God in the procreative power of man, which others connected with demoniacal agency (§ 51): Εἰκὼν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ θεοῦ γίνεται, καθὸ εἰς γένεσιν ἀνθρώπου ἄνθρωπος συνεργεῖ. *Origen* refers the divine image exclusively to the spirit of man; Con. Cels. vi. (Opp. i. p. 680), and Hom. i. in Genes. (Opp. T. ii. p. 57).

[4] The tautological phrase, Gen. i. 26: בְּצַלְמֵנוּ כִּדְמוּתֵנוּ, induced the fathers in their acumen to make an arbitrary distinction between צֶלֶם (εἰκών) and דְּמוּת (ὁμοίωσις; comp. *Schott*, Opuscul. T. ii. p. 66, ss. *Neander* sees in this (Hist. Dog. p. 190): "*the first germ of the distinction, afterward so important, between the dona naturalia and supernaturalia.*" *Irenæus*, Adv. Hær. v. 6, p. 299, v. 16, p. 313: Ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν χρόνοις ἐλέγετο μὲν κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ γεγονέναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐκ ἐδείκνυτο δέ· ἔτι γὰρ ἀόρατος ἦν ὁ λόγος, οὗ κατ' εἰκόνα ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐγεγόνει. Διὰ τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν ῥᾳδίως ἀπέβαλεν. Ὁπότε δὲ σὰρξ ἐγένετο ὁ λόγος, τοῦ Θεοῦ τὰ ἀμφότερα ἐπεκύρωσε· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα ἔδειξεν ἀγηθῶς, αὐτὸς τοῦτο γενόμενος, ὅπερ ἦν ἡ εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ· καὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν βεβαίως κατέστησε συνεξομοιώσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῷ ἀοράτῳ πατρί. According to some, the language of *Clem.* Strom. ii. p. 499 (418, Sylb.) implies that the image of God is communicated

to man εὐθέως κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν, and that he obtains the likeness ὕστερον κατὰ τὴν τελείωσιν. According to *Tert.* De Bapt. c. 5, man attains unto likeness to God by *baptism*. According to *Origen*, who everywhere insists upon the self-determination of man, the likeness to God which is to be obtained, consists in this, ut (homo) ipse sibi eam sibi eam propriæ industriæ studiis ex Dei imitatione conscisceret, cum possibilitate sibi perfectionis in initiis data per imaginis dignitatem in fine demum per operum expletionem perfectam sibi ipse similitudinem consummaret; De Princ. iii. 6 1 (Opp. T. 1, p. 152; *Red.* p. 317; *Schnitzer*, p. 236). Comp. Contra Cels. iv. 20, p. 522, 23. But Origen again uses both terms indifferently, Hom. ii. in Jer. (Opp. T. iii. p. 137).

§ 57.

FREEDOM AND IMMORTALITY.

a. Liberty

Wörter, die christl. Lehre über d. Verhältniss von Gnade und Freiheit von den apostolischen Zeiten bis auf Augustinus. 1. Hälfte, Freiburg im Breisg. 1856. [*Landerer*, Verhältniss von Gnade und Freiheit (dogmatico-historical), in the Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie, 1857, p. 500–603. *Kuhn*, Der vorgebliche Pelagianismus der vorangustinischen Kirchenväter, in the (Tübingen) Theol. Quartalschrift, 1853. *J. B. Mozley*, Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination, Lond. 1855, pp. 398 sq. *Neander*, Hist. Dog. (Ryland) p. 182 sq.]

Freedom and immortality are those prerogatives of the human mind in which the image of God manifests itself; such was the doctrine of the primitive church, confirmed by the general Christian consciousness. All the Greek fathers, as well as the apologists *Justin*,[1] *Tatian*,[2] *Athenagoras*,[3] *Theophilus*,[4] and the Latin author *Minucius Felix*,[5] also the theologians of the Alexandrian school, *Clement*[6] and *Origen*,[7] exalt the αὐτεξούσιον (the autonomy, self-determination) of the human soul with the freshness of youth and a tincture of hellenistic idealism, but also influenced by a practical Christian interest. They know nothing of any imputation of sin, except as a voluntary and moral self-determination is presupposed. Even *Irenæus*,[8] although opposed to speculation, and the more austere *Tertullian*,[9] strongly insist upon this self-determination in the use of the freedom of the will, from the practical and moral point of view. None but heretics ventured to maintain that man is subject to the influence of a foreign power (the stars, or the εἱμαρμένη);[10] and on this very account they met with the most decided opposition on the part of the whole church.

[1] *Justin M.*, Apol. i. c. 43: Εἱμαρμένην φαμὲν ἀπαράβατον ταύτην εἶναι, τοῖς τὰ καλὰ ἐκλεγομένοις τὰ ἄξια ἐπιτίμια, καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίως τὰ

ἐναντία, τὰ ἄξια ἐπίχειρα. Οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα, οἷον δένδρα καὶ τετράποδα, ἁπλῶς φυόμενα προαιρέσει πράττειν, ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν ἄξιος ἀμοιβῆς ἢ ἐπαίνου, οὐκ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἑλόμενος τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο γενόμενος, οὐδ' εἰ κακὸς ὑπῆρχε, δικαίως κολάσεως ἐτύγχανεν, οὐκ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τοιοῦτος ὤν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν δυνάμενος εἶναι ἕτερον παρ' ὃ ἐγεγόνει. This is most decided against all necessarianism.

[3] *Tatian*, Or. c. 7: Τὸ δὲ ἑκάτερον τῆς ποιήσεως εἶδος αὐτεξούσιον γέγονε, τἀγαθοῦ φύσιν μὴ ἔχον, ὃ πλὴν [πάλιν] μόνον παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ, τῇ δὲ ἐλευθερίᾳ τῆς προαιρέσεως ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκτελειούμενον· ὅπως ὁ μὲν φαῦλος δικαίως κολάζηται, δι' αὑτὸν γεγονὼς μοχθηρός· ὁ δὲ δίκαιος χάριν τῶν ἀνδραγαθημάτων ἀξίως ἐπαινῆται κατὰ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τοῦ Θεοῦ μὴ παραβὰς τὸ βούλημα. Concerning the critical and exegetical difficulties connected with this passage, see *Daniel*, Tatian der Apologet. p. 207.

[3] Athen. Leg. 31; comp. De Resurr. 12, 13, 15, 18, ss.

[4] Ad Autol. ii. 27: Ἐλεύθερον γὰρ καὶ αὐτεξούσιον ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ἄνθρωπον, in connection with the doctrine of immortality, of which in the next §.

[5] Octav. c. 36, 37. Nec de fato quisquam aut solatium captet aut excuset eventum. Sit sortis fortuna, mens tamen libera est, et ideo actus hominis, non dignitas judicatur.....Ita in nobis non genitura plectitur, sed ingenii natura punitur. The liberty of man gets the victory in the contest with all the adversities of destiny: Vires denique et mentis et corporis sine laboris exercitatione torpescunt; omnes adeo vestri viri fortes, quos in exemplum prædicatis, ærumnis suis inclyti floruerunt. Itaque et nobis Deus nec non potest subvenire, nec despicit, quum sit et omnium rector et amator suorum; sed in adversis unumquemque explorat et examinat; ingenium singulorum periculis pensitat, usque ad extremam mortem voluntatem hominis sciscitatur, nihil sibi posse perire securus. Itaque ut aurum ignibus, sic nos discriminibus arguimur. Quam pulcrum spectaculum Deo, quum Christianus cum dolore congreditur, quum adversum minas et supplicia et tormenta componitur! quum strepitum mortis et horrorem carnificis irridens insultat! quum libertatem suam adversus reges et principes erigit, soli Deo, cujus est, cedit, etc.! Moreover, in Minucius xi. 6, it is intimated (though the opinion is put in the mouth of his opponent), that the Christians believed, that God judges man not so much according to his conduct, as according to predestination; but he refutes this, as a false accusation.

[6] *Clem.* Coh. p. 79: Ὑμῶν ἐστιν (ἡ βας. τῶν οὐρανῶν) ἐὰν θελήσητε, τῶν πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐσχηκότων. He then shows (p. 80) how man himself, in accordance with his own nature, ought to cultivate the talents which God has given him. As the horse is not for the plow (after the custom of the ancients), nor the ox for riding, as none is required to do more than his nature will allow, so man alone can be expected to strive after the divine, because he has received the power of doing it. According to Clement, too, man is accountable for *that sin* alone, which proceeds from free choice, Strom. ii. p. 461; it is also frequently in our power to acquire both discernment and strength, ibid. 462. Clement knows nothing of a gratia irresistibilis, Strom. viii. p. 855: Οὔτε μὴν ἄκων σωθήσεται ὁ σωζόμενος

οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄψυχος· ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἑκουσίως καὶ προαιρετικῶς σπεύσει πρὸς σωτηρίαν· διὸ καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς ἔλαβεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὡς ἂν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὁρμητικὸς πρὸς ὁπότερον ἂν καὶ βούλοιτο τῶν τε αἱρετῶν καὶ τῶν φευκτῶν κ. τ. λ.

[1] Comp. the whole of the third book of the work De Princip. According to *Origen*, there is no accountability without liberty, De Princ. ii. 5, Red. p. 188: "If men were corrupt *by nature*, and could not possibly do good, God would appear as the judge not of *actions*, but of *natural capacities*" (comp. what Minucius says on this point). Comp. De Princ. i. 5, 3, and Contra Cels. iv. 3 (Opp. i. p. 504): Ἀρετῆς μὲν ἐὰν ἀνέλῃς τὸ ἑκούσιον, ἀνεῖλες αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν. Nevertheless, this liberty is only relative; every moral action is a mixture of free choice and divine aid. Comp. § 70, and the passages quoted by *Redepenning*, Orig. ii. p. 318.

[2] Iren. iv. 4, p. 231, 232 (Gr. 281): Sed frumentum quidem et palea, inanimalia et irrationabilia existentia, naturaliter talia facta sunt: homo vero, rationabilis et secundum hoc similis Deo, liber in arbitrio factus et suæ potestatis ipse sibi causa est, ut aliquando quidem frumentum, aliquando autem palea fiat; Irenæus then founds the accountability of man upon this argument. Comp. iv. 15, p. 245 (Gr. 318); iv. 37, p. 281, '82 (Gr. 374, '75): Εἰ φύσει οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν, οὔθ' οὗτοι ἐπαινετοὶ, ὄντες ἀγαθοὶ, τοιοῦτοι γὰρ κατεσκευάσθησαν· οὔτ' ἐκεῖνοι μεμπτοὶ, οὕτως γεγονότες. Ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οἱ πάντες τῆς αὐτῆς εἰσι φύσεως, δυνάμενοί τε κατασχεῖν καὶ πρᾶξαι τὸ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ δυνάμενοι πάλιν ἀποβάλεῖν αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ποιῆσαι· δικαίως καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς εὐνομουμένοις, καὶ πολὺ πρότερον παρὰ Θεῷ οἱ μὲν ἐπαινοῦνται, καὶ ἀξίας τυγχάνουσι μαρτυρίας τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ καθόλου ἐκλογῆς καὶ ἐπιμονῆς· οἱ δὲ καταιτιῶνται καὶ ἀξίας τυγχάνουσι ζημίας τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἀποβολῆς. Comp. also iv. 39, p. 285 (Gr. 380); v. 27, p. 325 (Gr. 442). But, according to Irenæus, the freedom of man is not only seen in his works, but also in his faith, iv. 37, p. 282 (Gr. 376); comp. also the fragment of the sermon De Fide, p. 342 (Gr. 467). On *Hippolytus* and his view of freedom, see *Neander*, Hist. Dog. p. 188.

[3] Tertullian defended the idea of liberty especially in opposition to Marcion: "How could man, who was destined to rule over the whole creation, be a slave in respect to himself, and not have the faculty of reigning over himself?" Advers. Marcion, ii. 8, 6, 9; comp. *Neander*, Antignost. p. 372–378.*

[4] "*According to the Gnostics, there is a fate which stands in intimate connection with the stars, and is brought about by their instrumentality*," etc. *Baur*, Gnosis, p. 232. But the doctrine of human freedom is of importance in the opinion of the author of the Clementine Homilies, *e. g.*, Hom. xv. 7: Ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐλεύθερον ἐποίησεν ἔχειν τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἑαυτὸν ἀπονέμειν ᾧ βούλεται, ἢ τῷ παρόντι κακῷ, ἢ τῷ μέλλοντι ἀγαθῷ, comp. also c. 8. Hom. ii. 15; iii. 69; viii. 16; xi. 8. *Credner*, l. c. iii. p. 289, 290, 294. *Schliemann*, p. 182, ss., 235, ss., 241.

* Even the opponents of the doctrine of human liberty, as Calvin, are compelled to acknowledge this remarkable consensus Patrum of the first period, and in order to account for it, they are obliged to suppose a general illusion about this doctrine! "*It is at any rate a remarkable phenomenon, that the very doctrines which afterward caused disruptions in the Christian church, are scarcely ever mentioned in the primitive church.*" *Daniel*, Tatian, p. 209.

§ 58.

b. IMMORTALITY.

* *Olshausen*, antiquissimorum ecclesiæ græcæ patrum de immortalitate sententiæ recensentur, Osterprogramm, 1827, reviewed by *Ullmann* in Studien und Kritiken, i. 2, p. 425.

The theologians of the primitive age did not so completely agree concerning the immortality of the soul. They were far from denying the doctrine itself, or doubting its possibility. But some of them, *e. g.*, *Justin*, *Tatian*, and *Theophilus*,[1] on various grounds supposed that the soul, though mortal in itself, or at least indifferent in relation to mortality or immortality, either acquires immortality as a promised reward, by its union with the spirit and the right use of its liberty, or, in the opposite case, perishes with the body. They were led to this view, partly because they laid so much stress on freedom, and because they thought that likeness to God was to be obtained only by this freedom; and partly, too, because they supposed (according to the trichotomistic division of human nature) that the soul receives the seeds of immortal life only by union with the spirit, as the higher and free life of reason. And, lastly, other philosophical hypotheses concerning the nature of the soul doubtless had an influence. On the contrary, *Tertullian* and *Origen*, whose views differed on other subjects, agreed in this one point, that they, in accordance with their peculiar notions concerning the nature of the soul, looked upon its immortality as essential to it.[2]

[1] On the question whether the view advocated by the aged man in *Justin*, Dial. c. Tryph. § 4, is the opinion of the author himself or not?—as well as on the meaning of the passage: Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀποθνήσκειν φημὶ πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς ἐγώ, comp. his commentators, *Olshausen*, l. c. *Rössler*, Bibl. i. p. 141; *Möhler*, Patrologie, i. p. 242; *Daniel*, Tatian, p. 224; *Semisch*, ii. 368. *Tatian* speaks more distinctly, Contra Græc. c. 13: Οὔκ ἐστιν ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' ἑαυτήν*, θνητὴ δὲ. Ἀλλὰ δύναται ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ μὴ ἀποθνήσκειν. Θνήσκει μὲν γὰρ καὶ λύεται μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μὴ γινώσκουσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Ἀνίσταται δὲ εἰς ὕστερον ἐπὶ συντελείᾳ τοῦ κόσμου σὺν τῷ σώματι, θάνατον διὰ τιμωρίας ἐν ἀθανασίᾳ λαμβάνουσα. Πάλιν δὲ οὐ θνήσκει, κἂν πρὸς καιρὸν λυθῇ, τὴν ἐπίγνωσιν τοῦ θεοῦ πεποιημένη. Καθ' ἑαυτὴν γὰρ σκότος ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδὲν ἐν αὐτῇ φωτεινόν . . . . (Joh. i.) . . . . Ψυχὴ γὰρ οὐκ αὐτὴ τὸ πνεῦμα ἔσωσεν, ἐσώθη δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, κ. τ. λ. . . . . Συζυγίαν δὲ κεκτημένη τὴν τοῦ θείου πνεύματος, οὔκ ἐστιν ἀβοήθητος, ἀνέρχεται δὲ πρὸς ἅπερ αὐτὴν ὁδηγεῖ χωρὶς τὸ πνεῦμα. *Theophilus* (ad. Aut. ii. 27) starts the question: was Adam created with a mortal or immor-

* Καθ' ἑαυτὴν is wanting in the most recent manuscripts, vide *Daniel*, p. 228, on this passage.

tal nature? and replies: neither the one nor the other, but he was fitted for both (δεκτικὸν ἀμφοτέρων), in order that he might receive immortality as a reward, and become God (γένηται θεός), if he aspired after it by obeying the divine commandments; but that he might become the author of his own ruin, if he did the works of the devil, and disobeyed God.* *Irenæus* also speaks only of an immortality which is given to man, see Adv. Hær. ii. 64: Sine initio et sine fine, vere et semper idem et eodem modo se habens solus est Deus. . . . . Et de animalibus, de animabus et de spiritibus et omnino de omnibus his, quæ facta sunt, cogitans quis minime peccabit, quando omnia, quæ facta sunt, initium quidem facturæ suæ habeant, perseverant autem, *quoadusque ea Deus et esse et perseverare voluerit. Non enim ex nobis, neque ex nostra natura vita est, sed secundem gratiam Dei datur.* Sicut autem corpus animale ipsum quidem non est anima, participatur autem animam, quoadusque Deus vult, sic et anima ipsa quidem non est vita, participatur autem a Deo sibi præstitam vitam.

[1] The opposition which *Tertullian* raised to the above doctrine was connected with his twofold division of the soul, that of *Origen* with his views on preëxistence. (For the latter could easily dispose of the objection that the soul must have an end, because it has had a beginning.) Comp., however, Tert. De Anima, xi. xiv. xv. Among other things, Tertullian appeals to the fact that the soul continues active even in dreams. According to Orig. Exhort. ad Mart. 47 (Opp. i. p. 307), De Princ. ii. 11; 4, p. 105, and iii. 1, 13, p. 122, it is both the inherent principle of life in the soul, and its natural relation to God, which secures its immortality. To this is to be added his view about self-determination, and the retribution based thereon. Comp. *Thomasius*, p. 159; *Redepenning*, ii. 111.

The whole question, however, had more of a philosophical than Christian bearing; as the idea of immortality itself is abstract negative. On the other hand, the believer by faith lays hold of eternal life in Christ as something real. The Christian doctrine of immortality can not therefore be considered apart from the person, work, and kingdom of Christ, and rests upon Christian views and promises; see, below, in the Eschatology.

§ 59.

SIN, THE FALL, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

Walch, J. G. (*Th. Ch. Lilienthal*), De Pelagianismo ante Pelagium, Jen. 1738, 4. *Ejusdem*, Historia Doctrinæ de Peccato Originis; both in his Miscellanea Sacra, Amstel. 1744, 4. *Horn, J.*, Commentatio de sententiis eorum patrum, quorum auctoritas ante Augustinum plurimum valuit, de peccato originali, Gött. 1801, 4. † Wörter [*Landerer and Huber*], u. s. § 57.

However much the primitive church was inclined, as we have already seen, to look with a free and clear vision at the bright side of man (his ideal nature), yet it did not endeavor to conceal the dark side, by a false idealism. Though it can not be said, that the con-

* About the view of the Thnetopsychites (Arabici), compare below, on Eschatology, § 76, note 8.

sciousness of human depravity was the exclusive and fundamental principle upon which the entire theology of that time was founded, yet every Christian conscience was convinced of the opposition between the ideal and the real, and the effects of sin in destroying the harmony of life; and this, too, in proportion to the strictness of claims set up for human freedom.

Thus *Justin M.* complained of the universality of sin, Dial. c. Tryph. c. 95. The whole human race is under the curse; for cursed is every one who does not keep the law. The author of the Clementine Homilies also supposes that the propensity to sin is made stronger by its preponderance in human history, and calls men the slaves of sin (*δουλεύοντες ἐπιθυμίᾳ*); Hom. iv. 23, x. 4, *Schliemann*, p. 183.—*Clement* of Alexander directs our attention, in particular, to the internal conflict which sin has introduced into the nature of man; it does not form a part of our nature, nevertheless it is spread through the whole human race. We come to sin without ourselves knowing how; comp. Strom. ii. p. 487. *Origen* also conceives of sin as a universal corruption, since the world is apostate, Contra Cels. iii. 66, p. 491: *Σαφῶς γὰρ φαίνεται, ὅτι πάντες μὲν ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν πεφύκαμεν, ἔνιοι δὲ οὐ μόνον πεφύκασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰθισμένοι εἰσὶν ἁμαρτάνειν.* Comp. iii. 62, p. 488: *Ἀδύνατον γάρ φαμεν εἶναί ἄνθρωπον μετ' ἀρετῆς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἄνω βλέπειν· κακίαν γὰρ ὑφίστασθαι ἀναγκαῖον πρῶτον ἐν ἀνθρώποις.* Nevertheless the writers of the present period do not express as strong a sense of sin as those of the following. On the contrary, jubilant feelings preponderated in view of the finished work of the Saviour; counterbalanced by external contests and persecutions, rather than by internal penitential struggles. It is as one-sided to expect in the first centuries the experience of later times, as it is to misconceive the necessity of the later developments.

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Though sin was recognized as a fact, yet definitions of its precise nature were to a great extent indefinite and unsettled during this period.[1] The heretical sects of the Gnostics in general (and in this particular they were the forerunners of Manichæism), with their dualistic notions, either ascribed the origin of evil to the demiurge, or maintained that it was inherent in matter.[2] On the other hand, the Christian theologians, generally speaking, agreed in seeking the

source of sin in the human will, and clearing God from all responsibility.[2] Such a view easily led to the opinion of *Origen*, that moral evil is something negative.[4]

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§ 61.

INTERPRETATION OF THE NARRATIVE OF THE FALL.

The documents contained in the five books of Moses were to the early church the *historical* foundation, not only of the doctrine of the creation of the world and of man, but also of the doctrine of the origin of sin, which appears as a fact in the history of Adam. Some writers, however, rejected the literal interpretation of this narrative. Thus *Origen* (after the example of Philo)[1] regarded it as a type, historically clothed, of what takes place in free moral agents every where, and at all times.[2] It is difficult to ascertain how far *Irenæus* adhered to the letter of the narrative.[3] *Tertullian* unhesitatingly pronounced in favor of its strict historical interpretation.[4] Both the Gnostics and the author of the Clementine Homilies rejected this view on dogmatic grounds.[5]

[1] *Philo* sees in the narrative τρόποι τῆς ψυχῆς, vide *Dähne*, p. 341, and his essay in the Theologische Studien und Krit. 1833, 4th part.

[2] *Clement* considers the narrative of the fall partly as fact, and partly as allegory, Strom. v. 11, p. 689, 90. (Serpent = image of voluptuousness).* On the other hand, *Origen* regards it as purely allegorical, De Princ. iv. 16 (Opp. T. i. p. 174); Contra Cels. iv. 40, p. 534. Adam is called man, because: Ἐν τοῖς δοκοῦσι περὶ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ εἶναι φυσιολογεῖ Μωϋσῆς τὰ περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως..οὐχ οὕτως περὶ ἑνός τινος, ὡς περὶ ὅλου τοῦ γένους ταῦτα φάσκοντος τοῦ θείου λόγου. Concerning the further application of allegorical interpretation to the particulars of the narrative (the clothing our first parents in skins as a symbol of the clothing of the soul?), comp. Meth. in Phot. Bibl. cod. 234, and 293. On the other side, see Orig. Fragm. in Gen. T. ii. p. 29, where both the literal interpretation is excluded, and this allegorical exposition is called in question.

[3] According to the fragment of Anastasius Sinaïta in Massuet, p. 344, *Irenæus* must be understood as having explained the temptation by the serpent (in opposition to the Ophites), πνευματικῶς, not ἱστορικῶς, but it is not evident to what extent he did so. Besides, objections have been urged to the genuineness of this passage; see Duncker, p. 115, note. But Irenæus speaks elsewhere plainly enough of the fall of Adam as an historical fact, iii. 18 (Gr. 20), p. 211 (Gr. 248); iii. 21 (Gr. 31), p. 218 (Gr. 259), ss. Thus he labors to defend the threatening of God: "For in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die," from the chronological point of view, by taking the word "day" (as in the account of the creation) in the sense of "period," for "one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one

* That the serpent was the devil, or the devil was *in* the serpent (which is not expressly declared in Genesis), was generally assumed, in accordance with Wisdom, ii. 24, and Rev. xii. 9 (ὁ ὄφις ὁ ἀρχαῖος); probably also with reference to John, viii. 44.

day." Adam and Eve died during that period on the same day of the week on which they were created and disobeyed the command of God, viz., on a *Friday* within the first one thousand years; Adv. Hær. v. 23, 2. See *Duncker*, p. 129.

[4] *Tert.* Adv. Judæos, ii. p. 184; De Virg. vel. 11; Adv. Marc. ii. 2, ss., and other passages. He insists upon the literal interpretation of the particulars of the narrative, as they succeeded each other in order of time, in his De Resurr. Carn. 61: Adam ante nomina animalibus enunciavit quam de arbore decerpsit; ante etiam prophetavit quam voravit.

[5] On the Gnostic (Basilidian) doctrine of the fall (*σύγχυσις ἀρχική*) comp. Clem. Strom. ii. 20, p. 488. *Gieseler*, Studien und Kritiken, 1830, p. 396. *Baur*, p. 211. The author of the Clementine Homilies goes so far in idealizing Adam, as to convert the historical person into a purely mythical being (like the Adam-Cadmon of the Cabbalists), while he represents Eve as far inferior to him. Hence Adam could not sin, but sin makes its first appearance in *Cain*; vide *Credner*, ii. 258, iii. 284. *Baur*, Gnosis, p. 539. *Schliemann*, p. 177. On the other hand, the Gnostic Cainites rendered homage to Cain, as the representative of freedom from the thraldom of the demiurge; while the Gnostic Sethites considered Cain as the representative of the hylic, Abel as that of the psychical, and Seth as that of the pneumatic principle, the ideal of humanity. *Neander*, Church History (Torrey), i. 448.

§ 62.

STATE OF INNOCENCE AND FALL.

With all their differences of opinion about the original endowments of the first man,[1] and the nature of his sin,[2] all the catholic teachers agreed in this, that the temptation of the serpent was a real temptation to sin, and, accordingly, that the transgression of the command given by Jehovah was a *fall* from a state of innocence followed by disasters to the human race.[3] On the other hand, the Clementine Ebionites denied that Adam could have sinned;[4] and the Ophites thought that by this event (at least in one respect) man was elevated to his proper dignity,—a transition to freedom; inasmuch as the prohibition had proceeded from the jealousy of Jaldabaoth, but the act of disobedience had been brought about by the intervention of wisdom (Sophia), the symbol of which is the serpent.[5]

[1] These were especially exaggerated by the author of the Clementine Homilies (see the preceding §). Adam possessed prophetic gifts, Hom. iii. 21, viii. 10 (*Credner*, ii. p. 248, *Baur*, p. 363, *Schliemann*, p. 175, *Hilgenfeld*, p. 294), which, however, *Tertullian*, De Resurr. Carn. c. 61, also ascribed to him. The Ophites taught that Adam and Eve had light and luminous bodies, see *Baur*, p. 187. The theologians, previous to the time of Augustine, attached less weight to what was afterward called *justitia originalis*. According

to *Theophilus of Antioch* (ad Aut. ii. 24, 27), Adam was νήπιος, and had to be treated as a child; he was neither mortal nor immortal, but capable of either mortality or immortality. *Clement* of Alexandria maintains the same, Strom. vi. 12, p. 788: "They may learn from us (he says in opposition to the Gnostics), that Adam was created perfect, not in relation to his moral excellencies, but in respect to his *capacity* of receiving virtue; for there is certainly a difference between a capacity for virtue and the real possession of it. God will have us attain to bliss by our own exertions, hence it belongs to the nature of the soul to determine itself," etc. (in *Baur's* Gnosis, p. 493). He accordingly restricts the original endowments (Strom. iv. p. 632) to what is purely human, a basis for action; Οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν χαρακτηριζόντων τὴν ἀνθρώπου ἰδέαν τε καὶ μορφὴν ἐνεδέησεν αὐτῷ.

[3] *Justin M.* attributes the fall mainly to the cunning malignity of Satan; Dial. c. Tryph. c. 119, p. 205. A beast (θηρίον) seduced man. On his own part he added disobedience and credulity; comp. *Semisch*, p. 393–94. *Clement of Alexandria* conceives that it was sensuality which caused the fall of the first man; Coh. p. 86: Ὄφις ἀλληγορεῖται ἡδονὴ ἐπὶ γαστέρα ἕρπουσα, κακία γηίνη εἰς ὕλας τρεφομένη. (*Thiersch* conjectures the reading, τρεπομένη, in Rudelbach's Zeitschrift f. d. luth. Theol. 1841, p. 184.) Comp. Strom. iii. 17, p. 559 (470, Sylb.). Clement does not (like the Encratites whom he combats) blame the cohabitation of our first parents as in itself sinful, but he objects that it took place too soon; this is also implied in the passage Strom. ii. 19, p. 481: Τὰ μὲν αἰσχρὰ οὗτος προθύμως εἵλετο, ἐπόμενος τῇ γυναικί. Comp. § 61, 2.

[4] The notion that the tree itself was the cause of death (its fruit being venomous), is rejected by *Theophil.* ad Autol. ii. 25: Οὐ γὰρ, ὡς οἴονταί τινες, θάνατον εἶχε τὸ ξύλον ἀλλ' ἡ παρακοή.

[5] Comp. § 61, note 5. Adam could not sin, because the θεῖον πνεῦμα, or the σοφία itself, having been manifested in him, the latter must have sinned; but such an assertion would be impious; comp. *Schliemann*, u. s. Yet the Clementina seem to adopt the view, that the image of God was defaced in the descendants of the first human pair; comp. Hilgenfeld, p. 291.

[6] The Ophites are in confusion about their own doctrines; for now they render divine homage to the serpent, and again say that Eve was seduced by it. Epiph. Hær. 37, 6. *Baur*, p. 178, ss.

§ 63.

THE EFFECTS OF THE FALL.

Death was the punishment which Jehovah had threatened to inflict upon the transgressors of his law. Nevertheless the act of transgression was not immediately succeeded by death, but by a train of evils which come upon both the man and the woman, introductory to death, and testifying that man had become mortal. Accordingly, both death and physical evils were considered

as the effects of Adam's sin; thus, *e. g.* by *Irenæus* and others.[1] But opinions were not as yet fully developed concerning the moral depravity of each individual, and the sin of the race in general, considered as the effect of the first sin. They were so much disposed to look upon sin as the free act of man's will, that they could hardly conceive of it as simply a hereditary tendency, transmitted from one to another. The sin of every individual, as found in experience, had its type in the sin of Adam, and consequently appeared to be a repetition of the first sin rather than its necessary consequence.[2] In order to explain the mysterious power which drives man to evil, they had recourse to the influence of the demons, strong, but not absolutely compulsory, rather than to a total bondage of the will (as the result of original sin).[3] Nevertheless we meet in the writings of *Irenæus* with intimations of more profound views about the effects of the fall.[4] *Tertullian* and *Origen* aided more definitely the theory of original sin, though on different grounds. Origen thought that souls were stained with sin in a former state, and thus enter into the world in a sinful condition. To this idea he added another, allied to the notions of Gnostics and Manichees, viz., that there is a stain in physical generation itself.[5] According to Tertullian, the soul itself is propagated with all its defects, as matter is propagated. The phrase "vitium originis," first used by him, is in perfect accordance with this view.[6] But both were far from considering inherent depravity as constituting accountability, and still farther from believing in the entire absence of human liberty.[7]

[1] *Iren.* III. 23 (35 Gr.), p. 221 (263 Gr.): Condemnationem autem transgressionis accepit homo tædia et terrenum laborem et manducare panem in sudore vultus sui et converti in terram, ex qua assumtus est; similiter autem mulier tædia et labores et gemitus et tristitias partus et servitium, *i. e.* ut serviret viro suo: ut neque maledicti a Deo in totum perirent, neque sine increpatione perseverantes Deum contemnerent (comp. c. 37, p. 264, *Grabe*). Ibid. v. 15, p. 311 (423, *Grabe*)....propter inobedientiæ peccatum subsecuti sunt languores hominibus. V. 17, p. 313 (p. 426). V. 23, p. 320 (p. 435): Sed quoniam Deus verax est, mendax autem serpens, de effectu ostensum est morte subsecuta eos, qui manducaverant. Simul enim cum esca et mortem adsciverunt, quoniam inobedientes manducabant: inobedientia autem Dei mortem infert, et sqq. (Hence the devil is called a murderer from the beginning.) But Irenæus also sees a blessing in the penalty inflicted by God, iii. 20, 1: Magnanimus (*i. e.* μακρόθυμος) fuit Deus deficiente homine, eam quæ per verbum esset victoriam reddendam ei providens. He compares the fall of man to the fate of the prophet Jonas, who was swallowed by the whale in order to be saved. Thus man is swallowed by the great whale (the devil), that Christ may deliver him out of his jaws; comp. *Duncker*, p. 151 According to *Cyprian*, De Bono Patientiæ, p. 212, even

the higher physical strength of man (along with immortality) was lost by the fall; *Origen* also connected the existence of evil in the world with sin. Comp. above, § 48. By *death*, however, the Alexandrians do not mean physical death, which, on their postulates, they must regard as a blessing; but moral and spiritual death. Clement, Strom. iii. p. 540, and the passages from Origen in *Gieseler's* Dogmengesch., p. 182. [Comm. in Matth. P. xiii. § 7: in Joan xvii. § 37. On the Ep. to the Romans, lib. vi. § 6, Origen declares the death, effected by sin, to be the separation of the soul from God: Separatio animæ a Deo mors appellatur, quæ per peccatum venit.]

[2] Though *Justin M.* uses strong expressions in lamenting the universal corruption of mankind (Dial. c. Tryph. c. 95), yet original sin, and the imputation of Adam's guilt are conceptions foreign to him. At least man has still such right moral feelings, that he judges and blames the sin of others as his.—Dial. c. Tryph. c. 93: Τὰ γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ δι' ὅλου δίκαια καὶ πᾶσαν δικαιοσύνην παρέχει ἐν πάντι γένει ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἔστι πᾶν γένος γνωρίζον ὅτι μοιχεία κακόν, καὶ πορνεία, καὶ ἀνδροφονίο, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. Compare what follows, according to which only those filled with the evil spirit, or wholly corrupted by bad education (and hence not the posterity of Adam as such) have lost this feeling. Accordingly every man deserves death, because in his disobedience he *is like* the first man. Dial. c. Tr. c. 88: Ὁ (scil. γένος ἀνθρώπων) ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ ὑπὸ θάνατον καὶ πλάνην τῆν τοῦ ὄφεως ἐπεπτώκει, παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου αὐτῶν πονηρευσαμένου. C. 124: Οὗτοι (scil. ἄνθρωποι) ὁμοίως τῷ Ἀδὰμ καὶ τῇ Εὔᾳ ἐξομοιούμενοι θάνατον ἑαυτοῖς ἐργάζονται, κ. τ. λ. Compare *Semisch*, l. c. p. 397–399, who goes into the interpretation of these passages. See ibid. p. 401, in reference to the difficult passage, Dial. c. Tr. c. 100, in which many have found an argument for original sin: Παρθένος οὐσα Εὔα καὶ ἄφθορος τὸν λόγον τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄφεως συλλαβοῦσα, παρακοὴν καὶ θάνατον ἔτεκε; is τέκτειν here metaphorical? [On the difficult passage, Apol. i. cap. 61, see Rudelbach Zeitschrift f. luth. Theol. 1841, s. 171: especially *Landerer*, Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. 1857, s. 518 sq.; Just. M. on Erbsünde, Theol. Quartalschrift. 1859. The passage in the First Apology, chap. 61, reads: ἐπειδὴ τῇ πρώτῃ γένεσιν ἡμῶν ἀγνοοῦντες κατ' ἀνάγκην γεγεννήμεθα ἐξ ὑγρᾶς σπορᾶς κατὰ μίξιν τὴν τῶν γονέων πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐν ἔθεσι φαύλοις καὶ πονεραῖς ἀνατροφαῖς γεγόναμεν, ὅπως μὴ ἀνάγκης τέκνα μηδὲ ἀγνοίας μένωμεν ἀλλὰ προαιρέσεως καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἀφέσεώς τε ἁμαρτιῶν ὑπὲρ ὧν προημάρτομεν τύχωμεν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ἐπονομάζεται τῷ ἑλομένῳ ἀναγεννηθῆναι.....τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς.....θεοῦ ὄνομα. That Justin taught the necessity of internal grace, see Landerer, in the same essay, s. 522.] According to *Clement of Alexandria*, man now stands in the same relation to the tempter, in which Adam stood prior to the fall, Coh. p. 7: Εἰς γὰρ ὁ ἀπάτεων, ἄνωθεν μὲν τὴν Εὔαν, νῦν δὲ ἤδη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους εἰς θάνατον ὑποφέρων; comp. Pæd. i. 13, 158, 159. Clement indeed admits the universality of sin among men, Pæd. iii. 12, p. 307: Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξαμαρτάνειν πᾶσιν ἔμφυτον καὶ κοινόν; but the very circumstance that some appear to him by nature better than others (Strom. i. 6, p. 336), shows that he did not consider man as absolutely depraved, nor throw all into *one* mass of corruption. No one commits iniquity

for its own sake, Strom. i. 17, p. 368. But he rejects the idea of original sin, as already imputed to children, most strongly, in Strom. iii. 16, p. 356, '57: Αεγέτωσαν ἡμῖν· Ποῦ ἐπόρνευσεν τὸ γεννηθὲν παιδίον, ἢ πῶς ὑπὸ τὴν τοῦ 'Αδὰμ ὑποπέπτωκεν ἀρὰν τὸ μηδὲν ἐνεργῆσαν. He does not regard the passage, Ps. li. 5, as proof. (Comp. the above passages on liberty and sin in general).

[8] Athen. Leg. c. 25. Tatian, Contra Græc. c. 7, and the passages quoted § 58. Besides the influence of Satan, Justin M. also mentions bad education and evil examples, Apol. i. 61: Ἐν ἔθεσι φαύλοις καὶ πονηραῖς ἀνατροφαῖς γεγόναμεν.

[9] Irenæus Adv. Hær. iv. 41, '2, and other passages quoted by *Duncker*, p. 132, ss. According to Duncker, the doctrine of original sin and hereditary evil is so fully developed in the writings of Irenæus, "*that the characteristic features of the western type of doctrine may be distinctly recognised.*" Irenæus indeed asserts that man, freely yielding to the voice of the tempter, has become a child, disciple, and servant of the devil, etc. He also thinks that, in consequence of the sin of Adam, men are already in a state of guilt. On the question whether Irenæus understands by that death which we have inherited, merely physical death (V. 1, 3 and other passages), see *Duncker*, l. c. [The doctrine of Irenæus, in its approximation to Augustinianism is given in the following passages (*Landerer* in Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie, 1857, s. 528): Adv. Hær. V. 16, ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ 'Αδὰμ προσεκόψαμεν, μὴ ποιήσαντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐντολήν, ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ 'Αδὰμ ἀποκατηλλάγημεν ὑπήκοοι μέχρι θανάτου γενόμενοι. Οὔδε γὰρ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ἤμεν ὀφειλέται ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκείνῳ, οὗ καὶ τὴν ἐντολὴν παρέβημεν: so in iii. 18: Perdideramus in Adam—secundum imaginem et similitudinem Dei esse; and in III. 22: Quemadmodum illa (Eva) inobediens facta et sibi et universo generi humano causa est facta mortis: V. 19: et quemadmodum adstrictum est morti genus humanum per virginem, salvatur per virginem].

[10] On the one hand, *Origen*, by insisting upon the freedom of the human will, forms a strong contrast with Augustine; as he also maintains that concupiscence is not reckoned as sin, so long as it has not ripened into a purpose; guilt arises only when we yield to it, De Princ. iii. 2, 2 (Opp. T. i. p. 139, *Red.* p. 179), and iii. 4 (de Humanis Tentationibus). But, on the other, he formally adopts the idea of original sin, by asserting that the human soul does not come into the world in a state of innocence, because it has already sinned in a former state; De Princ. iii. 5 (Opp. T. i. p. 149, '50, *Red.* p. 309, ss.); comp. also Redep. ii. 322; concerning the generation of man see Hom. xv. in Matth. § 23 (Opp. iii. p. 685); Hom. viii. in Lev. (Opp. ii. p. 229, and xii. p. 251): Omnis qui ingreditur hunc mundum in quadam contaminatione effici dicitur (Job xiv. 4, 5).....Omnis ergo homo in patre ei in matre pollutus est, solus Jesus Dominus meus in hanc generationem mundus ingressus est, et in matre non est pollutus. Ingressus est enim corpus incontaminatum. And yet subsequent times, especially after Jerome, have seen in Origen the precursor of Pelagius. Jerome (Ep. ad Ctesiphont.) calls the opinion, that man can be without sin—Origenis ra musculus. Comp. in reply, *Wörter*, u. s. p. 201, [and *Landerer*, u. s.]

[t] *Tert.* De Anima, c. 40: Ita omnis anima eo usque in Adam censetur, donec in Christo recenseatur; tamdiu immunda, quamdiu recenseatur. Peccatrix autem, quia immunda, recipiens ignominiam ex carnis societate. Cap. 41, he makes use of the phrase *vitium originis*, and maintains that evil has become man's second nature, while his *true* nature (according to Tertullian) is the good. He, therefore, distinguishes *naturale quodammodo* from *proprie naturale*. Quod enim a Deo est, non tam extinguitur, quam obumbratur. Potest enim *obumbrari*, quia non est Deus, *extingui non potest, quia a Deo est*.

[u] That, *e. g.*, *Tertullian* was far from imputing original sin to children as real sin, may be seen from his remarkable expression concerning the baptism of infants; De Bapt. 18, comp. § 72, and *Neander*, Antignosticus, p. 209, ss., 455, ss.—His disciple *Cyprian* also acknowledges inherent depravity, and defends infant baptism on *this ground*; but yet only to purify infants from a *foreign* guilt which is imputed to them, but not from any guilt which is properly *their own*. Ep. 64. Comp. *Rettberg*, p. 317, ss. *Cyprian* calls original sin, contagio mortis antiquæ, in Ep. 59; but says that it does not annul freedom; De Gratia Dei, ad Donatum, c. 2.

FOURTH DIVISION.

CHRISTOLOGY AND SOTERIOLOGY.

§ 64.

CHRISTOLOGY IN GENERAL.

Martini, Versuch einer pragmatischen Geschichte des Dogma von der Gottheit Christi, Rostock, 1800, 8vo. **Dorner*, Entwicklungsgeschichte der Christologie, Stuttgardt, 1839; 2d edit. 2 Bde. 1845–'53. [*Baur*, Dreieinigkeitslehre, 3 Bde. Tübing. 1841–43. *G. A. Meier*, Trinität. 2 Bde. 1844. *L. Lange*, Antitrinitar. 1851.]

THE manifestation of the Logos in the flesh is the chief dogmatic idea around which this period revolves. This fact, unvailing the eternal counsels of God's love, was regarded by the first teachers of the church, not under a partial aspect as the mere consequence of human sin, nor as exclusively conditioned and brought about by sin, but also as a free revelation of God, as the summit of all earlier revelations and developments of life, as the completion and crown of creation. Thus the *Christology* of this period forms, at once, the continuation of its *theology*, and the supplement and counterpart of its *anthropology*.

Irenæus decidedly keeps in view the twofold aspect under which Christ may be considered, as both *completing* and *restoring* human nature. Both are expressed by the terms *ἀνακεφαλαιοῦν*, *ἀνακεφαλαίωσις* (*i. e.*, the repetition of that which formerly existed, renovation, restoration, the re-union of that which was separated, comp. *Suicer*, Thesaurus, sub voce). Christ is the sum of all that is human in its highest significance, both the sum total and the renovation of mankind, the new Adam; comp. v. 29, 2; vii. 18, 7, and other passages quoted by *Duncker*, p. 157, ss. He frequently repeats the proposition, that Christ became what *we* are, that *we* might be what *he* is, *e. g.*, iii. 10, 20, and in the Præfatio: Jesus Christus, Dominus noster, propter immensam suam dilectionem factum est quod sumus nos, uti nos perficeret esse, quod est ipse. [Irenæus, iii. 18: Filius Dei, existens semper apud patrem, incarnatus est et homo factus, longam hominum expositionem in se ipso recapitulavit, in compendio nobis salutem præstans, et quod perdideramus in Adam, *i. e.*, secundum imaginem et similitudinem esse, hoc in Christo Jesu reciperemus. Comp. v. 16.] Irenæus also says that Christ represents the

perfect man in all the stages of human life. Similar views were entertained by the theologians of the Alexandrian school; see the passages quoted about the Logos.—On the other hand, *Tertullian*, De Carne Christi, c. 6, thinks that the incarnation of Christ had reference to the sufferings he was to endure. (At vero Christus mori missus nasci quoque necessario habuit, ut mori posset.) According to *Cyprian*, the incarnation was necessary, not so much on account of the sin of Adam, as because of the disobedience of the later generations, on whom the former revelations did not produce their effect (Heb. i. 1), De Idol. Van. p. 15: Quod vero Christus sit, et quomodo per ipsum nobis salus venerit, sic est ordo, sic ratio. Judæis primum erat apud Deum gratia. Sic olim justi erant, sic majores eorum religionibus obediebant. Inde illis et regni sublimitas floruit et generis magnitudo provenit. Sed illi negligentes, indisciplinati et superbi postmodum facti, et fiducia patrum inflati, dum divina præcepta contemnunt, datam sibi gratiam perdiderunt. . . . . Nec non Deus ante prædixerat, fore ut vergente sæculo, et mundi fine jam proximo, ex omni gente et populo et loco cultores sibi allegeret Deus multo fideliores et melioris obsequii; qui indulgentiam de divinis muneribus haurirent, quam acceptam Judæi contemtis religionibus perdidissent. Hujus igitur indulgentiæ, gratiæ disciplinæque arbiter et magister, sermo et filius Dei mittitur, qui per prophetas omnes retro illuminator et doctor humani generis prædicabatur. Hic est virtus Dei, hic ratio, hic sapientia ejus et gloria. Hic in virginem illabitur, carnem, Spiritu Sancto coöperante, induitur. Deus cum homine miscetur. Hic Deus noster, hic Christus est, qui, mediator duorum, hominem induit, quem perducat ad patrem. *Quod homo est, esse Christus voluit, ut et homo possit esse quod Christus est.* Comp. *Rettberg*, p. 305. In this last position he coincides with Irenæus.

§ 65.

THE GOD-MAN.

Along with more indefinite and general expressions concerning the higher nature of Jesus,[1] the elevation of his doctrine and person[2] and his Messianic character,[3] we find even in the primitive church allusions to the intimate union between the divine and the human in his person. But the relation in which they stand to each other is not exactly defined, nor is the part which each takes in the formation of his personality philosophically determined.[4] The earlier fathers endeavored, on the one hand, to avoid the low views of the Ebionites and Artemonites (Alogi), who considered Jesus as only the son of Joseph and Mary (while the more moderate Nazarenes, in accordance with the catholic confession, admitted a supernatural conception[5]). On the other hand, they combated still more decidedly the tendency of the Docetæ, who rejected the true humanity of Christ.[6] They also opposed the opinion (held by Cerinthus and Basilides), that the Logos (Christ) had descended upon the man Jesus at his baptism—

according to which the divine and human are united only in an external, mechanical way; and the still more fanciful notions of Marcion, according to which Christ appeared as Deus ex machina;[1] and lastly, the view of Valentinus (also docetic), who admitted that Christ was born of Mary, but maintained that he made use of her only as of a channel (canal), by which he might be introduced into this finite life.[2]

[1] Thus in the letter of Pliny to Trajan (Ep. x. 97): Carmen Christo quasi Deo dicere.—The usual doxologies, the baptismal formulas, the services of the Christian festivals and of divine worship, bear witness to the divine homage paid to Christ by the primitive church; comp. *Dorner*, l. c. p. 273, ss. Even art and Christian customs testify the same; ibid. p. 290 sq. [Comp. Münter, Schöne, Bingham, Piper, Didron, Jameson, in their works referred to § 8; also, especially, Louis Perret, Catacombes de Rome, 5 fol. Paris, 1851 (by the Institute).] The calumnies which the Jew of Celsus brings against the person of Christ, that he was born from the adulterous intercourse of Mary with a Roman soldier, Pantheras, are refuted by *Origen*, and the miraculous birth of the Saviour vindicated in view of his high destination (in connection with the doctrine of the preëxistence of the soul); Contra Celsum, i. 32 (p. 345–51).

[2] According to *Justin the Martyr*, the excellency of his *doctrine* elevates Christ over the rest of mankind (Apol. i. 14): Βραχεῖς δὲ καὶ σύντομοι παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγοι γεγόνασιν· οὐ γὰρ σοφιστὴς ὑπῆρχεν, ἀλλὰ δύναμις Θεοῦ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ ἦν, and this human wisdom would be sufficient by itself (according to c. 22) to secure to Jesus the predicate of the Son of God, even though he were a mere man. But he is *more* than this: ibidem. *Origen* also appeals to the extraordinary personal character of Jesus (apart from his divine dignity), which he considers as the bloom and crown of humanity; Contra Cels. i. 29 (Opp. T. i. p. 347, in reference to Plato De Rep. i. p. 329, and Plutarch, in Vita Themistoclis);—"Jesus, the least and humblest of all Seriphii, yet caused a greater commotion in the world than either Themistocles, or Pythagoras, or Plato, yea more than any wise man, prince or general." He unites in himself all human excellencies, while others have distinguished themselves by particular virtues, or particular actions; he is the miracle of the world! c. 30 (altogether in the sense of the modern apologists). *Minucius Felix* does not go beyond the negative statement, that Jesus *was more than a mere man;* generally speaking, we find in his writings little or nothing positively christological; Octav. 29, § 2, 3 (comp. with 9, 5): Nam quod religioni nostræ hominem noxium et crucem ejus adscribitis, longe de vicinia veritatis erratis, qui putatis Deum credi aut meruisse noxium aut potuisse terrenum. Næ ille miserabilis, cujus in homine mortali spes omnis innititur; totum enim ejus auxilium cum extincto homine finitur. Comp. *Novatian* De Trin. 14: Si homo tantummodo Christus, cur spes in illum ponitur, cum spes in homine maledicta referatur? *Arnobius*, Adv. Gentes, i., 53: Deus ille sublimis fuit, Deus radice ab intima, Deus ab incognitis regnis, et ab omnium principe Deus suspitator est missus, quem neque sol ipse, neque ulla, si sentiunt,

sidera, non rectores, non principes mundi, non denique dii magni, aut qui finqentes se deos genus omne mortalium territant, unde aut qui fuerit, potuerunt noscere vel suspicuri. On the Christology of the apostolical Fathers, see *Dorner*, l. c. p. 144, ss.

[3] *Justin M.* Apol. i. 5, 30, ss.; Dial. c. Tr. in its whole bearing, Novatian, De Trin. c. 9. Orig. Contra Cels. in various places.

[4] Thus *Justin M.* defended on the one hand the birth of Christ from the virgin in opposition to the Ebionites, and on the other, his true humanity in opposition to the Gnostics; Dial. c. Tryph. c. 54: Οὔκ ἔστιν ὁ Χρ. ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, κατὰ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων γεννηθείς. Apol. i. 46: Διὰ δυνάμεως τοῦ λόγου κατὰ τῆν τοῦ πατρὸς πάντων καὶ δεσπότου θεοῦ βουλὴν διὰ παρθένου ἄνθρωπος ἀπεκυήθη. Comp. *Semisch*, ii. p. 403, ss. *Iren.* iii. 16 (18 Gr.), 18 (20 Gr.), p. 211 (248 Gr.): Ἥνωσεν οὖν καθὼς προέφαμεν, τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῷ Θεῷ.....Εἰ μὴ συνηνώθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ Θεῷ, οὐκ ἂν ἠδυνήθη μετασχεῖν τῆς ἀφθαρσίας. Ἔδει γὰρ τὸν μεσίτην Θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων διὰ τῆς ἰδίας πρὸς ἑκατέρους οἰκειότητος εἰς φιλίαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους συναγαγεῖν καὶ Θεῷ μὲν παραστῆσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀνθρωποις δὲ γνωρίσαι Θεόν, c. 19 (21), p. 212, 13 (250): Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἦν ἄνθρωπος, ἵνα πειρασθῇ, οὕτως καὶ λόγος, ἵνα δοξασθῇ· ἡσυχάζοντος μὲν τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῷ πειράζεσθαι.....καὶ σταυροῦσθαι καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν· συγγινομένου δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐν τῷ νικᾶν καὶ ὑπομένειν καὶ χρηστεύεσθαι καὶ ἀνίστασθαι καὶ ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι. *Irenæus* also advocates the true humanity of the Saviour, in opposition to the Docetæ, and his true divinity in opposition to the Ebionites. As Adam had no human father, so Christ is begotten without the act of a man; as the former was formed from the virgin soil, so the latter is born of an undeflowered virgin. Contrasted with the sinful flesh of Adam is this sinless nature; a spiritual (πνευματικός) man is set over against the carnal (psychical, ψυχικός); iii. 21, 10. *Duncker*, p. 218, ss. Comp. *Novatian*, De Trin. c. 18: Quoniam si ad hominem veniebat, ut mediator Dei et hominum esse deberet, oportuit illum cum eo esse et verbum carnem fieri, ut in semetipso concordiam confibularet terrenorum pariter atque cœlestium, dum utriusque partis in se connectens pignora, et Deum homini et hominem Deo copularet, ut merito filius Dei per assumtionem carnis fiilius hominis, et filius hominis per receptionem Dei verbi filius Dei effici possit. Hoc altissimum atque reconditum sacramentum ad salutem generis humani ante sæcula destinatum, in Domino Jesu Christo Deo et homine invenitur impleri, quo conditio generis humani ad fructum æternæ salutis posset adduci.

[5] Comp. § 23, 24, and § 42, note 1. On the mild manner in which Justin M. (Dial. c. Tryph. § 48) and Origen (in Matth. T. xvi. c. 12, Opp. iii. p. 732, comparison with the blind man, Mark x. 46), judged of the view of the Ebionites, see *Neander's* Church History (Torrey), i. p. 344. But Origen expresses himself in stronger terms against them in Hom. xv. in Jerem. ib. p. 226: Ἐτόλμησαν γὰρ μετὰ τῶν πολλῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν καὶ τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὔκ ἐστι θεὸς ὁ μονογενὴς ὁ πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως· ἐπικατάρατος γὰρ, ὃς τὴν ἐλπίδα ἔχει ἐπ' ἄνθρωπον. But even common Ebionites supposed that a higher power had united itself with the man Jesus

at his baptism, though it was indeed only an (abstract) power. The Ebionites, whose views are represented by the Clementine Homilies, differed from the former by asserting that Jesus had from the beginning been penetrated with this higher power; hence he is in. *one* rank with Adam, Enoch, and Moses, who all had the same prophetic character; comp. *Schliemann*, p. 200, ss., 483, ss. Concerning the birth from the virgin, it is remarkable how little the primitive church hesitated about adducing analogies from pagan myths as a kind of evidence, though the reality of the fact was held fast. Thus Orig. Contra Cels. i. 37 (Opp. T. i. p. 355—Plato, a son of Apollo and of Amphictyone); in the same connection an analogy is drawn from nature (in the case of the hawk) in opposition to the blasphemy of Celsus, c. 32, p. 350, mentioned above; comp., however, c. 67, p. 381.*

[6] Against the Docetæ comp. the Epistles of *Ignatius*, especially ad Smyrn. 2 and 3; ad Ephes. 7, 18; ad Trall. 9, also the before-cited passage of Irenæus, as well as Tert. Adv. Marc. and De Carne Christi; *Novatian*, De Trin. c. 10: Neque igitur eum hæreticorum agnoscimus Christum, qui in imagine (ut dicitur) fuit, et non in veritate; nihil verum, eorum quæ gessit, fecerit, si ipse phantasma et non veritas fuit. Some have thought that there is a leaning toward Docetism in the epistle of Barnabas, c. 5. But it is only the same idea of the *κρύψις* which occurs in later times, *e. g.*, in the (apocryphal) oration of Thaddeus to Abgarus, apud Euseb. 1, 13: *Ἐσμίκρυνεν αὐτοῦ τὴν θεότητα*, and elsewhere.

[7] Tertull. De Carne Christi, c. 2: Odit moras Marcion, qui subito Christum de cœlis deferebat. Adv. Marc. iii. 2: Subito filius, et subito missus, et subito Christus. iv. 11: Subito Christus, subito et Johannes. Sic sunt omnia apud Marcionem, quæ suum et plenum habent ordinem apud creatorem. [On Basilides and Marcion, see Ryland's Neander's Hist. Dog. p. 193–5.]

[8] *Καθάπερ ὕδωρ διὰ σωλῆνος ὀδεύει*, comp. *Neander*, gnost. Systeme, p. 136, ss. On the Docetism of the Gnostics in general, see *Baur*, p. 258, ss.: "*Basilides is nearest to the orthodox view; Marcion departs farthest from it; and Valentinus, with his psychical Christ, occupies an intermediate position.*"

§ 66.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THIS DOCTRINE.

* *Gieseler, J. C. L.*, Commentatio, qua Clementis Alexandrini et Origenis doctrinæ de corpore Christi exponuntur, Götting. 1837, 4. [*Lämmer*, Clem. Alex. Doctrina de *λογῷ*, 1855.]

Though the Christian and Catholic doctrine, in opposition to all these heretical theories, rested upon the simple declaration of John: *ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*, and thus preserved the idea which is peculiar to

* On the different recensions of what is commonly called the Apostles' Creed, comp. *King*, p. 145. The phrase: conceptus de Spiritu Sancto, is wanting in the earlier recensions, and one reads: qui natus est de Spiritu Sancto ex Maria virg. Comp. *King*, p. 145

Christianity, viz. that of a necessary union between the Divine and the human;[1] yet the doctrine of the Godman was modified by the influence of various modes of thought and speculation. Thus it is not quite clear from the phraseology of the fathers *prior* to Origen[2] (with the exception of *Irenæus*[3] and *Tertullian*),[4] how far they thought the soul of Jesus to be a part of his humanity. Nor does *Clement* of Alexandria make a strict distinction between the human and Divine in Christ.[5] Concerning his body, the theologians of the Alexandrian school adopted views essentially allied to those of the Docetæ, although they opposed the grosser forms of Docetism. *Clement* maintained that the body of Jesus was not subject to the accidents and influences of the external world with the same physical necessity as other human bodies;[6] and *Origen* went so far as to ascribe to it the property of appearing to different persons under different forms.[7] On the other hand, Origen was very definite upon the doctrine of the human soul of Jesus,[8] and, generally speaking, endeavored, more exactly than his predecessors, to define in a dialectic method the relation between the Divine and the human in the person of Christ.[9] He also first made use of the expression *θεάνθρωπος*.[10]

[1] *Novat.* De Trin. c. 10: Non est ergo in unam partem inclinandum et ab alia parte fugiendum, quoniam nec tenebit perfectam veritatem, quisquis aliquam veritatis excluserit portionem. Tam enim scriptura etiam Deum adnuntiat Christum, quam etiam ipsum hominem adnuntiat Deum, etc.

[2] According to *Justin M.*, Christ had a soul, but not a *νοῦς*. Its place was supplied by the *λόγος*. In his view, Christ is composed of *λόγος*, *ψυχή*, and *σῶμα*, Apol. min. c. 10, comp. *Semisch*, p. 410.

[3] *Duncker* (p. 207, sq.) endeavors to make it probable, from passages quoted by him (especially iii. 22, 1; v. 6, 1), that *Irenæus* taught the perfect humanity of Christ as regards body, soul, and spirit; he also adduces the passage v. 1, 3, to which others have attached the opposite sense, comp. *Gieseler* on the passage, Dogmengesch. p. 187. [Gieseler here states, that the fathers of the church soon came to feel the necessity, in a doctrinal point of view, of maintaining that Christ had a proper human soul, as otherwise he could not be a real man, nor our example, and his sufferings must be wholly denied, or else ascribed to the Logos. *Irenæus* first refers to it distinctly, v. c. 1; he gave his soul for our souls, his flesh for our flesh; and *ψυχή* here can not mean merely the sensuous soul, for Irenæus does not distinguish between *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα*. Tertullian expressly says, that Christ assumed a human soul as well as a human body; De Carne Christi, c. 11, 13; Adv. Prax. c. 16. Origen, De Princip. ii. c. 6, first goes into full investigations on this point, making the rational human soul the necessary medium of the incarnation, since God could not be immediately united with a body, etc. Comp. also *Neander's* Hist. Dog. (Ryland's) p. 197–8.]

[4] *Tert.* Adv. Prax. c. 30, takes the exclamation of Christ on the cross: My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me! as a vox carnis et animæ:

cf. De Carne Christi, c. 11–13: Non poterat Christus inter homines nisi homo videri. Redde igitur Christo fidem suam, ut, qui homo voluerit incedere, animam quoque humanæ conditionis ostenderit, non faciens eam carneam, sed induens eam carne. Comp. De Resurr. Carn. c. 34, and other less definite passages (only in relation to the assuming of the flesh) which are given by *Münscher* von Cölln, i. p. 261–63.

[6] He indulges in harsh contrasts, *e. g.* in Coh. p. 6, and p. 84: *Πίστευσον, ἄθρωπε, ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ Θεῷ· πίστευσον, ἄνθρωπε, τῷ παθόντι καὶ προσκυνουμένῳ Θεῷ ζῶντι· πιστεύσατε, οἱ δοῦλοι, τῷ νεκρῷ· πάντες ἄνθρωποι, πιστεύσατε μόνῳ τῷ πάντων ἀνθρώπων Θεῷ· πίστεύσατε, καὶ μισθὸν λάβετε σωτηρίαν· ἐκζητήσατε τὸν Θεὸν, καὶ ζήσεται ἡ ψυχὴ ὑμῶν.* He does not make the distinction drawn by others, according to which the name *Ἰησοῦς* is used only of the *man:* on the contrary, Pæd. i. 7, p. 131, he says: *Ὁ δὲ ἡμέτερος παιδαγωγὸς ἅγιος θεὸς Ἰησοῦς, ὁ πάσης τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος καθηγεμὼν λόγος.* He also applies the subject, *ὁ λόγος*, to his humanity, Pæd. i. 6, p. 124: *Ὁ λόγος τὸ αὐτοῦ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἐξέχεεν αἷμα*; comp. iii. 1, p. 251, and *Gieseler*, l. c. On the question, whether *Clement* of Alex. believed that Christ had a human soul, see *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. p. 187. [*Clement*, Strom. vi. p. 775, says that the God-man had no *πάθη*; in Pædag. iii. 250, he distinguishes in the human soul, the rational (*λογιστικόν*), the principle of resentment (*θυμικόν*), and the principle of desire (*ἐπιθυμητικόν*); and says that the two last were not in Jesus.]

[7] Pæd. ii. 2, p. 186 (Syb. 158), he most decidedly maintains, in opposition to the Docetæ, that Jesus ate and drank like other men, but very moderately; comp. Strom. vii. 17, p. 900, where he calls the Docetæ heretics; hence the charge which Photius (Bibl. Cod. 109) brought against him, viz., that the doctrine that Christ's body was a phantasm, is propounded in his work entitled the Hypotyposes (*μὴ σαρκωθῆναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ δόξαι*), is justly considered as unfounded. But, after all, Clement refines the true human body of Jesus into little more than a kind of phantom, Strom. vi. 9, p. 775. (Sylb. p. 158, given by *Gieseler*, l. c. p. 12), where he speaks of the eating and drinking of our Lord as only an accommodation to human nature, and calls it even *ridiculous* (*γέλως*) to think otherwise; for, according to him, the body of Jesus was sustained by a divine power, but not by meats and drinks. Clement admits that his body was bruised and died; but still he maintains that the passion was only apparent, inasmuch as the suffering Redeemer felt no pains; comp. Pæd. i. c. 5, p. 112, and *Gieseler* on the passage, p. 13. Clement also teaches that his divinity was veiled during his manifestation (*κρύψις*) in the flesh, Strom. vii. 2, p. 833, though he does not use these very words. In accordance perhaps with these views, he asserts that Jesus was without comeliness, Pæd. iii. 1, sub finem, p. 252, in deference to the passage Is. liii.; yet, on the other hand, he elevates the body of Jesus far above all other human organisms; for the Saviour did not manifest that beauty of the flesh which strikes the senses, but the beauty of the soul, and the *true* beauty of the body, viz. immortality.* The assump-

* This is also alleged by Tertullian, De Carne Christi, c. 9: Adeo nec humanæ honestatis corpus fuit, nedum cœlestis claritatis. For had it been otherwise, how could the soldiers have dared to pierce this fair body?

tion of the perpetual virginity of Mary (Strom. vii. 16, p. 889–890, and the (apocryphal) passage there cited: Τέτοκεν καὶ οὐ τέτοκεν, may be traced to the same docetic tendency. Different views are entertained by *Tertull.* De Carne Christi, sub finem (in *Potter's* edition, on the passage from the Clementina), who nevertheless quotes the same dictum. A real Docetism has been inferred from the Coh. ad Græcos, p. 86, where the assumption of humanity on the part of the Logos is compared with the putting on of a mask, and the taking a part in a drama: at any rate, this is no real *becoming* man. Comp. *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. p. 191.

[7] *Gennadius*, De Dogm. Eccles. c. 2, incorrectly numbers Origen among those, qui Christum carnem de cœlo secum affere contenderint (cf. *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. p. 191); but his doctrine too is not quite free from Docetism. It is most fully given in the Comment. in Ep. ad Gal., preserved by Pamphilus; comp. *Gieseler*, l. c. p. 16, 17, and Contra Cels. i. 69, 70. (Opp. i. p. 383, '84); ibid. iii. 42 (p. 474); De Princ. ii. 6, § 6. Hom. in Gen. i. (Opp. ii. p. 55): Non æqualiter omnes, qui vident, illuminantur a Christo, sed singuli secundum eam mensuram illuminantur, qua vim luminis recipere valent. Et sicut non æqualiter oculi corporis nostri illuminantur a sole, sed quanto quis in loca altiora conscenderit, et ortum ejus editioris speculæ intuitione fuerit contemplatus, tanto amplius et splendoris ejus vim percipiet et caloris: ita etiam mens nostra quanto altius et excelsius appropinquaverit Christo, ac se viciniorem splendori lucis ejus objecerit, tanto magnificentius et clarius ejus lumine radiabitur. With this view he connects the transfiguration on the mount, Contra Cels. ii. 64 (Opp. i. p. 435), and Comment. in Matth. (Opp. iii. p. 906); *Gieseler*, p. 19, ss. Comp. contra Cels. iv. 16, p. 511: Εἰσὶ γὰρ διάφοροι οἱονεὶ τοῦ λόγου μορφαὶ, καθὼς ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰς ἐπιστήμην ἀγομένων φαίνεται ὁ λόγος, ἀνάλογον τῇ ἕξει τοῦ εἰσαγομένου, ἢ ἐπ' ὀλίγον προκόπτοντος, ἢ ἐπὶ πλεῖον, ἢ καὶ ἐγγὺς ἤδη γινομένου τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἢ καὶ ἐν ἀρετῇ γεγενημένου.

[8] De Princ. iv. 31: Volens Filius Deo pro salute generis humani apparere hominibus et inter homines conversari, suscepit non solum corpus humanum, ut quidam putant, sed et animam, nostrarum quidem animarum similem per naturam, proposito vero et virtute similem sibi, et talem, qualis omnes voluntates et dispensationes verbi ac sapientiæ indeclinabiliter possit implere (Joh. x. 18; xii. 27. Matth. xxvi. 28). Origen held it to be impossible that the Logos should be directly united with the body: the soul is the intermediate link: De Princ. ii. 6. Comp. contra Cels. ii. 9, quoted by *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, i. p. 263, where he infers the human soul of the Saviour from Matth. xxvi. 38.—Origen's theory of preëxistence would force him to ask, why the Son of God assumed *this* very soul, and not any other? comp. Contra Cels. i. 32, (Opp. i. p. 350); De Princ. ii. 6, 3, quoted in *Münscher*, p. 265, ss.; comp. Dorner, ii, 677, sq. According to Socrat. iii. 7, the Synod of Bostra, A. D. 240, maintained in opposition to Beryllus the proposition: ἔμψυχον εἶναι τὸν ἐνανθρωπήσαντα.—On the christological views of Origen in general see *Dorner*, ii. 2, p. 942, ss.

[9] *Origen* observes that in the Christology a twofold error is to be guarded against: (1), that of excluding the Logos from Christ, as if the eternal Logos and the historical Christ were two distinct personalities; (2), that of includ-

ing the Logos wholly in the man, as if he did not exist apart from him; De Princ. iv. c. 30: . . . . Non ita sentiendum est, quod omnis divinitatis ejus majestas intra brevissimi corporis claustra conclusa est, ita ut omne verbum Dei et sapientia ejus ac substantialis veritas ac vita vel a patre divulsa sit, vel intra corporis ejus coercita et conscripta brevitatem, nec usquam præterea putetur operata: sed inter utrumque cauta pietatis esse debet confessio, ut neque aliquid divinitatis in Christo defuisse credatur, et nulla penitus a paterna substantia, quæ ubique est, facta putetur esse divisio . . . . Cap. 31: Ne quis tamen nos existimet per hæc illud affirmare, quod pars alibi vel ubique: quod illi sentire possunt, qui naturam substantiæ incorporeæ atque invisibilis ignorant. Comp. also Contra Cels. iv. 5: Κἂν ὁ θεὸς τῶν ὅλων τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμει συγκαταβαίνῃ τῷ Ἰησοῦ εἰσ τὸν τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίον, κἂν ὁ ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸσ τὸν θεὸν λόγος, θεὸς καὶ αὐτὸς ὤν, ἔρχηται πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐκ ἔξεδρος γίνεται, οὐδὲ καταλείπει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἕδραν ὥσ τινα μὲν τόπον κενὸν αὐτοῦ εἶναι, ἕτερον δὲ πλήρη, οὐ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἔχοντα. The Logos in his incarnate state is like the sun, whose beams remain pure wherever they may shine (Contra Cels. vi. 73). Nevertheless, Origen asserts that he laid aside his glory; in Jerem. Hom. x. 7 (Opp. iii. p. 186). The Father is the light as such, the Son is the light which shines in darkness; comp. Comm. in Joh. ii. 18 (Opp. iv. p. 76), and De Princ. i. 28. The humanity of Christ ceased to exist after his exaltation; comp. Hom. in Jerem. xv. (Opp. iii. p. 226): Εἰ καὶ ἦν ἄνθρωπος (ὁ σωτὴρ), ἀλλὰ νῦν οὐδαμῶς ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος. Comp. Hom. in Luc. xxix. (Opp. iii. p. 967): Tunc homo fuit, nunc autem homo esse cessavit. See *Dorner*, l. c. p. 671, ss. *Thomasius*, p. 202, ss. *Redepenning*, ii. 313.

[10] See *Dorner*, l. c. p. 679, note 40. The phrase in question occurs (so far as we know) only in the Latin translation of the Homil. in Ezech. iii. 3 (Deus homo); but it is implied in other passages, *e. g.*, Contra Cels. iii. 29; vii. 17. Comp. *Thomasius*, p. 203, note c. The Greek term was first explained by Chrysostom, see *Suicer*, Thesaurus, sub voce.

A special question arose concerning the *risen* body of Christ, in its relation to the body which he possessed prior to the resurrection. According to *Ignatius*, *Justin*, *Irenæus*, *Tertullian*, *Cyprian*, and *Novatian*, Jesus had the same body *after* the resurrection which he had *before* it. Comp. the passages in the work of *C. L. Müller*, De Resurrectione Jesu Christi, vitam æt. excipiente et ascensu in cœlum. Sententiæ, quæ in ecclesia Christiana ad finem usque sæculi sexti viguerunt. Havniæ, 1836, 8, p. 77; some merely modifying statements of Irenæus and Tertullian, p. 78. But *Origen* taught, on the other hand, in more definite terms, c. Cels. ii. c. 62 (Opp. i. p. 434), that the body of Jesus had undergone a change, and, in support of his opinion, appealed to his miraculous appearance, when the doors were shut: Καὶ ἦν γε μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν αὐτοῦ ὡσπερεὶ ἐν μεθορίῳ τινὶ τῆς παχύτητος τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ πάθους σώματος καὶ τοῦ γυμνὴν τοιούτου σώματος φαίνεσθαι ψυχήν. Comp. c. 64, 65, p. 436: Τὸν μηκέτι ἔχοντά τι χωρητὸν ὁραθῆναι τοῖς πολλοῖς, οὐχ οἷοι τε ἦσαν αὐτὸν βλέπειν οἱ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἰδόντες πάντες . . . . Ἀμπροτέρα γὰρ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τελέσαντος ἡ θειότης ἦν αὐτοῦ. *Müller*, p. 83. Origen does not seem to have believed that the ascension of Christ effected a further change; for he probably means by the ethereal body, which he ascribes to him in his state of exaltation (c. Cels. iii. 41, 42, Opp. i. p. 474), the same which he had when he rose from the grave. Comp. *Müller*, p. 82, and p. 131.

§ 67.

THE SINLESSNESS OF CHRIST.

Ullmann, über die Sündlosigkeit Jesu, 5th edit. Hamb. 1846. [Ullmann, on the Sinless Character of Jesus, in Clark's Student's Cabinet Library of Useful Tracts.] *Fritzsche*, de *ἀναμαρτησίᾳ* Jesu Christi, Comment. IV. comp. § 27.

The intimate union between the divine and human in Christ, as held by the primitive Church, excluded every possible idea of the existence of sin in *him*, who was the spotless image of Deity. Hence *Irenæus*, *Tertullian*, *Clement*, and *Origen* assert the sinlessness (*ἀναμαρτησία*) of Jesus in the strongest terms,[1] and even those of the fathers who do not expressly mention it, at least take it for granted. In the scheme of the Ebionites and Artemonites, this sinlessness was not necessarily affirmed, although there are not any definite declarations to the contrary. On the other hand, *Basilides* found it difficult to reconcile the sinlessness of Christ with his Gnostic system, according to which every sufferer bears the punishments of his own sins; though he used every possible means to conceal this defect in his scheme.[2]

[1] *Justin M.* Dial. c. Tr. § 11, 17, 110, et al., *Iren.* in the next §. *Tert.* De Anima, cap. 41: Solus enim Deus sine peccato, et solus homo sine peccato Christus, quia et Deus Christus. *Arnobius*, Adv. Gentes, i. 53: Nihil, ut remini, magicum, nihil humanum, præstigiosum, aut subdolum, nihil fraudis delituit in Christo. *Clem. Al.* derives (Pæd. i. 2, p. 99) the prerogative of Christ as the judge of all men, from his sinlessness. In Pæd. iii. 12, p. 307, he speaks indeed of the *Logos* as alone *ἀναμάρτητος*, but as he makes no distinction between the Logos and the human nature of Christ (comp. the preceding §), it would follow that he regarded Jesus as sinless, which is confirmed by what he says, Strom. vii. 12, p. 875. (Sylb. 742): Εἷς μὲν οὖν μόνος ὁ ἀνεπιθύμητος (which implies still more than *ἀναμάρτητος*) ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ κύριος, ὁ φιλάνθρωπος, ὁ καὶ δι' ἡμᾶς ἄνθρωπος. Concerning *Origen*, comp. § 63, note 5; Hom. xii. in Lev. (Opp. ii. p. 251) . . Solus Jesus dominus meus in hanc generationem mundus ingressus est, etc. In De Princ. ii. c. 6, § 5, 6 (Opp. i. p. 91), he endeavors to remove the difficulty which arises when we assume the absolute sinlessness of our Lord, in contrast with the other assumption of his free spiritual development: Verum quoniam boni malique eligendi facultas omnibus præsto est, hæc anima, quæ Christi est, ita elegit diligere justitiam, ut pro immensitate dilectionis inconvertibiliter ei atque inseparabiliter inhæreret, ita ut propositi firmitas et affectus immensitas et dilectionis inextinguibilis calor omnem sensum conversionis atque immutationis abscinderet, et quod in arbitrio erat positum, longi usus affectu jam, versum sit in naturam: ita et fuisse quidem in Christo humana et rationabilis

anima credenda est, et nullum sensum vel possibilitatem eam putandum est habuisse peccati (comparison with iron always in the fire). Christ possesses sinlessness as something peculiar to himself: Sicut vas ipsum, quod substantiam continet unguenti, nullo genere potest aliquid recipere fœtoris, hi vero qui ex odore ejus participant, si se paulo longius a fragrantia ejus removerint, possibile est, ut incidentem recipiant fœtorem: ita Christus velut vas ipsum, in quo erat unguenti substantia, impossibile fuit, ut contrarium reciperet odorem. Participes vero ejus quam proximi fuerint vasculo, tam odoris erunt participes et capaces. Comp. Contra Cels. i. 69, Opp. i. p. 383: Διὸ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ μέγαν ἀγωνιστὴν αὐτόν φαμεν γεγονέναι, διὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον σῶμα, πεπειρασμένον μὲν ὁμοίως πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις κατὰ τάντα, οὐκέτι δὲ ὡς ἄνθρωποι μετὰ ἁμαρτίας, ἀλλὰ πάντη χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας. (Hebr. iv. 15, where 1 Pet. ii. 22, and 2 Cor. v. 21, are also quoted). The term ἀναμάρτητος first occurs in the writings of Hippolytus (*Gallandii* Bibl. ii. p. 466).

[1] Comp. Clem. Strom. iv. p. 600 (Sylb. 506); and the comment of *Jacobi* in Neander's Hist. Dog. (Ryland), p. 207, in connection with the statement of Hippolytus. Comp. also *Neander*, Gnost. Syst. p. 49, ss. *Baur*, Versöhnungslehre, p. 24.

§ 68.

REDEMPTION AND ATONEMENT.

(*The Death of Christ.*)

Dissertatio Historiam Doctrinæ de Redemtione Ecclesiæ, Sanguine Jesu Christi facta, exhibens, in *Cotta's* edition of *Gerhard's* Loci Theologici, T. iv. p. 105–132. *W. C. L. Ziegler*, Historia Dogmatis de Redemptione, etc., inde ab ecclesiæ primordiis usque ad Lutheri tempora, Gött. 1791 (in Comment. Theol. ed. *A. Vellhusen*, T. v. p. 227, seq.) * *Bähr*, K. die Lehre der Kirche vom Tode Jesu in den ersten 3 Jahrhunderten, Sulzb. 1832, reviewed in the Neue Kirchenzeitung, 1833, No. 36. *Baur*, *F. Ch.* die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung von der ältesten Zeit bis auf die neueste. Tübingen, 1838 (p. 1–67). [*Thomasius*, Christi Person und Work, iii. p. 158 sq. 1859. *William Thomson* (Fellow of Queen's College), The Atoning Work of Christ; Bampton Lectures, Oxford, 1853, Lect. VI, Theories in the Early Church.]

The incarnation of the God-Man, in and of itself, had a redeeming and reconciling efficacy, by breaking the power of evil, and restoring the harmony of human nature, through the life-awakening and life-imparting influences which proceeded from this manifestation of deity.[1] But from the very beginning, on the basis of apostolic Christianity, the redeeming element was put chiefly in the sufferings and death of Christ. The first teachers of the church regarded this death as a sacrifice and ransom (λύτρον), and therefore ascribed to the blood of Jesus the power of cleansing from sin and guilt,[2] and attached a high importance, sometimes even a magical efficacy, to

the sign of the cross.[3] They did not, however, rest satisfied with such vague ideas, but, in connection with the prevailing views of the age, they further developed the above doctrine, and saw in the death of Christ the actual victory over the devil, the restoration of the divine image, and the source and condition of all happiness.[4] But, however decidedly and victoriously this enthusiastic faith in the power of the Redeemer's death manifested itself in the writings and lives of the Christian fathers, as well as in the death of martyrs; yet this faith had not yet been developed into the form of a strict theory of satisfaction, in the sense that the sufferings of Christ were a punishment, necessarily inflicted by divine justice, and assumed in the place of the sinner, whereby the justice of God was strictly *satisfied.* At least several intermediate links were wanting, ere the doctrine could assume this shape. The term "*satisfactio*" occurs, indeed, first in the writings of *Tertullian*, but in a sense essentially different from, and even opposed to, the idea of a *vicarious* satisfaction. Nor was the death of Christ, as a reconciling power, considered as an isolated truth, dissevered from other aspects of it. The same *Origen*, who, on the one hand, along with the notion that the devil had been outwitted in this matter, likewise developed the idea of sacrifice as applicable to it on the basis of the Old Testament typology,[5] on the other hand, spoke just as definitely in favor of the moral interpretation of Christ's death, which he did not hesitate to compare with the heroic death of other great men of primitive times. He also ascribed a purifying power to the blood of martyrs, as *Clement* had done before him.[6] And besides, he understood the death of Jesus in a mystic and idealistic sense, as an event not limited to this world, nor to one single moment of time, but which occurred in heaven as well as on earth, embraces all ages, and is in its consequences of infinite importance even for the other worlds.[7]

[3] "*Christianity is not only the religion of redemption, inasmuch as it realizes the idea of the union of the divine and the human in the person of the God-Man, but also the religion of complete and absolute reconciliation.*" *Baur*, l. c. p. 5. Concerning the relation in which redemption stands to reconciliation, ibid. [Baur here says: The two ideas of redemption and atonement (reconciliation) are usually distinguished, by referring the former to the idea of sin, and the latter to the idea of guilt....Even if one should be transferred from a state of sin to one of sinlessness, it would not follow that the guilt of his sin had been removed....The removal of this guilt can be conceived only as a divine act, and the ground of its possibility can be found only in the idea of God.] On negative and positive redemption, see *Neander* (Church History, Torrey's transl. i. p. 640). According to *Justin M.*, the renovation and restoration of mankind is brought about by the *doctrine* of Christ, Apol. i. 23: Γενόμενος ἄνθρωπος ταῦτα ἡμᾶς ἐδίδαξεν ἐπ' ἀλλαγῇ καὶ ἐπαναγωγῇ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου γένους. Comp. Apol. ii. 6

(see note 4, below); Coh. ad Græc. 38, Dial. c. Tryph. § 121; § 83: *Ἰσχυρὸς ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ πέπεισθε πολλοὺς καταλιπεῖν δαιμόνια, οἷς ἐδούλευον, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν παντοκράτορα Θεὸν δι' αὐτοῦ πιστεύειν.* Also § 30: *Ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν δαιμονίων, ἃ ἐστιν ἀλλότρια τῆς θεοσεβείας τοῦ Θεοῦ, οἷς πάλαι προσεκυνοῦμεν, τὸν Θεὸν ἀεὶ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ συντηρηθῆναι παρακαλοῦμεν, ἵνα μετὰ τὸ ἐπιστρέψαι πρὸς Θεὸν δι' αὐτοῦ ἄμωμοι ὦμεν. Βοηθὸν γὰρ ἐκεῖνον καὶ λυτρωτὴν καλοῦμεν· οὗ καὶ τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος ἰσχὺν καὶ τὰ δαιμόνια τρέμει κ. τ. λ.* If *Justin* emphasizes the negative, *Irenæus* speaks rather of the positive aspect, iii. 18 (20) [quando filius Dei incarnatus est et homo factus, longam hominum expositionem in semet ipso recapitulavit]; 20 (22), p. 214.....Filius hominis factus est, ut assuesceret hominem percipere Deum et assuesceret Deum habitare in homine, sec. placitum Patris. The work of redemption was carried on through all the ages and stages of life, which Christ represented in himself, so that death appears as the crown of the entire redemptive work, ii. 22, 4, p. 147: Omnes enim venit per semetipsum salvare: omnes, inquam, qui per eum renascuntur in Deum, infantes et parvulos et pueros et juvenes et seniores. Ideo per omnem venit ætatem, et infantibus infans factus, sanctificans infantes; in parvulis parvulus, sanctificans hanc ipsam habentes ætatem, simul et exemplum illis pietatis effectus et justitiæ et subjectionis: in juvenibus juvenis, exemplum juvenibus fiens, eosque sanctificans Domino; sic et senior in senioribus, ut sit perfectus magister in omnibus, non solum secundum expositionem veritatis, sed et secundum ætatem, sanctificans simul et seniores, exemplum ipsis quoque fiens; deinde et usque ad mortem pervenit, ut sit primogenitus ex mortuis, ipse primatum tenens in omnibus, princeps vitæ, prior omnium et præcedens omnes [v. 23, 2: Recapitulans autem universum hominem in se ab initio usque ad finem, recapitulavit et mortem ejus]. Comp. v. 16. [Comp. also Irenæus Contra Hæres. v. 16: *Ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν χρόνοις ἐλέγετο μὲν κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ γεγονέναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐκ ἐδείκνυτο δέ. ἔτι γὰρ ἀόρατος ἦν ὁ λόγος, οὗ κατ' εἰκόνα ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐγεγόνει διὰ τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν ῥαδίως ἀπέβαλεν, ὁπότε δὲ σὰρξ ἐγένετο ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὰ ἀμφότερα ἐπεκύρωσε· καὶ γὰρ τὴν εἰκόνα ἔδειξεν ἀληθῶς, αὐτὸς τοῦτο γενόμενος, ὅπερ ἦν ἡ εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ. καὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν βεβαίως κατέστησε, συνεξομοιώσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῷ ἀοράτῳ Πατρί.*]—Comp. *Tert.* Adv. Marc. 12.—*Clem.* Coh. p. 6, p. 23: *Ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ὀργῆς θρέμματα ἔτι, οἱ τῆς πλάνης ἀπεσπασμένοι, ἀΐσσοντες δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. Ταύτη τοι ἡμεῖς, οἱ τῆς ἀνομίας υἱοί ποτε, διὰ τὴν φιλανθρωπίαν τοῦ λόγου νῦν υἱοὶ γεγόναμεν τοῦ Θεοῦ.* Pæd. i. 2, p. 100: *Ἔστιν οὖν ὁ παιδαγωγὸς ἡμῶν λόγος διὰ παραινέσεων θεραπευτικὸς τῶν παρὰ φύσιν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν.... Δόγος δὲ ὁ πατρικὸς μόνος ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἰατρὸς ἀῤῥωστημάτων παιώνιος καὶ ἐπῳδὸς ἅγιος νοσούσης ψυχῆς.* Comp. i. 9, p. 147; i. 12. p. 158; Quis Div. salv. p. 951, 52. (Comparison with the merciful Samaritan). *Origen* also (Contra Cels. iii. 28, Opp. i. p. 465), sees in the union of the divine and the human in Christ the beginning of an intimate connection between the one and the other, which is to be progressively developed in mankind: *Ὅτι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἤρξατο θεία καὶ ἀνθρωπίνη συννεφαίνεσθαι φύσις· ἵν' ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη τῇ πρὸς τὸ θειότερον κοινωνίᾳ γένηται θεία οὐκ ἐν μόνῳ τῷ*

Ἰησοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς μετὰ τοῦ πιστεύειν ἀναλαμβάνουσι βίον, ὃν Ἰησοῦς ἐδίδαξεν.*

[1] *Barnabas*, c. 5: Propter hoc Dominus sustinuit tradere corpus suum in exterminium, ut remissione peccatorum sanctificemur, quod est sparsione sanguinis illius, etc., comp. c. 7, 11, and 12. *Clemens Rom.* ad Cor. i. c. 7: Ἀτενίσωμεν εἰς τὸ αἷμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ ἴδωμεν, ὡς ἔστιν τίμιον τῷ θεῷ (αἷμα) αὐτοῦ, ὅτι διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν ἐκχυθὲν παντὶ τῷ κόσμῳ μετάνοίας χάριν ὑπήνεγκεν, comp. i. c. 2, where the παθήματα αὐτοῦ grammically refer to Θεὸς. (*Möhler*, Patrologie, i. p. 61.) [Comp. also Clem. Rom. c. 49: Διὰ τὴν ἀγάπην, ἣν ἔσχεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἔδωκεν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ὁ χριστὸς ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν ἐν θελήματι θεοῦ, καὶ τὴν σάρκα ὑπὲρ τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν ἡμῶν.] *Dorner*, in his Christology, i. 138, says: "*Every interpretation of these passages is forced, which does not find in them the idea of substitution; and this, not only subjectively, the vicarious satisfaction of Christ, but also, objectively, that his substituted experience and acts also had their corresponding objective consequences.*" *Ignatius*, ad Smyrn. 6: Μηδεὶς πλανάσθω. Καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια καὶ ἡ δόξα τῶν ἀγγέλων, καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες ὁρατοί τε καὶ ἀόρατοι, ἐὰν μὴ πιστεύσωσιν εἰς τὸ αἷμα Χριστοῦ, κάκείνοις κρίσις ἐστιν. (He also defends the reality of his bodily sufferings in opposition to the Docetæ, c. 2.) Comp. *Höfling*, die Lehre der Apostolischen Väter vom Opfer im Christlichen Cultus, 1841. The following passage, from the Epistle to Diognetus, is peculiar, from its pure apprehension of the redemption that is in Christ, as an act of love proceeding from the divine compassion, not as reconciling his wrath; (*Hefele*, Patres Apost. p. 316): Ἐπεὶ δὲ πεπλήρωτο μὲν ἡ ἡμετέρα ἀδικιά καὶ τελείως πεφανέρωτο, ἦλθε δὲ ὁ καιρὸς, ὃν Θεὸς προέθετο λοιπὸν φανερῶσαι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χρηστότητα καὶ δύναμιν, ὡς [τῆς] ὑπερβαλλούσης φιλανθρωπίας μία ἀγάπη [τοῦ Θεοῦ], οὐκ ἐμίσησεν ἡμᾶς, οὐδὲ ἀπώσατο, οὐδὲ ἐμνησικάκησεν, ἀλλὰ ἐμακροθύμησεν, ἠνέσχετο, αὐτὸς τὰς ἡμετέρας ἁμαρτίας ἀπεδέξατο· αὐτὸς τὸν ἴδιον υἱὸν ἀπεδοτο λύτρον ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, τὸν ἅγιον ὑπὲρ ἀνόμων, τὸν ἄκακον ὑπὲρ τῶν κακῶν, τὸν δίκαιον ὑπὲρ των ἀδίκων, τὸν ἄφθαρτον ὑπὲρ τῶν φθαρτῶν, τὸν ἀθάνατον ὑπὲρ τῶν θνητῶν. Τί γὰρ ἄλλο τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμων ἠδυνήθη καλύψαι ἢ ἐκείνου δικαιοσύνη; ἐν τίνι δικαιωθῆναι δυνατὸν τοὺς ἀνόμους ἡμᾶς καὶ ἀσεβεῖς, ἢ ἐν μόνῳ τῷ υἱῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ; comp. also c. 7 and 8: .... ὡς σώζων ἔπεμψεν, ὡς πείθων, οὐ βιαζόμενος. βία γὰρ οὐ πρόσεστι τῷ Θεῷ .... God is rather called by him, ἀόργητος. [Comp. *Neander*, Hist. of Church, i. 642.] According to *Justin M.*, the object of Christ's incarnation was to *suffer* for mankind, Apol. iii. 13: Δι' ἡμᾶς ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν, ὅπως καὶ τῶν παθῶν τῶν ἡμετέρων συμμέτοχος γενόμενος καὶ ἰασιν ποιήσηται. Comp. Apol. i. 32: Δι' αἵματος καθαίρων τοὺς πιστεύοντας αὐτῷ. i. 63: Dial. c. Tryph. § 40–43, and § 95. Justin also calls the death of Jesus a sacrifice (προσφορά); comp. the passages quoted by *Bähr*, p. 42, and *Semisch*, ii. p. 418, ss. On the question whether Justin

* "Inferences might be drawn from these ideas of Origen, not in accordance with the simple truth of Scripture; but they may also be so interpreted as to agree with the example of wholesome doctrine. *The latter is undoubtedly better and more charitable than the former.*" *Mosheim*, transl. p. 297.

referred the power of the death of Christ in canceling sin to the whole life of the believer, or restricted it to the epoch preceding his deliberate entrance into the church, see Semisch, p. 422, sq.; comp. Ep. ad Diognetum, c. 9. The writings of *Clement of Alexandria* also abound in passages upon the efficacy of the death of Jesus; Coh. p. 86; comp. *Bähr*, l. c. p. 76; ibid. 88; Paed. i. 9, p. 148; ii. 2. p. 177 (διττὸν τὸ αἷμα τοῦ κυρίου), and other passages. A mystical interpretation of the crown of thorns, Pæd. ii. 8, p. 214, '15 (with reference to Hebr. ix. 22), a passage which Bähr has overlooked. In the treatise, Quis Dives Salvus, 34, p. 954, the phrase occurs: αἷμα Θεοῦ παιδὸς (not παιδὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ); hence the assertion of Bähr (p. 116), that the Lutheran phrase, "*the blood of God*," would have met with opposition on the part of all the fathers of this period, must be restricted. On the efficacy of his death, see Strom. iv. 7, 583, and other passages. On the other hand, it is worthy of notice that Clement, as Philo had done before him, and Origen did after him, applies the idea of the high priesthood of Christ in an ideal sense to the Logos, without reference to the death which he suffered in his human nature; comp. *Bähr*, p. 81.

[8] The fact that the heathen charged the Christians with rendering homage to all that were crucified (Orig. c. Cels. ii. 47, Opp. i. p. 422), shows, to say the least, that the latter held the cross in high esteem. On the symbolical signification of the cross, and the earlier fanciful interpretations of the allegorists concerning the blood of Christ, comp. § 29, note 3; and Gieseler, Dogmengesch. p. 196, sq. On the effects of the cross upon the demons, see § 52, note 4.

[9] "*The notion that the death of Christ represented the victory over the devil was so congruous with the entire circle of ideas in which these times moved, that they could not abandon it.*" *Baur*, l. c. p. 28. Baur also maintains that this mode of considering the death of Christ was transplanted from the Gnostics to the church, by simply converting the person of the demiurge into that of the devil (?). This view is represented in this period by *Irenæus*. His train of thought is the following: Man came under the dominion of the devil by violating the divine commandment. This state of bondage lasted from Adam to Christ. The latter delivered men by rendering perfect obedience on the cross, and paying a ransom with his blood. God did not rescue their souls from the power of the devil by force, as the devil himself had done, but *secundum suadelam* (*i. e.*, according to *Baur*, l. c., the devil was himself convinced of the justice of the manner in which he was treated). But *Duncker*, p. 237, and *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. p. 201, refer the *suadela* more correctly to man, who was delivered from the power of the devil by the better conviction he had gained through the teaching of Christ. Comp. the passage, on the previous page, from the Ep. ad Diagnetum, ὡς πείθων, οὐ βιαζ. [Comp. Dorner, i. 479 (also against Baur). Dorner makes use of the passage from the Ep. ad Diog. to refute Baur's interpretation of Irenæus.] And as man now voluntarily abandoned the service of the devil, under whose sway he had voluntarily placed himself, the jural relation in which God stands to man was restored; comp. Iren. Adv. Hær. v. 1, 1: [Et quoniam injuste dominabatur nobis apostasia, et cum natura essemus Dei omnipotentis, alienavit nos contra naturam, suos proprios nos faciens discipulos, potens in omnibus Dei

verbum, et non deficiens in sua justitia, juste etiam adversus ipsum conversus est apostasiam, ea quæ sunt sua redimens ab eo non cum vi, quemadmodum ille initio dominabatur nostri, ea quæ non erant sua insatiabilitur rapiens; sed *secundum suadelam*, quemadmodum decebat Deum suadentem, et non vim inferentem, accipere quæ vellet, ut neque quod est justum confringeretur, neque antiqua plasmatio Dei deperiret.] From this Irenæus infers the necessity of the Saviour's twofold nature (here the views of Irenæus appproach most nearly those of Anselm in a later period), iii. 18, 7: Ἥνωσεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῷ θεῷ. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἄνθρωπος ἐνίκησε τὸν ἀντίπαλον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως ἐνικήθη ὁ ἐχθρός; comp. v. 21, 3; iii. 19, 3: Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἦν ἄνθρωπος ἵνα πειρασθῇ, οὕτως καὶ λόγος ἵνα δοξασθῇ, etc. (comp. § 65, note 3). Both elements are here, viz., the perfect obedience of Christ, and the shedding of his blood as a ransom (v. 1, 1,: Τῷ ἰδίῳ οὖν αἵματι λυτρωσαμένου ἡμᾶς τοῦ κυρίου, καὶ δόντος τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἡμετέρων ψυχῶν, καὶ τὴν σάρκα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀντὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων σαρκῶν, etc.): and thus Irenæus has in his system the negative aspect of the doctrine of redemption; and to this is added the positive one, the communication of a new principle of life, iii. 23, 7. Comp. *Baur*, l. c. p. 30–42. *Bähr*, p. 55–72. On the other hand, the idea of a sacrifice is in his writings kept in the background, see *Duncker*, p. 252: "The idea of the vicarious sufferings of the Lord, in the sense that thereby satisfaction is rendered to the divine justice, injured by our sins, and that thus the punishment, which ought in justice to have been inflicted upon all men, is canceled—this idea is not found in Irenæus, any more than the corresponding notion of an exchange or compact with the devil, by which he receives, as it were, a legal compensation for the men he gives up." [Neander, i. 642, qualifies this statement about the views of Irenæus, by adding, "but doubtless there is lying at the bottom the idea of a perfect fulfillment of the law by Christ; of his perfect obedience to the holiness of God in its claims to satisfaction due to it from mankind." And *Thomasius*, iii. 176, cites from Irenæus, iii. 18: "We were God's enemies and debtors, and Christ in his priestly work fulfilled the law"—propitians pro nobis Deum; and, also, xvii. 1: Et propter hoc in novissimis temperibus in amicitiam nos restituit Dominus per suam incarnationem, mediator Dei et hominum factus; propitians quidem pro nobis Patrem, in quem peccaveramus, et nostram inobedientiam consolatus, etc.]

[1] On the peculiar usage of the term satisfactio, comp. *Münscher*, Hanb. i. p. 223. *Bähr*, p. 90, ss. On the question whether *Justin M.* propounded the doctrine of satisfaction, see *Semisch*, p. 423, 424. The answer to it must mainly depend on the interpretation of *ὑπέρ*, which frequently occurs in his writings; Apol. i. 63; Dial. c. Tryph. § 88, and other passages quoted by *Semisch*. He distinctly says that the curse under which Christ was laid, was only apparent, Dial. c. Tryph. §. 90; comp. § 94: Ὅνπερ οὖν τρόπον τὸ σημεῖον διὰ τοῦ χαλκοῦ ὄφεως γενέσθαι ὁ Θεὸς ἐκέλευσε, καὶ ἀναίτιός ἐστιν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ κατάρα κεῖται κατὰ τῶν σταυρουμένων ἀνθρώπων· οὐκ ἔτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ Θεοῦ κατάρα κεῖται, δι' οὗ σώζει πάντας τοὺς κατάρας ἄξια πράξαντας. § 96: Καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰρημένον ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, ὅτι ἐπικατάρατος πᾶς ὁ κρεμάμενος ἐπὶ

ξύλου οὐχ ὡς τοῦ Θεοῦ καταρωμένου τούτου τοῦ ἐσταυρωμένου, ἡμῶν τονοῦ τὴν ἐλπίδα ἐκκρεμαμένην ἀπὸ τοῦ σταυρωθέντος Χριστοῦ, ἀλλ' ὥσ προειπόντος τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸ ὑφ' ὑμῶν πάντων καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑμῖν ...μέλλοντο γίνεσθαι. § 111: *Ὁ παθητὸς ἡμῶν καὶ σταυρωθεὶς Χριστὸς οὐ κατηράθη ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου, ἀλλὰ μόνος σώσειν τοὺς μὴ ἀφισταμένους τῆς πίστεως αὐτοῦ ἐδήλου.* The agony of soul in Gethsemane, too, according to Justin, only made indubitable the fact of Christ's human nature, and set aside the subterfuge that, because he was the Son of God, he could not feel pain as well as other men; cf. Dial. c. Tryph. § 103. [Comp. Neander, Church Hist. (Torrey's trans.) i. 642: "In Justin Martyr may be recognized the idea of a satisfaction rendered by Christ through suffering—at least lying at the bottom, if it is not clearly unfolded and held fast in the form of conscious thought." So, too, *Thomasius*, Christologie, iii. 169.] From *Tert.* De Pœn. 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, De Pat. 13, De Pud. 9, it is evident "*that he applies the term satisfaction to such as make amends for their own sins by confession and repentance, which shows itself in works;*" but he never understands by it *satisfactio vicaria* in the sense afterward attached to it. That Tertullian was far from entertaining this view may be proved from De Cultu Fem. i. 1, and the interpretation which he gives to Gal. iii. 13, Contra Judæos 10; he there represents the crime that had been committed as a curse, but not the hanging on the tree (for Christ was not accursed by God, but by the Jews); thus also Contra Marc. v. 5, and other passages which are quoted by *Bähr*, p. 89, ss. In other points his views resemble those of Irenæus, ibid. p. 100–104.

* On the relation of these two representations of the matter, viz., that of Irenæus, that it was a victory over the devil (which assumes in Origen the still more mythical character of an intentional deception on the part of God), and that it was a voluntary sacrifice, not having respect, like the former, to the idea of justice, but resting rather on the love of God; compare *Baur*, p. 43–67; *Bähr*, p. 111, sq.; *Thomasius*, p. 214; *Redepenning*, ii. 405; *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. 203. On the question whether Origen taught an intentional deception on the part of God, see (against *Baur*) *Redepenning*, p. 406, note 5. The idea is original that it was a *torment* to the devil to be obliged to keep near him so pure a soul as that of Jesus; he *could not* keep it, because it did not belong to him. Comp. Origen's Comm. in Matth. T. xvi. 8 (Opp. i. 726), and the other passages, Comment. series, § 75 (on Matth. xxvi. 1, Opp. i. 819), and on Matth. Tom. xiii. 8 and 9, in which the giving up of the Son by the Father appears as an act of love, in distinction from the treachery practiced on him by Satan through his agents (different interpretations of the expression *παραδίδοσθαι* used in both places). Origen's interpretation of Is. liii. 3, comes nearest to the view entertained in later times by Anselm, Comment. in Joh. Tom. 28, 14. Opp. iv. p. 392. *Bähr*, p. 151.* But still Origen differs from the church doctrine of satisfaction in the manner in which he explains, *e. g.*, the sufferings in the garden of Gethsemane,

* But it should not be overlooked that Origen immediately afterward connects this passage with 1 Cor. iv. 13, and applies to Christ in a *higher degree* what is there said in reference to the apostles, and also adduces still other examples from ancient times.

and the exclamation of Christ on the cross: My God, my God, etc. *Bähr*, p. 147–149, and *Redepenning*, p. 408, sq. [On Origen's views, comp. Thomson's Bampton Lectures, ubi supra; and Origen, in Joan. Tom. ii. 21; in Matth. xvi. 8; and in Rom. ii. 13 (p. 493): Si ergo pretio emti sumus, ut etiam Paulus adstipulatur, nec ab aliquo sine dubio emti sumus cujus eramus servi, qui et pretium poposcit quod voluit, ut de potestate dimitterat quos tenebat. Tenebat autem nos Diabolus, cui distracti fueramus peccatis nostris. Poposcit ergo pretium nostrum sanguinem Christi. That Origen also brought the death of Christ into relation to God, see his comment on Rom. iii. 24 (Thomasius, iii. 180): Nunc addit [Paulus] aliquid sublimius et dicit: proposuit eum Deus *propitiationem*, quo scilicet per hostiam sui corporis *propitium hominibus faceret Deum*; and his Hom. in Lev. ix. 10: Tu, qui ad Christum venisti, qui sanguine suo *Deum tibi propitium* fecit, et reconciliavit te patri, etc.]

[r] Comp. T. xix. in Joh. (Opp. iv. p. 286), and the passage before quoted from T. xxviii. p. 393; Contra Cels. i. 1, p. 349: Ὅτι ὁ σταυρωθεὶς ἑκὼν τοῦτον τὸν θάνατον ὑπὲρ τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένους ἀνεδέξατο, ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι ὑπὲρ πατρίδων ἐπὶ τῷ σβέσαι λοιμικὰ κρατήσαντα καταστήματα ἢ ἀφορίας ἢ δυσπλοίας. These human sacrifices were thought to be connected with the influence exerted by the demons, which was to be removed by them; see *Baur*, p. 45, and *Mosheim*, in a note to the translation of that passage, p. 70. The death of Christ also gave an additional weight to his *doctrine*, and was the cause of its propagation; Hom. in Jerem. 10, 2, comp. *Bähr*, p. 142, who observes that no ecclesiastical writer of this period beside Origen distinctly mentions this point. This idea bears, indeed, the greatest resemblance to the modern rationalistico-moral notions concerning the death of Christ. He also compares the death of Jesus with that of Socrates, Contra Cels. ii. 17, Opp. i. p. 408, '4, and represents it as a moral lever to elevate the courage of his followers, ibid. 40–42, p. 418, '19.

[s] *Clement*, too, saw in the death of the martyrs a reconciling power, Strom. iv. 9, p. 596, comp. p. 602, '3; likewise *Orig.* Comm. in Joh. (Opp. iv. p. 153, '54), Exhort. ad Martyr. 50, Opp. i. p. 309: Τάχα δὲ καὶ ὥσπερ τιμίῳ αἵματι τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἠγοράσθημέν.... οὕτως τῷ τιμίῳ αἵματι τῶν μαρτύρων ἀγορασθήσονταί τινες.

[t] On the basis of Col. i. 20 (Comment. in Joh. i. 40, Opp. iv. p. 41, 42): Οὐ μόνον ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων ἀπέθανεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν λοιπῶν λογικῶν. De Princ. iv. 25 (Opp. i. p. 188; *Red.* p. 79 and 364). There are two altars on which sacrifice is made, an earthly and a heavenly; Hom. in Lev. i. 3 (Opp. ii. p. 186); ii. 3 (ibid. p. 190); comp. *Bähr*, p. 119, ss. *Baur*, p. 64. *Thomasius*, p. 214–217, *Redepenning*, Orig. ii. p. 463.

From all that has been said in reference to the subject in question, it would follow that the primitive church held the doctrine of vicarious *sufferings*, but not that of vicarious *satisfaction*. But we should not lay too much stress upon the negative aspect of this inference, so as to justify, or to identify it with, that later interpretation of the death of Jesus, which excludes every thing that is mysterious. Comp. *Bähr*, p. 5–8, and 176–180.

§ 69.

DESCENSUS AD INFEROS.

Dietelmaier, J. A., Historia Dogmatis de Descensu Christi ad Inferos, Altorf. 1762, 8. *Semler, J. A.*, Observatio historico-dogmatica de vario et impari veterum Studio in recolenda Historia Descensus Christi ad Inferos, Hal. 1775. *J. Clausen*, Dogmatis de Descensu Jesu Christi ad Inferos historiam biblicam atque ecclesiasticam composuit, Hafn. 1801. Comp. *Pott*, Epp. cath. Exc. iii. [Comp. also *Pearson*, On the Creed, V. art. and *Heylyn*, on the Creed, VI. art.] *J. L. König*, die Lehre von Christi Höllenfahrt, nach der h. Schrift, der ältesten Kirche, den christlichen Symbolen und nach ihrer viel umfassenden Bedeutung. Frankf. 1842. *E. Güder*, Die Lehre von d. Erscheinung Christi unter den Todten, Berl. 1853. [*F. Huidekoper*, The Belief of the first Three Centuries concerning Christ's Mission to the Underworld. Boston. 1854. *Archd. Blackburn*, Hist. Account of Views about the Intermed. State. 1770. The Revealed Economy of Heaven and Earth, Lond. 1853. *V. U. Maywahlen*, Tod, Todtenreich, etc. Berl. 1854; transl. by J. F. Schön, The Intermed. State, Lond. 1856. The Intermed. State, by the late Duke of Manchester, Lond. 1856. *T. Körber*, Die kath. Lehre d. Höllenfahrt Jes. Christi. Landshut, 1860.]

We have seen that the fathers of this period, with the exception of *Origen*, limited the direct efficacy of Christ's death to this world. But several writers of the second and third centuries thought that it was also retrospective in its effects, and inferred from some allusions in Scripture[1] that Christ descended into the abode of the dead (underworld, Hades), to announce to the souls of the patriarchs, etc., there abiding, the accomplishment of the work of redemption, and to conduct them with him into the kingdom of his glory.[2]

[1] Acts ii. 27, 31 (Rom. x. 6, 7, 8), Eph. iv. 9. 1 Pet. iii. 19, 20 (in connection with Psalm xvi. 10).—On the clause descendit ad inferos in the Apostles' creed, which is of later origin, see Rufin. Expos. p. 22 (ed. *Fell*), *King*, p. 169, ss. *Pott*, l. c. p. 300. *G. H. Waage*, De Ætate Articuli, quo in Symb. Apost. traditur Jesu Christi ad Inferos Descensus, Hær. 1836. This clause is first found in the creed of the church of Aquileia, and was brought into wider use through Rufinus. [Comp. Harvey on the Three Creeds; Pearson, l. c. p. 237: Church Review, 1852; Christ. Rev. 1855; Southern Presb. Rev. 1854: Bibl. Sacra, 1855, 1856, 1859.]

[2] Apocryphal narrative, in the Ev. Nic. c. 17–27. (*Thilo*, Cod. Ap. i. p. 667, ss.) *Ullmann*, Historisch oder mythisch? p. 228. An allusion is found in the Testament of the XII Patriarchs, *Grabe*, Spic. PP. Sæc. i. p. 250. On the passage in the oration of Thaddeus quoted by Eus. i. 13: *Κατέβη εἰς τὸν ᾅδην καὶ διέσχισε φραγμὸν τὸν ἐξ αἰῶνος μὴ σχισθέντα, καὶ ἀνέστη καὶ συνήγειρε νεκροὺς τοὺς ἀπ' αἰώνων κεκοιμημένους, καὶ πῶς κατέβη μόνος, ἀνέβη δὲ μετὰ πολλοῦ ὄχλου πρὸς τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ*, comp. Vales. —The passage from the fuller recension of *Ign.* Ep. ad Trall. c. 9, ii. p. 64, is doubtful; and that from the Shepherd of *Hermas*, Sim. ix. c. 16, refers

properly to the apostles. *Justin M.* also supposes that Christ preached in the nether world, Dial. c. Tryph. § 72; though he was not compelled to this, on account of his views about the λόγος σπερματικός, in relation to the heathen; Comp. *Semisch*, ii. p. 414. More definite language is first used by *Iren.* iv. 27 (45), p. 264 (347), v. 31, p. 331 (451). *Tert.* De An. 7 and 55. *Clem* Strom. vi. 6, p. 762–67, and ii. 9, p. 452 (where he quotes the passage from Hermas); the latter is inclined to extend the preaching of the Gospel to the Gentiles in Hades. *Orig.* Contra Cels. ii. 43 (Opp. i. p. 419), in libr. Reg. Hom. ii. (Opp. ii. p. 492–'98), especially towards the close. Comp. *König*, p. 97. Among the heretics we may mention the opinion of Marcion, that Christ did not deliver the patriarchs, but Cain, the people of Sodom, and all those who had been condemned by the demiurge. Iren. i. 27 (29), p. 106 (Gr. 104) (Neander, Hist. Dog. 250). [On the opinions of the Fathers, comp. also *Pearson*, l. c. p. 238, 245, ss., and *Heylyn*, l. c. p. 264, ss.] Other Gnostics wholly rejected the doctrine of the Descensus, and explained the passage in Peter of Christ's appearance on the earth.

§ 70.

THE ECONOMY OF REDEMPTION.

Heubner, H. L., Historia antiquior Dogmatis de modo salutis tenendæ et justificationis, etc. Wittenb. 1805, 4. *Wörter*, Die christl. Lehre über das Verhältniss von Gnade u. Freiheit, etc. Freib. 1856. [*Landerer*, as cited before, in the Jahrb. f. deutsche Theologie, etc.]

From what precedes, it is evident that the primitive church universally believed that Jesus Christ was the only ground of salvation, and the Mediator between God and man. But all were required to appropriate to themselves, by a free act, the blessings which Christ obtained for them;[1] and the forgiveness of sins was made dependent both on true repentance,[2] and the performance of good works.[3] Sometimes expressions are used which seem to favor the doctrine of the meritoriousness of good works.[4] Nevertheless, all agreed in making *faith* (in accordance with the apostolic doctrine) the conditio sine qua non of salvation,[5] and in celebrating its blessed power in bringing about an intimate union (unio mystica) between man and God.[6] Though the will of man was admitted to be free, yet it was also felt that it must be assisted by divine grace,[7] and this, when carried out, led to the idea of an eternal decree of God (*predestination*), which, however, was not yet viewed as unconditional. *Origen*, in particular, endeavored to explain the relation of predestination to the freedom of the human will so as not to endanger the latter.[8]

[1] This follows from the passages above cited on human liberty. *Justin M.*, Dial. c. Tryph. § 95: Εἰ μετανοοῦντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ἡμαρτημένοις καὶ ἐπιγνόντες τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν καὶ φυλάσσοντες αὐτοῦ τὰς ἐντολὰς ταῦτα φήσετε ἄφεσις ὑμῖν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ὅτι ἔσται, προεῖπον. Comp. *Orig.* Contra Cels. iii. 29. Opp. i. p. 465 (in connection with what is cited § 68, Note 1), according to whom, every one who *lives* in compliance with the precepts of Christ obtains through him friendship with God, and is vitally united to him.

[2] The very circumstance that, in the opinion of the primitive church, sins committed *after* baptism are less easily pardoned (Clem. Strom. iv. 24, p. 634. Sylb. 536, C.), and the entire ecclesiastical discipline of the first ages prove this.—As regards μετάνοια, *Clement* knows the distinction afterward made between contritio and attritio, Strom. iv. 6, p. 580: Τοῦ μετανοοῦντος δὲ τρόποι δύο· ὁ μὲν κοινότερος, φόβος ἐπὶ τοῖς πραχθεῖσιν, ὁ δὲ ἰδιαίτερος, ἡ δυσωπία ἡ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ συνειδήσεως.—On μετάνοια comp. also Pæd. i. 9, 146, and quis Div. Salv. 40, p. 957.

[3] *Hermas*, Pastor. iii. 7: Oportet eum, qui agit pœnitentiam, affligere animan suam, et humilem animo se præstare in omni negotio, et vexationes multas variasque perferre. *Justin M.* also lays great stress upon the external manifestation of repentance by tears, etc. Dial. c. Tryph. § 141. *Cypr.* De Opere et Eleem. p. 167. (237 Bal.); Loquitur in scripturis divinis Spir. S. et dicit (Prov. xv. 29): Eleemosynis et fide delicta purgantur; non utique illa delicta, quæ fuerunt ante contracta, nam illa Christi sanguine et sanctificatione purgantur. Item denuo dicit (Eccles. iii. 33): Sicut aqua extinguit ignem, sic eleemosyna extinguit peccatum. Hic quoque ostenditur et probatur, quia sicut lavacro aquæ salutaris gehennæ ignis extinguitur, ita eleemosynis atque operationibus justis delictorum flamma sopitur. Et quia semel in baptismo remissa peccatorum datur, assidua et jugis operatio baptismi instar imitata Dei rursus indulgentiam largitur (with a further appeal to Luke xi. 41). Tears are of much avail, Ep. 31, p. 64, *Rettb.* p. 323, 389. *Origen*, Hom. in Lev. ii. 4, Opp. ii. p. 190, '91, enumerates 7 remissiones peccatorum: 1, that which is granted in baptism; 2, that which is obtained by martyrdom; 3, by alms (Luke xi. 41); 4, by the forgiveness which we grant to those who have trespassed against us (Matth. vi. 14); 5, by the conversion of others (James v. 20); 6, by exceeding great love (Luke vii. 47; 1 Pet. iv. 8); 7, by penance and repentance: Est adhuc et septima, licet dura et laboriosa, per pœnitentiam remissio peccatorum, cum lavat peccator in lacrymis stratum suum, et fiunt ei lacrymæ suæ panes die ac nocte, et cum non erubescit sacerdoti Domini indicare peccatum suum et quærere medicinam. On the merit of the martyrs, comp. § 68. The intercession of confessors yet living is opposed by *Tert.* De Pud. 22. *Cyprian* also limits their influence to the day of judgment, De Lapsis, p. 129 (187).—*Concerning a first and second penance*, see *Hermæ* Pastor, Mand. iv. 3, *Clem.* Strom. ii. 13, p. 459: Καί οὐκ οἶδ' ὁπότερον αὐτοῖν χεῖρον ἢ τὸ εἰδότα ἁμαρτάνειν ἢ μετανοήσαντα ἐφ' οἷς ἥμαρτεν πλημμελεῖν αὖθις. The different views of Tertullian *before* and *after* his his conversion to Montanism may be seen by comparing De Pœnit. 7 with De Pud. 18. On the controversy between Cyprian and the Novatians see the works on ecclesiastical history.

[4] Even in the Epistle of *Polycarp*, the giving of alms is praised as a work

that saves from death (appealing to Tob. xii. 9); and hints about the doctrine of works of supererogation (opera supererogatoria) are found in the Shepherd of *Hermas*, Simil. Lib. iii. 5. 3: Si præter ea quæ non mandavit Dominus aliquod boni adjeceris, majorem dignitatem tibi conquires et honoratior apud Dominum eris, quam eras futurus. *Origen* speaks in a similar manner, Ep. ad Rom. Lib. iii. Opp. T. iv. p. 507 (he makes a subtle distinction between the *unprofitable* servant, Luke xvii. 10, and the *good* and *faithful* servant, Matth. xxv. 21, and appeals to 1 Cor. vii. 25, concerning the command to the virgins).

[8] During this period, in which theoretical knowledge was made prominent, *faith* was for the most part considered as historico-dogmatic faith in its relation to γνῶσις (comp. § 34). Hence the opinion that knowledge in Divine things may contribute to justification, while ignorance condemns. *Minucius Fel.* 35: Imperitia Dei sufficit ad pœnam, notitia prodest ad veniam. *Theophilus* of Antioch also distinctly recognizes only a fides historica, upon which he makes salvation to depend, i. 14: Ἀπόδειξιν οὖν λαβὼν τῶν γινομένων καὶ προαναπεφωνημένων, οὐκ ἀπιστῶ, ἀλλὰ πιστεύω πειθαρχῶν θεῷ, ᾧ εἰ βούλει, καὶ σὺ ὑποτάγηθι, πιστεύων αὐτῷ, μὴ νῦν ἀπισθήσας πεισθῇς ἀνιώμενος τότε ἐν αἰωνίοις τιμωρίαις. But though it was reserved for later times to investigate more profoundly the idea of justifying faith in the Pauline sense, yet correct views on this subject were not entirely wanting during this period, comp. Clem. Rom. Ep. i. ad Cor. 32 and 33: Ἡμεῖς οὖν διὰ θελήματος αὐτοῦ [sc. Θεοῦ] ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ κληθέντες οὐ δι' ἑαυτῶν δικαιούμεθα, οὐδὲ διὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας σοφίας ἢ συνέσεως ἢ εὐσεβείας ἢ ἔργων, ὧν κατειργασάμεθα ἐν ὁσιότητι καρδίας· ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς πίστεως, δι' ἧς πάντας τοῦ ἀπ' αἰῶνος ὁ παντοκράτωρ Θεὸς ἐδικαίωσεν. Comp. 37–39. *Irenæus*, too (iv. 13, 2, sq.), distinguishes clearly between the righteousness of the law, and the new obedience which comes from faith; *Neander*, Hist. Dogm. p. 216. *Tertull.* Adv. Marc. v. 3: Ex fidei libertate justificatur homo, non ex legis servitute, quia justus ex fide vivit.* According to *Clement* of Alexandria, *faith* is not only the key to the knowledge of God (Coh. p. 9), but by it we are also made the children of God, ib. p. 23 (comp. § 68, note 1), and p. 69. Clement accurately distinguishes between theoretical and practical unbelief, and understands by the latter the want of susceptibility to Divine impressions, a carnal mind which would have every thing in a tangible shape, Strom. ii. 4, p. 436. *Origen* in Num. Hom. xxvi. (Opp. iii. p. 369): Impossibile est salvari sine fide. Comm. in Ep. ad Rom. Opp. iv. p. 517: Etiamsi opera quis habeat ex lege, tamen, quia non sunt ædificata supra fundamentum fidei, quamvis videantur esse bona, tamen operatorem suum justificare non possunt, quod eis deest fides, quæ est signaculum eorum, qui justificantur a Deo.

[9] *Clement*, Coh. p. 90: Ὢ τῆς ἁγίας καὶ μακαρίας ταύτης δυνάμεως, δι' ἧς ἀνθρώποις συμπολιτεύεται Θεός κ. τ. λ. Quis. Div. salv. p. 951: Ὅσον γὰρ ἀγαπᾷ τις τὸν Θεὸν, τοσούτῳ καὶ πλέον ἐνδοτέρῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ παραδύεται. Ideal quietism, Pæd. i. 13, p. 160: Τέλος δέ ἐστι θεοσεβείας ἡ ἀΐδιος ἀνά-

* It was natural, too, that Marcion should insist upon the Pauline view, in opposition to the Jewish dependence on works; see Neander, Hist. Dogm. (Ryland), p. 209.

πανσις ἐν τῷ Θεῷ. Comp. iii. 7, p. 277, '78 (in reference to riches in God), Strom. ii. 16, p. 467, '68, iv. 22, p. 627, 630.

[7] *Tert.* Ad Uxor. i. 8: Quædam sunt divinæ liberalitatis, quædam nostræ operationis. Quæ a Domino indulgentur, sua gratia gubernantur; quæ ab homine captantur, studio perpetrantur. Cf. De Virg. Vel. 10; De Patient. 1, Adv. Hermog. 5. *Justin M.* and *Clement* of Alexandria are favorable to synergism. Comp. Just. Apol. i. 10, Dial. c. Tr. § 32. *Clem. of Alex.* Coh. i. 99. Strom. V. 13, p. 696, vii. 7, p. 860: Ὡς δὲ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὑγείαν παρέχεται τοῖς συνεργοῦσι πρὸς ὑγείαν, οὕτως καὶ ὁ Θεὸς τὴν ἰδίαν σωτηρίαν τοῖς συνεργοῦσι πρὸς γνῶσίν τε καὶ εὐπραγίαν. Quis. Div. salv. p. 947: Βουλομέναις μὲν γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς ταῖς ψυχαῖς συνεπιπνεῖ. So, too, *Orig.* Hom. in Ps. (Opp. T. ii. p. 571): Τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ ἀγαθὸν μικτόν ἐστιν ἔκ τε τῆς προαιρέσεως αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς συμπνεούσης θείας δυνάμεως τῷ τὰ κάλλιστα προελομένῳ; comp. De Princ. iii. 1, 18 (Opp. i. p. 129), and 22, p. 137 (on Rom. ix. 16, and the apparent contradiction between 2 Tim. ii. 20, 21, and Rom. ix. 21). *Cyprian*, De Gratia Dei ad Donat. p. 3, 4: Ceterum si tu innocentiæ, si justitiæ viam teneas, si illapsa firmitate vestigii tui incedas, si in Deum viribus totis ac toto corde suspensus, hoc sis tantum quod esse cœpisti, tantum tibi ad licentiam datur, quantum gratiæ spiritalis augetur. Non enim, qui beneficiorum terrestrium mos est, in capessendo munere cœlesti mensura ulla vel modus est: profluens largiter spiritus nullis finibus premitur, nec cœrcentibus claustris intra certa metarum spatia frænatur, manat jugiter, exuberat affluentur. Nostrum tantum sitiat pectus et pateat; quantum illuc fidei capacis afferimus, tantum gratiæ inundantis haurimus. De Orat. dom. p. 144 (208); Adv. Jud. iii. 25, ss. p. 72, 42, ss., p. 77, ss.

[8] *Hermas* represented the predestination of God as dependent on his *foreknowledge*, Lib. iii. Simil. 8, 6, likewise *Justin M.* Dial. c. Tryph. § 141. *Iren.* iv. 29, 2, p. 267. *Minuc. Fel.* c. 36. *Tert.* adv. Marc. ii. 23. *Clem. Al.* Pæd. i. 6, p. 114: Οἶδεν οὖν (ὁ Θεὸς) οὓς κέκληκεν, οὓς σέσωκεν. According to Strom. vi. p. 763, it is men's own fault if they are not elected. They resemble those who voluntarily jump out of the vessel into the sea. "*Thus the practical sense of Cyprian rebelled against the doctrine of rigid predestination, of irresistible grace; he could not with so bold a front admit all the consequences which are found in the stupendous fabric of Augustine's system.*"—"*That the bishop of Hippo still thought that he discovered his own orthodoxy in the writings of Cyprian, may perhaps be ascribed to his joy at finding in him the premises, from which he drew the conclusions. Rettberg*, p. 321."

[9] *Origen* is far from believing in the doctrine of reprobation. De Princ. iii. 1 (Opp. i. p. 115. Redep. p. 20), he calls those heterodox who adduce the passage relative to the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, and other passages of the Old Test. of similar import in opposition to the *αὐτεξούσιον* of the human soul. He explains God's dealings with Pharaoh from physical analogies: the rain falls upon different kinds of soil, and causes different plants to grow; the sun both melts wax and hardens clay. Even in common life it sometimes happens that a good master says to his lazy servant spoiled by indulgence: I have spoiled you, not meaning that such was his

intention. Origen (as *Schleiermacher* in later times) sees in what is called *reprobatio*, only a longer delay of the grace of God. As a physician often employs those remedies which at first apparently produce bad effects, but heal the disease (homœopathically?) radically, instead of using such as effect a speedy cure, so God acts in his long suffering for men; he prepares their souls not only for the span of this short life, but for eternity, ibid. p. 121. (*Redep.* p. 26.) He adduces a similar illustration from the husbandman (after Matth. xiii. 8), and then goes on, p. 128: *Ἄπειροι γὰρ ἡμῖν, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, αἱ ψυχαὶ, καὶ ἄπειρα τὰ τούτων ἤθη καὶ πλεῖστα ὅσα τὰ κινήματα καὶ αἱ προθέσεις καὶ αἱ ἐπιβολαὶ καὶ αἱ ὁρμαὶ, ὧν εἷς μόνος οἰκονόμος ἄριστος, καὶ τοὺς καιροὺς ἐπιστάμενος, καὶ τὰ ἁρμόζοντα βοηθήματα καὶ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰς ὁδοὺς, ὁ τῶν ὅλων θεὸς καὶ πατήρ.* See ibid. the interpretation of Ezek. xi. 19, and other passages. On the connection between Origen's doctrine of predestination and his doctrine of the preëxistence of the soul, comp. De Princ. ii. 9, 7 (Opp. i. p. 99); Red. p. 220), in reference to Jacob and Esau. Origen also held, like the other fathers prior to the time of Augustine, that predestination was dependent on foreknowledge, Philoc. c. 25, on Rom. viii. 28, 29 (quoted by *Münscher*, edit. by Von Cölln, i. p. 369). "All the fathers of this period agree that God so far predestines men to blessedness or condemnation, as he foresees their free acts, by which they are made worthy of reward or punishment; but the foreseeing these acts is not the cause of them, but the acts are the cause [ground] of the foreknowledge." Gieseler, Dogmengesch. p. 212.

FIFTH DIVISION.

THE CHURCH AND ITS MEANS OF GRACE.

§ 71.

THE CHURCH.

Henke, H. Th. C., Historia antiquior Dogmatis de Unitate Ecclesiæ. Helmst. 1781. †*Möhler*, die Einheit der Kirche. Tüb. 1825. **Rothe, Rich.*, die Entwicklung des Begriffs der Kirche in ihrem ersten Stadium. (The third book of his work: die Anfänge der christlichen Kirche und ihrer Verfassung. Wittenb. 1837, i. vol.) *Gess*, die Einheit der Kirche im Sinne Cyprians (in Studien der evangelischen Geistlichkeit Würtembergs. Stuttgart, 1838, ii. 1, p. 147). *Huther*, Cyprian, comp. § 26, note 9. *Schenkel*, see § 30. In reference to Rothe's work: *Petersen, A.*, die Idee der christlichen Kirche. Lpzg. 1839–44, 3 vols. 8. *Jul. Müller*, Die unsichtbare Kirche (in the Deutsche Zeitschrift f. chr. Wiss. 1850, No. 2). *J. Köstlin*, Die katholische Auffassung von d. Kirche (ibid. 1855, Nos. 33, 46, 1856, No. 12). *Münchmeier*, von der sichtbaren und unsichtbaren Kirche, Götting. 1854. [*Arthur Litton*, The Church in its Idea, etc., Lond. 1851. *Scherer*, Esquisse d'une Theorie de l'Eglise chrétienne, 1844. *W. Palmer*, Treatise on the Church, Am. ed. 2, 1841. On Cyprian's view, *Nevin* in Mercersb. Rev. 1852, three articles. *Th. Kliefoth*, Acht Bücher von d. Kirche, 1854, sq. *Hauber* in Herzog's Realencyclop. Bd. vii. *Ritschl*, Die Begriffe sichtbare und unsichtbare Kirche, in Stud. und Krit. 1859, reviewing Münchmeier. *J. H. Friedlieb*, Schrift, Tradition, etc., Breslau, 1854. *Thos. Greenwood*, Cathedra Petri, 4 vols. Lond. 1856–60. Bishop *Kaye*, Government and Discipline of the Church in the First Three Centuries, Lond. 1855. *F. C. Baur*, Das Christenthum d. drei ersten Jahrh. 1860, p. 239, sq.]

A holy Catholic Christian church, which is the communion of saints, was the expression used in the Christian confession of faith to denote the feeling of Christian fellowship which prevailed in the primitive church, though no exact definitions concerning the nature of the church are found previous to the time of Cyprian.[1] Among the many images under which the church was represented, none was so frequently employed as that of a mother, or of Noah's ark. The fathers uniformly asserted, both in opposition to heretics, and to all who were not Christians, that there is no salvation out of the church,* but that all the fullness of the Divine grace is to be found in it.[2] *Clement of Alexandria*, too, and *Cyprian*, yet more emphatically and in a realistic sense, gave prominence to the unity of the church.[3] The definitions of the latter make an epoch in the history of this

* This strongly defined church feeling is very marked in the writings of *Irenæus*.

doctrine. But he did not sufficiently distinguish between the historico-empirical, visible existence of the church (its body), and the idea of a church which is above the change of mere forms, and which is ever struggling for a complete expression of its essence. This is shown in the Novatian controversy. Thus it happened that the apostolic Christian doctrine of a universal priesthood was more and more superseded by the hierarchical aspirations of the bishops, and the internal was converted into the external.[4] The false idealism of the Gnostics, and the subjective, heretical, and schismatical tendencies of separate sects, especially of the Montanists and the followers of Novatian (the primitive Puritans), form a striking contrast with this false external unity of the Catholic church.[5]

[1] "*The general character of the earlier period (previous to the time of Cyprian) is that of abstract indefiniteness. What the theologians of this period say concerning the nature of the church is so frequently void of clearness and precision, that it is almost impossible fully to ascertain their real sentiments on this point; it is not uncommon to see the same fathers evading, or even rejecting, consequences which necessarily follow from their general reasonings. They thus evince a fickleness (?) which prevents us from forming any decided and certain opinion as to their ideas of the nature of the church.*" *Rothe*, l. c. p. 575, abridged.

[2] On the term *ἐκκλησία* in general (corresponding to the Hebrew יְהוָה, קָהָל, עֵדָה, מִקְרָא) Matt. xvi. 18, xviii. 17; 1 Cor. x. 32; Eph. i. 22; Col. i. 18, 24; comp. *Suicer*, Thes. sub voce; *Rothe*, p. 74, ss.; and the anonymous work, Zukunft d. evang. Kirche, Leipz. 1849, p. 42: "The solemn and emphatic meaning of the words, *called*, *calling* (*καλεῖν*, *κλῆσις*, *κλητοί*), which sound out to us from all parts of the writings of the New Testament, may have essentially contributed in lending to the word *ecclesia*, formed from the same root, its significance, as designating the whole company of the elect, the called." The phrase *ἐκκλησία καθολική* first occurs in the inscription of the Ep. Smyrn. de mart. Polycarpi about the year 169 (Eus. iv. 15). Comp. *Ign.* ad Smyrn. 8: *Ὥσπερ ὅπου ἂν ᾖ Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς, ἐκεῖ ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία.* How great an importance the fathers were accustomed to attribute to the church, may be seen from *Irenæus*, Adv. Hær. iii. 4, 1, and iii. 24, (40). The *church* alone contains all the riches of truth: out of her there are nothing but thieves and robbers, pools with foul water: Ubi enim ecclesia, ibi et spiritus Dei, ubi spiritus Dei, illic ecclesia et omnis gratia (comp. *Huther*, l. c. p. 4, 5); iv. 31, 3, where the pillar of salt into which the wife of Lot was transformed, represents the imperishability of the church; and other passages (comp. § 34, notes 1 and 2). *Clement* of Alexandria derives the term and the idea of *ἐκκλησία* from the elect forming a society, Coh. p. 69, and Pæd. i. 6, p. 114: *Ὡς γὰρ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο Κόσμος ὀνομάζεται· οὕτως καὶ τὸ βούλημα αὐτοῦ ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ σωτηρία, καὶ τοῦτο Ἐκκλησία κέκληται· οἶδεν οὖν οὓς κέκληκεν, οὓς σέσωκεν.* Comp. Strom. vii. 5, p. 846: *Οὐ γὰρ νῦν τὸν τόπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄθροισμα τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν Ἐκκλησίαν καλῶ κ. τ. λ.* Clement describes the church as a mother, Pæd.

i. 5, p. 110; and as both a mother and a virgin, c. 6, p. 123; in speaking of this subject in other places he indulges in allegories, p. 111, ss. The church is the *body* of the Lord, Strom. vii. 14, p. 885; comp. p. 899, 900 (765 Sylb.). Though Clement asserts that only the *true* Gnostics (οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐπιστημῃ) form the church, yet he does not so much contrast with them *those* who have only *faith*, as the heretics who have only *opinions* (οἴησις), and the heathen who live in total ignorance (ἄγνοια), Strom. vii. 16, p. 894, (760 Sylb.). *Origen* also, though, generally speaking, he judges mildly of heretical or sectarian opinions (Contra Cels. iii. § 10–13), knows of no salvation out of the church, Hom. iii. in Josuam (Opp. ii. p. 404): Nemo semet-ipsum decipiat, extra hanc domum, *i. e.* extra ecclesiam nemo salvetur, and Selecta in Iob. ibid. iii. p. 501, 502. Yet with him every thing turns upon a living union with Christ: *Christus* est lux vera . . . . ex cujus lumine illuminata ecclesia etiam ipsa lux mundi efficitur, illuminans eos qui in tenebris sunt: sicut et ipse Christus contestatur discipulis suis, dicens: Vos estis lux mundi; ex quo ostenditur, quia Christus quidem lux est Apostolorum, Apostoli vero lux mundi. *Ipsi enim sunt non habentes maculam vel rugam aut aliquid hujuscemodi vera ecclesia* (Hom. i in Gen. Opp. i. p. 54). Consequently, a distinction between the true and the false church! As to the views of *Tertullian*, we must make a distinction between those which he held prior, and those which he entertained subsequent to his conversion to Montanism. Comp. *Neander*, Antign. p. 264, ss. The principal passages relative to his early opinions are: De Præscript. c. 21, ss. 32, 35; De Bapt. c. 8; De Orat. c. 2, where the above figures about the ark of Noah, and the mother, are carried out at length (see *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, i. p. 70). So, too, *Cyprian*, Ep. 4, p. 9: Neque enim vivere foris possunt, cum domus Dei una sit, et nemini salus esse, nisi in ecclesia possit. He, too, adduces a profusion of similar images. Comp. note 3.

" *The common opinion, that the proposition:* quod extra ecclesia nulla salus, *or:* de ecclesia, extra quam nemo potest esse salvus, *was for the first time laid down by Augustine*, in the fourth century, *in the Donatist controversy, is incorrect. It was only the necessary consequence and application of earlier principles, and was distinctly implied in the form which the doctrine of the church had assumed since the time of Irenæus. Hence we find in the writings of the latter many allusions to it, though he does not make use of this formula of terror.*" *Marheineke* (in Daub und Creuzers Studien, iii. p. 187).

[3] On the *unity* of the church, see *Clem.* Al. Paed. i. 4, p. 103; c. 6, p. 123: Ὢ θαύματος μυστικοῦ· εἷς μὲν ὁ τῶν ὅλων πατήρ· εἷς δὲ καὶ ὁ τῶν ὅλων λόγος· καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ· μία δὲ μόνη γίνεται μήτηρ παρθένος κ. τ. λ. Strom. i. 18, p. 375, vii. 6, p. 848, and other passages. Concerning the opinion of *Tertull.* comp. the passages before cited. *Cyprian* wrote a separate work on the doctrine of the *unity* of the church about the year 251: De Unitate Ecclesiæ, with which, however, several of his extant letters (see note 4) should be compared. He adds some new images to those used by Tertullian, as illustrative of this unity: the sun which breaks into many rays; the tree with its many branches, and the *one* power in the tough root; the *one* source which gives rise to many brooks: Avelle radium solis a corpore, divisionem lucis unitas non capit: ab

arbore frange ramum, fractus germinare non poterit; a fonte præcide rivum, præcisus arescet. Sic ecclesia Domini luce perfusa per orbem totum radios suos porrigit, etc. He also carries out at great length the image of the *one* mother: Illius fœtu nascimur, illius lacte nutrimur, spiritu ejus animamur. He who has not the church for his mother, has no longer God for his father (De Unit. Eccles. 5, 6). After the analogy of the Old Test. faithlessness toward the church is compared to adultery. The Trinity itself is an image of the unity of the church (comp. Clement, l. c.); also the coat of Christ which could not be rent, the passover which must be eaten in *one* house; the *one* dove in Solomon's Song; the house of Rahab which was *alone* preserved, etc. Quite in consistence with such notions, but harshly, he maintains, that martyrdom out of the church, so far from being meritorious, is rather an aggravation of sin: Esse martyr non potest, qui in ecclesia non est.... Occidi talis potest, coronari non potest, etc. Comp. *Rettb.* 241, ss., p. 355, ss., p. 367, ss. *Huther*, p. 52–59. (Comp. the passages quoted by *Münscher*, l. c. p. 70, ss.)

[4] If the genuineness of the epistles of Ignatius (even of the shorter recension) were fully established, they would prove beyond all dispute that submission to the bishops was considered as a *doctrine* of the church at a very early period. Comp. Ep. ad Smyrn. c. 8: Πάντες τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ ἀκολουθεῖτε, ὡς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς τῷ πατρί, etc., ad Polyc. c. 6: Τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ προσέχετε, ἵνα καὶ ὁ Θεὸς ὑμῖν; ad Eph. c. 4: [Πρέπει ὑμῖν συντρέχειν τῇ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου γνώμῃ, ὅπερ καὶ ποιεῖτε. Τὸ γὰρ ἀξιονόμαστον ὑμῶν πρεσβυτέριον, τοῦ θεοῦ ἄξιον, οὕτως συνήρμοσται τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ, ὡς χορδαὶ κιθάρᾳ.] ad Magn. c. 6; ad Philad. c. 7; ad Trall. c. 2: [Ἀναγκαῖον οὖν ἐστιν...ἄνευ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου μηδὲν πράσσειν ὑμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὑποτάσσασθε καὶ τῷ πρεσβυτερίῳ.] Comp. *Rothe*, p. 445, ss., and Bunsen, p. 93. *Iren.* iii. 14, iv. 26, (43), v. 20. On the succession of the bishops: iii. 3 (primacy of the Romish church); comp. with it *Neander*, Church Hist. (Torrey), i. 204. [*Gieseler*, i. 150, note 10; *Kuhn* (R. C.) in Theol. Quartalschrift, 1858, p. 205.] Though *Tertullian* at first appeared willing, De Præscr. c. 32, to concede to the church of Rome the precedence over other churches, yet, after his conversion to Montanism, he combatted the pretensions of the Romish bishops, De Pud. 21; he there alludes particularly to the words of Christ addressed to Peter: dabo tibi claves ecclesiæ—and maintains that the word *tibi* refers to Peter alone, and not to the bishops. He supposed that the spiritually-minded (πνευματικοί) were the successors of Peter, and distinguished between the ecclesia spiritus per spiritales homines (in which the Trinity dwells), and *that* ecclesia, which is composed of the sum total of the bishops (numerus episcoporum). On this ground (but not in the purely apostolic sense) he defended the idea of a spiritual priesthood. *Neander*, Antignosticus, p. 258–59, and p. 272. On the contrary, *Cyprian* conceives that the true priestly dignity is expressed in the *episcopal* power itself (not indeed in that of the Romish bishops exclusively, but in that of all the bishops collectively, which he views in its solidarity, as if it were *one* man), and thinks that the unity of the church is represented by the successors of the apostles; so that he who is not with the bishops, is not with the church. Comp. especially the following epistles: 45, 52, 55, 64, 66, 67, 69, 74, 76 (c. 2).

see *Huther*, p. 59, ss. *Rettberg*, p. 367, ss. *Gess*, p. 150, ss *Neander*, Church Hist., i. 214 (Torrey's transl.). Here, however, the Alexandrian school takes a different and contrasted view. According to Origen (Comment. in Matth. xii. 10), all true believers are also πέτροι, of whom holds good the word spoken to Peter. Comp. De Orat. c. 28, and Neander, Hist. Dog. (Ryland), p. 224.

[1] Wherever the term ἐκκλησία occurs in the Clementine Homilies (Hom. iii. 60, 65, 67, p. 653, ss.; vii. 8, p. 680; *Credner*, iii. p. 308; *Baur*, p. 373), it is to be understood in a limited sense. They do not rise to the idea of a *catholic* church, although they indicate the tendency to a strict, hierarchical church constitution; comp. Schliemann, u. s. page 4, 247, sq. Concerning the Ebionites, Epiphanius observes, Hær. 30, 18, p. 142: Συναγωγὴν δὲ οὗτοι καλοῦσι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἐκκλησίαν καὶ οὐχὶ ἐκκλησίαν. Comp. *Credner*, ii. p. 236. The Ebionitic tendency converted the idea of a church into that of a Jewish synagogue sect, the Gnostics refined it into an idealistic world of æons (*Baur*, p. 172); there a body without life, here a phantom without body. For the views of the Montanists concerning the church (vera, pudica, sancta, virgo: *Tertull.* de pudic. 1), which, as a spiritual church, is composed of homines pneumatici, see *Schwegler*, Montanismus, p. 47, ss. 229, ss. The Montanists made no more distinction between the *visible* and *invisible* church than did the catholic church; but they prepared the way for it. See *Schwegler*, p. 232.

§ 72.

BAPTISM.

Voss, G. J., De Baptismo, disputt. xx. Opp. Amstel. 1701, fol. T. vi. *Matthies, C. St.*, Baptismatis Expositio biblica, historica, dogmatica. Berol. 1831. *Walch, J. G.*, Historia Pædo-baptismi 4 priorum sæcul. Jen. 1739, 4. (Misc. Sacr. Amstel. 1744, 4.) [*Robinson*, the History of Baptism, Lond. 1790. *Halley, R.*, The Sacraments. P. I. Baptism. Lond. 1844.] *J. W. F. Höfling*, Das Sacrament der Taufe, nebst anderen damit zusammenhangenden Acten der Initiation, 2 Bde. Erl. 1846. [*Edward Beecher*, Baptism with reference to its Import and Modes, New York, 1849. *Bunsen's* Hippolytus, vol. iii. *Wall, W.*, Hist. of Infant Baptism, 2 vols. 1705, 2 vols. 1862. *Leopold* on Tertullian's views on Infant Baptism in the Zeitschrift f. d. Hist. Theol. 1854, p. 172. On *Origen* on Infant Baptism, see Journal of Sacr. Lit. 1853; Christian Review (Chase), 1854. *E. B. Pusey*, in Tracts for the Times, No. 67, 3d ed. 1840. Chronological Catena on Baptism, Lond. 1852. *W. Goode*, Effects of Infant Baptism, 1851. *R. J. Wilberforce*, Doctrine of Holy Baptism, 1851. *J. B. Mozley*, Primitive Doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration, Lond. 1856. *J. Gibson*, Testimony of Script. and Fathers of first five centuries to Nature and Effects of Baptism, Lond. 1854.]

The doctrine of baptism stands in intimate connection with the doctrine of the church. From the founding of Christianity great efficacy was attached to baptism in relation to the forgiveness of sins and to regeneration.[1] Some of the fathers, especially *Irenæus*, *Tertullian*, and *Cyprian*, in treating of this subject, as well as of the doctrine of the church, often indulged in exaggerated, fanciful,

and absurd allegories, and symbolisms,[1] while *Origen* draws a more distinct line between the external sign and the thing signified.[2] Infant baptism had not come into general use before the time of *Tertullian;* and this father, the most strenuous advocate of the doctrine of original sin, nevertheless opposed pædo-baptism, on the ground that the age of innocence does not need cleansing from sin.[4] *Origen*, on the contrary, is in favor of infant baptism.[5] In the time of *Cyprian* it became more general in the African church, so that the African bishop *Fidus*, appealed to the analogy of circumcision under the Old Test. dispensation, and proposed to delay the performance of the ceremony of baptism to the eighth day, which, however, Cyprian did not allow.[6] The baptism of newly converted persons was still frequently deferred till the approach of death (Baptismus Clinicorum).[7]—During this period a question arose, intimately connected with the doctrine of the nature of the church, viz., whether the baptism of heretics was to be accounted valid, or whether a heretic who returned to the Catholic church was to be rebaptized? In opposition to the usage of the Eastern and African churches, which was defended by *Cyprian*, the principle was established in the Romish church under *Stephen*, that the rite of baptism, if duly performed, was always valid, and its repetition contrary to the tradition of the church (*i. e.*, the Romish church).[8] Baptism was entirely rejected by some Gnostic sects, while it was held in high esteem by the Marcionites and Valentinus. But the mode of baptism which they adopted was altogether different from that of the Catholic church, and founded upon quite another principle.[9] The idea of a *baptism of blood* originated with martyrdom, and found response in the sympathies of the age.[10]

[1] Concerning the baptism of Christ and of the Apostles, comp. the works on Biblical Theology, and in reference to the mode of baptism (immersion, formula, etc.), see the works on Archæology. *Augusti*, vol. vii. As to the words used at baptism, baptism in the name of Christ alone seems to be more ancient than in the name of the three persons of the Trinity; comp. *Höfling*, p. 35, sq. On the terms: *βάπτισμα, βαπτισμός, λοῦτρον, φωτισμός, σφραγίς*, and others, comp. the Lexicons. Respecting baptism as it was practiced previous to the appearance of Christ, see *Schneckenburger*, über das Alter der jüdischen Proselytentaufe und deren Zusammenhang mit dem johanneischen und christlichen Ritus, Berlin, 1828, where the literature is given, [and *Halley, R.*, Lect. on the Sacraments, P. i. Baptism, p. 111–161]. Like the Apostles, the first teachers of the church regarded baptism, not as a mere ritual act, but as having its objective results. "Baptism was to them not merely a significant symbol, representing to the senses the internal consecration and renewal of the soul, but an efficacious medium for really conveying to believers the blessings of the gospel, and especially the benefits of the sacrificial death of Christ." *Semisch*, Justin d. Mart. ii. 426.

* On the magical influence which the Clementine Homilies ascribe to water, in connection with the notions widely spread in the East, comp. *e. g.*, Hom. ix. and x.; see *Baur*, Gnos. p. 372. *Credner*, l. c. ii. p. 236, and iii. p. 303. Concerning the Ebionites, it is said by Epiph., Indicul. ii. p. 53: Τὸ ὕδωρ ἀντὶ θεοῦ ἔχουσι, comp. Hær. 30. Together with the symbolism of the cross, we find in the writings of the apostolical fathers a symbolical interpretation of water: *Barn.* 11. *Hermas*, Pastor, Vis. iii. 3; Mand. iv. 3; Simil. ix. 6. *Justin M.* (Apol. i. 61) contrasts regeneration by the baptismal water with natural birth ἐξ ὑγρᾶς σπορᾶς. By the latter we are τέκνα ἀνάγκης, ἀγνοίας; by the former τέκνα προαιρέσεως καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀφέσεώς τε ἁμαρτιῶν; hence the λοῦτρον is also called φωτισμός. Comp. Dial. c. Tr. c. 13 and 14, where the contrast between baptism and Jewish lustrations is urged. *Theoph.* Ad. Aut. ii. 16, applies the blessing God pronounced on the fifth day of the work of creation upon the creatures which the waters brought forth, to the water used in baptism. *Clement of Alexandria*, Pæd. i. 6, p. 113, connects the baptism of Christians with the baptism of Jesus. He became τέλειος only by it. And so it is with us: Βαπτιζόμενοι φωτιζόμεθα, φωτιζόμενοι υἱοποιούμεθα, υἱοποιούμενοι τελειούμεθα, τελειούμενοι ἀπαθανατιζόμεθα. Baptism is a χάρισμα. Comp. also p. 116, 117, where the baptized, in allusion to the cleansing power of water, are called διυλιζόμενοι (filtered). On account of the union between the element and the Logos, or his power and spirit, he also calls baptism ὕδωρ λογικόν; Coh. p. 79. All former lustrations are abolished by baptism, being all included in it, Strom. iii. 12, p. 548, '49. *Iren.* iii. 17 (19), p. 208 (224). As dough can not be made of dry flour without the addition of some fluid, so we, the many, can not be united in one body in Christ without the cement of water which comes down from heaven; and as the earth is quickened and rendered fruitful by dew and rain, so Christianity by the heavenly water, etc. *Tertullian* wrote a separate treatise on this subject, entitled De Baptismo. Though he rejects the notion of a merely magical and mechanical blotting out of sins by baptism, and makes the efficacy of baptism dependent on repentance (De Pœnitentia, c. 6), yet he takes occasion, from the cosmical and physical importance of water, to adduce numerous analogies. Water (felix sacramentum aquæ nostræ, qua abluti delictis pristinæ cæcitatis in vitam æternam liberamur!) is in his view the element in which Christians alone feel at home, as the small fishes which follow the great fish (ΙΧΘΥΣ). Heretics, on the contrary, are the amphibious generation of vipers and snakes that can not live in wholesome water. Water is of great importance for the whole universe. The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters—so upon the waters of baptism. As the church is compared with the ark (see the previous §), so the water of baptism is contrasted with the deluge, and the dove of Noah is a type of the dove—the Spirit.*

* Concerning these manifold allegorical interpretations of fish, dove, etc., comp. *Münter*, Sinnbilder der Christen, and *Augusti* in his essay: Die Kirchenthiere, in vol. xii. of his work on the Antiquities of the Christian Church. But Tertullian rightly says in reference to himself: Vereor, ne laudes aquæ potius quam baptismi rationes videar congregasse! [See also the works of Didron, Piper, Twining, etc., as referred to in § 8, supra. On the representation of baptism in the Catacombs, see Perret's work, ubi supra, and Dublin Review, Dec. 1858.]

As power is inherent in all water, it is indifferent what kind of water is used. The water of the Tiber possesses the same power as the water of Jordan; still water produces the same effects as running water, De Bapt. 4: Omnes aquæ de pristina originis prærogativa sacramentum sanctificationis consequuntur, invocato Deo. Supervenit enim statim Spiritus de cœlis et aquis superest, sanctificans eas de semetipso, et ita sanctificatæ vim sanctificandi combibunt. He also compares (c. 5) the baptismal water with the pool of Bethesda; as the latter was troubled by an angel, so there is a special angel of baptism (angelus baptismi), who prepares the way for the Holy Spirit. (Non quod in aquis Spiritum Sanctum consequamur, sed in aqua emundati sub angelo Spiritui Sancto præparamur.)—[On Tertullian, comp. *Leopold*, in Zeitschrift f. Hist. Theol. 854; and Bibl. Sacra (Andover), 1846, p. 680–91, 1848, p. 308, sq.] *Cyprian* spoke of the high importance of baptismal water from his own experience, de Grat. ad Donat. p. 3. He does not indeed maintain that water purifies *as such* (peccata enim purgare et hominem sanctificare aqua sola non potest, nisi habeat et Spiritum S. Ep. 74, p. 213), but his comparisons make the impression of a magical efficacy of water. The devil was cast out of Pharaoh, when he and all his host were drowned in the Red Sea (the sea is a symbol of baptism, according to 1 Cor. x.); for the power of the devil only reaches to the margin of the water. As scorpions and snakes are strong on dry land, but lose their strength, and must vomit their poison, when thrown into water, so the unclean spirits. In short, whenever water is mentioned in the Sacred Scriptures, the Punic symbolism is at once applied to it—"*it is, therefore, not at all surprising, that the rock in the wilderness, as well as the Samaritan woman at Jacob's well, and many others, are regarded as types of baptism.*" *Rettberg*, p. 332.

[3] The term σύμβολον itself, which *Origen* uses Adv. Cels. iii. (Opp. i. p. 481), and Comment. in Joh. (Opp. iv. p. 132), indicates a more or less distinct idea of the difference between the image and the thing which it represents. Nevertheless (οὐδὲν ἧττον), from the last-mentioned passage it is evident that he also considers baptism as something κατ' αὐτό, viz., ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγὴ χαρισμάτων θείων, because it is administered in the name of the divine Trias. Comp. Hom. in Luc. xxi. (Opp. i. p. 957).

[4] The passages from Scripture cited in favor of infant baptism as a usage of the primitive church are doubtful, and prove nothing: viz. Mark x. 14; Matt. xviii. 4, 6; Acts ii. 38, 39, 41; Acts x. 48; 1 Cor. i. 16; Col. ii. 11, 12. [Comp. *E. Beecher*, Baptism, its Imports and Modes, i. 1849. Leonard Woods, Works, Andover, 1850, vol. iii. *N. L. Rice*, Baptism, its Mode, Subjects, etc., New York, 1856. *R. Wardlaw*, Scriptural Authority of Inf. Baptism. *Ripley*, in Christ. Rev. Oct. 1841. R. Halley, on the Sacraments. I. Baptism, (Cong. Lect. England.) Waterland's Works, ii. 171, sq.] *Justin Mart.* Apol. i. 15, speaks of μαθητεύεσθαι ἐκ παίδων, but this does not necessarily involve baptism; comp. *Semisch*, ii. 431, sq. Nor does the earliest definite passage in the writings of the fathers, *Iren.* Adv. Hær. ii. 22, 4, p. 147 (see § 68, note 1), afford any absolute proof. It only expresses the beautiful idea that Jesus was Redeemer *in* every stage of life, and *for* every stage of life; but it does not say that he redeemed children by the *water of baptism*, unless baptism is interpreted into the term *renasci* (comp., however,

Thiersch, in the Zeitschrift f. d. Luth. Theol. 1841, p. 177, and *Höfling*, Die Taufe, p. 112).* Just as little can this passage prove any thing *against* the usage. That, on the other hand, infant baptism was customary in *Tertullian's* times, is proved by his opposition to it. De Bapt. 18. He alleges the following reasons against it: 1. The importance of baptism—not even earthly goods are intrusted to those under age; 2. The consequent responsibility of the sponsors; 3. The innocence of children (quid festinat innocens ætas ad remissionem peccatorum?); 4. The necessity of being previously instructed in religion (Ait quidem Dominus: nolite eos prohibere ad me *venire*. Veniant ergo dum adolescunt, veniant dum discunt, dum quo veniant docentur; fiant Christiani cum Christum nosse potuerint); 5. The great responsibility which the subject of baptism takes upon him (Si qui pondus intelligant baptismi, magis timebunt consecutionem, quam dilationem). From the last-mentioned reason he recommends even to grown-up persons (single persons, widows, etc.) to delay baptism till they are either married, or have formed the firm resolution to live a single life. Comp. *Neander*, Antignosticus, p. 209, 210. [*Robinson*, l. c. ch. xxi. p. 164, ss.]

[s] The views of *Origen*, Comm. in Ep. ad Rom. v. (Opp. iv. p. 565), in Lev. Hom. viii. (Opp. i. p. 230), in Lucam (Opp. iii. p. 948), were connected with his notions concerning the stain in natural generation (comp. § 63, note 4). But it is worthy of notice, that in the first of the above passages he calls infant baptism *a rite derived from the Apostles*: [Ecclesia ab apostolis traditionem accepit etiam parvulis baptismum dare. Sciebant enim illi quibus mysteriorum secreta commissa sunt divinorum, quod essent in omnibus genuinæ sordes peccati, quæ per aquam et spiritum ablui deberent.] And so it was held to be, in the third century, in the North African, Alexandrian, and Syrian-Persian church; Mani among the Persians appealed to infant baptism as customary (August. c. Julian, iii. 187); comp. Neander, Hist. Dogm. (Ryland), p. 234. [On Origen's views compare Journal of Sacred Lit. 1853, and Bunsen's Hippolytus, vol. iii.]

[t] See *Cypr.* Ep. 59 (written in the name of 66 occidental bishops; Ep. 64, edit. *Fell*, Oxon). Cyprian maintains that infants should be baptized as soon as is possible: it is, however, remarkable that his argument in favor of infant baptism is not founded upon the *guilt* of original sin, but upon the *innocence* of infants. Tertullian, on the other hand, urges this very reason in opposition to infant baptism. But Cyprian looks more at the beneficial effects it is designed to produce, than at the responsibility which is attached to it. As we do not hesitate to salute the new-born, yet innocent babe, with the holy kiss of peace, "*since we still see in him the fresh handiwork of God*," so we should not raise any objection to his being baptized., Comp. *Rettb.* p. 331. *Neander* (Torrey's transl.), i. 314.

[u] On this custom, comp. the works on ecclesiastical history and antiquities; *Cyprian*, Ep. 76 (69, Edit. Ox. p. 185), where some very thorny questions are raised respecting sprinkling. [*Münscher*, l. c. i. p. 464.] Against the delay: Const. Apost. vi. 15, so far as it proceeds from depreciation or levity.

* *Gieseler*, in his Dogmengesch, maintains that *renasci* can here be understood only of baptism; *Neander*, Hist. Dog. (Ryland), p. 230, is more reserved.

Tertullian allows even laymen, but not women, to administer the rite of baptism in cases of emergency; de Bapt. c. 17. Comp. Const. Apost. iii. c. 9–11.

[a] *Clement* of Alexandria recognizes only *that* baptism as valid which is administered in the catholic church: Τὸ *βάπτισμα τὸ αἱρετικὸν οὐκ οἰκεῖον καὶ γνήσιον ὕδωρ*, Strom. i. 19, p. 375: so, too, *Tert.* De Bapt. c. 15: Unus omnino baptismus est nobis tam ex Domini evangelio, quam ex Apostoli litteris, quoniam unus Deus et unum baptisma et una ecclesia in cœlis.... Hæretici autem nullum habent consortium nostræ disciplinæ, quos extraneos utique testatur ipsa ademptio communicationis. Non debeo in illis cognoscere, quod mihi est præceptum, quia non idem Deus est nobis et illis, nec unus Christus, i. e. idem: ideoque nec baptismus unus, quia non idem. Quem quum rite non habeant, sine dubion on habent. Comp. De Pud. 19; De Præscr. 12.—The Phrygian synods of Iconium and Synnada (about the year 235) pronounced the baptism of heretics invalid, see the letter of *Firmilian*, bishop of Cæsarea, to Cyprian (Ep. 75), Eus. vii. 7. [*Münscher* ed. by von Cölln, i. p. 473.] A synod held at Carthage (about the year 200), under Agrippinus, had used similar language; see Cypr. Ep. 73 (ad Jubianum, p. 129, 130, *Bal.*). Cyprian adopted the custom of the Asiatic and African churches, and insisted that heretics should be re-baptized; though according to him this was not a repetition of the act of baptism, but the *true* baptism; comp. Ep. 71, where he uses *baptizari*, but not *re-baptizari*, in reference to heretics. Concerning the subsequent controversy with Stephen, comp. *Neander*, Church Hist., i. 319, sq. *Rettberg*, p. 156, ss. The epistles 69–75 of Cyprian refer to this subject. *Stephen* recognized baptism administered by heretics as valid, and merely demanded the laying on of hands as significant of *pœnitentia* (with oblique reference to Acts viii. 17). The African bishops, on the other hand, restricted this latter rite to those who had once been baptized in the catholic church, but afterwards fallen away and returned back again; and they appealed to the custom observed by the heretics themselves in confirmation of their view. Such *lapsi* could, of course, not be re-baptized. The African usage was confirmed by the synods of Carthage (held in the years 255 and 256). Comp. Sententiæ Episcoporum lxxxii. de baptizandis hæreticis, in Cypr. Opp. p. 229 (Fell). [On the whole controversy comp. *Münscher* ed. by von Cölln, i. p. 472–75. *Laurence*, Lay Baptism invalid, 1712, sq. Anonymi Scriptoris de Rebaptismate liber, in Routh's Reliquiæ Sacræ, v. 283–328. *Waterland's* Letters on Lay Baptism, Works, vi. 73–235. Shepherd's Hist. of Church of Rome, 1852.]

[b] Theod. Fab. Hær. i. c. 10. On the question whether the sect of the Cainians (vipera venenatissima, *Tert.*), to which Quintilla of Carthage, an opponent of baptism, belonged, was identical with the Gnostic Cainites; see *Neander*, Antignosticus, p. 193; Church Hist. ii. 476; Hist. Dogm. 229–31. Some of the objections to baptism were the following: it is below the dignity of the Divine to be represented by any thing earthly: Abraham was justified by faith alone; the apostles themselves were not baptized,* and Paul attaches little importance to the rite (1 Cor. i. 17).—That the majority of the Gnostics held baptism in high esteem, is evident from the circumstance

* To the remark of some: Tunc apostolos baptismi vicem impleese, quum in navicula

that they laid great stress on the baptism of Jesus, see *Baur*, Gnosis, p. 224; but they advocated it on very different grounds from those of the orthodox church. On the threefold baptism of the Marcionites, and further particulars, comp. the works treating on this subject: respecting the Clementine Homilies, see *Credner*, iii. p. 308.

[10] *Orig.* Exh. ad Mart. i. p. 292, with reference to Mark x. 38: Luke xii. 50. *Tert.* De Bapt. 16: Est quidem nobis etiam secundum lavacrum, unum et ipsum, *sanguinis* scilicet.....Hos duos baptismos de vulnere perfossi lateris emisit: quatenus qui in sanguinem ejus crederent, aqua lavarentur; qui aqua lavissent, etiam sanguinem potarent. Hic est baptismus, qui lavacrum et non acceptum repræsentat, et perditum reddit. Comp. Scorp. c. 6. *Cyprian* Ep. 73, and especially De Exh. Martyr. p. 168, 69. According to him the baptism of blood is in comparison with the baptism of water, in gratia majus, in potestate sublimius, in honore pretiosius; it is, baptisma, in quo angeli baptizant, b. in quo Deus et Christus ejus exultant, b. post quod nemo jam peccat, b. quod fidei nostræ incrementa consummat, b. quod nos de mundo recedentes statim Deo copulat. In aquæ baptismo accipitur peccatorum remissa, in sanguinis corona virtutum. Heretics are profited neither by the baptism of blood, nor by that of water, but the former is of some service to the catechumens who are not yet baptized. *Rettberg*, p. 382. Comp. also Acta Martyr. Perpet. et Fel. ed Oxon. p. 29, 30, and *Dodwell*, De secundo Martyrii Baptismo, in his Diss. Cypr. XIII.*

§ 73.

THE LORD'S SUPPER.

Schulz, D., die christl. Lehre vom Abendmahl, nach dem Grundtexte des N. Test. Lpz. 1824, 31 (exegetical and dogmatic). *Works on the History of this Doctrine:* **Marheineke, Phil.*, Sa. Patrum de Præsentia Christi in Cœna Domini sententia triplex, s. sacræ Eucharistiæ Historia tripartita. Heidelb. 1811, 4. *Meyer, Karl*, Versuch einer Geschichte der Transsubstantiationslehre, mit Vorrede von Dr. Paulus. Heidelb. 1832. †*Döllinger, J. J. J.*, die Lehre von der Eucharistie in den 3 ersten Jahrhunderten. Mainz, 1826. **A. Ebrard*, des Dogma vom h. Abendmahl und seine Geschichte. Frankf. 1845. *Engelhardt, J. G. W.*, Bemerkungen über die Gesch. d. Lehre vom Abendmahl in den drei ersten Jahrh. in Illgen's Zeitschrift f. d. hist.

fluctibus adspersi operti sunt, ipsum quoque Petrum per mare ingredientem satis mersum. *Tertullian* replies (De Bapt. 12): aliud est adspergi vel intercipi violentia maris, aliud tingui disciplina religionis.

* Though the parallel drawn between the baptism of blood and that of water has a basis in the whole symbolical tendency of the age, yet in its connection with the doctrine of the fathers it appears to be more than a mere rhetorical figure. Like the comparison instituted between the death of the martyrs and that of Jesus, as well as the notions concerning penance, it rests upon the equilibrium which the writers of that period were desirous to maintain between the free will of man, and the influence of Divine grace. In the baptism of water man appears as a passive recipient, in the baptism of blood he acts with spontaneity.

Theol. 1842. **Höfling, J. W. F.*, Die Lehre der ältesten Kirche vom Opfer im Leben und Cultus der Christen. Erlang. 1851. *Kahnis*, Lehre vom Abendmahl. Leipz. 1851. *Rückert, L. J.*, Das Abendmahl, sein Wesen und seine Gesch. in der alten Kirche. Leipz. 1856.

[*Rinck, W. F.*, Lehrbegriff vom heilig. Abendmahl in den ersten Jahrh., in Zeitschrift f. d. hist. Theol. 1853, p. 331–334. *Julius Müller*, article *Abendmahl* in Herzog's Realencyclop., cf. *Ströbel* on the Zeitschrift f. luth. Theol. 1854. *Jeremy Taylor*, on the Real Presence. *Waterland*, on the Eucharist, works, iv. 476–798, v. 125–292. *Hampden's* Bampton Lects. (3d ed. 1848), Lect. viii. *Robert Halley*, The Sacraments, Part II. (Cong. Lect. 1851). *Robt. J. Wilberforce*, Doctrine of Eucharist, 1853 (cf. Christ. Rembr. 1853. Church Review, New Haven, 1854). *W. Goode*, Nature of Christ's Presence in Euch. 2, 1856. *E. B. Pusey*, The Real Presence, 1853–7. *Philip Freeman*, Principles of Divine Service, Lond. 1855–7 (cf. Christ. Rembr. Jan. 1858). *Turton* (Bp.) on the Eucharist, and *Wiseman's* reply (rep. in his Essays), 1854.

The Christian church attached, from the beginning, a high and mysterious import[1] to the bread and wine used in the Lord's Supper, as the symbols of the body and blood of Christ (Eucharist),[2] to be received by the church with thanksgiving. It was not the tendency of the age to analyze the symbolical in a critical and philosophical manner, and to draw metaphysical distinctions between its constituent parts—viz., the outward sign on the one hand, and the thing represented by it on the other. On the contrary, the real and the symbolical were so blended, that the symbol did not supplant the fact, nor did the fact dislodge the symbol.[3] Thus it happens that in the writings of the fathers of this period we meet with passages which speak distinctly of *signs*, and at the same time with others which speak openly of a *real participation* in the body and blood of Christ. Yet we may already discern some leading tendencies. *Ignatius*, as well as *Justin* and *Irenæus*,[4] laid great stress on the mysterious connection subsisting between the Logos and the elements; though this union was sometimes misunderstood, in a superstitious sense, or perverted, in the hope of producing magical effects.[5] *Tertullian* and *Cyprian*, though somewhat favorable to the supernatural, are, nevertheless, representatives of the symbolical interpretation.[6] The Alexandrian school, too, espoused the latter view, though the language of *Clement* on this subject (intermingling an ideal mysticism) is less definite than that of *Origen*.[7] In the apostolical fathers, and, with more definite reference to the Lord's Supper, in the writings of *Justin* and *Irenæus*, the idea of a *sacrifice* already occurs; by which, however, they did not understand a daily repeated propitiatory sacrifice of Christ (in the sense of the Romish church), but a thank-offering to be presented by Christians themselves.[8] This idea, which may have had its origin in the custom of offering oblations, was brought into connection with the service for the commemmoration of the dead, and thus imperceptibly prepared the way for the later doctrine of masses for the deceased.[9] It further led to the notion of a sacrifice

which is repeated by the priest (but only symbolically), an idea first found in *Cyprian*.[10] It is not quite certain, but probable, that the Ebionites celebrated the Lord's Supper as a commemorative feast; the mystical meals of some Gnostics, on the contrary, bear but little resemblance to the Lord's Supper.[11]

[1] "*That the body and blood of Christ were given and received in the Lord's Supper, was from the beginning the general faith, and this, too, at a time when written documents were not yet extant or not widely diffused. And this faith remained in subsequent times; the Christian church has never had any other; no one opposed this in the ancient church, not even the arch-heretics.*" *Rückert*, Abendmahl, p. 297.

[2] Respecting the terms *εὐχαριστία*, *σύναξις*, *εὐλογία*, see *Suicer*, and the lexicons. With the exception of the *Hydroparastates* (Aquarii, Epiph. Hær. 46, 2), all Christians, in accordance with the original institution, used wine and bread; the wine was mixed with water (*κρᾶμα*), and dogmatical significancy was attributed to the mingling of these two elements (*Justin M.*, Apol. i. 65; *Iren.* v. 2, 3; *Cypr.* Epist. 63). The *Artotyrites* are said to have used cheese along with bread (Epiph. Hær. 49, 2). Comp. the Acts of Perpetua and Felicitas, in *Schwegler*, Montanismus, p. 122. *Olshausen*, Monumenta, p. 101: Et clamavit me (Christus) et de caseo, quod mulgebat, dedit mihi quasi buccellam, et ego accepi junctis manibus et manducavi, et universi circumstantes dixerunt Amen. Et ad sonum vocis experrecta sum, commanducans adhuc dulcis nescio quid. Concerning the celebration of the Lord's Supper in the age of the Antonines, and the custom of administering it to the sick, etc., see Justin M. Apol. i. 65: [Προσφέρεται τῷ προεστῶτι τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἄρτος, καὶ ποτήριον ὕδατος καὶ κράματος· καὶ οὗτος λαβὼν, αἶνον καὶ δόξαν τῷ Πατρὶ τῶν ὅλων διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ Πνεύματος τοῦ Ἁγίου ἀναπέμπει, καὶ εὐχαριστίαν ὑπὲρ τοῦ κατηξιῶσθαι τούτων παρ' αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ πολὺ ποιεῖται . . . . εὐχαριστήσαντος δὲ τοῦ προεστῶτος, καὶ ἐπευφημήσαντος παντὸς τοῦ λαοῦ, οἱ καλούμενοι παρ' ἡμῖν διάκονοι διδόασιν ἑκάστῳ τῶν παρόντων μεταλαβεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐχαριστηθέντος ἄρτου καὶ οἴνου καὶ ὕδατος, καὶ τοῖς οὐ παροῦσιν ἀποφέρουσι. 66. Καὶ ἡ τροφὴ αὕτη καλεῖται παρ' ἡμῖν Εὐχαριστία. . . . . *Neander*, Hist. of the Ch. transl. i. 332.] On the liturgical part of this ordinance in general, see *Augusti*, vol. viii. On the communion of children, Neander, Hist. Dogm. 242.

[3] "*It is only in consequence of the more abstract tendency of the West and of modern times that so many different significations are assigned to what the early eastern church understood by the phrase* τοῦτο ἐστί. *If we would fully enter into its original meaning, we ought not to separate these possible significations. To say that the words in question denote transubstantiation, is too definite and too much said; to interpret them by the phrase, cum et sub specie, is too artificial, it says too little; the rendering: this signifies, says too little, and is too jejune. In the view of the writers of the gospels (and after them of the earliest fathers),* THE BREAD IN THE LORD'S SUPPER WAS THE BODY OF CHRIST. *But if they had been asked whether the bread was changed? they would have replied in the negative; if they had*

been told that the communicants partook of the body with and under the form of the bread, they would not have understood it; if it had been asserted that then the bread only signifies the body, they would not have been satisfied." *Strauss*, Leben Jesu, 1st edit. vol. ii. p. 437. Comp. *Baumgarten-Crusius*, ii. p. 1211, ss., and 1185, ss. It is also noteworthy, that in this period there is not as yet any proper *dogma* about the Lord's Supper. "There had not been any controversy; no council had spoken;" Rückert, s. 8. Yet the germs of later opinions were certainly there.

[1] *Ignat.* ad Rom. 7: Ἄρτον Θεοῦ θέλω, κ. τ. λ.; this is incorrectly referred to the Lord's Supper; it can only be understood of that internal and vital union with Christ, after which the Martyr longed; comp. *Rückert*, p. 302. But here is pertinent, ad Smyrn. 7, where Ignatius objects to the Docetæ: Εὐχαριστίας καὶ προσευχῆς ἀπέχονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁμολογεῖν τὴν εὐχαριστίαν σάρκα εἶναι τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, τὴν ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν παθοῦσαν, ἣν τῇ χρηστότητι ὁ πατὴρ ἤγειρεν (comp. ad. Trall. 8. ad Philad. 5. ad Rom. 5). Some understand the word εἶναι itself as symbolical. Comp. *Münscher* ed. by Cölln., i. p. 495, and, on the other side, *Ebrard*, l. c. 254: and *Engelhardt*, in Illgen's Hist. Theol. Zeitschrift. "*Ignatius* teaches *that* flesh and blood are present in the Lord's Supper; but he does not teach how they came to be there, nor in what relation they stand to the bread and the wine;" *Rückert*, p. 303. *Justin*, Apol. i. 66, first makes a strict distinction between the bread and wine used in the Lord's Supper and common bread and wine: Οὐ γὰρ ὡς κοινὸν ἄρτον, οὐδὲ κοινὸν πόμα ταῦτα λαμβάνομεν, ἀλλ' ὃν τρόπον διὰ λόγου Θεοῦ σαρκοποιηθεὶς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν καὶ σάρκα καὶ αἷμα ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας ἡμῶν ἔσχεν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν δι' εὐχῆς λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῦ εὐχαριστηθεῖσαν τροφὴν, ἐξ ἧς αἷμα καὶ σάρκες κατὰ μεταβολὴν τρέφονται ἡμῶν, ἐκείνου τοῦ σαρκοποιηθέντος Ἰησοῦ καὶ σάρκα καὶ αἷμα ἐδιδάχθημεν εἶναι. He does not speak of a change of the bread and wine into the flesh and blood of Christ, see *Ebrard*, p. 257 (against *Engelhardt*). In Ebrard's view, the phrase κατὰ μεταβολήν is the opposite of κατὰ κτίσιν, and denotes that natural food is accompanied by that provided by our Saviour for our new life, comp., also, *Semisch*, ii. p. 439, ss., and *Rückert*, p. 401. The passage is obscure, and it is remarkable that all the three (later) confessions, the Roman Catholic, the Lutheran, and the Reformed, find their doctrine expressed in Justin, while his doctrine is fully expressed by none of them. "*That he teaches a change is not to be denied, but yet only a change into flesh that belongs to Christ, not into the flesh born of Mary; there is not to be found in him a word about what the church afterward added to the doctrine;*" *Rückert*, p. 401. *Irenæus*, iv. 18 (33), p. 250 (324, Grabe) also thinks that the change consists in this, that common bread becomes bread of a higher order, the earthly heavenly; but it does not, therefore, cease to be bread. He draws a parallel between this change and the transformation of the mortal body into the immortal, p. 251: Ὡς γὰρ ἀπὸ γῆς ἄρτος προσλαμβανόμενος τὴν ἔκκλησιν [ἐπίκλησιν] τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐκέτι κοινὸς ἄρτος ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' εὐχαριστία, ἐκ δύο πραγμάτων συνεστηκυῖα, ἐπιγείου τε καὶ οὐρανίου, οὕτως καὶ τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν μεταλαμβάνοντα τῆς εὐχαριστίας μηκέτι εἶναι φθαρτὰ, τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς εἰς αἰῶνας ἀναστάσεως ἔχοντα. Comp. v. 2, p. 293, '4 (396, '97), and *Massueti* Diss. iii. art. 7 n.

114. Irenæus also defends the real presence of the body of Christ in the Lord's Supper in opposition to the Docetæ and Gnostics, iv. 18, § 4: Quomodo constabit eis, cum panem, in quo gratiæ actæ sint, corpus esse Domini sui et calicem [esse calicem] sanguinis ejus, si non ipsum fabricatoris mundi filium dicunt? Comp. the Greek passage from Joh. Dam. Parall.: Πῶς τὴν σάρκα λέγουσιν εἰς φθορὰν χωρεῖν καὶ μὴ μετέχειν τῆς ζωῆς, τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Κυρίου καὶ τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ τρεφομένην; ἢ τὴν γνώμην ἀλλαξάτωσαν, ἢ τὸ προσφέρειν τὰ εἰρημένα παραιτείσθωσαν· ἡμῶν δὲ σύμφωνος ἡ γνώμη τῇ εὐχαριστίᾳ, καὶ ἡ εὐχαριστία βεβαιοῖ τὴν γνώμην. Comp. 33, § 2 (*Münscher*, von Cölln, i. p. 496). But the reason which he urges in favor of his views, viz., that *the Gnostics can not partake of the bread and wine with thanksgiving because they despise matter*, shows that he regarded the elements as more than merely accidental things, though they are not merely bread and wine. Comp. *Thiersch*, die Lehre des Irenæus von der Eucharistie, in Rudelbach and Guerickes Zeitschrift, 1841, p. 40, ss.; in reply, *Ebrard*, p. 261.

[a] The fear of spilling any part of the wine (*Tert.* De Corona Mil. 3: Calicis aut panis nostri aliquid decuti in terram anxie patimur, and *Orig.* in Exod. Hom. xiii. 3), may have originated in a profound feeling of propriety, but it degenerated into superstitious dread. Thus, too, the fair faith in an inherent vital power in the elements (φάρμακον ἀθανασίας, ἀντίδοτον τοῦ μὴ ἀποθανεῖν) was gradually converted into the belief of miraculous cures being effected by them, which easily made the transition to gross superstition. The practice of administering the Lord's Supper to children may also be ascribed to the expectation of magical effects. Comp. the anecdotes of Cyprian, De Lapsis, p. 132. *Rettberg*, p. 337.—The separation of the Lord's Supper from the agapæ, which had become necessary, the custom of preserving the bread, the communion of the sick, etc., furthered such views.

[b] It is remarkable that *Tertullian*, whose views, generally speaking, are so realistic, shows in this instance a leaning toward the sober symbolical interpretation according to which the Lord's Supper is *figura corporis Christi*, Adv. Marc. i. 14; iv. 40. In the latter place (see the connection), he urges the *symbolical* sense to refute Marcion: if Christ had not possessed a real body, it could not have been represented (vacua res, quod est phantasma, figuram capere non potest:—how near to saying, it is impossible to partake of a phantom as such)![*] This sentiment accords with what is said as to its significancy as a memorial in De Anima, c. 17: vinum in sanguinis sui memoriam consecravit. Nevertheless, Tertullian speaks in other places (De Resurr. c. 8, De Pud. c. 9) of the participation of the Lord's Supper as an opimitate dominici corporis vesci, as a-de Deo saginari; with these expressione, comp. De Orat. 6: Christus enim panis noster est [spoken in reference to the daily bread in the Lord's Prayer], quia vita Christus et vita panis.

[*] Respecting the manner in which Tertullian viewed the relation between the *sign* and the *thing signified*, comp. as a parallel passage, De Resurr. Carnis, p. 30. *Rückert*, (p. 307) correctly remarks that Tertullian here follows the usus loquendi of the New Test., and that any one might just as well in all simplicity speak of the body of the Lord, as of the Good Shepherd, and the true vine, without being obliged always to say, in the way of caution, that it is meant figuratively.

Ego sum, inquit, panis vitæ. Et paulo supra: Panis est sermo Dei vivi, qui descendit de coelis. Tum quod et corpus ejus in pane *censetur* (not *est*):* Hoc est corpus meum. Itaque petendo panem quotidianum perpetuitatem postulamus in Christo et individuitatem a corpore ejus. He also is not wanting in mystical allusions (*e. g.*, Gen. xlix. 11: Lavabit in vino stolam suam, is in his opinion a type, etc.), and adopts the notions of his age concerning the magical effects of the Lord's Supper. But these do not prove that the doctrine of transubstantiation, or any of similar import, was known at that time, since the same expressions occur about the baptismal water. Comp. *Neander*, Antignosticus, p. 517, and *Baur*, *F.*, Tertullian's Lehre vom Abendmahl (Tübing. Zeitschr. 1839, part 2, p. 36, ss.) in opposition to *Rudelbach*, who finds (as Luther had done before him) in Tertullian the Lutheran view of the point in question. On the other hand, Œcolampadius and Zuingle appealed to the same father in support of their opinions; comp. also *Ebrard*, p. 289, sq., and *Rückert*, p. 305, sq., against Rudelbach, Scheibel, and Kahnis. *Cyprian's* doctrine of the Lord's Supper is set forth in the sixty-third of his epistles, where he combats the irregularity of those who used water instead of wine (see note 1), and proves the necessity of employing the latter. The phrase *ostenditur*, used in reference to the wine as the blood of Christ, is somewhat doubtful. But the comparison which Cyprian makes of the water with the people is rather *for* than *against* the symbolical interpretation, though in other places (like Tertullian) he calls the Lord's Supper outright the body and blood of Christ, Ep. 57, p. 117. The rhetoric, bordering on the dithyrambic, with which he speaks of the effects of the Lord's Supper (the blessed drunkenness of the communicants compared with the drunkenness of Noah), and the miraculous stories he relates, should protect him from the charge of an excessively prosaic view. But in connection with the doctrine of the unity of the church, he attaches great practical importance to the idea of a *communio*, which was afterward abandoned by the Romish church, but on which much stress was again laid by the Reformed church; Ep. 63, p. 154: Quo et ipso sacramento populus noster ostenditur adunatus, ut quemadmodum grana multa in unum collecta et commolita et commixta panem unum faciunt, sic in Christo, qui est panis cœlestis, unum sciamus esse corpus, cui conjunctus sit noster numerus et adunatus. Comp. *Rettberg*, p. 332, ss.

' In *Clement* the mystical view of the Lord's Supper preponderates, according to which it is heavenly meat and heavenly drink; but he looks for the mystical not so much in the elements (bread and wine), as in the spiritual union of the soul with the Logos; and thinks that effects are produced only upon the mind, not upon the body. Clement also considers the Lord's Supper as a *σύμβολον*, but a *σύμβολον μυστικόν*, Pæd. ii. 2, p. 184 (156, Sylb.); comp. Pæd. 1, 6, p. 123: *Ταύτας ἡμῖν οἰκείας τροφὰς ὁ Κύριος χορηγεῖ καὶ σάρκα ὀρέγει καὶ αἷμα ἐκχεῖ, καὶ οὐδὲν εἰς αὔξησιν τοῖς παιδίοις ἐνδεῖ· ὦ τοῦ παραδόξου μυστηρίου κ. τ. λ.* The use of the terms *ἀλληγορεῖν*, *δημιουργεῖν*, *αἰνίττεσθαι*, clearly shows that he sought the mystery, not in the material elements, but in the spiritual and symbolical inter-

* Comp., however, De Anima, 40 (above § 63, Note 6), and *Rückert*, p. 210–'12 (with reference to *Döllinger*, p. 52).

pretation of the idea hidden in the elements. His interpretation of the symbols is peculiar: the Holy Spirit is represented by the *σάρξ*, the Logos by the *αἷμα*, and the Lord, who unites in himself the Logos and the Spirit, by the mixture of the wine and the water. A distinction between the blood once shed on the cross, and that represented in the Lord's Supper, is found in Pæd. ii. 2, p. 177 (151, Sylb.): *Διττὸν τε τὸ αἷμα τοῦ Κυρίου· τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ σαρκικὸν, ᾧ τῆς φθορᾶς λελυτρώμεθα· τὸ δὲ πνευματικὸν, τουτέστιν ᾧ κεχρίσμεθα. Καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ πιεῖν τὸ αἷμα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, τῆς κυριακῆς μεταλαβεῖν ἀφθαρσίας· ἰσχὺς δὲ τοῦ λόγου τὸ πνεῦμα, ὡς αἷμα σαρκός.* Comp. *Bähr*, vom Tode Jesu, p. 80. [*Bähr* says: "The meaning of Clement is, that what the blood is for the flesh and the body, its life and power, that is the *πνεῦμα* for the Logos. It is, as it were, the blood of the Logos. By the blood of Christ poured out upon the cross we are ransomed; by the blood of the Logos, through the *πνεῦμα*, we are anointed and sanctified"]. In what follows, the mixture of the wine and water is again said to be a symbol of the union of the *πνεῦμα* with the spirit of man. Lastly, Clement also finds in the Old Test. types of the Lord's Supper, *e. g.*, in Melchisedec, Strom. iv. 25, p. 637 (539, B. Sylb.)—Among the Antenicene fathers *Origen* is the only one who decidedly opposes, as *ἀκεραιοτέρος*, those who take the external sign for the thing itself; in the xi. Tom. on Matth. Opp. iii. p. 498–500. "As common meat does not defile, but rather unbelief and the impurity of the heart, so the meat which is consecrated by the word of God and by prayer, does not by itself (*τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ*) sanctify those who partake of it. The bread of the Lord profits only those who receive it with an undefiled heart and a pure conscience." In connection with such views Origen (as afterward Zuingle, and still more decidedly the Socinians) did not attach so much importance to the actual participation of the Lord's Supper as the other fathers: *Οὕτω δὲ οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ φαγεῖν παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ μὴ φαγεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁγιασθέντος λόγῳ θεοῦ καὶ ἐντεύξει ἄρτου ὑστερούμεθα ἀγαθοῦ τινος, οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ φαγεῖν περισσεύομεν ἀγαθῷ τινι· τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τῆς ὑστερήσεως ἡ κακία ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον τῆς περισσεύσεως ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ τα καθορθώματα*, ib. p. 898: Non enim panem illum visibilem, quem tenebat in manibus, corpus suum dicebat Deus Verbum, sed verbum, in cujus mysterio fuerat panis ille fragendus, etc. Comp. Hom. vii. 5, in Lev. (Opp. ii. p. 225): Agnoscite, quia figuræ sunt, quæ in divinis voluminibus scripta sunt, et ideo tamquam spiritales et non tamquam carnales examinate et intelligite, quæ dicuntur. Si enim quasi carnales ista suscipitis, lædunt vos et non alunt. Est enim et in evangeliis littera.... quæ occidit eum, qui non spiritaliter, quæ dicuntur, adverterit. Si enim secundum litteram sequaris hoc ipsum, quod dictum est: Nisi manducaveritis carnem meam et biberitis sanguinem meum, occidit hæc littera. Comp. *Redepenning's* Origenes, ii. p. 438, sq. On other passages, in which Origen seems to incline to the conception of a *real* body (especially Cont. Celsum, viii. 33), see Rückert, p. 343.

[a] Concerning the oblations, see the works on ecclesiastical history, and on antiquities.—The apostolical fathers speak of sacrifices, by which, however, we are to understand either the sacrifices of the heart and life (*Barn.* c. 2), or the sacrifices of prayer and alms (*Clem. of Rome*, c. 40–44), which may

also include the gifts (δῶρα) offered at the Lord's Supper; comp. also *Ignat.* ad Ephes. 5; ad Trall. 7; ad Magn. 7. Only in the passage ad Philad. 4, the εὐχαριστία is mentioned in connection with the θυσιαστήριον, but in such a manner that no argument for the later theory of sacrifice can be inferred from it; see *Höfling*, die Lehre der apostolischen Väter vom Opfer im Christlichen cultus, 1841. More definite is the language of *Justin M.* Dial. c. Tryph. c. 117, who calls the Lord's Supper θυσία and προσφορά and compares it with the sacrifices under the Old Test. dispensation.* He connects with this the offering of prayers (εὐχαριστία), which are also sacrifices. But the Christians themselves make the sacrifice; there is not the slightest allusion to a repeated sacrifice on the part of Christ! Comp. *Ebrard*, l. c. p. 236, ss. *Irenæus*, Adv. Hær. iv. 17, 5, p. 249 (324 Gr.), teaches, with equal clearness, that Christ had commanded, not for the sake of *God*, but of the *disciples*, to offer the first fruits; and thus, breaking the bread and blessing the cup with thanksgiving, he instituted—oblationem, quam ecclesia Apostolis accipiens in universo mundo offert Deo, ei, qui alimenta nobis præstat, primitias suorum munerum, etc. The principal thing, too, is the disposition of the person who makes the offering. On the difficult passage, iv. 18, p. 251 (326 Gr.): Judæi autem jam non offerunt, manus enim eorum sanguine plenæ sunt: non enim receperent verbum, quod [per quod?) offertur Deo.† Comp. *Massuet*, Diss. iii. in Iren. *Deylingii* Obss. sacr. P. iv. p. 92, ss., and *Neander*, Torrey's transl., i. 330,‡ Hist. Dogm. (Ryland), p. 238. *Origen* knows only the *one* sacrifice offered by Christ. It is fitting, however, for Christians to offer spiritual sacrifices (sacrificia spiritualia). Hom. xxiv. in Num et Hom. v. in Lev. (Opp. ii. p. 200): Notandum est quod quæ offeruntur in holocaustum, interiora sunt; quod vero exterius est, Domino non offertur. Ibid. p. 210: Ille obtulit sacrificium laudis, pro cujus actibus, pro cujus doctrina, præceptis, verbo et moribus, et disciplina laudatur et benedicitur Deus (as in Matth. 5, 16). Comp. *Höfling*. Origenis Doctrina de Sacrificiis Christianorum in examen vocatur, Part 1 and 2 (Erl. 1840–41), especially Part 2, p. 24, ss. *Redepenning*, Origen. ii. 437, and *Rückert*, p. 383.

* *Tert.* De Cor. Mil. 3: Oblationes pro defunctis, pro natalitiis annua die facimus. De Exh. Cast. 11: Pro uxore defuncta oblationis annuas reddis, etc., where he also uses the term sacrificium. De Monog. 10, he even speaks of a *refrigerium*, which hence accrues to the dead, comp. de Orat. 14 (19). Here also we might be reminded that Tertullian, as the Christians in general, called prayers "sacrifices" (even the whole Christian worship is called by Tertullian sacrificium, see Ebrard, p. 224); on the other hand, it should not be overlooked that in the above passage, De Monogamia, prayers

* Namely, "*as a thank-offering for the gifts of nature, to which was then added thanksgiving for all other divine blessings.... The primitive church had a distinct conception of this connection between the Lord's Supper and what might be called the natural aspect of the passover.*"—*Baur*, l. c. p. 137.

† Just before, it is said: Offertur Deo ex creatura ejus; and, § 6: *per* Christum offert ecclesia.

‡ Neander considers the reading *per quod* offertur as unquestionably correct.

and sacrifices are distinctly separated. *Neander*, Antignosticus, p. 155. *Höfling*, p. 207–15. *Rückert*, 376.

[10] *Cyprian*, in accordance with his hierarchical tendency, first of all the fathers, gave to the idea of sacrifice such a turn, that it is no longer the congregation that brings the thank-offering, but the *priest*, taking the place of Christ, who offered himself a sacrifice: vice Christi fungitur, id quod Christus fecit, imitatur, et sacrificium verum et plenum tunc offert in ecclesia Deo Patri. But even Cyprian does not go beyond the idea of the sacrifice being *imitated*, which is very different from that of its actual *repetition*. Comp. *Rettberg*, p. 334, and *Neander*, l. c. i. p. 331. *Ebrard*, p. 249, directs attention to the obliquities in Cyprian's modes of statement. [Comp. Marheineke, Symbolik, iii. 420.]

[11] Concerning the Ebionites, see *Credner*, l. c. iii. p. 308; on the Ophites, Epiph. Hær. 37, 5. *Baur*, Gnosis, p. 196.

If we compare the preceding statements with the doctrines afterward set forth in the confessions of faith, we arrive at the following conclusions: 1. The Roman Catholic notion of transubstantiation is as yet altogether unknown; yet there are hints pointing that way, as well as the beginnings of the theory of sacrifice. 2. The views of Ignatius, Justin, and Irenæus (which Rückert calls *metabolism*) can be compared with the Lutheran, only so far as they stand in the middle between strict transubstantiation and the merely symbolical view, and hold fast to an objective union of the sensible with the supersensible. 3. The theologians of North Africa and Alexandria represent the type of doctrine in the Reformed church, in such a way that the positive side of the Calvinistic doctrine may be best seen in Clement, the negative view of Zuingle in Origen; and both the positive and the negative aspects of the Reformed doctrine are united in Tertullian and Cyprian. The Ebionites might then be considered as the forerunners of the Socinians, the Gnostics of the Quakers. Yet caution is needed in instituting such comparisons, for no phase of history is entirely identical with any other, and partisan prejudices have always disturbed the historical point of view.

§ 74.

IDEA OF THE SACRAMENT.

The two ordinances of baptism and the Lord's Supper existed before a systematic definition of the term Sacrament had been formed, so as to include both.[1] The terms *μυστήριον* and *sacramentum* are indeed already used to designate both;[2] but they are quite as frequently applied to other religious symbols and usages, which implied a high religious idea, and also to the more profound doctrines of the church.[3]

[1] The New Testament does not contain the idea of *sacrament*, as such. Baptism and the Lord's Supper were not instituted by Christ as two connected rites; but each in its own place and time, without a hint of a relation of the one to the other. In the apostolical epistles, it has been thought that a connection of the two is indicated in 1 John, v. 6: that it does not

refer to the two sacraments, see *Lücke's* commentary on the passage. More pertinent is 1 Cor. x. 4 (comp. 1 Cor. xii. 13). Yet still both these rites, being instituted by Christ, assumed special prominence, as did also their relation to each other.

[3] As *Tertullian*, generally speaking, is the author of the later dogmatic terminology (comp. the phrases: novum Testamentum, trinitas, peccatum originale, satisfactio) so *he* is the first writer who uses the phrase sacramentum baptismatis et eucharistiæ, Adv. Marc. iv. 30. Comp. *Baumgarten-Crusius*, ii. p. 1188, and the works quoted by him. The corresponding Greek term μυστήριον occurs in *Justin*, Apol. i. 66, and *Clem.* Pæd. i. p. 123 (comp. *Suicer*, sub voce).

[4] *Tertullian* also uses the word sacramentum in a more general sense, adv. Marc. v. 18, and adv. Prax. 30, where he calls the Christian religion a sacrament. Comp. the Indices Latinitatis Tertullianeæ, by Semler, p. 500, and by Oehler. [*Halley*, l. c. p. 9, 10.] Equally varied is the use of the term μυστήριον. *Cyprian* does not recognize an exclusive terminology on this point. He speaks indeed, Ep. 63, of a sacrament of the Lord's Supper, but also of a sacrament of the Trinity (De Orat. Dom. where the Lord's prayer itself is called a sacrament). On the twofold sense of the Latin word, sometimes denoting oath, sometimes used as the translation of the Greek term μυστήριον, see *Rettberg*, p. 324, '25, and compare *Rückert*, p. 315.

SIXTH DIVISION.

THE DOCTRINE ABOUT THE LAST THINGS.
(ESCHATOLOGY.)

§ 75.

THE SECOND ADVENT OF CHRIST—MILLENNARIANISM. (CHILIASM.)

(*Corrodi*) kritische Geschichte des Chiliasmus. Zür. 1781–83, iii. 1794. *Münscher*, *W.*, Entwicklung der Lehre vom tausendjährigen Reiche in den 3 ersten Jahrhunderten, in Henkes Magazin. vol. vi. p. 233, ss. [Comp. the article on Millennium, in *Kitto's* Cyclop. of Bibl. Liter., where the literature will be found. *W. Floerke*, Die Lehre vom tausendjährigen Reiche. Marb. 1859.]

THE disciples of Christ having received from their master the promise of his second coming (*παρουσία*), the first Christians looked upon this event as near at hand, in connection with the general resurrection of the dead and the final judgment.[1] The book of Revelation (which many ascribed to the apostle John, while others denied this, and even contested its canonicity),[2] in its 20th chapter, gave currency to the idea of a millennial kingdom, together with that of a second resurrection, also found in the same book ;[3] and the imagination of those who dwelt fondly upon sensuous impressions, delineated these millennial hopes in the most glowing terms. This was the case not only with the Judaizing Ebionites[4] and *Cerinthus*[5] (according to the testimony of some writers), but also with several orthodox Fathers, such as *Papias* of Hierapolis, *Justin*, *Irenæus*,[6] and *Tertullian*. The millennial notions of the latter were supported by his Montanistic views.[7] In *Cyprian* we find only an echo in a lower tone of the ideas of Tertullian.[8] The Gnostics were from the first unfavorable to millennarian tendencies,[9] which were also opposed by some orthodox writers, *e. g.*, the Presbyter *Caius* in Rome, and by the theologians of the Alexandrian school, especially *Origen*.[10]

[1] Comp. the works on Biblical Theology. On the importance of eschatology in the first period, and its necessary connection with christology, see *Dorner's* Person Christi, i. 232, sq. ["The Christian hope in the Christ that was to come grew out of faith in the Christ who had already come."

"The Christian principle celebrated its apotheosis in the eschatology. For the whole universe is ordered in reference to Christ. What is not a part of the eternal kingdom, must at the end of all things be entirely rejected, become powerless and worthless."] The distinction between the second coming of Christ and the first, was founded on the New Test. *Justin M.* Apol. i. 52: Δύο γὰρ αὐτοῦ παρουσίας προεκήρυξαν οἱ προφῆται· μίαν μὲν τὴν ἤδη γενομένην, ὡς ἀτίμου καὶ παθητοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν, ὅταν μετὰ δόξης ἐξ οὐρανῶν μετὰ τῆς ἀγγελικῆς αὐτοῦ στρατιᾶς παραγενήσεσθαι κεκήρυκται, ὅτε καὶ τὰ σώματα ἀνεγερεῖ πάντων τῶν γενομένων ἀνθρώπων κ. τ. λ. Cf. Dial. c. Tr. 45. Iren. i. 10 (he makes a distinction between ἔλευσις and παρουσία), iv. 22, 2.

[a] See above § 31, note 7, esp. Euseb. vii. 25, and the introductions to the commentaries on the book of Revelation; *Lücke* [*Stuart*, i. p. 283, ss.] According to the latest criticism, the author of the Apocalypse was indeed the real John; but, because entangled in the Ebionitish and Jewish modes of thought, he cannot be the same with John the Evangelist; compare *Baur* (in Zeller's Theol. Jahrb. 1844), and *Schwegler's* Nachapost. Zeitalter, p. 66, sq. In opposition to them, Ebrard endeavors to harmonize the standpoint of the Apocalypse with that of the Gospel; see his Evangel. Johannes und die neueste Hypothese über seine Entstehung (Zürich, 1845), p. 137, sq.— We can not regard the acts in this controversy as definitely closed.

[b] Comp. the commentaries on this chapter [*Stuart*, ii. p. 459, ss., 474]. From *Justin's* larger Apology, c. 52, it has been inferred that, though a millennarian, he held to only *one* resurrection (τὰ σώματα ἀνεργεῖ πάντων τῶν γενομένων ἀνθρώπων); so *Münter* (älteste Dogmengesch. ii. 2, p. 269), and also *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. p. 241 and 247. But in the Dial. c. Tryph. c. 81, Justin teaches a double resurrection; comp. *Semisch*, ii. p. 471, sq. He calls the *first* resurrection *holy* (Dial. c. Tryph. c. 113), but the *second*, the *general*. *Irenæus*, too (v. c. 32), and *Tertullian* (De Resur. Carn. c. 42, and De Anima, c. 58) teach a double resurrection; or (in the case of Tertull.) a progressive resurrection (?); comp. *Gieseler*, u. s. page 241. ["The wholly pure will rise at once; those, however, who have contracted great guilt, must make amends by staying a longer time in the under-world, and rising later;" and thus he interprets Matth. v. 26.]

[c] Jerome, in his Comment. on Is. lxvi. 20, observes that the Ebionites understand the passage, "And they shall bring all your brethren for an offering unto the Lord out of all nations upon horses, and in chariots, and in litters, and upon mules, and upon swift beasts," in its literal sense, and apply it to chariots drawn by four horses and conveyances of every description. They believe that at the last day, when Christ shall reign at Jerusalem, and the temple be rebuilt, the Israelites will be gathered together from all the ends of the earth. They will have no wings to fly, but they will come in wagons of Gaul; in covered chariots of war, and on horses of Spain and Cappadocia; their wives will be carried in litters, and ride upon mules of Numidia instead of horses. Those who hold offices, dignitaries, and princes, will come in coaches from Britain, Spain, Gaul, and the regions where the river Rhine is divided into two arms; the subdued nations will hasten to meet them. But the Clementine Homilies and the Gnostic Ebionites, far from

adopting such gross notions (*Credner*, l. c. iii. p. 289, '90), even oppose them; see *Schliemann*, p. 251 and 519.

[5] Euseb. iii. 28 (from the accounts given by Caius of Rome and Dionysius of Alexandria). According to Caius, *Cerinthus* taught: Μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἐπίγειον εἶναι τὸ βασίλειον τοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ πάλιν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἡδοναῖς ἐν Ἱερουσαλὴμ τὴν σάρκα πολιτευομένην δουλεύειν, this state would last a thousand years: according to Dionysius, ἐπίγειον ἔσεσθαι τὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ βασιλείαν· Καὶ ὢν αὐτὸς ὠρέγετο φιλοσώματος ὢν καὶ πάνυ σαρκικὸς, ἐν τούτοις ὀνειροπολεῖν ἔσεσθαι, γαστρὸς καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ γαστέρα πλησμονῶν, τουτέστι σιτίοις καὶ πότοις καὶ γάμοις καὶ δι' ὧν εὐφημότερον ταῦτα ᾠήθη ποριεῖσθαι, ἑορταῖς καὶ θυσίαις καὶ ἱερείων σφαγαῖς. Comp. vii. 25, and Theodoret Fab. Hær. ii. 3, and the works referred to in § 23. [*Burton*, Bampton Lecture, vi. lect. p. 177–179, and note 76.] But that chiliasm did not come into the orthodox church through Cerinthus, is shown by *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. p. 234. [This is declared by *Eusebius*, Hist. Eccl. iii. c. 28; and Theodoretus and others. But Eusebius (iii. 39) accuses Papias of having spread millennarianism, from a misunderstanding of the apostles, and calls him on this very account σφόδρα σμικρὸς τὸν νοῦν. But *Justin* (Dial. p. 306), writing at the time of Papias, says that it was the general faith of all orthodox Christians; and that only the Gnostics did not share in it. Comp. Irenæus, v. 25, 26. Tertull. c. Marc. iii. 24; and the apocryphal books of the period.]

[6] "*In all the works of this period (the first two centuries) millennarianism is so prominent, that we can not hesitate to consider it as universal in an age, when such sensuous motives were certainly not unnecessary to animate men to suffer for Christianity:*" Gieseler, Text-Book of Church Hist., New York ed., i. 156; Dogmengesch. p. 231, sq. Comp., however, the writings of Clement of Rome, Ignatius, Polycarp, Tatian, Athenagoras, and Theophilus of Antioch, in none of which millennarian notions are propounded. On the millennial views of *Papias*, see Euseb. iii. 39: Χιλιάδα τινά φησιν ἐτῶν ἔσεσθαι μετὰ τὴν ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀνάστασιν, σωματικῶς τῆς τοῦ Χριστοῦ βασιλείας ἐπὶ ταυτησὶ τῆς γῆς ὑποστησομένης. Comp. *Barn.* c. 15 (Ps. xc. 4), *Hermas*, lib. i. Vis. i. 3, and the observations of *Jachmann*, p. 86.—*Justin*, Dial. c. Tr. 80, 81, asserts, that according to his own opinion and that of the other orthodox theologians (εἰ τινές εἰσιν ὀρθογνώμονες κατὰ πάντα χριστιανοί), the elect will rise from the dead, and spend a thousand years in the city of Jerusalem, which will be restored, changed, and beautified (in support of his views he appeals to Jeremiah and Ezekiel); at the same time he admits that even orthodox Christians (τῆς καθαρᾶς καὶ εὐσεβοῦς γνώμης*) entertain different views, comp. Apol. i. 11; he there opposes the hope of a human political kingdom, but not that of a millennial reign of Christ. Justin holds an intermediate position between a gross, sensuous view (συμπιεῖν

* Various writers have endeavored to remove the contradiction between these two views. *Rössler*, i. p. 104, interpolates thus: many *otherwise* orthodox Christians, *Dallæus*, *Münscher* (Handbuch, ii. p. 420), *Münter*, *Schwegler* (Montan. p. 137), interpolate the word μή [comp. *Gieseler*, l. c. i. § 52, note 19.] *Semisch*, in opposition to this, ii. p. 469, note: "Justin does not assert that *all*, but that only the all-sided, the complete believers, are chiliasts."

πάλιν καὶ συμφαγεῖν, Dial. c. Tr. § 51) on the one hand, and a spiritualising idealism on the other. [Comp. *Semisch*, *C.*, Justin Martyr, his Life. Writings, and Opinions, transl. by J. E. Ryland, ii. 370–376.] *Irenæus*, Adv. Hær. v. 33, p. 332 (453, Gr.), defends chiliasm, especially in opposition to the Gnostics. He appeals, *e. g.*, to Matth. xxvi. 29, and Is. xi. 6.—On the highly sensuous and fantastical description (carried out with genuine Rabbinic taste) of the fertility of the vine and of corn, which is said to have originated with Papias and the disciples of John, see *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, i. p. 44. *Grabe*, Spic. Sæc. 2, p. 31, and 230. *Corrodi*, ii. p. 406. [Iren. Adv. Hær. v. 33: "The days will come in which vines will grow, each having ten thousand branches; and on each branch there will be ten thousand twigs, and on each twig ten thousand clusters of grapes, and in each cluster ten thousand grapes; and each grape, when expressed, will yield twenty-five μετρῆται of wine. And when any one of the saints shall take hold of a cluster of grapes, another (cluster) will cry out: I am a better cluster, take me, and on my account give thanks to the Lord. In like manner, a grain of wheat will produce ten thousand heads, and each head will have ten thousand grains; and each grain will yield ten pounds of clear fine flour; and other fruits will yield seeds and herbage in the same proportion." Respecting the millennarian notions propounded in the Sibylline oracles, the book of Enoch, the Testament of the twelve Patriarchs, etc., see *Stuart*, Comment. on the Apocalypse, i. p. 50, ss., 87, ss., 107, ss. Comp. also ii. p. 488, ss.] See also *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. p. 235. *Dorner* tries to give a more spiritual turn to this chiliasm; he does not view it as necessarily connected with Judaizing tendencies; see his Lehre von d. Person Christi, i. 240, sq. note. [He views it as the counterpoise to the Gnostic abstractions, and as containing a genuine historical element; and particularly opposes the views of Corrodi, which have been too implicitly followed by many German church historians.] On the Sibylline Oracles, the Book of Enoch (probably a purely Jewish product), the Testaments of the XII. Patriarchs, and the New Testament Apocrypha, see *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch, p. 243 [also Stuart's Apocalypse; Hilgenfeld, Die Judische Apocalypse, 1859.]

[r] *Tertullian's* views are intimately connected with his Montanistic notions. His treatise, De Spe Fidelium (Hieron. de Vir. illuss. c. 18, and in Ezech. c. 36), is indeed lost; but comp. Adv. Marc. iii. 24. *Tertullian*, however, speaks not so much of sensual enjoyments as of a copia omnium bonorum spiritualium, and even opposes the too sensuous interpretations of Messianic passages, De Resurr. Carn. c. 26, though many sensuous images pervade his own expositions, comp. *Neander*, Antignosticus, p. 499; Church Hist. in Torrey's transl. i. 651. On the question, how far we may implicitly rely on the assertion of Euseb. v. 16, that Montanus had fixed upon the city Pepuza, in Phrygia, as the seat of the millennial reign, and on the millennarian notions of the Montanists in general, see *Gieseler*, Church History, § 48.

[s] Respecting his doctrine of Antichrist, and his belief that the end of the world would soon come, comp. Ep. 58 (p. 120, 124), Ep. 61 (p. 144); Exh. Mart. ab init. p. 167. Tert. adv. Jud. iii. § 118 (p. 91), see *Rettberg*, p. 340, ss.

[t] This is evident both from the nature of Gnosticism itself, and the oppo-

sition which *Irenæus* made to it. Some have even ascribed the origin of Marcion's system to his opposition to millennarianism; comp. however, *Baur*, Gnosis, p. 295.

[10] Concerning *Caius* and his controversy with the Montanist *Proclus*, see *Neander*, Church Hist. i. p. 399.—*Origen* speaks in very strong terms against the millennarians, whose opinions he designates as ineptæ fabulæ, figmenta inania, δόγματα ἀτοπώτατα, μοχθηρά, etc., De Princ. ii. c. 11, § 2. (Opp. i. p. 104); contra Cels. iv. 22 (Opp. i. p. 517); Select. in Ps. (Opp. Tom. ii. p. 570); in Cant. Cant. (Opp. T. iii. p. 28). *Münscher* ed. by von Cölln, i. p. 44–46. Respecting *Hippolytus*, who wrote a treatise on Antichrist without being a real Millennarian, comp. Photius, Cod. 202. *Hœnell*, de Hippolyto (Gött. 838, 4), p. 37, 60. *Corrodi*, ii. p. 401, 406, 413, 416.

§ 76.

THE RESURRECTION.

Teller, *G. A.*, Fides Dogmatis de Resurrectione Carnis per 4 priora secula. Hal. et Helmst. 1766, 8. *Flügge*, *Ch. W*, Geschichte der Lehre vom Zustande des Menschen nach dem Tode. Lpzg. 1799, 1800, 8. †*Hubert Beckers*, Mittheilungen aus den merkwürdigsten Schriften der verflossenen Jahrhunderte über den Zustand der Seele nach dem Tode. Augsb. 1835, '36. †*C. Ramers*, des Origenes Lehre von der Auferstehung des Fleisches. Trier. 1851. [*Bush*, Anastasis, New York, 3d ed. 1845; comp. Bibl. Repos. 1845. *Robt. Landis*, Doctrine of the Resurr., Phila. 1848.]

Though traces of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, which is set forth by the apostle Paul in such a majestic manner, may be found in some conceptions of greater antiquity,[1] yet it received a personal centre, and was made popular even among the uneducated, only after the resurrection of Christ.[2] During the period of Apologetics this doctrine of the resurrection (of the flesh) was further developed on the basis of the Pauline teaching.[3] The objections of its opponents, proceeding from a tendency limited to sense and the understanding, were more or less fully answered in the Epistle of *Clement of Rome* to the Corinthians, as well as in the writings of *Justin*, *Athenagoras*, *Theophilus*, *Irenæus*, *Tertullian*, *Minucius Felix*, *Cyprian*, and others.[4] Most of the fathers believed in the resuscitation of the body, and of the very same body which man possessed while on earth.[5] The theologians of the Alexandrian school, however, formed an exception; *Origen*, in particular,[6] endeavored to clear the doctrine in question from its false additions, by reducing it to the genuine idea of Paul; but, at the same time, he sought to refine and to spiritualize it after the manner of the Alexandrian school. The Gnostics, on the other hand, rejected the doctrine of the resurrection of the body entirely;[7] while the false teachers of Arabia, whom Origen combatted, asserted that both soul and body fall into a sleep of death, from which they will not awake till the last day.[8]

[1] Comp. *Herder*, Von der Auferstehung (Werke Zur Religion und Theologie, vol. xi.)—*Müller, G.*, über die Auferstehungslehre der Parsen, in the Studien und Kritiken, 1835, 2d part, p. 477, ss. *Corrodi*, l. c. p. 345. On the doctrine of Christ and of the apostle Paul (1 Cor. xv.; 2 Cor. v.), and on the opponents of the doctrine in the apostolic age (Hymeneus and Philetus), see the works on Biblical Theology. [*Fries*, Ueber Auferstehung in the Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. 1856. *Delitzsch*, Bibl. Psychol. 1855, p. 400, sq. *Tracy*, in Bibl. Sacra, 1845. *Yeomans*, in Princeton Repert. 1845. *D. R. Goodwin*, in Bib. Sacra, 1852. *John Brown*, Resurr. to Life, Edinb. 1852.]

[2] It naturally excites surprise that, while Paul represents *the resurrection of Christ* as the central point of the whole doctrine, the fathers of the present period keep this fact so much in the background; at least it is not, with all of them, the foundation of their opinions concerning the resurrection of the body. Some, *e. g.*, *Athenagoras*, who yet devoted a whole book to the subject, and *Minucius Felix*, are entirely silent on the resurrection of Christ (see below); the others also rest their arguments chiefly upon reason and analogies from nature (the change of day and night, seed and fruit, the phœnix, etc., Clement of Rome, c. 24, and Ep. 11, 9).

[3] It belongs to exegetical theology to inquire how far the New Testament teaches an *ἀνάστασις τῆς σαρκός*, and what is the relation of the *σάρξ* to the *σῶμα* and to the *ἀνάστασις τῶν νεκρῶν*. Comp. *Zyro*, Ob Fleisch oder Leib das Auferstehende, in Illgen's Zeitschrift, 1849, p. 639, sq. At any rate, the expression resurrectio carnis soon became current, and thus it passed over into the so-called Apostles' Creed.

[4] *Clement*, Ep. i. ad Cor. c. 24–26 (comp. note 2). *Justin M.* adopts the literal interpretation of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, and, in the form, that it will rise again with all its members, Fragm. de Resurr. c. 3 (edited as a separate programme by *Teller*, 1766; extracts in Rössler, Bibl. i. 174). Comp. *Semisch*, ii. p. 146, ss. Even cripples will rise as such, but at the moment of the resurrection, be restored by Christ, and put into a more perfect condition; De Resurr. c. 4, and Dial. c. Tryph. c. 69. Justin founds his belief in the resurrection of the body chiefly upon the omnipotence, justice, and benevolence of God, upon the miracles of Jesus in raising the dead while he was upon the earth, and also, in fine, upon the resurrection of Christ himself;* and shows, in connection with it, that the body must necessarily participate in future rewards or punishments, for body and soul necessarily constitute one whole; like two bullocks, they make one span. Alone, they can accomplish as little as one ox in plowing. According to Justin, Christianity differs from the systems of either Pythagoras or Plato, in that it teaches not only the immortality of the soul, but also the resurrection of the body. But as Justin investigated this subject more thoroughly, he was necessarily led to the discussion of certain questions which have generally been reserved for scholastic acumen, *e. g.*, relating to the sexual relations of the resurrection-bodies, which he compares to mules (!) [Quest. et Resp. p.

* On the other hand, he fails to take notice of the analogies from nature, which others adduce; as *Semisch*, p. 148, has remarked.

423 : Tametsi membra genitalia post resurrectionem, ad prolificationem utilia non erunt: ad reminiscentiam tamen ejus facient, quod per ea membra mortales acceperint generationem, auctum, et diurnitatem. Inducimur namque per ea ad cogitationem tam prolixæ sapientiæ *Christi*, quæ illa (hominibus per mortem intercedentibus attribuit, ad eorum per generationem) augendorum conservationem, ut sobolis creatæ successione, genus nostrum in immortalitate (perducaret)].—The arguments which *Athenagoras* adduces in his treatise De Resurr. (especially c. 11) are partly the same which were in after ages urged by natural theology in support of the doctrine of immortality; the moral nature of man, his liberty, and the retributive justice of God. Concerning the resurrection of the body, he has regard to the objections which have been made to it at all times, on the ground of the natural course of things (the fact that the elements of one organism may enter into the composition of another, etc.). He is, however, comforted by the idea that at the resurrection all things will be restored, *πρὸς τὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ σώματος ἁρμονίαν καὶ σύστασιν.*—*Theophilus*, ad Aut. i. 8, uses similar language.—*Irenæus*, Adv. Hær. v. 12 and 13, also asserts the identity of the future with the present body, and appeals to the analogous revivification (not new creation) of separate organs of the body in some of the miraculous cures performed by Christ (*e. g.*, of the blind man, the man with the withered hand). He alludes particularly to those whom Christ raised from the dead, the son of the widow at Nain, and Lazarus (but makes no mention of the body of Christ himself!).* That *Tertullian*, who wrote a separate work on this subject (De Resurrectione Carnis), believed in the resurrection of the body, is what we might expect, especially as he made no strict distinction between the body and the soul. In illustration, he acutely points out the intimate connection existing between the one and the other during the present life: Nemo tam proximus tibi (animæ), quem post Dominum diligas, nemo magis frater tuus, quæ (sc. caro) tecum etiam in Deo nascitur (c. 63). In his opinion the flesh participates in spiritual blessings, in the means of grace presented to us in unction, baptism, and the Lord's Supper; it even participates in martyrdom (the baptism of blood)! The body, too, is created after the image of God (comp. above, § 56, note 3)! He uses the same illustrations of day and night, the phœnix, etc., which we find in the writings of others, and maintains the identity of the future with the present body, c. 52: Certe non aliud resurgit quam quod seminatur, nec aliud seminatur quam quod dissolvitur humi, nec aliud dissolvitur humi quam caro, cf. 6, 63. He endeavors to meet the objection, that certain members will be of no use in the future life, by saying that the members of the human body are not only designed for the mean service of the visible world, but also for something higher. Even on earth the mouth serves, not only for the purpose of eating, but also to speak and to praise God, etc., c. 60 and 61. *Minucius Felix* makes Cæcilius bring forward the objections of the heathen to the possibility, both of an incorporeal immortality, and of a resurrection of the body, c. 11: Vellem tamen sciscitari, utrumne sine corpore, an cum corporibus,

* Irenæus takes the word "flesh" in 1 Cor. xv. 50, which was often quoted against the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh, to mean *fleshly sense*.

et corporibus quibus, ipsisne an innovatis, resurgatur? Sine corpore? hoc, quod sciam, neque mens, neque anima, nec vita est. Ipso corpore? sed jam ante dilapsum est. Alio corpore? ergo homo novus nascitur, non prior ille reparatur. Et tamen tanta ætas abiit, sæcula innumera fluxerunt; quis unus ab inferis vel Protesilai sorte remeavit, horarum saltem permisso commeatu, vel ut exemplo crederemus?—Every one expects that Octavius will say that *Christ* is this Protesilaus; but in vain! The arguments which he adduces, c. 34, in reply to these objections, are restricted to the omnipotence of God, which created man out of nothing, and this is certainly more difficult than the mere restoration of his body; to the above analogies from nature (expectandum nobis etiam corporis ver est); and to the necessity of retribution, which the deniers of the resurrection are anxious to escape.—The notions of *Cyprian* on this subject are formed after those of Tertullian, comp. De Habitu Virg. p. 100, and *Rettberg*, p. 345.

[a] See the passages quoted in the preceding note.

[b] *Clement of Alexandria* had intended to write a separate work *περὶ ἀναστάσεως*, comp. Pæd. i. 6, p. 125 (104 Sylb.): according to Euseb. vi. 24, and Hieron. apud Rufinum, *Origen* composed not only two books, but also (according to the latter) two dialogues (?) on this subject, comp. contra Cels. v. 20 (Opp. i. p. 592), De Princ. ii. 10, i. p. 100, and the fragments, Opp. T. i. p. 33–37. Clement of Alexandria, in such of his writings as are yet extant, only touches upon the doctrine of the resurrection without discussing it. The passage, Strom. iv. 5, p. 569 (479 Sylb.), where he represents the future deliverance of the soul from the fetters of the body as the object of the most ardent desire of the wise man, does not give a very favorable idea of his orthodoxy on this point. But his disciple *Origen* maintains, Comm. in Matt. (Opp. iii. p. 811, '12), that we may put our trust in Christ without believing the resurrection of the body, provided we hold fast the immortality of the soul. Nevertheless he defended the doctrine of the church against Celsus, but endeavored to divest it of every thing which might give a handle to scoffers: on this account he rejected the doctrine of the identity of the bodies (which is not that of Paul). Contra Cels. iv. 57 (Opp. i. p. 548); v. 18 (ibid. p. 590): *Οὔτε μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς, οὔτε τὰ θεῖα γράματα αὐταῖς φησι σαρξὶ μηδεμίαν μεταβολὴν ἀνειληφυίαις τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον, ζήσεσθαι τοὺς πάλαι ἀποθανόντας, ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀναδύντας. Ὁ δὲ Κέλσος συκοφαντεῖ ἡμᾶς ταῦτα λέγων.* Cap. 23, p. 594: *Ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν οὐ φαμεν τὸ διαφθαρὲν σῶμα ἐπανέρχεσθαι εἰς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς φύσιν, ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν διαφθαρέντα κόκκον τοῦ σίτου ἐπανέρχεσθαι εἰς τὸν κόκκον τοῦ σίτου. Λέγομεν γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ κόκκου τοῦ σίτου ἐγείρεται στάχυς, οὕτω λόγος τις ἔγκειται τῷ σώματι, ἀφ' οὗ μὴ φθειρομένου ἐγείρεται τὸ σῶμα ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ.* The appeal to the omnipotence of God appeared to him an *ἀτοπωτάτη ἀναχώρησις*, p. 595, according to the principle *εἰ γὰρ αἰσχρόν τι δρᾷ ὁ Θεὸς, οὐκ ἐστι θεὸς*; but the biblical doctrine of the resurrection, if rightly interpreted, includes nothing that is unworthy of God, comp. viii. 49, 50 (Opp. i. p. 777, sq.); Selecta in Psalm (Opp. ii. p. 532–'36), where he designates the literal interpretation as *φλυαρία πτωχῶν νοημάτων*, and proves that every body must be adapted to the surrounding world. If we would live in water, we ought to be made like fish, etc. The heavenly state also demands glorified

bodies, like those of Moses and Elias. In the same place Origen gives a more correct interpretation of Ezech. xxxvii; Matt. viii. 12; Ps. iii. 7, and other passages, which were commonly applied to the resurrection of the body. Comp. De Princ. ii. 10 (Opp. i. p. 100, Red. p. 223); *Schnitzer*, p. 147, ss. On the other side: Hieron. ad Pammach. ep. 38 (61); Photius (according to Method.), Cod. 234. The opinion held by Origen's later followers, and of which he himself was accused, that the resurrection bodies have the shape of a sphere, is supported, as far as he is concerned, by only a single passage (De Oratione, Opp. i. 268), in which, moreover, he refers to other (Platonic?) authorities; comp. *Redep.* ii. 463; *Ramers*, ubi supra, 69.

[1] Thus the Gnostic *Apelles* maintained that the work of Christ had reference only to the soul, and rejected the resurrection of the body. *Baur*, Gnosis, p. 410. [That the Gnostics believed in the immortality of the soul, appears certain; but their notions concerning matter made them shrink from the idea of a reunion of the body with the soul, and led them to reject the doctrine of the resurrection of the former. But they have unjustly been charged by the fathers with a denial of the resurrection in general. Comp. *Burton*, Bampton Lecture, notes 58 and 59, and *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, i. p. 51, 52.]

[2] Respecting the error of the *Thnetopsychites* (as John Damascenus first calls them) about the year 248, comp. Euseb. vi. 37: Τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ψυχὴν τέως μὲν κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρὸν ἅμα τῇ τελευτῇ συναποθνήσκειν τοῖς σώμασι καὶ συνδιαφθείρεσθαι, αὖθις δέ ποτε κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀναστάσεως καιρὸν σὺν αὐτοῖς ἀναβιώσεσθαι.

§ 77.

GENERAL JUDGMENT.—HADES.—PURGATORY.—CONFLAGRATION OF THE WORLD.

Baumgarten, J. S., Historia Doctrinæ de Statu Animarum separatarum, Hal. 1754. 4. *Ernesti, J. A.*, de veterum Patr. Opinione de Statu Medio Animarum a corpore sejunct. Excurs. in lectt. academ. in Ep. ad Hebr. Lips. 1795. [*Jac. Windet*, Στρωματεὺς ἐπιστολικός de Vita Functorum Statu ex Hebræorum et Græcorum comparatis Sententiis concinnatus, Lond. 1663, '64. *Thom. Burnet*, De Statu Mortuorum et Resurgentium, Lond. 1757. Comp. *Knapp*, l. c. p. 463, 464, and p. 478, and the references § 69.]

The transactions of the general judgment, which was thought to be connected with the general resurrection, were depicted in various ways. Some ascribe the office of Judge to the Son, others to the Father, both in opposition to the Hellenistic myth of the judges in the under-world.[1] The idea of a *Hades* (שְׁאוֹל), known to both the Hebrews and the Greeks, was transferred to Christianity, and the assumption, that the real happiness, or the final misery, of the departed did not commence till after the general judgment and the resurrection of the body, appeared to necessitate the belief in an intermediate state, in which the soul was supposed to remain from the moment of its separation from the body to this last catastrophe,[2]

Tertullian, however, held that the martyrs went at once to paradise, the abode of the blessed, and thought that in this they enjoyed an advantage over other Christians;[3] while *Cyprian* does not seem to know about any intermediate state whatever.[4] The Gnostics rejected the belief in Hades, together with that of the resurrection of the body, and imagined that the spiritually minded (the pneumatic) would, immediately after death, be delivered from the kingdom of the demiurge, and elevated to the *πλήρωμα*.[5] The ancient oriental and Parsic idea of a purifying fire already occurs during this period in the writings of *Clement of Alexandria* and *Origen*. This purifying fire, however, is not yet transferred to this intermediate state, but is either taken in a very general sense, or supposed to be connected with the general conflagration of the world.[6]

[2] *Justin M.* Apol. i. 8: Πλάτων δὲ ὁμοίως ἔφη Ῥαδάμανθον καὶ Μίνω κολάσειν τοὺς ἀδίκους παρ' αὐτοὺς ἐλθόντας, ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμά φαμεν γενήσεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ. For the further views of Justin about the general judgment, see Apol. ii. 9; *Semisch*, ii. p. 474, '75. *Tatian* contra Gr. 6: Δικάζουσι δὲ ἡμῖν οὐ Μίνως, οὐδὲ Ῥαδάμανθυς . . . . δοκιμαστὴς δὲ αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητὴς Θεὸς γίνεται. Comp. c. 25.

[3] *Justin M.* Dial. c. Tr. § 5, makes the souls of the pious take up a temporary abode in a better, those of the wicked in a worse place. He even stigmatizes as heretical (§ 80), the doctrine that souls are received into heaven immediately after death; but he admits that they possess a presentiment of their future destiny, Coh. ad Græc. c. 35; comp. *Semisch*, p. 464, note 3. The good, even before the final divison, dwell in a happier, the evil in a more wretched abode; Dial. cum Tryph. § 5. On his opinion, that, at the departure of the soul from the body, the former fall into the hands of evil angels (Dial. c. Tryph. § 105), see *Semisch*, ii. 465. *Iren.* v. 31, p. 331, (451, Gr.): Αἱ ψυχαὶ ἀπέρχονται εἰς τὸν τόπον τὸν ὡρισμένον αὐταῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, κἀκεῖ μέχρι τῆς ἀναστάσεως φοιτῶσι, περιμένουσαι τὴν ἀνάστασιν· ἔπειτα ἀπολαβοῦσαι τὰ σώματα καὶ ὁλοκλήρως ἀναστᾶσαι, τουτέστι σωματικῶς, καθὼς καὶ ὁ Κύριος ἀνέστη, οὕτως ἐλεύσονται εἰς τὴν ὄψιν τοῦ Θεοῦ (in connection with this, the decensus Christi ad inferos, and Luke xvi. 22, etc.). *Tertullian* mentions (De Anima, 55) a treatise in which he says he has proved, omnem animam apud inferos sequestrari in diem Domini. The treatise itself is no longer extant; but comp. De Anima, c. 7 (aliquid tormenti sive solatii anima præcerpit in carcere seu diversorio inferum, in igni, vel in sinu Abrahæ); and c. 58. Tertullian rejects the notion of *the sleep of the soul*, which is not to be confounded with the error of the Arabian false teachers; he also opposes the opinion, founded upon 1 Sam. xxviii., that spirits might be conjured up from the abode of the dead, by appealing to Luke xvi. 26 (comp. Orig. Hom. ii. in 1 Reg. Opp. ii. p. 490–'98).

[4] *Tert.* De Anim. 55, De Resurr. 43: Nemo peregrinatus a corpore statim immoratur penes Dominum, nisi ex martyrii prærogativa, paradiso scilicet, non inferis deversurus.—On the meaning of the different terms: inferi, sinus Abrahæ, Paradisus, see Adv. Marc. iv. 34; Apol. c. 47; Orig. Hom. ii. in

Reg. l. c. and Hom. in Num. 26, 4; *Münscher*, von Cölln, i. p. 57, 58, Giesceler, Dogmengesch. 225. [Tertullian gives the most information about the underworld. He describes it (De Anim. 55) as an immense space in the depths of the earth, divided by an impassable gulf into two parts. The part assigned to the righteous he calls sinus Abrahæ, that of the wicked ignis, and sometimes inferi. So, too, *Hippolytus*, in a fragment, Opp. ed. Fabricius, i. 220. Paradise was a different place from this underworld; it is far above this earth, separated from it by a glowing girdle: thither Christ went: and there, too, martyrs go at once; Enoch and Elijah were also transported thither. *Origen* held that, before Christ, no souls, not even those of the prophets and patriarchs, went to Paradise; but when Jesus descended to Hades he transferred them into the lower Paradise (in contrast with the upper), or the third heaven. The souls of pious Christians also go to this Paradise—which Origen identifies with the bosom of Abraham.]

[4] *Cypr.* adv. Demetr. p. 196, and Tract. de Mortalitate, in various places; he expresses, *e. g.*, his hope that those who die of pestilence, will come at once to Christ, p. 158, 164 (where he appeals to the example of Enoch), 166. *Rettberg*, p. 345.

[5] *Neander*, Gnost. Systeme, p. 141, ss. ["*The Gnostics taught that the soul of the perfect Gnostic, having risen again at baptism, and being enabled by perfection of knowledge to conquer the Demiurge, or principle of evil, would ascend, as soon as it was freed from the body, to the heavenly Pleroma, and dwell there for ever in the presence of the Father: while the soul of him who had not been allowed while on earth to arrive at such a plenitude of knowledge, would pass through several transmigrations, till it was sufficiently purified to wing its flight to the Pleroma.*" *Burton*, Bampton Lecture, v. Lect. p. 131.]

[6] The views of *Clement* on this subject are expressed in still more general terms, Pæd. iii. 9, toward the end, p. 282 (Sylb. p. 241), and Strom. vii. 6, p. 851 (709 Sylb.): *Φαμὲν δ' ἡμεῖς ἁγιάζειν τὸ πῦρ, οὐ τὰ κρέα, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἁμαρτωλοὺς ψυχάς· πῦρ οὐ τὸ πάμφαγον καὶ βάνανσον, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρόνιμον λέγοντες, τὸ διϊκνούμενον διὰ ψυχῆς τῆς διερχομένης τὸ πῦρ.* From the whole context it appears that he speaks of the purifying efficacy of a mystical fire, even *during the present life*, perhaps in allusion to Matth. iii. 11. Luke iii. 16.—*Origen*, on the other hand, referring to 1 Cor. iii. 12, considers the fire which will consume the world at the last day, as at the same time a *πῦρ καθάρσιον*, Contra Cels. v. 15. No one (not even Paul or Peter himself) can escape this fire, but it does not cause any pain to the pure (according to Is. xliii. 2). It is a second sacramentum regenerationis: and as the baptism of blood was compared with the baptism of water (see above, § 72, note 10), so Origen thought that this *baptism of fire* at the end of the world would be necessary in the case of those who have forfeited the baptism of the Spirit; in the case of all others it will be a fire of test. Comp. in Exod. Hom. vi. 4; in Psalm Hom. iii. 1; in Luc. Hom. xiv. (Opp. iii. p. 948); xxiv. p. 961; in Jerem. Hom. ii. 3; in Ezech. Hom. i. 13; comp. *Redepenning* on p. 235. *Guerike*, De Schola Alexand. ii. p. 294. *Thomasius*, p. 250.

In respect to the *end of the world*, opinions wavered between *annihilation* and *re-formation*. Most of the fathers seem to have held to the latter view, but *Justin* (in opposition to the Stoic tenet) believed in a real annihilation; Apol. i. 20 and ii. 7. Comp. *Semisch*, ii. 475.

§ 78.

STATE OF THE BLESSED AND THE CONDEMNED.—RESTITUTION OF ALL THINGS.

Cotta, J. F., Historia succincta Dogmatis de Pœnarum Infernalium Duratione, Tüb. 1744.
Dietelmaier, J. A., Commenti fanatici ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων Historia antiquior. Altorf. 1769, 8.

Various modes of statement were used to denote the state of the blessed. The idea that different degrees of blessedness are proportionate to the different degrees of virtue exhibited in this life, was in harmony with the views of most of the fathers of this period concerning the doctrine of moral freedom;[1] and was also congruous with the idea of further progress after the present life. *Origen* in particular developed this latter notion,[2] and also endeavored to avoid as much as possible all sensuous representations of the pleasures of the future world, and to place them in purely spiritual enjoyments.[3] Notions more or less gross prevailed concerning the punishment of the wicked, which most of the fathers regarded as *eternal*.[4] From the very nature of the case it is evident, that purely spiritual views on this subject could not reasonably be expected. Even *Origen* imagined the bodies of the damned to be black.[5] But as he looked upon evil rather as the negation of good than as something positive, he was induced, by his idealistic tendency, to set limits even to hell, and to hope for a final remission of the punishment of the wicked at the restitution of all things, although in popular discourse he retained the common idea of eternal punishment.[6]

[1] According to *Justin M.*, the blessedness of heaven consists mainly in the continuation of the blessedness of the millennial reign, the only difference being the enjoyment of immediate intercourse with God, Apol. i. 8. *Semisch*, ii. p. 477. Different names were given even to the intermediate states before the resurrection (comp. the preceding §, note 6). This was also the case with the abode of the blessed. Thus *Irenæus*, v. 36, p. 337 (460, Gr.), makes a distinction between *οὐρανός*, *παράδεισος* and *πόλις*, and endeavors to prove the existence of different habitations from Matth. xiii. 8, and John xiv. 2. *Clement* of Alexandria also adopted the idea of different degrees of blessedness. Strom. iv. 6, p. 579, '80 (488, '89, Sylb.); vi. 14, p. 793 (668, Sylb.); and *Orig.* De Princip. ii. 11 (Opp. i. p. 104).

[2] According to *Origen*, l. c. the blessed dwell in the aërial regions (1 Thess. iv. 17), and take notice of what happens in the air. Immediately after their departure from this earth, they go first to paradise (eruditionis locus, auditorium vel schola animarum), which (like Plato) he imagined to

be a happy island; as they grow in knowledge and piety, they proceed on their journey from paradise to higher regions, and having passed through various mansions which the Scriptures call heavens, they arrive at last at the kingdom of heaven, properly so called. He too appeals to John xiv. 2, and maintains that progress is possible even in the kingdom of heaven (striving and perfection). The perfection of blessedness ensues only after the general judgment. Even the glory of Christ will be completed only when he celebrates his victory, as the head of the church, dwelling entirely in those who are his. Comp. in Lev. Hom. vii. (Opp. ii. 222). Comp. *Redepenning* Origenes, ii. p. 340, ss. *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. 230.

[s] In the same place, De Princ. ii. 11, [s]Origen describes in strong terms the sensuous expectations of those, qui magis delectationi suæ quodammodo ac libidini indulgentes, solius, litteræ discipuli arbitrantur repromissiones futuras in voluptate et luxuria corporis expectandas. He himself, attaching too much importance to the intellectual, supposes the principal enjoyment of the future life to consist in the gratification of the desire after knowledge, which God would not have given us if he had not designed to satisfy it. While on earth we trace the outlines of the picture which will be finished in heaven. The objects of future knowledge are, as we might naturally expect, for the most part of a theological character; as an allegorical interpreter, he would think it of great importance that we should then fully understand all the types of the Old Test. p. 105: Tunc intelligit etiam de sacerdotibus et Levitis et de diversis sacerdotalibus ordinibus rationem, et cujus forma erat in Moyse, et nihilominus quæ sit veritas apud Deum jubilæorum, et septimanas annorum; sed et festorum dierum et feriarum rationes videbit et omnium sacrificiorum et purificationum intuebitur causas; quæ sit quoque ratio lepræ purgationis et quæ lepræ diversæ, et quæ purgatio sit corom qui, seminis profluvium patiuntur, advertet; et agnoscet quoque, quæ et quantæ qualesque virtutes sint bonæ, quæque nihilominus contrariæ, et qui vel illis affectus sit hominibus, vel istis contentiosa æmulatio. The knowledge, however, of metaphysics, and even of natural philosophy, is not excluded: Intuebitur quoque, quæ sit ratio animarum, quæve diversitas animalium vel eorum, quæ in aquis vivunt, vel avium, vel ferarum, quidve sit, quod in tam multas species singula genera deducuntur, qui creatoris prospectus, vel quis per hæc singula sapientiæ ejus tegitur sensus. Sed et agnoscet, qua ratione radicibus quibusdam vel herbis associantur quædam virtutes, et aliis e contrario herbis vel radicibus depelluntur. We shall also have a clear insight into the destinies of man, and the dealings of Providence. Among the teachings of God in that higher state will also be instruction about the stars, "why a star is in such and such a position, why it stands at such and such a distance from another," etc. But the highest and last degree is the intuitive vision of God himself, the complete elevation of the spirit above the region of sense. The blessed need no other food. Comp. De Princip. iii. 318–321, and Tom. xx. in Joh. (Opp. iv. p. 315): *Ὅτε μὲν ὁ ἑωρακὼς τὸν υἱὸν, ἑώρακε τόν πατέρα· ὅτε δε ὡς ὁ υἱὸς ὁρᾷ τὸν πατέρα, καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ ὄψεταί τις, οἱονεὶ ὁμοίως τῷ υἱῷ αὐτόπτης ἔσται τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῶν τοῦ πατρὸς, οὐκέτι ἀπὸ τῆς εἰκόνος ἐννοῶν τὰ περὶ τούτου, οὗ ἡ εἰκών ἐστι. Καὶ νομίζω γε τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ τέλος, ὅταν παραδίδωσι τὴν βασίλειαν ὁ υἱὸς τῷ θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ,*

καὶ ὅτε γίνεται ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν (1 Cor. xv. 28). *Redepen.* Orig. ii. 283, sq. The views of Origen form a remarkable contrast with the sensuous and rhetorical description of *Cyprian*, which are indeed connected with his hierarchial and ascetic tendency, but also have a more churchly character, and enjoy greater popularity, because they are adapted to the wants of the heart (the meeting again of individuals, etc.); De Mortalitate, p. 166: Quis non ad suos navigare festinans ventum prosperum cupidius optaret, ut velociter caros liceret amplecti? Patriam nostram Paradisum computamus; parentes Patriarchas habere jam cœpimus: quid non properamus et currimus, ut patriam nostram videre, ut parentes salutare possimus? Magnus illic nos carorum numerus expectat, parentum, fratrum, filiorum frequens nos et copiosa turba desiderat, jam de sua immortalitate secura, et adhuc de nostra salute solicita. Ad horum conspectum et complexum venire quanta et illis et nobis in commune lætitia est! Qualis illic cœlestium regnorum voluptas sine timore moriendi et cum æternitate vivendi! quam summa et perpetua felicitas! Illic apostolorum gloriosus chorus, illic prophetarum exultantium numerus, illic martyrum innumerabilis populus ob certaminis et passionis victoriam coronatus; triumphantes illic virgines, quæ concupiscentiam carnis et corporis continentiæ robore subegerunt; remunerati misericordes, qui alimentis et largitionibus pauperum justitiæ opera fecerunt, qui dominica præcepta servantes ad cœlestes thesauros terrena patrimonia transtulerunt. Ad hos, fratres dilectissimi, avida cupiditate properemus, ut cum his cito esse, ut cito ad Christum venire contingat, optemus.

[4] *Clement* of Rome, Ep. 2, c. 8 (comp. c. 9): Μετὰ γὰρ τὸ ἐξελθεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου οὐκ ἔτι δυνάμεθα ἐκεῖ ἐξομολογήσασθαι ἢ μετανοεῖν ἔτι. *Justin M.* also asserts the eternity of future punishments in opposition to Plato's doctrine, that they would last a thousand years, Apol. i. 8, Coh. ad Gr. c. 35. Thus *Minuc. Fel.* c. 35: Nec tormentis aut modus ullus aut terminus. Also *Cyprian*, ad Demetr. p. 195: Cremabit addictos ardems semper gehenna, et vivacibus flammis vorax pœna, nec erit, unde habere tormenta vel requiem possint aliquando vel finem. Servabuntur cum corporibus suis animæ infinitis cruciatibus ad dolorem. P. 196: Quando istinc excessum fuerit, nullus jam pœnitentiæ locus est, nullus, satisfactionis effectus: hic vita aut amittitur, aut tenetur, hic saluti æternæ cultu Dei et fructu fidei providetur.—The idea of eternal punishments is different from that of a total annihilation, which was propounded by *Arnobius* at the commencement of the following period. Some are disposed to find the first traces of this doctrine in *Justin M.*, Dial. cum Tryph. c. 5, where it is said that the souls of the wicked should be punished as long as ἔστ' ἂν αὐτὰς καὶ εἶναι καὶ κολάζεσθαι ὁ Θεὸς θέλῃ. (Comp. on this passage *Semisch*, ii. p. 480, 481.) Comp. also *Iren.* ii. 34: Quoadusque ea Deus et esse et perseverare voluerit; and Clement Hom. iii. 8.

[5] In accordance with the analogy of Scripture, fire was commonly represented as the instrument by which God executes his punishments. *Justin M.* speaks in various places of a πῦρ αἰώνιον, ἄσβεστον (Apol. ii. 1, 2, 7, Dial. c. Tr. § 130). *Clement* of Alexandria, Coh. 47 (35), calls it πῦρ σωφρονοῦν; *Tert.* Scorp. 4, and *Minuc. Fel.* 35 (afterward also Jerome and others), call it ignis sapiens. It will be sufficient here to quote the passage of Minucius

Illic sapiens ignis membra urit et reficit, carpit et nutrit, sicut ignes fulminum corpora tangunt, nec absumunt. Sicut ignes Ætnæ et Vesuvii montis et ardentium ubique terrarum flagrant nec erogantur, ita pœnale illud incendium non damnis ardentium pascitur, sed inexesa corporum laceratione nutritur. Comp. also *Tert.* Apol. c. 48, and *Cypr.* ad. Demetr. l. c., who thinks that the sight of these punishments is a kind of satisfaction to the blessed for the persecution which they had to suffer while on earth. [*Cyprian*, Ep. 55 (Baluz. 52, c. 17).—Aliud est ad veniam stare, aliud ad gloriam pervenire, aliud missum in carcerem non exire inde, donec solvat novissimam quadrantem, aliud statim fidei et virtutis accipere mercedem, aliud pro peccatis longo dolore cruciatum emundari et *purgari diu igne* (another reading is, *purgari diutine*), aliud peccata omnia passione purgasse, aliud denique pendere in diem judicii ad sententiam Domini, aliud statim a Domino coronari. Comp. *Neander*, Hist. Dogm. (Ryland), p. 258.]—Hell was represented as a place; thus by *Justin M.*, Apol. i. 19: Ἡ δὲ γεέννά ἐστι τόπος, ἔνθα κολάζεσθαι μέλλουσι οἱ ἀδίκως βιώσαντες καὶ μὴ πιστεύοντες ταῦτα γενήσεσθαι, ὅσα ὁ θεὸς διὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐδίδαξε.—As *Origen* imagined that spiritual enjoyments constitute the future blessedness, so he believed the condemnation of the wicked to consist in separation from God, remorse of conscience, etc., De Princ. ii. 10 (Opp. i. p. 102). The eternal fire is not a material substance, kindled by another, but the combustible materials are our sins themselves, coming up before the conscience: the fire of hell resembles the fire of passion in this world. The separation of the soul from God may be compared with the pain which we suffer, when all the members of the body are torn out of their joints (an undying dissolution of our very essence!). By "outer darkness" Origen does not so much understand a place devoid of light, as a state of ignorance; so that this notion about *black bodies* seems to be an accommodation to popular ideas. It should also be borne in mind, that Origen supposed that the design of all these punishments was medicinal or educational, in expectation of future reformation.

* De Princ. i. 6 (Opp. i. p. 70, 71, quoted by *Münscher* von Cölln, i. p. 64, 65). The ideas here expressed are connected with Origen's general views about the character of God, the design of the divine punishments, liberty and the nature of evil, as well as with his demonology, and especially with his triumphant faith in the power of redemption to overcome all things (according to Ps. cx. 1, and 1 Cor. xv. 25). At the same time, he frankly confessed that his doctrine might easily become dangerous to the unconverted; contra Celsum, vi. 26 (Opp. i. p. 650). He therefore speaks at the very commencement of the xix. Hom. in Jerem. (Opp. T. iii. p. 241), of an eternal condemnation, and even of the impossibility of being converted in the world to come. Nevertheless, in the same Hom. (p. 267), he calls the fear of eternal punishment (according to Jerem. xx. 7) ἀπάτη, beneficial indeed in its effects, and appointed by God himself (a pedagogical artifice as it were). For, he says, many wise men, or such as thought themselves wise, after having apprehended the (theoretical) truth respecting the divine punishments, and rejected the delusion (beneficial in a practical point of view), have given themselves up to a vicious life; so that it would have been much better for them to believe in the eternity of the punishments of hell. Comp. *Redepen.* ii. 447.

SECOND PERIOD.

FROM THE DEATH OF ORIGEN TO JOHN OF DAMASCUS, FROM THE YEAR 254–730.

THE AGE OF POLEMICS.

A. GENERAL HISTORY OF DOCTRINES IN THE SECOND PERIOD.

§ 79.

INTRODUCTION.

De Wette, Christliche Sittenlehre, vol. ii. p. 294, ss. *Münscher*, Handbuch, vol. iii. Section 1. [*Baur, F. C.*, Die Christliche Kirche vom Anfang des vierten bis zum Ende des sechsten Jahrh. Tübingen, 1859. *E. von Lasaulx*, Der Untergang des Hellenismus. München, 1854. *Isaac Taylor*, Ancient Christianity, 4th ed., 2 vols., 1844.]

During the considerable space of time embraced in this period, the *Polemics* of the church were developed much more prominently than either the apologetical tendency as in the preceding, or the systematic tendency as in the next period. In the time which elapsed between the Sabellian and the Monothelite controversies, which nearly coincides with the limits here assigned, an unbroken series of contests is carried on *within* the church, about the most important doctrinal points. While in the preceding period heretical tendencies separated from the church as a matter of course, here, on the contrary, victory for a long time wavers, now to the one side, and again to the other. Orthodoxy, however, prevailed at last, partly from an internal necessity, yet not without the aid of the secular power and of external circumstances.

It is just as one-sided to ascribe the victory of orthodoxy to the combination of political power and monkish intrigues, as it is to deny these factors altogether. Much as there was of human passion and dogmatism intermingled with this strife, yet it is not to be wholly derived from such impure sources; but there must also be recognized a law of internal progress, determining the gradual and systematic unfolding of the dogmas.

§ 80.

DOCTRINAL DEFINITIONS AND CONTROVERSIES.

The three main pillars of the Christian system, *Theology*, *Christology*, and *Anthropology*, were the principal points debated in the councils, and defined in the symbols. The controversies here to be considered are the following: *a. In reference to the Doctrine of the Trinity* (Theology): the Sabellian and the Arian controversies, with their branches, the Semi-Arian and the Macedonian. *b. Relative to the two Natures of Christ* (Christology): the Apollinarian, Nestorian, Eutychian-Monophysite, and Monothelite controversies. *c. Concerning Anthropology and the Economy of Redemption:* the Pelagian, Semipelagian, and (in reference to the Church) the Donatist controversies. The first eight took their rise in the East; the last three originated in the West, but both east and west reciprocally felt their effects; so that there were frequent divisions between the oriental and occidental church, till at last the controversy respecting the procession of the Holy Ghost brought about a lasting schism.

The controversy about the *Worship of Images*, carried on in the East, and partly, too, in the West (only the beginning of which falls into this period), belongs, in the first instance, to the history of worship; but it also had an influence, especially in the West, upon the doctrinal definitions of the nature of God, the person of Christ, and the significance of the sacraments. But the further development of the doctrine of the sacraments, and of eschatology, was reserved for the next period. Concerning the external history of those controversies, see the works on ecclesiastical history.

§ 81.

THE DOGMATIC CHARACTER OF THIS PERIOD.—THE FATE OF ORIGENISM.

In proportion to the development of ecclesiastical orthodoxy into fixed and systematic shape, was the loss of individual freedom in respect to the formation of doctrines and the increased peril of becoming heretical. The more liberal tendency of former theologians, such as *Origen*, could no longer be tolerated, and was at length condemned. But, notwithstanding this external condemnation, the spirit of Origen continued to animate the chief theologians of the East, though it was kept within narrower limits. The works of this great teacher were also made known in the West by Jerome and Rufinus, and exerted an influence even upon his opponents.

The principal *followers* of Origen were *Dionysius*, bishop of Alexandria, *Pamphilus* of Cæsarea, *Gregory Thaumaturgus*, bishop of Neocæsarea, and others. Among his opponents *Methodius* (bishop of Lycia, and afterward of Tyrus, died in the Diocletian persecution, A. D. 311) occupied the most conspicuous position, although he too adopted many of Origen's views, *e. g.*, in his *Symposion;* see *Neander's* Church Hist., i. 721 (Torrey). On the further controversies relative to the doctrinal tenets of Origen under the Emperor Justinian I., and their condemnation brought about (A. D. 544) by *Mennas*, bishop of Constantinople, see the works on ecclesiastical history. *Ramers*, u. s. (§76), in his first part, or historical introduction.

§ 82.

TEACHERS OF THE CHURCH IN THIS PERIOD.

Among the theologians of the East who either exerted the greatest influence upon the development of the system of doctrines, or composed works on the subject, are the following: *Eusebius of Cæsarea*,[1] *Eusebius of Nicomedia*,[2] but principally *Athanasius*,[3] *Basil the Great*,[4] *Gregory of Nyssa*,[5] and *Gregory of Naziamzum*[6] (the last three of Cappadocia); next to them, *Chrysostom*,[7] *Cyril of Jerusalem*,[8] *Epiphanius*,[9] *Ephräm the Syrian*,[10] *Nemesius*,[11] *Cyril of Alexandria*,[12] *Theodore of Mopsuestia*,[13] *Theodoret, bishop of Cyrus*;[14] in the West: *Arnobius*,[15] *Lactantius*,[16] *Hilary of Poitiers*,[17] *Jerome*,[18] *Ambrose*,[19] and above all, *Augustine*.[20] These were followed by others of greater or less importance: *John Cassian*,[21] *Vincens of Lerins*,[22] *Salvian*,[23] *Leo I. surnamed the Great*,[24] *Prosper of Aquitanie*,[25] *Gennadius*,[26] *Fulgentius of Ruspe*,[27] *Boëthius*,[28] *Gregory the Great*,[29] and *Isidore of Seville*.[30] The last is of importance, as he brought together the dogmatic material already in existence, and was thus the forerunner of John of Damascus (in the East).

[1] *Eusebius* (Pamphili), bishop of Cæsarea (anthor of the ecclesiastical history), was born about the year 261, and died 340. Of his dogmatical works the following may be mentioned (in addition to the prologue to his ecclesiastical history): Εὐαγγελικῆς ἀποδείξεως παρασκευή (Præparatio Evangelica), Ed. i. of Steph. 1544, ss. Cum not *F. Vigeri*, 1628. Col. 1688, fol.—Εὐαγγελικὴ ἀπόδειξις (Demonstratio Evangelica), Ed. of Steph. 1545. Cum not. *Rich. Montacutii*, 1628. Lips. 1688, fol.—Κατὰ Μαρκέλλου, ii.—Περὶ τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς θεολογίας, τῶν πρὸς Μάρκελλον.—Epistola de Fide Nicæna ad Cæsareenses. Some exegetical treatises also belong here. [Eccles. Hist. edited by *E. Burton*, 4 vols. with notes, Oxford, 1841 and 1845; Annotationes ad Eus. Hist. ed. Burton, 2, Oxon. 1841. Præp. Evang. ed. *E. Burton*, 4 Oxon. 1841; this and the Demonstr. Evangelica, and Contra Hieroclem et Marcellum, ed. *T. Gaisford*, Oxon.; on the Theophania, Syriac ver-

sion, by *S. Lee*, Lond. 1842, and translation, by the same, Cambr. 1843. Treatises by Eusebius in *Mai's* Patrum Nov. Bibliotheca, Tom. 3, 1853.—The first fasciculus of a new, critical edition of the Eccles. Hist. of Eusebius, by Hugo Læmmer, Berl. 1859.]

[3] *Eusebius of Nicomedia*, at first bishop of Berytus, and afterwards of Constantinople, died A. D. 340. He was the leader of the Eusebian party in the Arian controversy. His opinions are given in the works of Athanasius, Sozomen, Theodoret (comp. especially his Epistola ad Paulianum Tyri Episcopum, in Theod. i. 6), and Philostorgius. Comp. *Fabric.* Bibl. Gr. vol. vi. p. 109, ss.* [Comp. *Semisch*, in Herzog's Realencyclop.]

[4] *Athanasius*, called the father of orthodoxy, was born at Alexandria about the year 296, was bishop of that city from the year 326, and died A. D. 373; he exerted an important influence in the formation of the Nicene Creed, and took a prominent part in the Arian controversy. Of his numerous dogmatical works the most important are: Λόγος κατὰ Ἑλλήνων (an apologetical treatise); Λόγος περὶ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς διὰ σώματος πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐπιφανείας αὐτοῦ.—Ἔκθεσις πίστεως (Expositio Fidei Nicænæ).—Πρὸς τοὺς ἐπισκόπους Αἰγύπτου καὶ Λιβύης, ἐπιστολὴ ἐγκυκλικὸς κατὰ Ἀριανῶν.—Oratt. V. contra Arianos.—Homilies, Letters, etc. The principal Editions are: that of the Benedictine monks (of Montfaucon), 1689–98, ii. f. ed. *N. A. Giustiniani*, Patav. et Lips. 1777, iv. f. Festal Letters, by *Cureton*, from the Syriac; in German, by Larsow, Götting. 1852. Comp. *Tillemont*, T. viii. *Rössler*, Bibliothek der Kirchenväter, vol. v. Monographs: †*Möhler*, Athanasius der Grosse und die Kirche seiner Zeit, Mainz. 827, ii. 8. *Böhringer*, die Kirche Christi, i. 2, p. 1, ss. [On Athanasius, Comp. Bp. *Kaye* in his Council of Nice, 1853. His treatises against the Arians, translated by *John Henry Newman*, with notes, in the Oxford Library of the Fathers, vols. 8 and 19, and his Historical Tracts in the same Library, vol. 13. His Four Orations against the Arians, previously translated by S. Parker, 2 vols. Oxford, 1713. His Opera Dogmatica Selecta, ed. by Thilo, in his Bibl. Patr. Græc. Dogmatica, vol. i, Leipz. 1853.]

[5] *Basil* of Neocæsarea, surnamed the Great, was born A. D. 316, and died A. D. 379; he is of importance in the Arian and Macedonian controversies. His *principal writings* are: Ἀνατρεπτικὸς τοῦ ἀπολογητικοῦ τοῦ δυσσεβοῦς Εὐνομίου (libri. v. contra Eunomium), Περὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος, numerous Letters and Homilies (in Hexaëmeron 11: in Ps. xvii: Diversi Argumenti 31; Sermones 25). Editions of his works were published by *Fronto Ducæus* and *Morellius*, Par. 1618, 38, ii. (iii.) f.; by the Benedictine monks in the year 1688, iii. fol. and by **Garnier*, Paris, 1721–30, iii. f.; by *De Sinner*, Paris, 1839, iii. Monographs: *Feisser*, De Vita Basilii, Gron. 1828. **Klose*, *C. R. W.*, Basilius der Gr. nach seinem Leben und seiner Lehre, Stralsund, 1835, 8: ibid. Animadvers. in S. Bos. Opera. 1843. *A. Jahn*, Basilius M. platonizans, Bern. 1838, 4. *Böhringer*, i. 2, p. 152, ss. [Basil, Opera Dogmat. ed. Thilo in Bibl. Patr. Græc. Dogm. vol. 2, 1854. Select

* The homilies of *Eusebius of Emisa* (who died A. D. 360), are only of secondary importance relative to the doctrine of the descensus ad inferos. Opusc. ed. *Augusti*, Elberf. 1829. *Thilo*, über die Schriften des Euseb. von Alex. und des Euseb. von Emisa, Halle, 1832.

Passages from Basil, Lond. 1810. Complete works, ed. *Gaume*, Paris. On Basil, comp. Christian Review, New York, 1853; and on his Life and Letters, the North American Review, 1860, by Dr. Proudfit.]

[8] *Gregory of Nyssa*, a brother of Basil, a native of Cappadocia, died about the year 394. His principal work is: Λόγος κατηχητικὸς ὁ μέγας.—He also composed dogmatical and exegetical treatises on the creation of the world and of man, wrote against Eunomius and Apollinaris, and was the author of several homilies, ascetic tracts, etc. Though he strictly adhered to the Nicene Creed, yet he was distinguished for the mildness of his disposition; "*the profoundness of his scientific knowledge, as well as his peculiarities, assign to him the first place among the followers of Origen.*" (*Hase.*) His works were edited by *Morellius*, Par. 1615, ii. f. Append. by *Gretser*, Par. 1618. Of the Benedictine edition (Paris, 1780) only the first volume appeared. Some newly discovered treatises against the Arians and Macedonians were published in *A. Maii* Scriptt. Vet. Coll. Rom. 834, T. viii. MONOGRAPHS: *Rupp, Jul.*, Gregora, des Bischofs von Nyssa, Leben und Meinungen, Leipz. 1834. *Böhringer*, i. 2, p. 275 ss. *Heyns*, De Greg. Nyss. Lugd. Bat. 1835. [*E. G. Mœller*, Greg. Nyss. Doctrina de hominis natura, cum Origen. comparat. Halle, 1854. *J. N. Stigler*, Die Psychol. des Greg. v. N. Regensb. 1857. Gregory on Celibacy and eight discourses, Greek and German, in *Oehler's* Bibl. d Kirchenväter, 1859.]

[9] *Gregory of Nazianzum*, surnamed the theologian, was born about the year 300 at Arianzus, near Nazianzum, was afterwards bishop of Constantinople, and died A. D. 390. His *principal works* are: In Julianum Apostatam Invectiva duo (published separately by *Montague*, 1610, 4).—Λόγοι θεολογικοί.—He also composed numerous orations, letters, poems, and shorter treatises. His works were published by *Morellius*, Paris, 1630, ii. f. (Lips. 1690). Of the Benedictine edition only the first volume appeared, [vol. ii. 1840.] MONOGRAPHS: **Ullmann*, Gregor von Nazianz, der Theologe. Darmst. 1825. *Böringer*, i. 2, p. 357, ss. [Ullmann's Life of Greg. Naz. transl. in part by G. V. Cox, Lond. 1851. His dogmatic works in Thilo's Bibl. (u. s.). Hergenröther, Greg. Lehre von d. Dreieinigkeit, Regensb. 1850. Comp. Journal of Sacred Lit. 1852; West. Review, vol. 56.]

[10] *Chrysostom* was born at Antioch in Syria about the year 344, occupied the episcopal see of Constantinople, and died A. D. 407. His practico-exegetical and homiletical writings are more valuable than his strictly dogmatical works; at the same time, he is of importance in the history of doctrines on account of this very practical tendency; *e. g.*, his views on the freedom of the will are in strong contrast with those of Augustine. In addition to his numerous homilies and sermons, he wrote: Περὶ ἱερωσύνης, lib. vi. (edited by *Bengel*, Stuttg. 1825, by *Leo*, Lips. 1834), De Providentia, lib. iii.—*Editions of his complete works* were published by *Savile*, Eton. 1612. *Fronto Ducæus*, Par. 1609—36. **Bern. de Montfaucon*, Paris, 1718—31, xiii. fol. Venet. 1755, xiii. f. ib. 1780, xiv. f.—MONOGRAPHS: **Neander*, der heil. Chrysostomus und die Kirche des Orients in dessen Zeitalter. Berlin, 1821, 22, ii. 8vo., 2d ed. 1833. *Böhringer*, i. 4, p. 1, ss. [Paris edition of Chrysostom ed. *Gaume*, xiii. Tom. Neander's monograph, vol. i. transl. by *J. C. Stapleton*, Lond. 1845. Life of C., by Neander, Böhringer, etc., Bost. 1854.

Perthes, Leben. Chrysost. 1854. Homiliæ in St. Matth., Gr. cum varîis Lection., ed. *F. Field*, 4 Cantab. 1839 sq.; Homilies Ep. ad Corinth. cura *F. Field*, Oxon. 1845–9, 4 vols.; in Ep. ad Gal., ad Ephes. Phil. Col. etc., ed. F. Field, 1850–5. His Homilies, transl. in Oxford Libr. of Fathers, vols. 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 27, 28, 33, 34. Abbé *J. B. Bergier*, Histoire de St. Jean Chrys., sa vie, ses œuvres, son siècle, Paris, 1856. Life of C. by *J. D. Butler*, Bibl. Sacra. vol. i. Comp. *Eadie* in Kitto's Journal, vol. i.; *S. Osgood* in North American, vol. lxii; *C. P. Krauth* in Evang. Rev. vol. i.; Sermons of C. in Christ. Rev. vol. xii; Life and Writings, Eclectic Rev. (Lond.) 1850.—Select Passages from C. by *H. S. Boyd*, Lond. 1810. His work on the Priesthood, transl. by H. Hollier, Lond. 1728; by *J. Bunce*, Lond. 1759; by *H. M. Mason*, Philad. 1826. Abbé *Rochet*, Hist. de C. 2. Paris, 1866.]

[8] *Cyril of Jerusalem*, at first a Eusebian, went over to the Nicene party; he had already combated the strict Arian Acacius; he died A. D. 386. He was distinguished for his Catechetics (347), in which he propounded the doctrines of the church in a popular style. His five Mystagogical Discourses are of most importance in the dogmatic point of view. His works were edited by *Mills*, Oxon. 1703, f. and by **Ant. Aug Touttée*, (after his death by *Prud Maran*), Par. 1720, f. Ven, 1763, f. Comp. *von Cölln*, in Ersch u. Grubers Encyklopädie, vol. xxii. p. 148, ss. [Opera i, ed. *Reischl*, 1848, 4, ii ed. *Jos. Rupp*, Monachii, 1860. *Van Vellenhoven*, Specim. theol. de Cyril, Hieros. Catechesibus, Amst. 1837. The Lectures of Cyril, transl. in Oxford Lib. of Fathers, 1838, vol. 3. Extracts from thirteen works in *Mai's* Nova Bibliotheca, vol. 2, 1853. De Cyril. Hierosol. Orationibus, *J. T. Plitt*, Heidels. 1855. Comm. in Evang. Lucae e mss. apud Mus. Britann. ed. Rob. Payne Smith, 1858, transl. 2 8vo. 1859.]

[9] *Epiphanius* of Besanduc, near Eleutheropolis in Palestine, bishop of Constantia in the isle of Cyprus, died at the age of nearly one hundred years, A. D. 404. His work against heretics: Αἱρεσέων LXXX, ἐπικληθὲν πανάριος εἶτ' οὖν κιβώτιος (Adv. Hær.) is among the secondary sources of the history of doctrines. The theology of Epiphanius consisted in rigid adherence to the orthodox system rather than in the development of original thought. It is represented in the treatise: Περιοχὴ λόγου τοῦ Ἐπιφ. τοῦ ἀγκυρωτοῦ καλουμένου, with which may be compared his Λόγος εἰς τὴν Κυρίου ἀνάστασιν, εἰς τὴν ἀνάληψιν τοῦ Κυρίου λόγος, etc. There is an EDITION of his works by **Petavius*, Par. 1622, fol. ib. 1630, f. Edit. auct. Colon. (Lips.) 1682, ii. fol. [Two new editions of Epiphanius are in progress, by *Oehler* and *Dindorf*. Epiphanii librorum adversus Hæreses prooem. Cum præf. G. Dindorfii; Epiphanii Opera, ed. *G. Dindorf*, 5 vols. 1855–'63. the 5th volume contains Petavii Animadversiones. *Eberhard*, Betheiligung Epiph. am Streit über Origenes. Trier. 1859.]

[10] *Ephräm*, Propheta Syrorum, of Nisibis in Mesopotamia, abbot and deacon in a monastery at Edessa, died about the year 378. He gained a high reputation by his exegetical works, and rendered signal service to Syria by the introduction of Grecian science and dogmatic terminology. Opp. ed. **J. S. Assemani*, Rom. 1732, 46, vi. fol. Comp. *C. A. Lengerke*, de Ephræmo Sc. S. interprete, Hal. 1828, 4. [H. Burgess, Transl. of Ephräm's Hymns and Homilies, 2 vols. Lond. 1853, and of his Repentance of Nineveh, 1854.

J. Alsleben, Das Leben des Eph. Syr. Berl. 1853. Comp. Kitto's Journal, 1853 and 1854; Cardinal Wiseman, Essays, vol. iii (from Dublin Review); Church Review, 1852; *Rödiger* in Herzog's Realencyclop., and in the Hall. Encyclop.; Aschbach's Allg. Kirchen-Lexicon; Zeitschrift d. deutscher morgenländ. Gesellschaft, Bd. ix. Alsleben has in preparation a new edition of Ephrăm's works.]

[11] *Nemesius*, bishop of Emisa in Phœnicia (?) lived about the year 400. His treatise: Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου was formerly attributed to Gregory of Nyssa. Oxon. 1671, 8. Comp. *Schröckh* Kirchengeschichte, vol. vii. p. 157.

[12] *Cyril of Alexandria*, (died A. D. 444), is well known by his violent proceedings against Nestorius, and by his Monophysite tendency. Besides homilies and exegetical works, he wrote Anathematismata against Nestorius, treatises on the Trinity and the Incarnation of Christ, Περὶ τῆς ἐν πνεύματι καὶ ἀληθείᾳ προσκυνήσεως καὶ λατρείας, xvii. books—Κατὰ ἀνθρωπομορφιτῶν —and a work in defence of Christianity against the Emperor Julian in 10 books.—Extracts of it are given by *Rössler*, vol. viii. p. 43–152. EDITIONS of his works were published by **J. Aubertus*, Lut. 1638, vii. fol. and *A. Maii*, Collectio T. viii.

[13] *Theodore of Mopsuestia* was born about the year 350, and died A. D. 429. Of his writings we have scarcely more than fragments. Theodori quæ supersunt omnia, ed. *A. F. Wegnern*, Berol. 1834, ss. Comp. *Assemani* Bibl. Orient. T. iii. pars. i. p. 30. Theod. Ep. in Nov. Test. Comment. ed. *O. F. Fritzsche*, Turin, 1847; De Incarn. lib. xv. frag., *ibid.* Comp. *R. E. Klener*, Symbolæ, liter. ad Theod. etc., Gött. 1836, and *Fritzsche*, *O. F.*, de Theodori Mopsvhesteni Vita et Scriptis. Comment. Hist. Hal. 1836, 8. A sketch of his (liberal) theology is given by *Neander*, Church History (Torrey), ii. p. 352, 422, 653. [In the Spicileg. Solesmense of *Pitra*, i, 1853, fragments of a commentary on Paul are ascribed to Hilary (cf. Christ. Rembrancer), which *Jacobi* vindicates for Theod. Mops. in the Deutsche Zeitschrift, 1854. Theod. Mops. Doctrina de Imagine Dei, by Dorner, 1844.—Comp. Dorner's Person Christi.]

[14] *Theodoret* was born at Antioch, and died about the year 457. His dogmatico-polemical writings are of importance in the Nestorian and Monophysite controversies. Theodoret and Theodore are the representatives of the liberal tendency of the Antiochian school of Antioch. The following work is among the sources of the history of doctrines: Αἱρετικῆς κακομυθίας ἐπιτομή, Lib. v. (Fabulæ Hæreticæ). He also composed several exegetical writings. There are EDITIONS of his works by *J. Sirmond*, Lutet. 1642, iv. fol. Auctuarium cura *J. Garnerii*, ib. 1684. f.—and *J. L. Schulze* and *Nösselt*, Hal. 1769–74, v. vols. 8vo. [Theod. Comm. in omnes beati Pauli Epistolas, in Bibl. Patrum. Oxf. 1852. Theod. Græcarum Affectionum Curatio, ed. *J. Gaisford*, Oxf. 1839. Theod. Eccl. Hist. libri v. ed. *J. Gaisford*, Oxf. 1854.; translated in the edition of Eusebius, etc. 6 vols. Lond. 1847.]

[15] *Arnobius* (in part considered in the previous period), born at Sicca Veneria in Numidia, the teacher of Lactantius, lived towards the close of the third, and at the commencement of the fourth century. He wrote a work

under the title: Adv. Gentes libr. vii. which was edited by *J. C. Orelli*, Lips. 1816, Add. 1817.—His writings contain many heterodox assertions, like those of his disciples; *Hildebrand*, Hal. 1844; *Oehler*, Lips. 1846.

[16] *Lucius Cælius Firmianus Lactantius* (Cicero Christianus), was born in Italy, became a rhetorician in Nicomedia, was tutor of *Crispus* (the eldest son of the Emperor Constantine) and died about the year 330. He wrote: Divinarum Institutt. libri. vii.; De Ira Dei; De Opificio Dei vel de formatione hominis.—EDITIONS of his works were published by *Bünemann*, Lips. 1739, by *Le Brun* and *Dufresnoi*, Par. 1748, ii. 4, and *O. F. Fritzsche*, Lips. 1842–44. Comp. *Ammon F. G. Ph.* Lactantii Opiniones de Religione in Systema redactæ, Diss. ii. Erl. 1820. *Spyker*, de pretio institutionibus Lactantii tribuendo, Lugd. 1826. On the position of Arnobius and Lactantius in the church development, see *Meier*, Trinitätslehre, i. 91, Note: "Coming out of time, blossoms appearing in the autumn, disfigured imitations of a period long since past."

[17] *Hilary*, (Hilarius), bishop of Pictavium (Poitiers) in Gaul, died A. D. 368. Besides commentaries on the Psalms and on Matthew, and several minor treatises, he wrote: De Trinitate libr. xii. EDITIONS of his works were published by the Benedictine monks, Par. 1693, f., by *Maffei*, Ver. 1730, ii. f., and by *Oberthür*, Würzb, 1785–88, iv. 8. *A. Maii*, Scriptt. Vet. Coll. T. vi. [Hilar. Pictav. Opera, 2 imp. 8vo. Paris, 1844. Fragments ascribed to him in Spicileg. Solesm. i. 1853; see above, Note 13; and comp. Zeitschrift f. d. luth. Theol. 1855, s. 551, sq.]

[18] *Sophronius Eusebius Hieronymus* (Jerome) was born about the year 331 at Stridon in Dalmatia, and died as a monk in a monastery at Bethlehem A. D. 420. In his earlier years he was a disciple of Origen, but became his opponent, with a blind zeal for orthodoxy; he possessed great talents, and was a man of profound learning. ("*He made the West acquainted with Greek ecclesiastical erudition, and with the Hebrew.*" *Hase.*) He rendered greater service to biblical criticism and exegesis (by the Vulgate version), as well as to literary history (by his work De Viris Illustribus), than to dogmatic theology. As to the latter, he rather preserved it like an antiquarian relic, rescued from the Origenistic deluge, than exerted any living and original influence upon the healthy development of doctrines. His controversial writings are partly directed against those who opposed monachism, the worship of relics, celibacy, Mariolatry (of which he was a great friend), etc., and in part have respect to the Pelagian and Origenist controversies. The following are the principal EDITIONS of his works: Opp. cura *Erasmi*, Bas. 1516, ix. f.; that of the Benedictine monks (by *Martianay* and *Pouget*), Par. 1693–1706, v. f.; and that of *Vallarsius*, Veron. 1734–42, xi. f. Ed. 2. Venet. 1766–72, iv. (Luther judged unfavorably of him.) Comp. *Fricke*, Kirchengesch, 104. [*Collembet*, Gesch. des Hieron. nach d. Franz. 1847. *Osgood* in Bib. Sacra. v. Comp. Princeton Rev. April, 1864.]

[19] *Ambrose* was born A. D. 340, was archbishop of Milan from the year 374, and died A. D. 398. He was the chief pillar of the Nicene orthodoxy in the West, and exerted considerable practical influence upon Augustine. His doctrinal writings are: Hexaëmeron, lib. vi.; De Officiis, iii.; De Incarnationis dominicæ Sacramento; De Fide, libri v.; de Spiritu, lib. iii.; and

several others. He also composed some exegetical works, though some, under his name, are spurious (Ambrosiaster). The principal EDITIONS of his works are that of *Amerbach*, Bas. 1492; and the Benedictine edition, cura *N. Nuriti* et *Jac. Frischii*, Par. 686–90, ii. f. Comp. *Böhringer*, i. 3, p. 1, ss. [Herzog's Realencycl. by *Böhringer*. Ambrosian MSS. in Quarterly Review, vol. 16. North Amer. Rev. 1855. His De Officiis Ministr. ed. by *Krabinger*, from new MSS. Tüb. 1857.]

** *Aurelius Augustine* was born at Tagaste in Numidia, A. D. 354, died as bishop of Hippo Regius, A. D. 430; on his eventful and deeply interesting life compare his autobiography, entitled Confessiones, libri. xiii. (a manual edition of which was published at Berlin 1823, with a preface by *Neander*), and Possidius (Possidonius); on his writings compare his own Retractationes. A great part of his works consists of polemical writings against the *Manichees*, *Pelagians*, and *Donatists*. All his works, and their different editions, are enumerated in the work of *Schönemann*, T. ii. p. 8, ss. A. PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS: Contra Academicos—De Vita Beata—De Ordine ii,—Soliloquia ii.—De Immortalitate Animæ, etc. B. POLEMICAL WRITINGS: a) *against the Manichees:* De Moribus Ecclesiæ Cathol. et Manichæorum, ii.—De Libero Arbitrio, iii.—De Genesi contra Manich.—De Genesi ad Litteram, xii.—De Vera Religione—De Utilitate credendi—De Fide et Symbolo, et al. b) *against the Pelagians and Semipelagians:* (they are contained for the most part in vol. x. of the Benedictine edition), De Gestis Pelagii—De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione—De Natura et Gratia—De Perfectione Justitiæ Hominis—De Gratia Christi et de Peccato Originali—Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum—Contra Julian. lib. vi.—De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio—De Correptione et Gratia—De Prædestinatione Sanctorum—De Dono Perseverantiæ—Contra secundam Juliani Responsionem, opus imperfectum. c) *against the Donatists:* (in vol. ix.) contra Parmenianum iii.—De Baptismo vii.—Contra Litteras Petiliani iii.—Ep. ad Catholicos (de unitate ecclesiæ), et al. C. DOGMATICAL WORKS: De Civitate Dei ad Marcellin. libr. xxii. (*A manual edition was published by Tauchnitz. Lips. 1825, ii. 8)—De Doctrina Christiana lib. iv.—Enchiridion ad Laurentium, s. de fide, spe et caritate—De Fide—De Trin. xv. D. PRACTICAL WORKS (De Catechizandis rudibus). E. EXEGETICAL WRITINGS, Letters, Sermons, etc. EDITIONS of his works were published by *Erasmus*, Bas. 1529. x. 1543, 56, 69 in xi.; by the *Benedictine monks, Paris, 1679–1701, xi. (in 8 vol.) Antwerp 1700–1703, xi. f. Append.; by *Clericus*, ib. 1703 f.—*J. B. Albrizzi*, Ven. 1729–35. xii. f. 1756–69. xviii. 4. Opp. Omnia, supplem. ed. *Hier Vignier*. Par. 1654, 55, ii. f.—* *Wiggers*, pragmatische Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagianismus, Berl. 1821. Hamb. 1833, ii. 8. **Bindemann* der h. Augustin. 2 Bde. Berl. 1844–54. *Poujoulat*, new edition, Paris, 2 vols., 1866. *Böhringer*, i. 3. p. 99, ss.

[In the Oxford Library of Fathers, vol. i, Augustine's Conf. edited by *T. B. Pusey*, who also edited the original, 1842; his Sermons, vols. 16 and 20; his Treatises, 22; Psalms, in 4 vols.; and John, 3 vols. *Kloth*, der Kirchenlehrer, Augustinus, Aachen, 1854. Life and Times of A. by *Philip Schaff*, 1854. Life, etc., London, 1853 (Bagster). Wiggers, August. and Pelag. transl. (vol. i.) by *R. Emerson*, Andover. *Trench*, Essay on August.

as Interpreter, etc. Articles on Augustine, Princeton Rep. 1854; Am. Bibl. Repos. vols. 3 and 5, and 7 of 2d series; Christ. Rev. 5 and 15; Brit. Quart. 6; North British, 1855 (by Fraser, repr. in his Phil. Essays); Journal of Sacr. Lit. 1858; Zeller in Theol. Jahrb. 1854.—*J. B. Mozley*, The August. Doctrine of Predestination, Lond. 1855; Comp. Christ. Remembr. 1856. *Th. Gangauf*, Die metaph. Theol. des heil. August. 1851–3. *J. Nirschl*, Wesen des Bösens nach Aug. Regensb. 1854. *Roulet*, De l'Idée du Péché dans St. August. Montauban, 1856. John Baillie, St. Aug. a Biog. Memoir, Lond. 1859. Aug. Confessions, with Introd. by Prof. Shedd, Andover, 1860. A new ed. of Aug. published in Paris, 1836–40, 11 vols.; 1849 in 16 vols., and at Venice, vol. viii. 1854. Two hundred new sermons, in *Mai*, Patrum Nov. Biblioth. vol. i. Aug. De Civit. Dei, ed. Strange, Col. 1850, 1; transl. by E. H. Lond. 1620; by Mannell, Lond. 1577; a new French version, by *Saisset*, 4, 12mo. Paris, 1855.—*Kling*, in Herzog's Realencyc.]

[21] *John Cassian*, a pupil of Chrysostom, was probably a native of the West, founded Semipelagianism, and died about the year 440. De Institut. Cœnob. lib. xii.—Collationes Patrum xxiv.—De Incarnatione Christi, adv. Nestorium, libr. vii. The principal *editions* of his works are: Ed. princ. Bas. 1485. Lugd. 1516. 8. Lips. 1733. Comp. *Wiggers*, vol. ii. and his Diss. de Joanne Cassiano, Rost. 1824, 5. *L. F. Meier*, Jean Cassian, Strasb. 1840.

[22] *Vincens of Lerins* (Lirin.), a monk and presbyter in the monastery in the isle of Lerina, near the coast of Gallia Narbonica, died about the year 450. Commonitoria duo pro Catholicæ Fidei Antiquitate et Universitate adv. profanas omnium Hæreticorum Novitates. There is an edition of this work by *Jo. Costerius*, et *Edm. Campianus*, Col. 1600. 12. denuo edid. *Herzog*, Vratislav. 1839. Commonitor. adv. Hæres. juxta editt. optim. recognitum, Notisque brev. illustr. a clerico diocesis Augustanæ, Aug. Vind. 1844; comp. *Wiggers*, ii. p. 208 sq. and *Gengler*, Ueber die Regel des Vincenz, in the Tüb. Quartalschrift, 1853. Der Katholik, 1837. [*Hefele* in Theol. Quartalschrift, 1854. His Commonitory, transl. by Reeves, 1716, and at Oxford, 1841. Enchiridion, ed. Krabinger, 1861.]

[23] *Salvian*, a native of Gaul, wrote: Adv. Avaritiam lib. iv.; and a work on the doctrine of providence which is of importance in dogmatic theology: De Gubernatione Dei (de providentia), Editions; Bas. 1530. *Venet. (*Baluz.*) 1728. 8 (together with Vinc. Lerin. Par. 1684, 8.) [Oxford ed. 12mo. 1633.]

[24] *Leo the Great*, bishop of Rome, died A. D. 461. He is of importance in the Monophysite controversy, by the influence which he exerted upon the decisions of the council of Chalcedon. He wrote Sermons and Letters, Ed. 1. Rom. 1479; Rom. 1753–55, cura *P. Th. Cacciari*. Comp. *Griesbach*, *J. J.*, Loci Theologici collecti ex Leone Magno. (Opusc. T. i. ab init.) **Perthel*, Pabst Leo's I. Leben und Lehren. i. Jena, 1843, 8. *Böhringer*, i. 4, p. 170, ss. *Arendt*, Leo d. Grosse, Mainz, 1835. [Migne's edition, 3 vols. 1845. *St. Cheron*, Vie de Leo. Comp. Greenwood's Cathedra Petri, i. 1856.]

[25] *Prosper of Aquitaine* opposed the Pelagians in several writings; Carmen de ingratis, and others. Opp. by *Jean Le Brun de Maret* and *Mangeant*, Par. 1711, fol. *Wiggers*, ii. p. 136, ss.

[26] *Gennadius*, a presbyter at Massilia, died about the year 493: De eccle-

siasticis Dogmatibus, edited by *Elmenhorst*, Hamb. 1714, 4; it is also found among the works of Augustine (T. viii).

[37] *Fulgentius* was born A. D. 468, at Telepte, in Africa, and died A. D. 533, as bishop of Ruspe. Contra Objectiones Arianorum—De Remissione Peccatorum—Ad Donatum, de Fide orthod. et de diversis Erroribus Hæreticorum. There is an edition of his works by **J. Sirmond*, Par. 1623, fol. (Bibl. Max. Patr. Lugd. T. ix. p. 1.) Ven. 1742, fol.

[38] *Anicius Manlius Torquatus Severianus Boëthius* was born at Rome A. D. 470, and beheaded A. D. 524, in the reign of King Theodoric. He wrote: De Trin. etc.; De Persona et Natura (contra Eutychem et Nestorium):—Fidei Confessio, s. brevis Fidei Christianæ Complexio. He also composed several philosophical writings, among which that entitled De Consolatione Philosophica, lib. v., is remarkable, inasmuch as it shows how the ancient philosophy of the Stoics was associated with the speculative dogmatic theology of the Church without being much influenced by the spirit of true Christianity. *Schleiermacher* even questions: "*whether Boëthius ever was in earnest about Christianity;*" Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 175. [De Consol. an English version, by *Chaucer;* by lord *Preston*, 1695, 2d ed. 1712; by *Ridpath*, Lond. 1735. F. Nitzsch, Das System des Boethius. 1860.]

[39] *Gregory the Great* (bishop of Rome, A. D. 590) died A. D. 604. Protestants commonly, but arbitrarily, regard him as closing the papistic period. Opp. Par. 1675. Venet. 1758–76.—*Wiggers*, de Gregorio Magno ejusque placitis anthropologicis; Comment. 1, 1838, 4. *G. J. Th. Lau*, Gregor I. der Grosse, nach seinem Leben und seiner Lehre. Leips. 1845. *Böhringer*, i. 4, p. 310, ss. [*G. Pfahler*, Gregor d. grosse und seine Zeit. Bd. i. Frankf. 1852. *Neander*, in his History, and in his Memorials of Christ. Life (Bohn), p. 386, sq. *Markgraf*, De Greg. Mag. Vita. Berol. 1845. Gregory's Augustinianism, *Wiggers*, in Zeitschrift, f. d. hist. Theol. 1854. *V. Luzarche*, Vie de Grég. le Grand, Paris, 1857. G's Morals on Job, in Oxf. Libr. of Father's, 18, 21, 23, 31; his Dialogues transl. in the Metropolitan (Balt.) 1854. King *Alfred* transl. Gregory's Pastoral (in Alf. Regis Res Gestæ), Lond. 1574.—Opera Omnia, ed. Migne. 5 imp. 8vo. Paris, 1849.]

[40] *Isidore Hispalensis* died A. D. 663; he attempted previous to the time of John of Damascus to arrange the doctrines of the church in the form of a system, but his work is only a compilation: Sententiarum sive de Summo Bono, libri. iii. Opp. ed. *Faust. Arevalo*, Rom. 1797, vii. 4. He wrote, moreover, some independent works on doctrinal subjects: Liber Questionum sive Expositionis Sacramentorum—De Natura Rerum—Exhort. ad Pœnitentiam—and also several historical, canonical, and practical treatises, particularly Originum sive Etymologiarum, libri. xx (ed. Otto, Lips. 1833). *Oudin*, Comment. vol. i. p. 1582–96. [Isid. Hisp. De Natura Rerum, recens. *G. Becker*, Berol. 1857, comp. *Gersdorf's* Rep. Oct. 1857.]

§ 83.

THE EASTERN CHURCH FROM THE FOURTH TO THE SIXTH CENTURY.

The Schools of Alexandria and Antioch.

Münter, Dr. F., über die antiochenische Schule, in Staüdlins and Tzschirners Archiv. i. 1, p. 1, ss. [*Niedner*, Kirchengeschichte, p. 317 sq. *Neander*, Hist. Dog. 265 sq. *Vacherot*, 3. Paris, 1846-51. St. Hilaire, Paris, 1845. Simon, 2. Paris, 1861.]

During this period an important change took place in the theological position of the school of Alexandria. Formerly it had been the representative of a spiritual and living Christianity, and of that idealistic theology, which did not rest satisfied with the popular and sensuous apprehension of truth; during the present period the dogmatic tendency of the school of Egypt reacted into a compact realism. As it had once been the task of the Alexandrian school, so it became now the office of the *School of Antioch*, to defend a more liberal theology against rude and narrow polemics. The consequence was, that the teachers of that school shared the same fate with Origen—they were treated as heretics. The school of Antioch, however, so far from resembling the earlier Alexandrian school, in giving countenance to the arbitrary system of allegorical interpretation, adopted the grammatical interpretation, to which [as well as to biblical criticism in general] they thus rendered signal service. But on this account they have also sometimes been charged with a want of spirituality.

The change of opinions respecting classical literature, which many thought irreconcilable with the spirit of the gospel (the dream of Jerome in his Epist. ad. Eustachium, comp. *Ullmann*, Gregor von Nazianzum, p. 543), could not but exert a prejudicial influence upon the critical judgment of commentators. But where this last was wanting, only a limited gain could accrue to Christian theology from speculation, even when strengthened by Christian principles. [Cf. Hergenröther, Die Antioch. Schule, Würzb. 1866.]

§ 84.

THE WESTERN CHURCH.—AUGUSTINIANISM.

About the same time a new epoch in the history of doctrines begins with the appearance of Augustine. From the dogmatic point of view the West now assumes a higher degree of importance than the East, which exhausted itself in the controversies respecting the nature of Christ and the worship of images. The Carthaginian and

Roman realistic tendency (a tendency earlier represented in the western churches,) gradually gained the ascendancy over the Hellenistic idealism of past ages; the philosophy of Aristotle supplanted that of Plato. Augustine embraced in his theology the seeds of two systems, which more than a thousand years afterwards were to wage open war against each other. The Roman-Catholic system was based on his doctrine of the church (in opposition to the Donatists); the system of evangelical Protestantism rests upon his views on sin, grace, and predestination (in opposition to the Pelagians). But both these systems appear organically conjoined in his own person, and have a basis, not only in his personal career and experience, but also in the position which he occupied relative to the church, and to his opponents. [Comp. Neander, Church History, and Hist. Dogmas (Ryland), p. 267 sq.]

§ 85.

THE HERESIES.

[*Baur*, Epochen d. kirchlichen Geschichtsehreibung, 1852; Die Christl. Kirche, vom 4n. bis 6n. Jahrh. 1859.]

Among the natural heresies which prevailed during the first period, the Ebionitic (judaizing) may be considered as entirely suppressed.[1] The Gnostic (anti-judaizing) tendency, on the contrary, was more firmly established in the *system of Manes* (Manicheism), which, as a complete dualism, planted itself by the side of Christianity, from its very nature belonging to that form of oriental and pagan philosophy which had not yet disappeared.[2] The system of the followers of *Priscillian* must be regarded as a continuation of Gnosticism, though modified by Manicheism; it spread in the West in the course of the fourth century, but was suppressed by violent persecutions.[3] The *Paulicians*, too, manifested a leaning towards Gnostic and Manichean notions, though they at first appear to have been impelled by a practical necessity, to attempt a return to the simplicity of apostolical Christianity.[4] These heresies, that are, as it were, the younger branches, which the old stock of Gnosticism continued to shoot forth, and which attained a higher importance in the next period, are to be carefully distinguished from the heresies which arose in consequence of dogmatic controversies; the latter, by the antagonisms which were called forth, had an essential influence upon the doctrinal definitions of the church, and in fact evoked these definitions to mediate between the extremes. Here belong the heresies which arose in the struggle about a dialectic treatment of the separate doctrines, and which essentially contributed to the doctrinal

statements made in this period, viz.: 1. The heresies of *Sabellius* and *Paul of Samosata*, with their opposites, the *Arian, Semiarian*, and *Eusebian* heresies (which continued to prevail among the Goths, Burgundians, and Vandals, long after they had been condemned). 2. The heresy of the *Pelagians*, who never were able to form a distinct sect, but by means of a modified system (*Semipelagianism*) kept a back door open to creep now and then into the church, from which they had been excluded by the more strict doctrinal decisions. 3. The *Nestorian* heresy, with its opposites, the *Monophysite* and *Monothelite* heresies. The Nestorians, after having been defeated in Europe, succeeded in winning over to their party the Chaldees, and the Thomas-Christians in Asia. Monophysites prevailed among the *Jacobites* and *Copts*, and the Monothelites have dragged out a wretched existence even to the present day among the *Maronites in Syria.*[5]

[1] A Judaizing view lies at the basis of *Sabellianism*, as a heathen tendency is also manifested in *Arianism*; yet the Jewish element is no longer bound to what is national, as it was in Ebionitism. Yet the whole conflict strikes rather into the sphere of dialectic thought, than into that of primitive religious opinions. The notions of the Pelagians concerning the meritoriousness of works bore some resemblance to Judaism, but they did not in the popular mind originate with it.

[2] *Manicheism* is distinguished from *Gnosticism* by a more complete development of the dualistic principle; this also accounts for its rigid and uniform appearance, while Gnosticism is divided into many branches, and admits of more variety. There is far less of historical Christianity in Manicheism than in Gnosticism: it rests on its own historical foundation, which is here and there an imitation of Christianity, and hence it forms (like Mohammedanism at a later period) a separate system of religion rather than a sect. Comp. *Beausobre*, Histoire de Manichée et du Manichéisme, Amst. 1734, 2 vols. 4to. **Baur*, das manichäische Religionssystem, Tüb. 1831. *Trechsel, F.*, über den Kanon, die Kritik und Exegese der Manichäer, Bern. 1832. *Colditz, F. E.*, die Entstehung des manichäischen Religionssystems, Lpz. 1837 (where Manicheism is compared with the Indian, Zoroastrian, and other systems of religion). [Comp. *Mosheim's* Commentaries (*Murdock's* version), vol. 2, 251–412. History of Manes in *Mai's* Patr. Nov. Bibl. 1853, vol. iv. On the Manichees, Note F to *Pusey's* edition of Augustine's Confessions.]

[3] On the history of the followers of Priscillian, which is of more importance in the history of the church than in the History of Doctrines, because they were the first heretics persecuted with the sword, comp. Sulp. Sever. Hist. Sacr. ii. 46–51. *Neander*, Church Hist. (Torrey) ii. 710–718. *Baumgarten-Crusius*, i. p. 292, ss. *J. H. B. Lübkert*, De Hæresi Priscillianistarum, Havn. 1840. [*Manderuach, J. M.*, Geschichte des Priscillianismus, Trier. 1851. *Bernays*, Sulp. Sev. Berl. 1861: cf. Christ. Ex. 1862.]

[4] Further particulars may be found in *Schmid, Fr.*, Historia Paulicianorum Orientalium, Hafn. 1826; in an essay in Winer's and Engelhardt's Jour-

nal 1827, vol. vii. parts 1 and 2; *Gieseler*, in the Studien and Kritiken, 1829, ii. 1, and *Neander*, Church History (Torrey), iii. 246–267. SOURCES: Petri Siculi (who lived about the year 876) Historia Manichæorum, Gr. et Lat. ed. *M. Raderus*, Ingolst. 1604, 4, newly edited, with a Latin translation, by *J. C. L. Gieseler*, Gott. 1846, 4. Photius adv. Paulianistas, s. rec. Manichæorum libr. iv. in *Gallandii* Bibl. PP. T. xiii. p. 603, ss.

[a] On all these heresies, which have a peculiar bearing upon the development of doctrines during this period, comp. the special History of Doctrines. Concerning the external history of the controversies themselves, see the works on ecclesiastical history.

§ 86.

DIVISION OF THE MATERIAL.

Respecting the dogmatic material of this period, we have to distinguish between:—1. *Those* doctrines, which were shaped by the controversy with the last-named heresies; and, 2. *Those* which were developed in a more quiet and gradual manner.

To the former class belong *Theology* proper (the doctrine of the Trinity), *Christology*, and *Anthropology*; to the latter, those parts of theology which treat of the nature of God, creation, providence, etc., as well as the doctrine of the sacraments, and eschatology; though it must be admitted that they exerted an influence upon each other. We think it best to begin with the history of the first class of doctrines, as there was here a strictly polemic movement, and then to treat of the more esoteric (acroämatic) doctrines. The first class may be subdivided into two divisions, viz.: the Theologico-Christological on the one hand, and the Anthropological on the other. The controversies respecting the doctrines belonging to the former of these two divisions were carried on principally in the East, those concerning the latter, in the West.

B. SPECIAL HISTORY OF DOCTRINES DURING THE SECOND PERIOD.

FIRST CLASS.

DOCTRINAL DEFINITIONS OF THE CHURCH IN THE CONTEST WITH HERESIES.

(POLEMICAL PART.)

FIRST DIVISION.

DOCTRINES RESPECTING THEOLOGY AND CHRISTOLOGY.

a. THEOLOGY PROPER.

§ 87.

THE HYPOSTASIS AND SUBORDINATION OF THE SON.

Lactantius. Dionysius of Alexandria, and the Origenists.

The term *Logos*, respecting which the earlier Fathers so little agreed, that some understood by it the *Word*, others the *Wisdom* (reason, spirit), was so indefinite that even *Lactantius*, who lived towards the commencement of the present period, made no distinction between the λόγος and the πνεῦμα.[1] From the time of Origen it fell increasingly into disuse, and in its place the other term, *Son*, which is used in the New Testament in direct reference to the human personality of Christ, was transferred to the second person of the Godhead (previous to his incarnation). The disciples of Origen,[2] in accordance with the opinions of their master, understood by this second person a distinct hypostasis subordinate to the Father. Such is the view of *Dionysius of Alexandria*, though he endeavored to clear himself from the charges brought against him by *Dionysius of Rome*, by putting forth the doctrine in a less offensive form.[3] The doctrine of Origen now met with a peculiar fate. It consisted, as we have seen, of two elements, viz., the hypostasis

of the Son, and his subordination to the Father. The former was maintained in opposition to Sabellianism, and received as orthodox; the latter, on the contrary, was condemned in the Arian controversy. Thus Origenism gained the victory on the one hand, but was defeated on the other; but it was thus proved to be a necessary link in the chain, and became an element by which the transition was made.

[1] The theology of *Lactantius* was an isolated phenomenon in the present period, and has always been regarded as heterodox. (Concerning his prevailing moral tendency, see *Dorner*, p. 777.) Lactantius, after having opposed the gross and sensuous interpretation of the birth of Christ: ex connubio ac permistione feminæ alicujus, Instit. Div. iv. c. 8, returns to the meaning which the term *Word* (sermo) has in common life: Sermo est spiritus cum voce aliquid significante prolatus. The Son is distinguished from the angels, in that he is not only *spiritus* (breath, wind), but also the (spiritual) *Word*. The angels proceed from God only as taciti spiritus, as the breath comes out of the nose of man, while the Son is the breath which comes out of God's mouth, and forms articulate sounds; hence he identifies Sermo with the Verbum Dei, quia Deus procedentem de ore suo *vocalem* spiritum, quem non utero, sed mente conceperat, inexcogitabili quadam majestatis suæ virtute ac potentia in effigiem, quæ proprio sensu ac sapientia vigeat, comprehendit. There is, however, a distinction between the word (Son) of God and our words. Our words being mingled with the air, soon perish; yet even *we* may perpetuate them by committing them to writing—quanto magis Dei vocem credendum est et manere in æternum et sensu ac virtute comitari, quam de Deo Patre tanquam rivus de fonte traduxerit. Lactantius is so far from the doctrine of the *Trinity*, that he finds it necessary to defend himself against the charge of believing not so much in *three* as in *two* Gods. To justify this dual unity (or belief in two divine persons), he makes use of the same expressions which orthodox writers employed in earlier and later times for the defense of the doctrine of the Trinity: Cum dicimus Deum Patrem et Deum Filium, non diversum dicimus, nec utrumque secernimus: quod nec Pater a Filio potest, nec Filius a Patre secerni, siquidem nec Pater sine Filio potest nuncupari, nec Filius potest sine Patre generari. Cum igitur et Pater Filium faciat et Filius Patrem, una utrique mens, unus spiritus, una substantia est. He then comes back to the illustrations previously used, *e. g.*, those drawn from the river and its source, the sun and its beams; and more boldly (wholly in the Arian sense) he compares the Son of God with an earthly son, who, dwelling in the house of his father, has all things in common with him, so that the house is named after the son, as well as after the father.

[2] Thus *Pierius*, the master of Pamphilus of Cæsarea, was charged by Photius (Cod. 119) with having maintained that the Father and the Son are two οὐσίαι καὶ φύσεις. Nevertheless, he is said to have taught εὐσεβῶς, by employing those terms in the sense of ὑποστάσεις; but, δυσσεβῶς, he made the πνεῦμα inferior to both the Father and the Son. In like manner *Theognostus* (about 280) was accused of making the Son a κτίσμα; but this is not in accordance with the other (more orthodox) teachings of that theologian

(Phot. Cod. 106); comp. *Dorner*, p. 733, ss. Some disciples of Origen, *e. g.*, *Gregory Thaumaturgus*, even manifested a leaning towards Sabellianism; according to Basil, Ep. 210, 5, Gregory taught πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν ἐπινοίᾳ, μὲν εἶναι δύο, ὑποστάσει δὲ ἕν; comp., however, *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. 147. *Methodius* of Patara avoided the use of the term ὁμοούσιος in reference to the preëxistence of the Son, yet he seems to have admitted his eternal preëxistence, though not in the sense of Origen; comp. Opp. edit. *Combefis.* Par. 1644, p. 283–474, and *Dorner*, l. c.

[3] This is obvious, especially in the opposition of *Dionysius* to Sabellianism (see the next section). Of his work addressed to the bishop of Rome, and entitled: Ἔλεγχος καὶ Ἀπολογία, Lib. iv., fragments are preserved in the writings of Athanasius (περὶ Διονυσίου τοῦ ἐπ. Ἀλ. liber.: Opp. i. p. 243), and Basil; they were collected by *Constant* in his Epistt. Rom. Pontt. in *Gallandi* T. iv. p. 495. See *Gieseler*, i. § 64; *Neander*, i. p. 599; *Münscher* (von Cölln), p. 197–200. *Schleiermacher* (see the next §) p. 402, ss. According to Athanasius, p. 246, Dionysius was charged with having compared (in a letter to Euphranor and Ammonius) the relation between the Father and Son to that in which the husbandman stands to the vine, the shipbuilder to the ship, etc. The Arians even asserted (see Athanasius, p. 253) that he taught like themselves: Οὐκ ἀεὶ ἦν ὁ Θεὸς πατὴρ, οὐκ ἀεὶ ἦν ὁ υἱός· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν θεὸς ἦν χωρὶς τοῦ λόγου· αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ υἱὸς οὐκ ἦν πρὶν γεννηθῇ· ἀλλ' ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, οὐ γὰρ ἀΐδιός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὕστερον ἐπιγέγονεν. He also called the Son ξένος κατ' οὐσίαν τοῦ πατρός. Comp. however, the expressions quoted by Athanasius, p. 254, which go to prove the contrary. But the bishop of Rome (not without a Sabellian leaning, see *Dorner*, 754) insisted that Dionysius should adopt the phrase ὁμοουσία (Homousia), to which the latter at last consented, though he did not think that it was founded either upon the language of Scripture, or upon the terminology till then current in the church.* Orthodox theologians of later times (*e. g.*, Athanasius), endeavoring to do more justice to Dionysius of Alexandria, maintained that he had used the aforesaid offensive illustrations only κατ' οἰκονομίαν, and that they might be easily explained from the stand he took against Sabellianism; Athanasius, p. 246, ss.: see on the other side, *Löffler*, Kleine Schriften, vol. i. p. 114, ss. (quoted by *Heinichen* on Euseb. vol. i. p. 306). It can also be justly alleged that Dionysius had a practical rather than a speculative mind, and that his main bias and intention was different from that of Arius. The thesis of subordination, which was the centre of the Arian system, was to him only a "*suspicious and hasty inference from the distinction between the Father and the Son*," see *Dorner*, p. 743, sq. [*Förster*, De Doctrina Dionys. M. Berl. 1865.]

* An intermediate position was taken by *Zeno of Verona* (a contemporary of Origen and Cyprian), who, in Hom. i. ad Genes. in Bibl. Max. PP. iii. p. 356, ss., compared the Father and the Son to two seas which are joined by straits; comp. *Dorner*, p. 754, ss.

§ 88.

THE CONSUBSTANTIALITY OF THE SON WITH THE FATHER, WITH THE DENIAL OF THE HYPOSTATIC DISTINCTIONS.

Sabellianism, and Paul of Samosata.

Ch. *Wormius*, Historia Sabelliana. Francof. et Lips. 1696, 8. *Schleiermacher*, über den Gegensatz zwischen der sabellianischen und athanasianischen Vorstellung von der Trinität (Berlin. Theol. Zeitschr. 1822, Part 3). *Lange*, der Sabellianismus in seiner ursprünglichen Bedeutung (Illgens Zeitschr. für historische Theol. iii. 2. 3).—*Feuerlin*, *J. G.*, de Hæresi Pauli Samos. 1741, 4. *Ehrlich*, *J. G.*, de Erroribus Pauli Samos. Lips. 1745, 4. *Schwab*, de Pauli Sam. vita atque doctrina. Diss. inaug. 1839. [*Schleiermacher's* Essay on the Discrepancy between the Sabellian and Athanasian Representation of the Trinity, trans., with notes, by *Moses Stuart*, in Bib. Repos., first series, vol. v. Comp. *Dorner*, i. 127, sq., on Sabellius; and on Paul of Samosata, i. 510, sq. *Neander*, Hist. Dog. (*Ryland*), i. 164. *L. Lange*, Antitrin. vor d. Nic. Syn. 1851. *Waterland's* Works, i. 517, sq., ii. 703, sq.]

Sabellius, a presbyter of Ptolemais, who lived about the middle of the third century, adopted the notions of the earlier Monarchians, such as Praxeas, Noëtus, and Beryllus; and maintained, in opposition to the doctrine propounded by Origen and his followers, that the appellations Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, were only so many different manifestations and names of one and the same divine being. He thus converted the objective and real distinction of persons (a Trinity of essence) into a merely subjective and modalistic view (the Trinity of manifestation). In illustration of his views, he made use not only of various images which his opponents sometimes misinterpreted, but also of such expressions as were afterwards transferred to the terminology of the orthodox church.[1] Thus while he avoided, on the one hand, the subordination of the Son to the Father, and recognized the divinity manifested in Christ as the absolute deity; yet, on the other hand, by annulling the personality of the Son, he gave the appearance of pantheism to this immediate revelation of God in Christ; since with the cessation of the manifestation of Christ in time, the Son also ceased to be Son. The doctrine of *Paul of Samosata* is not, as was formerly the case, to be confounded with the notions of Sabellius; it rather approached the earlier (Alogistic) opinions of Artemon and Theodotus, which, as regards the nature of Christ, were not so much pantheistic as deistic.[2]

[1] Eus. vii. 6. Epiph. Hær. 62. Athan Contra Arian. iv. 2. and other passages. Basil, Ep. 210, 214, 235. Theodoret Fab. Hær. ii. 9. According to Epiphanius, *Sabellius* taught that there were: ἐν μιᾷ ὑποστάσει τρεῖς ἐνέργειαι (ὀνομασίαι, ὀνόματα), and illustrated his views by adducing the human trias of body, soul, and spirit, and the three properties of the sun, viz.,

the enlightening (*φωτιστικόν*), the warming (*τὸ θαλπόν*), and the periphery (*τὸ περιφερείας σχῆμα*). But it is difficult to determine how far he applied the one or the other of these characteristics to the persons of the Trinity, and carried out the analogy in all its particulars. According to Athanasius, iv. 25, he also referred to the manifold gifts coming from the *one* Spirit, as illustrative of the Trinity. What is objective in the matter consisted, in his view, in the divine economy, in the modes in which God is revealed to the human race. God is called Father in relation to the giving of the law; he is called Son in relation to the work of redemption; and Holy Spirit in relation to the inspiration of the apostles, and the quickening of believers; hence the charge of the orthodox (Athan. iv. 25. Basil. Ep. 210, 214, 235. Aug. Tract. in Joh. § 3), that Sabellius had limited the doctrine of the Trinity merely to the wants of the present world (*πρὸς τὰς ἑκάστοτε χρείας*). These three different modes of the Divine manifestation (according to Athanasius, iv. 13) he regarded as a *πλατύνεσθαι*, or *ἐκτείνεσθαι* (the figure of an arm stretched out and brought back). But it is difficult to ascertain the precise distinction which he made between these different modes of manifestation and the "monas" (unity), the *αὐτόθεος*, whom he called *υἱοπάτωρ* (Athan. De Syn. 16); and the relation in which this monas stands to these modes of manifestation, and to the Father in particular. To judge from some passages, quoted by Athan. iv. 25, he seems to have considered the terms *πατήρ* and *μόνας* identical; while elsewhere (iv. 13) the Father, who is designated as the *μόνας*, forms a part of the Trinity, comp. *Dorner*, p. 706, ss. The Logos also occupies a peculiar position in the system of Sabellius. While, in his opinion, the Trinity only exists in relation to the world, the creation of the world is brought about by the Logos, to whom Sabellius, like the earlier writers, applies the predicates *ἐνδιάθετος* and *προφορικός*, see *Dorner*, p. 711, ss. Thus, according to Sabellius, God is inactive as silent, and active as speaking (Athanas. iv. 11). On the entire system of Sabellius, as well as on the sense in which he used the terms *πρόσωπον* (whether borrowed from the theatre?) and *ὁμοούσιος*, see *Schleiermacher*, l. c. *Baumgarten-Crusius*, i. l. 200, ss. *Neander*, translat. ii. p. 276, ss., and Hist. of Dog. p. 180. *Möhler*, Athanasius der Grosse, vol. i. p. 184, ss. As regards the historical manifestation of Christ, it must be admitted that its theological significance is not impugned by Sabellius, inasmuch as he regards the Saviour as the immediate manifestation of God. But Christ possesses personality only during this historical appearance in the flesh. That personality neither existed previous to his incarnation, nor does it continue to exist in heaven, since that divine ray which beamed forth in Christ returns again to God. Nevertheless, Sabellius seems to have expected the second coming of Christ (*Schleiermacher*, p. 174). It is even doubtful whether he makes the return of the Logos to God to occur at the ascension of Christ, or only when the kingdom of God is completed. On the connection between Sabellianism and Ebionitism, see Dorner, p. 726. [This is seen in that Sabellius makes the revelation of Christ a mere means, and not an end; in his calling the Son a ray (*ἀκτῖνα*) of the monas, on account of which he was accused of dividing the divine essence; and then the difficult question (since he allowed no distinctions in God), whether the whole God was in the

person (*Prosopon*) of the Son in such a way that he was not elsewhere active during the incarnation—a question which led him to speak of the Son in terms approximating to Ebionitism.] According to Epiphanius, the opinions of Sabellius were principally spread in Mesopotamia, and in the vicinity of Rome. A sect of Sabellians, properly so called, did not exist.

[1] *Paul*, a native of Syria, bishop of Antioch from the year 260, was, after 264, charged with heresy at several synods,* and at last removed from his office (269–72). Of his dispute with the presbyter Malchion, a fragment is preserved in *Mansi*, vol. i. p. 1001, ss. Comp. the different accounts given by Epiph. 65, 1, and Euseb. vii. 27. The writers on the History of Doctrines vary in their opinions respecting the relation in which he stands whether to Sabellianism, or to the Unitarianism of the Artemonites (see Euseb. v. 28, ab init.); comp. *Schleiermacher*, p. 389, sq. *Baumgarten-Crusius*, i. p. 204. *Augusti*, p. 59. *Meier*, Dogmengesch. p. 74, 75. *Dorner*, p. 510. The difference between Sabellius and Paul of Samosata may be said to have consisted in this, that the former thought that the whole substance of the Divine being, the latter that only one single Divine power, had manifested itself in Christ. *Trechsel* (Geschichte des Antitrinitarismus, vol. i. p. 81) agrees with this, calling Samosatianism "the correlate of Sabellianism, according to the measures of the mere understanding." The divine here comes only into an external contact with man, touches human nature only on the surface; while, on the other hand, the human element comes to its rights more than in the system of Sabellius. At all events, we can hardly expect any serious and persevering attempts at a doctrinal system from a man whose vanity is so prominent. Though the charge that he countenanced Jewish errors to obtain favor with the queen Zenobia, is unfounded (*Neander*, ii. p. 270), yet it is quite probable that the vain show he made of free-thinking principles, and his idle pretension of taking a stand *above* the parties, were in as full accordance with his ostentatious nature, as in other times and under other circumstances this has been found to be connected with an arrogant and pretentious orthodoxy. Even to make a heresy, a definite theological character is needed; frivolity is but an external appendage of any party. At any rate, it is false to use the terms Sabellianism and Samosatianism promiscuously. Generally, those who denied the distinctions of persons in the Trinity, were called Πατριπασσιανοί in the West, and Σαβελλιανοί in the East. Comp. Athanasius de Synod. 25, 7.

* On the two Antioch Synods, 265 and 270, see Dorner, p. 769. [Their decrees, though not in a strict dogmatic form, were received as orthodox—though containing expressions which were avoided after the Council of Nice. The Son is confessed to be God in essence and hypostasis (οὐσίᾳ καὶ ὑποστάσει); his preëxistence is positively stated —he was always with the Father; through him, not as instrument merely, nor as an impersonal Wisdom, the Father created all things, etc. Sabellianism and Samosatianism are excluded by these and like positions.]

§ 89.

THE SUBORDINATION OF THE SON TO THE FATHER, AND THE DISTINCTION OF PERSONS IN ARIANISM.

[*Whitaker's* Origin of Arianism. Lond. 1791. *Newman's* Arians of the Fourth Century. *Maimbourg*, Hist. of Arianism, by *W. Webster*, 2, 1768. *J. A. Stark*, Versuch einer Gesch. des Arian. *T. G. Hassencamp*, Historia Arianæ Controversiæ, 1845. Bp. *Kaye*, in his Council of Nice, 1853. *Albert de Broglie*, L'Eglise et l'Empire Romain au iv. siècle, Paris, 1856, i. 329–397; ii., ch. vii.; iii., ch. iv. *Stanley*. *W. Klose*, in Herzog's Realencycl.]

The system of *Arius*, a presbyter of Alexandria, forms the most striking contrast with that of Sabellius. Arius, in endeavoring to define objectively the distinction between the persons of the Trinity, carried the idea of a subordination of the one to the other, and, in the first place, of the Son to the Father, so far as to represent the former as a creation of the latter.[1] This opinion, which he promulgated at Alexandria, met with the most decided opposition on the part of *Alexander*, bishop of that city.[2] This contest, which was at first merely a private dispute, gave rise to a controversy, which exerted greater influence upon the History of Doctrines than all former controversies, and was the signal for an almost endless succession of subsequent conflicts.

[1] SOURCES: Arii Epist. ad Euseb. Nicomed. in Epiph. Hær. 69, § 6. Theodoret Hist. Eccles. i. 4. Epist. ad Alex. in Athan. De Synodis Arim. et Seleuc. c. 16, and Ep. Hær. 69, § 7. Of the work of Arius entitled *Θαλεία*, only some fragments are preserved by Athanasius.—According to the Epist. ad Euseb., his opinion was: *Ὅτι ὁ υἱὸς οὐκ ἐστιν ἀγέννητος, οὐδὲ μέρος ἀγεννήτου κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον, ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐξ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς, ἀλλ' ὅτι θελήματι καὶ βουλῇ ὑπέστη πρὸ χρόνων καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων, πλήρης θεὸς, μονογενής· ἀναλλοίωτος, καὶ πρὶν γεννηθῇ ἤτοι κτισθῇ ἤτοι ὁρισθῇ ἢ θεμελιωθῇ, οὐκ ἦν· ἀγεννητὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἦν.* His views are fully settled on the last (negative) point; though he is laboring in what precedes to get at a satisfactory mode of statement. "We are persecuted," he continues, "because we say that the Son hath a beginning, while we teach that God is *ἄναρχος*. We say *ὅτι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐστίν*, because he is no part of God, nor is he created of any thing already in existence" (he rejects accordingly the theory of emanation, or the notion that Christ is created from matter). Comp. the letter to Alexander, l. c., where he defends his own doctrine against the notion of Valentinus concerning a *προβολή*; against that of the Manichees about a *μέρος*; and lastly, against the opinions of Sabellius; he there uses almost the same phraseology which occurs in the letter to Eusebius. The same views are expressed in still stronger language in the fragments of the aforesaid work Thalia (in Athan. Contra Arian. Orat. i. § 9): *Οὐκ ἀεὶ ὁ θεὸς πατὴρ ἦν, ἀλλ' ὕστερον γέγονεν· οὐκ ἀεὶ ἦν ὁ υἱὸς, οὐ γὰρ*

ἦν πρὶν γεννηθῇ· οὐκ ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ὑπέστη καὶ αὐτός· οὐκ ἐστιν ἴδιος τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρός. Κτίσμα γάρ ἐστι καὶ ποίημα, καὶ οὐκ ἐστιν ἀληθινὸς θεὸς ὁ Χριστὸς, ἀλλὰ μετοχῇ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐθεοποιήθη. Οὐκ οἶδε τὸν πατέρα ἀκριβῶς ὁ υἱὸς, οὔτε ὁρᾷ ὁ λόγος τὸν πατέρα τελείως· καὶ οὔτε συνιεῖ, οὔτε γινώσκει ἀκριβῶς ὁ λόγος τὸν πατέρα· οὐκ ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθινὸς καὶ μόνος αὐτὸς τοῦ πατρὸς λόγος, ἀλλ' ὀνόματι μόνον λέγεται λόγος καὶ σοφία, καὶ χάριτι λέγεται υἱὸς καὶ δύναμις· οὐκ ἐστιν ἄτρεπτος ὡς ὁ πατὴρ, ἀλλὰ τρεπτός ἐστι φύσει, ὡς τὰ κτίσματα, καὶ λείπει αὐτῷ εἰς κατάληψιν τοῦ γνῶναι τελείως τὸν πατέρα. Contra Arian. i. § 5: Εἶτα θελήσας ἡμᾶς (ὁ θεὸς) δημιουργῆσαι, τότε δὲ πεποίηκεν ἕνα τινὰ καὶ ὠνόμασεν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ σοφίαν καὶ υἱὸν, ἵνα ἡμᾶς δι' αὐτοῦ δημιουργήσῃ.—He proves this from the figurative expression, Joel ii. 25 (the Septuagint reads, "the great power of God," instead of "locusts"). Comp. *Neander*, Church History, ii. p. 767, ss. *Dorner*, p. 849, ss. *Baur*, Trinitätl. p. 319, ss., 342, ss. *Neander*, Hist. Dogm. (Ryland), p. 301. *Meier*, Trinität. p. 134; the latter says, p. 137,* that Arius represents the reaction of common sense against the tendency to recur to the forms of Platonic speculation." But compare *Baur*, ubi supra, who finds also a speculative element in Arius. [The previous statements had resulted only in bringing out the extreme positions, without reconciling them. Arius laid hold of one of these, that the Father alone is unbegotten, and the Son begotten, and carried it to its logical results. If begotten, then not eternal; if not eternal, then original in time, etc. Arianism is an abstract separation between the infinite and the finite. Comp. *Baur's* Dogmengesch. 2d ed. 1858, p. 164.]

[2] Concerning the opinion of *Alexander*, see his letter to Alexander, bishop of Constantinople, in Theodoret, Hist. Eccles. i. 4, and the circular letter Ad Catholicos, in Socrat. i. 6. *Münscher*, edit. by von Cölln, p. 203–206. He founds his arguments chiefly on the prologue to the Gospel of John, and shows, μεταξὺ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ οὐδὲν εἶναι διάστημα. All time and all spaces of time are rather created by the Father through the Son. If the Son had had a beginning, the Father would have been ἄλογος. The generation of the Son had nothing in common with the sonship of believers. Christ is the Son of God κατὰ φύσιν. Comp. *Schleiermacher*, Kirchengesch. p. 212.

§ 90.

THE HYPOSTASIS AND HOMOUSIA OF THE SON.

The Doctrine of the Council of Nice.

Münscher, Untersuchung, über den Sinn der nicäischen Glaubensformel, in Henkes Neues, Magazin, vi. p. 334, ss. *Walch*, Bibl. Symb. Vet. Lemg. 1770, 8, p. 75, ss. [*Fuchs* Bibliothek d. Kirchenversammlungen der 4n. und 5n. Jahr. i. 350. *Athanasii* Epis-

* Thus Arius, on the doctrine of Origen, contended against its speculative side, in the *eternal generation*, while he adopted his view of the subordination of the Son to the Father. Comp. *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. 308; and Neander, Hist. Dogm. p. 303: "The profound idea, espoused by Origen, of the eternal generation of the Son, without any beginning, could not be comprehended by the commonplace understanding of Arius."

tolse de Decret. Synod. Nic. in Oxford Lib. of Fathers, vols. 8, 19. *Kaye's*, Some Account of the Council of Nice, 1853, comp. *Christ. Remembrancer*, 1854. *Petavius*, Theol. Dogm. Tom. ii. Bp. *Bull*, Defensio Fid. Nic. *De Broglie*, L'Eglise et l'Empire Romain, ii. 1–71. *Möhler*, Athanasius, 2 Thle. Mainz, 2d ed. 1844. *K. W. T. Hessler*, Athanasius, der Vertheidiger d. Homousia, in Zeitschrift, f. d. hist. Theol. 1856, transl. in Presb. Qu. Review, 1857. W. W. Harvey, Hist. and Theol. of the Three Creeds, 2. Lond. 1854. *Voigt*, Die Immanente Trinität, und Athanasius; in Jahrb. f. deutsche Theologie, 1858. Analecta Nicæna, fragments on the council, from the Syriac, by B. H. Cowper, Lond. 1857; cf. Journal of Sacr. Lit. Lond. Jan. 1860, p. 380. *Voigt*, Lehre ds. Athanasius, 1861.]

The Emperor Constantine the Great, and the two bishops of the name Eusebius (viz.: of Cæsarea and of Nicomedia), having in vain endeavored to bring about a reconciliation between the contending parties,[1] the *First General* (*Œcumenical*) *Council* was held at *Nice* (A. D. 325), principally through the intervention of the bishop Hosius of Corduba. After several other formulas, apparently favorable to Arianism,[2] had been rejected, a confession of faith was adopted, in which it was established as the inviolable doctrine of the catholic church, that the Son is of the *same essence* (ὁμοούσιος) with the Father, but sustaining to him the relation of that which is begotten to that which begets.[3]

[1] Comp. Epist. Constantini ad Alexandrum et Arium, in Eus. Vita Const. ii. 64–72; and on the attempts of the two bishops to bring about a reconciliation, see *Neander*, l. c. p. 783, ss.

[2] One of these is the confession of faith which Eusebius of Cæsarea proposed, Theodor. Hist. Eccles. i. 11, comp. Neander, l. c. p. 797, ss. It contained the expression: Ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος, θεὸς ἐκ θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτὸς, ζωὴ ἐκ ζωῆς, πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως, πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων, ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεγεννημένος. According to Athan. De Decret. Syn. Nic. 20, they at first only wished to decide, that the Son of God is εἰκὼν τοῦ πατρὸς, ὅμοιός τε καὶ ἀπαράλλακτος κατὰ πάντα τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ἄτρεπτος καὶ ἀεὶ, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἀδιαιρέτως.

[3] Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα Θεὸν, πατέρα παντοκράτορα, πάντων ὁρατῶν τε καὶ ἀοράτων ποιητήν· καὶ εἰς ἕνα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μονογενῆ, τουτέστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς, Θεὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτὸς, Θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ Θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο, τά τε ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ, τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν κατελθόντα καὶ σαρκωθέντα καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα, παθόντα καὶ ἀναστάντα τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ· ἀνελθόντα εἰς τοὺς οὐρανοὺς, καὶ ἐρχόμενον κρῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς. Καὶ εἰς τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα. Τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας, ὅτι ἦν ποτε ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, καὶ πρὶν γεννηθῆναι οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐγένετο, ἢ ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας φάσκοντας εἶναι, ἢ κτιστὸν ἢ τρεπτὸν ἢ ἀλλοιωτὸν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀναθεματίζει ἡ ἁγία καθολικὴ καὶ ἀποστολικὴ ἐκκλησία. Athan. Epist. De Decret. Syn. Nic.—Eus. Cæs. Ep. ad Cæsarienses.—Socrat. i. 8. Theodoret, Hist. Eccl. i. 11. *Münscher* von Cölln, p. 207–9. *Baur*, Trinitätl. p. 334, ss. *Meier*, p. 146,

ss. *Dorner*, p. 849. [The Nicene creed, says Dorner, showed to Christian theology the end at which it was to aim, even if it did not perfectly realize that end. Arianism had pressed back towards Ebionitism; it had lost the idea of the incarnation, putting between God and the creature a fantastic, subordinate God, which separated rather than united the infinite and finite. It made a perfect revelation or manifestation of God impossible. The Nicene fathers met this, by proclaiming the real and proper divinity of the Son, etc.]

Respecting the definitions of the phrases ἐξ οὐσίας and ὁμοούσιος, comp. Athanasius, l. c. We find that even at that time a distinction was made between *sameness* and *similarity*. The Son is like the Father in a different sense from that in which we become like God by rendering obedience to his laws. This resemblance, moreover, is not external, accidental, like that between metal and gold, tin and silver, etc.

[*Baur*, Dogmengesch. 2te Aufl. 1858, p. 164, gives the following as the substance of the Nicene and Athanasian belief. To the Arian hypothesis it opposes the eternal generation and consubstantiality (Homousia) of the Son, on the basis of the following arguments; 1. The Father would not be absolute God if he were not in his essence begetting and so the Father of a Son of the same essence. 2. The idea of the divinity of the Son is abolished, if he is not Son by nature, but only through God's grace. If created, he were neither Son nor God; to be both creature and creator is a complete contradiction. 3. The unity of the finite with the infinite, of man with God, falls to the ground, if the mediator of this unity is only a creature, and not the absolute God.]

§ 91.

Further Fluctuations until the Synod of Constantinople.

But the phrase ὁμοούσιος did not meet with universal approval.[1] In this unsettled state of affairs the party of the Eusebians,[2] who had for some time previous enjoyed the favor of the court, succeeded in gaining its assent to a doctrine in which the use of the term ὁμοούσιος was studiously avoided, though it did not strictly inculcate the principles of Arianism. Thus Athanasius, who firmly adhered to this watchword of the Nicene party, found himself compelled to seek refuge in the West. Several synods were summoned for the purpose of settling this long protracted question, a number of formulæ were drawn up and rejected,[3] till at last the Nicene and Athanasian doctrine was more firmly established by the decisions of the second œcumenical synod of Constantinople (A. D. 381).[4]

[1] Several Asiatic bishops took offense at the term in question; Socrat. i. 8, 6. *Münscher* von Cölln, p. 210. They considered it unscriptural (λέξις ἄγραφος), and were afraid that it might give rise to a revival of the theory of emanation. But the expression ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας was more favorable to that

theory than the term ὁμοούσιος, comp. *Meier*, l. c. p. 147.—Respecting the further course of the external events, see the works on ecclesiastical history. LEADING HISTORICAL FACTS: I. The banishment of Arius and of the bishops Theonas and Secundus. The fate of Eusebius of Nicomedia and Theognis of Nice. II. Arius is recalled A. D. 330, after having signed the following confession of faith: εἰς Κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, τὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων γεγεννημένον, θεὸν λόγον, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο κ. τ. λ. (Socr. i. 26.) Synods of Tyre and Jerusalem (A. D. 335). III. Banishment of Athanasius to Gaul. The sudden death of Arius at Constantinople (A. D. 336), prior to his solemn readmission into the Church. Different opinions concerning this event. IV. Death of the Emperor Constantine the Great at Nicomedia (A. D. 337). (Socr. i. 27–40.) A remarkable change had taken place in the views of Constantine towards the close of his life. The Arians were firmly supported by his son Constantius, who ruled in the East from A. D. 337.

[1] Concerning this name, see *Gieseler*, i. § 82. Athanasius himself frequently calls them οἱ περὶ Εὐσέβιον; by other writers they are classed with the Arians, whom they joined in their opposition to Athanasius.

[2] I. The four confessions of faith drawn up by the Eusebians, and presented at councils in Antioch from the year 341 (in Athan. De Syn. c. 22–25. *Walch*, p. 109. *Münscher*, edit. by von Cölln, p. 211, ss. *Gieseler*, i. § 82, note 4); in all of these the word ὁμοούσιος is wanting, but in other points they were not favorable to Arianism. II. The formula μακρόστιχος, by the council of Antioch, A. D. 343, in which Arianism was condemned, Tritheism rejected, the doctrine of Athanasius found fault with, and, in opposition to it, the subordination of the Son to the Father was maintained. III. The synod of Sardica, (A. D. 347, or, according to others, A. D. 344)* Socrat. ii. 20; but the western bishops alone remained at Sardica, the eastern held their assemblies in the neighboring town of Philippopolis. The Formula Philippopolitana, preserved by Hilary (de Synodis contra Arianos, § 34), is partly a repetition of the formula μακρόστιχος. IV. The confession of faith adopted at the first council of Sirmium (A. D. 351, in Athanas. § 27, in Hilary, § 37, and in Socrat. ii. 29, 30) was directed against Photinus; see below, § 92. V. The formula of the second council of Sirmium (A. D. 357, in Hilary, § 11, Athanas. § 28, Socrat. ii. 30) was directed both against the use of the term ὁμοούσιος, and against speculative tendencies in general: Scire autem manifestum est solum Patrem quomodo genuerit filium suum, et filium quomodo genitus sit a patre, (comp. above, Irenæus, § 42, note 9); but it also asserts the subordination of the Son to the Father in the strict Arian manner: Nulla ambiguitas est, majorem esse Patrem. Nulli potest dubium esse, Patrem honore, dignitate, claritate, majestate et ipso nomine Patris majorem esse filio, ipso testante: qui me misit major me est (John xiv. 28). Et hoc catholicum esse, nemo ignorat, duas Personas esse Patris et Filii, majorem Patrem, Filium subjectum cum omnibus his, quæ ipsi Pater subjecit. VI. These strict Arian views were rejected by the Semiarians at the synod

* Respecting the chronology, see *Weiser, H. J.*, Restitutio veræ Chronologiæ Rerum ex Controversiis Arianis inde ab anno 325 usque ad annum 350 exortarum contra chronologiam hodie receptam exhibita. Francof. 1827.

of Ancyra in Galatia (A. D. 358), under Basil, bishop of Ancyra; the decrees of this synod are given in Epiph. Hær. 73, § 2–11. (*Münscher* von Cölln and *Gieseler*, i. § 83.) VII. The confession of faith adopted at the third synod of Sirmium (A. D. 358), in which that agreed upon at the second synod (the Arian) is condemned, and the Semiarian confession of the synod of Ancyra is confirmed. Comp. Athan. § 8. Socrat. ii. 37. VIII. Council of the western church at Ariminum (Rimini), and of the eastern at Seleucia (A. D. 359).

[4] SYMBOLUM NICÆNO-CONSTANTINOPOLITANUM: Πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα θεὸν, πατέρα παντοκράτορα, ποιητὴν οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς, ὁρατῶν τε πάντων καὶ ἀοράτων. Καὶ εἰς ἕνα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ τὸν μονογενῆ, τὸν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθέντα πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων, φῶς ἐκ φωτὸς, θεὸν ἀληθινὸν ἐκ θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ, δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο· τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν κατελθόντα ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν, καὶ σαρκωθέντα ἐκ πνεύματος ἁγίου καὶ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου, καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντα· σταυρωθέντα δὲ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ Ποντίου Πιλάτου, καὶ παθόντα καὶ ταφέντα καὶ ἀναστάντα ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ κατὰ τὰς γραφάς· καὶ ἀνελθόντα εἰς τοὺς οὐρανούς, καὶ καθεζόμενον ἐκ δεξιῶν τοῦ πατρὸς, καὶ πάλιν ἐρχόμενον μετὰ δόξης κρῖναι ζῶντας καὶ νεκρούς· οὗ τῆς βασιλείας οὐκ ἔσται τέλος. Καὶ εἰς τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, etc. (Concerning the further statements as to the nature of the Holy Spirit, see below, § 93, note 7.)

Münscher edit by von Cölln, compares this symbol with the Nicene Creed, p. 240. Comp. *J. C. Suicer*, Symbolum Nicæno-Constantinopolitan, expositum et ex antiquitate ecclesiastica illustratum, Traj. ad Rhen. 1718, 4. [Comp. Cardinal Wiseman, Account of Council of Constantinople in the Arian Controv. in his Essays, vol. 3.]

§ 92.

THE CAUSES OF THESE FLUCTUATIONS.

Arianism and Semiarianism on the one hand, and return to Sabellianism on the other (Marcellus and Photinus).

Klose, C. R. W., Geschichte und Lehre des Eunomius, Kiel, 1833. *By the same:* Geschichte und Lehre des Marcellus und Photinus, Hamburg, 1837.

From the very nature of the controversy in question, it followed that the difficult task of steering clear both of Sabellianism and Arianism devolved on those who were anxious to preserve orthodoxy in its purity. In maintaining the sameness of essence, they had to hold fast to the distinction of persons; in asserting the latter, they had to avoid the doctrine of subordination.[1] The Semiarians,[2] and with them *Cyril of Jerusalem*,[3] and *Eusebius of Cæsarea*,[4] endeav-

ored to avoid the use of the term *ὁμοούσιος*, lest they should fall into the Sabellian error; though the former asserted, in opposition to the strict Arians (the followers of Aëtius, and the Eunomians),[1] that the Son was of *similar* essence with the Father (*ὁμοιούσιος*).[2] But *Marcellus*, bishop of Ancyra, and his disciple, *Photinus*, bishop of Sirmium, carried their opposition to Arianism so far as to adopt in substance the principles of Sabellianism. They modified it, however, to some extent, by drawing a distinction between the terms Logos and the Son of God, and thus guarded it against all semblance of patripassianism.[3]

[1] *Chrysostom* shows clearly the necessity, as well as the difficulty, of avoiding both these dangers, De Sacerdotio, iv. 4, sub finem: *Ἂν τε γὰρ μίαν τις εἴπῃ θεότητα, πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ παράνοιαν εὐθέως εἵλκυσε τὴν φωνὴν ὁ Σαβέλλιος· ἂν τε διέλῃ πάλιν ἕτερον μὲν τὸν Πατέρα, ἕτερον δὲ τὸν Υἱὸν καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα δὲ τὸ ἅγιον ἕτερον εἶναι λέγων, ἐφέστηκεν Ἄρειος, εἰς παραλλαγὴν οὐσίας ἕλκων τὴν ἐν τοῖς προσώποις διαφοράν. Δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀσεβῆ σύγχυσιν ἐκείνου, καὶ τὴν μανιώδη τούτου διαίρεσιν ἀποστρέφεσθαι καὶ φεύγειν, τὴν μὲν θεότητα Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου Πνεύματος μίαν ὁμολογοῦντας, προστιθέντας δὲ τὰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις. Οὕτω γὰρ ἀποτειχίσαι δυνησόμεθα τὰς ἀμφοτέρων ἐφόδους.*

[2] The leaders of the Semiarians (*ὁμοιουσιασταί, ἡμιάρειοι*) were ***Basil***, bishop of Ancyra, and ***Georgius***, bishop of Laodicea. Comp. the confession of faith adopted by the synod of Ancyra (A. D. 358), in Athanas. de Syn. § 41. *Münscher* ed. by von Cölln, p. 222.

[3] *Cyril*, Cat. xvi. 24. He rejects, generally speaking, the too fine-spun speculations, and thinks it sufficient to believe: *Εἷς θεὸς ὁ Πατήρ· εἷς κύριος, ὁ μονογενὴς αὐτοῦ υἱός· ἓν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, ὁ παράκλητος.* Christ says, he that believeth on him hath eternal life—not he who knows how he was generated. We ought not to go beyond Scripture, nor turn either to the right or to the left, but keep in the via regia, *μήτε διὰ τὸ νομίζειν τιμᾶν τὸν υἱὸν, πατέρα αὐτὸν ἀναγορεύσωμεν, μήτε διὰ τὸ τιμᾶν τὸν πατέρα νομίζειν, ἕν τι δημιουργημάτων τὸν υἱὸν ὑποπτεύσωμεν*, xi. 17. Instead of *ὁμοούσιος*, he would prefer *ὅμοιος κατὰ πάντα*, iv. 7, but comp. the various readings in the work of *Toutée*, p. 53, and *Münscher* ed. by von Cölln, p. 224–226. Socrat. iv. 25. He also maintains that it is necessary to hold the medium between Sabellianism and Arianism, iv. 8: *Καὶ μήτε ἀπαλλοτριώσῃς τοῦ πατρὸς τὸν υἱὸν, μήτε συναλοιφὴν ἐργασάμενος υἱοπατορίαν πιστεύσῃς κ. τ. λ.* Comp. xvi. 4, and *Meier*, die Lehre von der Trinität. i. p. 170. [Cyril's chief aim is to hold fast the individual existence of the Son and the Father, without so annulling all internal relations, that the Trias is destroyed, and the Son degraded to the level of creatures by the *ἦν ποτε οὐκ ἦν*.]

[4] *Eus.* Hist. Eccl. 1, 2, calls the Son *τὸν τῆς μεγάλης βουλῆς ἄγγελον, τὸν τῆς ἀῤῥήτου γνώμης τοῦ πατρὸς ὑπουργὸν, τὸν δεύτερον μετὰ τὸν πατέρα αἴτιον*, etc. In Panegyricus, x. i. he also calls him *τῶν ἀγαθῶν*

δεύτερον αἴτιον, an expression which greatly offended the orthodox writers;* but at another place he gives him the name αὐτόθεος, x. 4. On the formation of compound words by means of the pronoun αὐτό, of which Eusebius makes frequent use, comp. the Demonstr. Evang. iv. 2, 13, and *Heinichen*, l. c. p. 223. In the same work, v. 1, p. 215, the subordination of the Son to the Father is stated; he calls him, iv. 3, p. 149, υἱὸν γεννητὸν, but yet says that he is πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων ὄντα καὶ προόντα καὶ τῷ πατρὶ ὡς υἱὸν διαπαντὸς συνόντα; yet again he speaks of him as ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀνεκφράστου καὶ ἀπερινοήτου βουλῆς τε καὶ δυνάμεως οὐσιούμενον. For further particulars see *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, p. 227–29, and Handbuch, iii. p. 427, ss. *Martini*, Eus. Cæs. de Divinitate Christi Sententia, Rost. 1795, 4. †*Ritter*, Eus. Cæs. de Divinitate Christi placita, Bonn. 1823, 4. *Hœnell*, de Eusebio Cæs. relig. Christ. defensore. *Meier*, l. c. i. p. 167. *Baur*, Trinit. 472. *Dorner*, 792: "*His system is a play of colors, a reflex of the unsolved problems of the church at that time.*"

* Concerning the strict Arians: *Aëtius* of Antioch, *Eunomius*, bishop of Cycicum, and *Acacius*, bishop of Cæsarea, in Palestine, comp. Philostorg. iii. iv. Epiph. Hær. 76, 10. Respecting the life, writings, and opinions of Eunomius, see *Klose*, l. c. *Neander*, Church History (Torrey's transl.), ii. 399–409. Comp. *Dorner*, i. 3, p. 853, ss. *Meier*, i. p. 176, ss. *Baur*, Trin. i. 360, sq.

* *Athanasius* showed how little the idea of similarity of essence (homoiousianism) was adapted to satisfy the mind, when, among other things, he calls to mind that many things may be of similar nature without having sprung from each other (as silver and tin, a wolf and a dog); De Synod. § 41. The Semiarians, with the Arians, maintained that the Son was created of the will of the Father; the opposite of this appeared to them to be mere compulsion or force. In reply, Athanasius held up the idea of an internal necessity, founded in the very nature of God, to which the category of force does not apply. He compared the relation to that of the shining of the light. Orat. contr. Arios, 11, 2. Comp. *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. 311. *Neander*, Hist. Dogm. (Ryland), 322. [*Voigt* on Athanasius and the Immanent Trinity, in Jahrb. f. deutsche Theologie, 1858. *Hessler* on Athanasius, transl. in Presb. Qu. Rev. 1857. *Baur*, Dogmengesch. 2d ed. p. 165, says of the Semiarians, that they had a half-way position, reducing the absolute ideas of the two parties to indeterminate terms, and running back into the old subordination and emanation views.]

* The opinions of *Marcellus* (who died about the year 374), are derived partly from the fragments of his treatise against Asterius (de Subjectione Domini, edited by *Rettberg*, under the title: Marcelliana, Gött. 1794, 8), partly from the writings of his opponents, Eusebius (κατὰ Μαρκέλλου Lib. ii. and περὶ τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς θεολογίας) and Cyril of Jerusalem (Cat. xv. 27, 33), and partly from his own letter to Julius, bishop of Rome (Epiph.

* Comp. the note of the scholiast in the Cod. Med. (in the editions of *Valesius* and *Heinichen*, iii. p. 219): Κακῶς κἀνταῦθα θεολογεῖς, Εὐσέβιε, περὶ τοῦ συνανάρχου καὶ συναϊδίου καὶ συμποιητοῦ τῶν ὅλων υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ, δεύτερον αὐτὸν ἀποκαλῶν αἴτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν, συναίτιον ὄντα καὶ συνδημιουργὸν τῷ πατρὶ τῶν ὅλων, καὶ ὁμοούσιον, and the more recent note in the Cod. Mazarin., ibidem.

Hær. 72, 2). The earlier writers are divided in their opinions concerning the orthodoxy of Marcellus: the language of Athanasius is very mild and cautious (*διὰ τοῦ προσώπου μειδιάσας* Epiph. Hær. 72, 4); though he does not directly approve of his sentiments. Basil the Great, on the other hand, (according to Epiphanius, 69, 2, and 263, 5), and most of the other eastern bishops, insisted upon his condemnation; most of the latter writers considered him a heretic, comp. *Montfaucon*, Diatribe de Causa Marcelli Ancyrani (in Collect. Nova Patr. Par. 1707, T. ii. pag. li); *Klose*, p. 21–25, *Gieseler*, i. § 82, note 10. Marcellus had formerly defended the term *ὁμοούσιος* at the council of Nice. When, in the course of the controversy, and of his opposition to the Arian sophist Asterius, he seemed to lean more towards Sabellianism, this may have occurred without his being directly conscious of it; comp. *Baumgarten-Crusius*, i. p. 277, 278. [Ueber die Orthodoxie des Marc., von F. A. Willenberg, Munster, 1859.] Concerning the doctrine itself, Marcellus returned to the old distinction made between *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and *προφορικός*; he imagined, on the one hand, that the *λόγος* was *ἡσυχάζων* in God, and, on the other, that it was an *ἐνέργεια δραστική* proceeding from him. Inasmuch as he maintains the reality of the Logos (whom he does not consider to be a mere name), in opposition to the Sabellian view of a *τριὰς ἐκτεινομένη καὶ συστελλομένη*, and rejects the idea of *generation* adopted by the council of Nice (because it seemed to him to infringe upon the divinity of the Logos), he occupies an intermediate position between the one and the other. He also endeavored to re-introduce the older historical signification of the phrase *υἱὸς θεοῦ*, as applying to the personal manifestation of the historical Christ, and not to the preëxistence of the Logos; for the idea of generation can not be applied to the latter. He consequently interpreted the Biblical phrases, Col. i. 15, and the like, in which Christ is spoken of as the image of God, to the incarnate Logos; so, too, the *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*; comp. *Neander*, Hist. Dogm. 317. His disciple *Photinus*, bishop of Sirmium (to whom his opponents, with poor wit, gave the nickname *Σκοτεινός*), adopted similar views, but carried them to a much greater extent; he died about the year 376. His doctrine was condemned in the aforesaid formula *μακρόστιχος*, and again at the council of Milan (A. D. 346). He himself was dismissed from his office by the council of Sirmium (A. D. 351). The sect of the Photinians, however, continued to exist till the reign of Theodosius the Great. From what has been said concerning him by Athan. de Syn. § 26, Socrat. ii. 19, Epiph. Hær. 70, Hilary (Fragm., and De Synodis), Marius Mercator (Nestorii Sermo IV.), and Vigil. Tapsens. Dialogus), it can not be fully ascertained how far Photinus either adhered to the principles of his master, or deviated from them. Comp. on this point *Münscher*, Handbuch, iii. p. 447. *Neander*, Church Hist. ii. 395, 425. *Baumgarten-Crusius*, p. 279. *Gieseler*, i. § 82. *Hase*, Church Hist. in Wing's version, 114. *Klose*, p. 66, ss. *He* too asserted the co-eternity of the Logos (but not of the Son) with the Father, and employed the term *λογοπάτωρ* to denote their unity, as Sabellius had used the word *υἱοπάτωρ*. He applied the name "Son of God" only to the incarnate Christ. The only difference between Marcellus and Photinus probably was, that the latter developed the negative aspect of Christology more than his master, and con-

sequently considered the connection of the Logos with the historical Christ to be less intimate. Hence his followers were called Homuncionitæ (according to Mar. Mercator, quoted by *Klose*, p. 76). Thus Photinus corresponds more with Paul of Samosata, and Marcellus with Sabellius. So, too, Photinus viewed the preëxistence of Christ in a merely ideal way, referring it (as the Socinians afterwards did) to predestination. In these controversies it is very striking, as *Münscher* has said, "*that theologians then but little understood the distinction made by Marcellus and Photinus between the terms* LOGOS *and* SON OF GOD. *In refuting their opponents, they invariably confounded these expressions, and thus might easily draw dangerous and absurd inferences from their propositions. But, at the same time, it is evident that their own arguments would take a wrong direction, and thus lose the greatest part of their force.*" *Münscher*, Handbuch, l. c. Comp., however, *Dorner*, i. 3, p. 864, ss. *Baur*, Trinit. i. p. 525, ss. *Meier*, i. p. 160, ss., especially on the transverse relations in which Photinus stood to his teacher in respect to christology. [*Baur*, Dogmengesch. 2te aufl. 1858, p. 168; Marcellus distinguishes the Son from the Logos, and makes the Logos itself to be both quiescent and active; the Sonship of the Logos has both a beginning and an end; with Arianism, he sundered God and the world as far as possible. The doctrine of Paulinus is the same, excepting that, like Paul of Samosata and Arius, he adopted the view that the human Christ was deified by means of his moral excellencies. *Zahn*, Marcellus. Gotha. 1867.]

§ 93.

DIVINITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

[*Kahnis*, Gesch. d. Lehre vom Heiligen Geiste. Ed. *Burton*, Test. of Ante-Nicene Fathers to the Divinity of the Holy Ghost. 1831 (Works, vol. 2). *Hare's* (Archd.) Mission of the Comforter, 2d ed. 1851. *Owen's* Works, vols. iii and iv. The Personality of the Holy Spirit, against Sabellianism, *W. O. Child*, in Christian Review (N. Y.) 1852, pp. 515–537.]

The Nicene Creed decided nothing concerning the Holy Spirit.[1] While *Lactantius* still identified the Word with the Spirit,[2] other theologians regarded the Spirit as a mere divine power or gift, or at least did not venture to determine his nature in any more definite way, though accustomed to teach the divinity of the Son in unequivocal terms.[3] But *Athanasius* correctly inferred from his premises the divinity of the Holy Spirit,[4] and was followed by *Basil*, surnamed the Great, as well as by *Gregory of Nazianzum*, and *Gregory of Nyssa*.[5] At last the General Council of Constantinople (A. D. 381), influenced by Gregory of Nazianzum, adopted more precise doctrinal definitions concerning the Holy Spirit, especially in opposition to the Macedonians (πνευματομάχους).[6] Though the term ὁμοούσιος itself was not applied to the Spirit in the canons of this council, yet, by determining that he proceeds from the Father, they

prepared the way for further definitions, in which honor and power equal in every respect to those of the Father and the Son were ascribed to him.'

[1] The opposition to Arius would necessarily lead to more precise definitions; for *Arius* (according to Athan. Orat. 1, § 6) maintained that the Spirit stood as far below the Son as the Son was below the Father, and that he was the first of the creatures made by the Son. But it did not appear wise to complicate the matter in question still more by contending about the divinity of the Spirit, since many of the Nicene Fathers, who consented that the term ὁμοούσιος should be applied to the Son, would not have so easily admitted it in reference to the Spirit. See *Neander*, Church History (Torrey), ii. p. 419 sq.

[2] See above, § 87, note 1.

[3] There were here again two ways—the one falling back into Sabellianism, the other a continuation of Arianism. *Lactantius*, on the one hand, separated the Son from the Father (after the manner of the Arians), and, on the other, confounded the Spirit with the Son (as the Sabellians did). Some writers followed the same course, while others ascribed a distinct personality to the Spirit, but asserted that he was subordinate to both the Father and the Son (the Arian view). *Gregory of Nazianzum* gives a summary of the different views entertained in his time in the fifth of his theological orations, which was composed about the year 380 (De Spir. S. Orat. xxxi. p. 559): "Some of the wise men amongst us regard the Holy Spirit as an energy (ἐνέργεια), others think that he is a creature, some again that he is God himself, and, lastly, there are some who do not know what opinion to adopt, from reverence, as they say, for the Sacred Scriptures, because *they* do not teach anything definite on this point." *Eustathius of Sebaste* belonged to this latter class; he said in reference to the Macedonian controversy (Socr. ii. 45): Ἐγὼ οὔτε θεὸν ὀνομάζειν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον αἱροῦμαι, οὔτε κτίσμα καλεῖν τολμήσαιμι. Comp. *Ullmann*, Gregor von Nazianz. p. 380. *Neander*, Church Hist. ii. 342. *Eusebius of Cæsarea* was the more willing to subordinate the Spirit to both the Father and the Son, as he was disposed to admit the subordination of the Son to the Father. He thinks that the Spirit is the first of all rational beings, but belongs nevertheless to the Trinity; De Theol. eccles. iii. 3, 5, 6. *Hilary* was satisfied that that which searcheth the deep things of God, must be itself divine, though he could not find any passage in Scripture in which the name "*God*" was given to the Holy Spirit; De Trin. lib. xii. c. 55; Tuum est, quicquid te init; neque alienum a te est, quicquid virtute scrutantis inest. Comp. de Trin. ii. 29: De spiritu autem sancto nec tacere oportet, nec loqui necesse est, sed sileri a nobis eorum causa, qui nesciunt, non potest. Loqui autem de eo non necesse est, quia de patre et filio auctoribus confitendum est, et quidem puto an sit, non esse tractandum. Est enim, quandoquidem donatur, accipitur, obtinetur, et qui confessioni patris et filii connexus est, non potest a confessione patris et filii separari. Imperfectum enim est nobis totum, si aliquid desit a toto. De quo si quis intelligentiæ nostræ sensum requirit, in Apostolo legimus ambo: Quoniam estis, inquit, filii Dei, misit Deus spiritum filii sui in corda vestra

clamantem: Abba pater. Et rursum: Nolite contristare Spir. S. Dei, in quo signati estis... Unde quia est et donatur et habetur et Dei est, cesset hinc sermo calumniantium, cum dicunt, per quem sit et ob quid sit, vel qualis sit. Si responsio nostra displicebit, dicentium: Per quem omnia et in quo omnia sunt, et quia spiritus est Dei, donum fidelium; displiceant et apostoli et evangelistæ et prophetæ, hoc tantum de eo quod esset loquentes, et post hæc pater et filius displicebit.—He also advises us not to be perplexed by the language of Scripture, in which both the Father and the Son are sometimes called Spirit. *"He grossly confounds the terms: Deus Spiritus, Dei Spiritus, and Spiritus S., and, though he believes in the separate subsistence of the Spirit, he does not go beyond the idea that he is a donum, a munus."*—*Meier*, Trinitätal. i. p. 192. *Cyril of Jerusalem*, too, endeavors to avoid all further speculations as to the nature of the Holy Spirit not contained in the Scriptures, though he distinctly separates him from all created beings, and regards him as an inseparable part of the Trinity; but he urges especially the practical aspect of this doctrine in opposition to the false enthusiasm of heretical fanatics, Cat. 16 and 17.*

[4] *Athanasius* (Ep. 4, ad Serap.) endeavored to refute those who declared the Holy Ghost to be a *κτίσμα*, or the first of the *πνευμάτων λειτουργικῶν*, and who were called *τροπικοί*, *πνευματομαχοῦντες*. He shows that we completely renounce Arianism only when we perceive in the Trinity nothing that is foreign to the nature of God (*ἀλλότριον ἢ ἐξώθεν ἐπιμιγνύμενον*), but one and the same being, which is in perfect accordance, identical, with itself. *Τριὰς δέ ἐστιν οὐχ ἕως ὀνόματος μόνον καὶ φαντασίας λέξεως, ἀλλὰ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ ὑπάρξει τριάς* (Ep. i. 28, p. 677). He appealed both to the declarations of Holy Writ, and to the testimony of our own Christian consciousness. How can that which is not sanctified by anything else, which is itself the source of sanctification to all creatures, possess the *same* nature as those who are sanctified by it? We have fellowship with God, and participate in the divine life, by means of the Holy Spirit; but this could not be if the Spirit were created by God. As certain as it is, that we through him become partakers of the divine nature, so certain is it that he must himself be one with the divine being (*εἰ δὲ θεοποιεῖ, οὐκ ἀμφίβολον, ὅτι ἡ τούτου φύσις θεοῦ ἐστί*). Ep. i. ad Serap. § 24, p. 672, 73. *Neander*, l. c. p. 420. *Meier*, i. p. 187, ss. [*Voigt* on Athanasius in the Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. 1858.]

[5] *Basil the Great*, on a particular occasion, composed his treatise, De Spiritu Sancto, addressed to the bishop Amphilochius of Iconium (comp. with it Ep. 189; Homilia de Fide, T. ii. p. 132; Hom. contra Sab. T. ii. p. 195). He too maintained that the name *God* should be given to the Spirit, and appealed both to Scripture in general, and to the baptismal formula in particular, in which the Spirit is mentioned together with the Father and the Son. He did not, however, lay much stress upon the name itself, but simply demanded that the Spirit should not be regarded as a creature, but be considered as inseparable from both the Father and the Son. He spoke

* As one shower waters flowers of the most different species (roses and lilies), so *one* Spirit is the author of many different graces, etc. Cat. xvi. 12. He is *τίμιον, τὸ ἀγαθόν, μέγας παρὰ Θεοῦ σύμμαχος καὶ προστάτης, μέγας διδάσκαλος ἐκκλησίας, μέγας ὑπερασπιστὴς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*, etc., ibid. c. 19. Hence, his glory far surpasses that of all angels, c. 23.

in eloquent language of the practical importance of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit (as the sanctifier of the human heart), De Spir. S. c. 16: Τὸ δὲ μέγιστον τεκμήριον τῆς πρὸς τὸν πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν τοῦ πνεύματος συναφείας, ὅτι οὕτως ἔχειν λέγεται πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν, ὡς πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔχει τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν (1 Cor. ii. 10, 11). In answer to the objection, that the Spirit is called a *gift*, he remarks that the Son is likewise *a gift of God*, ibid. c. 24; comp. *Klose*, Basilius der Grosse, p. 34, ss. His brother, *Gregory of Nyssa*, in the second chapter of his larger Catechism, starts from ideas similar to those of Lactantius, that the *Spirit* (breath) must be connected with the *Word*, since it is so even in the case of man. He does not, however, like Lactantius, identify the Spirit with the Word, but keeps them separate. The Spirit is not to be considered as any thing foreign which enters from without into the Deity (comp. Athanasius); to think of the Spirit of God as similar to ours, would be detracting from the glory of the divine omnipotence. "On the contrary, we conceive that this *essential power, which manifests itself as a separate hypostasis*, can neither be separated from the Godhead in which it rests, nor from the divine word which it follows. Nor does it cease to exist, but being self-existing (αὐτοκίνητον) like the Deity, it is ever capable of choosing the good, and of carrying out all its purposes." Comp. *Rupp*, Gregor. von Nyssa, p. 169, 70.—The views of *Gregory of Nazianzum* agreed with those of these two writers, though he clearly perceived the difficulties with which the doctrine in question was beset in his time. He anticipated the objection, that it would introduce a θεὸν ξένον καὶ ἄγραφον (Orat. xxx. 1, p. 566. *Ullmann*, p. 381); he also acknowledged that the doctrine in this particular form was not expressly contained in Scripture, and therefore thought that we must go beyond the letter itself.* He, therefore, had recourse to the idea of a gradual revelation, which, as he conceived, stood in connection with a natural development of the Trinity. "The Old Test. sets forth the Father in a clear, but the Son in a somewhat dimmer, light: the New Test. reveals the Son, but only intimates the divinity of the Spirit; but now the Spirit dwells in the midst of us, and manifests himself more distinctly. It was not desirable that the divinity of the Son should be proclaimed, as long as that of the Father was not fully recognized; nor to add that of the Spirit, as long as that of the Son was not believed." Gregory numbered the doctrine of the Holy Spirit among those things of which Christ speaks, John xvi. 12, and recommended, therefore, prudence in discourses on this dogma. He himself developed it principally in his controversy with Macedonius, and showed, in opposition to him, that the Holy Spirit is neither a mere power, nor a creature, and, accordingly, that there is no other alternative except that he is God himself. For further particulars see *Ullman*, p. 378, ss.

* The word Πνευματομάχοι has a general meaning, in which it compre-

* Comp. *Meier*, Trinit.—Lehre, i. 190: "*The want of a sufficiently definite interpretation of Scripture was one of the chief hinderances to the recognition of the consubstantiality (Homoousia) of the Son. To conduct the proof from depths of the Christian consciousness, appeared to many too adventurous, especially in view of the tendencies of the Orient at that epoch; they had doubts about ascribing to the Holy Spirit identity of essence, and paying worship to him without express declaration of Christ and the apostles.*"

heads, of course, the strict Arians. But the divinity of the Spirit was equally denied by the *Semiarians*, while their views concerning the nature of the Son approximated to those of the orthodox party; the most prominent theologian among them was *Macedonius*, bishop of Constantinople (A. D. 341–360). Soz. iv. 27, says of him: Εἰσηγεῖτο δε τὸν υἱὸν θεὸν εἶναι, κατὰ πάντα τε καὶ κατ' οὐσίαν ὅμοιον τῷ πατρί· τό τε ἅγιον πνεῦμα ἄμοιρον τῶν αὐτῶν πρεσβείων ἀπεφαίνετο, διάκονον καὶ ὑπηρέτην καλῶν. Theodoret, ii. 6, adds that he did not hesitate to call the Spirit a creature. His opinion was afterwards called the *Marathonian*, from *Marathonius*, bishop of Nicomedia. His followers appear to have been very numerous, especially in the vicinity of Lampsacus, see *Meier*, i. p. 192. The Macedonians, though condemned at the second Œcumenical Council, continued to exist as a separate sect in Phrygia down to the fifth century, when they were combatted by Nestorius. The objections which the Macedonians either themselves made to the divinity of the Spirit, or with which they were charged by their opponents, are the following: "The Holy Spirit is either begotten or not begotten; if the latter, we have two unoriginated beings (δύο τὰ ἀναρχα), viz., the Father and the Spirit; if begotten, he must be begotten either of the Father or of the Son: if of the Father, it follows that there are two Sons in the Trinity, and hence brothers (the question then arises, who is the elder of the two, or are they twins?); but if of the Son, we have a grandson of God (θεὸς υἱωνός"), etc. Greg. Orat. xxxi. 7, p. 560, comp. Athanas. Ep. i. ad Serapion, c. 15. In opposition to this, *Gregory* simply remarks, that not the idea of generation, but that of ἐκπόρευσις is to be applied to the Spirit, according to John xv. 26; and that the procession of the Spirit is quite as incomprehensible as the generation of the Son. To these objections was allied another, viz., that the Spirit is wanting in something, if he is not Son. But the Macedonians chiefly appealed to the absence of decisive Scriptures. Comp. *Ullmann*, p. 390, '91.

[1] Τὸ κύριον, τὸ ζωοποιὸν, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον, τὸ σὺν πατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ συμπροσκυνούμενον, καὶ συνδοξαζόμενον, τὸ λαλῆσαν διὰ τῶν προφήτων. Comp. § 91, note 4.

§ 94.

PROCESSION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT.

Walch, J. G., Historia Controversiæ Græcorum Latinorumque de Processione Spir. S. Jenæ, 1751, 8. *Pfaff, Chr. Matth.*, Historia succincta Controversiæ de Processione Spir. S. Tüb. 1749, 4. [Twesten, transl. in Bibliotheca Sacra, iii. 513, iv. 33, sq.]

The formula of the council of Constantinople, however, did not fully settle the point in question. For though the relation of the Spirit to the Trinity in general was determined, yet the particular relation in which he stands to the Son and the Father respectively, still remained to be decided. Inasmuch as the formula declared that the Spirit proceeds from the Father, it did not indeed ex-

pressly deny the procession from the Son; but yet it could be taken in a negative (exclusive) sense. On the one hand, the assertion that the Spirit proceeds *only* from the Father, and not from the Son, seemed to favor the notion that the Son is subordinate to the Father; on the other, to maintain that he proceeds from both the Father and the Son, appeared to place the Spirit in a still greater dependence (viz., on two instead of one). Thus the attempt to establish the full divinity of the Son would easily detract from the divinity of the Spirit; the effort, on the contrary, to give greater independence to the Spirit, would tend to throw the importance of the Son into the shade. The Greek fathers, *Athanasius*, *Basil the Great*, *Gregory of Nyssa*, and others, asserted the procession of the Spirit from the Father, without distinctly denying that he also proceeds from the Son.[1] *Epiphanius*, on the other hand, derived the Spirit from both the Father and the Son, with whom *Marcellus of Ancyra* agreed.[2] But *Theodore of Mopsuestia*, and *Theodoret* would not in any way admit that the Spirit owes his being in any sense to the Son,[3] and defended their opinion in opposition to *Cyril of Alexandria*.[4] The Latin fathers, on the contrary, and *Augustine* in particular,[5] taught the procession of the Spirit from both the Father and the Son. This doctrine became so firmly established in the West, that at the third synod of Toledo (A. D. 589) the clause *filioque* was added to the confession of faith of the council of Constantinople, and so the dogmatic basis was laid for a schism between the eastern and western churches.[6]

[1] In accordance with the prevailing notions of the age, the Father was considered as the only efficient principle (*μία ἀρχή*) to whom all other things owe their existence, of whom the Son is begotten, and from whom the Holy Spirit proceeds, who works all things *through* the Son, and *in* the Holy Spirit. The phrase: that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, was maintained especially against the *Pneumatomachi*. It was asserted, in opposition to them, "*that the Holy Spirit does not derive his essence from the Son in a dependent manner, but that he stands in an equally direct relation to the Father, as the common first cause; that, as the Son is begotten of the Father, so the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father.*" *Neander*, Church Hist. ii. p. 420, sq.

[2] *Epiphan.* Ancor. § 9, after having proved the divinity of the Spirit, *e. g.*, from Acts v. 3, says: *ἄρα θεὸς ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα*, without expressly stating that he *ἐκπορεύεται ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ*. Comp. Ancor. 8: *Πνεῦμα γὰρ Θεοῦ καὶ πνεῦμα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ πνεῦμα υἱοῦ, οὐ κατά τινα σύνθεσιν, καθάπερ ἐν ἡμῖν ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, ἀλλ' ἐν μέσῳ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ, ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ, τρίτον τῇ ὀνομασίᾳ.* *Marcellus* inferred from the position, that the Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son, the sameness of the last two in the Sabellian sense. Eusebius, De Eccles. Theol. iii. 4, p. 168 (quoted by *Klose*, über Marcell. p. 47). Concerning the views of *Photinus*, see *Klose*, l. c. p. 83.

[3] *Theodore* of Mopsuestia in his confession of faith (quoted by *Walch*, Bibl. Symb. p. 204), combatted the opinion which represents the Spirit as διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν ὕπαρξιν εἰληφός. On the opinion of *Theodoret* comp. the IX. Anathematisma of Cyril, Opp. v. p. 47.

[4] *Cyril* condemned all who denied that the Holy Spirit was the *proprium* of Christ. *Theodoret* in reply, observed, that this expression was not objectionable, if nothing more were understood by it than that the Holy Spirit is of the same essence (ὁμοούσιος) with the Son, and proceeds from the Father; but that it ought to be rejected if it were meant to imply that he derives his existence from the Son, or through the Son, either of which would be contrary to what is said, John xv. 26; 1 Cor. ii. 12. Comp. *Neander*, ii. 422.

[5] Augustine, Tract. 99, in Evang. Joh.: A quo autem habet filius, ut sit Deus (est enim de Deo Deus), ab illo habet utique, ut etiam de illo procedat Spir. S. Et per hoc Spir. S. ut etiam de filio procedat, sicut procedit de patre, ab ipso habet patre. Ibid: Spir. S. non de patre procedit in filium, et de filio procedit ad sanctificandam creaturam, sed simul de utroque procedit, quamvis hoc filio Pater dederit, ut quemadmodum de se, ita de illo quoque procedat. De Trin. 4. 20: Nec possumus dicere, quod Spir. S. et a filio non procedat, neque frustra idem Spir. et Patris et Filii Spir. dicitur. 5, 14: ...Sicunt Pater et Filius unus Deus et ad creaturam relative unus creator et unus Deus, sic relative ad Spiritum S. unum principium. (Comp. the whole section, c. 11 and 15.)

[6] This additional clause made its appearance at the time when Recared, king of the Visigoths, passed over from the Arian to the catholic doctrine. The above synod pronounced an anathema against all who did not believe that the Spirit proceeded from both the Father and the Son. Comp. *Mansi*, ix. p. 981.

§ 95.

FINAL STATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

The more accurately the divinity both of the Holy Spirit and of the Son was defined, the more important it became to determine exactly the relation in which the different persons stood to each other, and to the divine essence itself, and then to settle the ecclesiastical terminology. *Athanasius*, *Basil the Great*, *Gregory of Nazianzum*, and *Gregory of Nyssa* in the Greek, *Hilary*, *Ambrose*, *Augustine*, and *Leo the Great* in the Latin church, exerted the greatest influence upon the formation of the said terminology. According to this usage the word οὐσία (essentia, substantia) denotes what is common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; the word ὑπόστασις (persona) what is individual, distinguishing the one from the other.[1] Each person possesses some peculiarity (ἰδιότης), by which it is distinguished from the other persons, notwithstanding the sameness of essence. Thus, underived existence (ἀγεννησία) belongs to the Father,

generation (*γέννησις*) to the Son, and procession (*ἐκπόρευσις, ἔκπεμψις*) to the Holy Spirit.[2] When *Augustine* rejected all the distinctions which had been formerly made between the different persons, and referred to the triune Godhead what had been before predicated of the separate persons (particularly creation), he completely purified the dogma from the older vestiges of subordinationism;[3] but, as he reduced the persons to the general idea of divine relations, he could not entirely avoid the appearance of Sabellianism.[4] *Boëthius* and others adopted his views on this point.[5]

[1] The writers of this period avoided the use of the term *πρόσωπον*, which would have corresponded more exactly with the Latin word persona, while *ὑπόστασις* means literally substantia, lest it might lead to Sabellian inferences; but they sometimes confounded *ὑπόστασις* with *οὐσία*, and occasionally used *φύσις* instead of the latter. This was done *e. g.* by *Gregory* of Nazianzum, Orat. xxiii. 11, p. 431, xxxiii. 16, p. 614, xiii. 11, p. 431; Ep. 1, ad Cledonium, p. 739, ed. Lips. quoted by *Ullmann*, p. 355, note 1, and p. 356, note 1. Gregory also sometimes attaches the same meaning to *ὑπόστασις* and to *πρόσωπον*, though he prefers the use of the latter; Orat. xx. 6, p. 379. *Ullmann*, p. 356, note 3. This distinction is more accurately defined by *Basil*, Ep. 236, 6, (quoted by *Münscher* ed. by von Cölln, p. 242, 243): *Οὐσία δὲ καὶ ὑπόστασις ταύτην ἔχει τὴν διαφοράν, ἣν ἔχει τὸ κοινὸν πρὸς τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον· οἷον ὡς ἔχει τὸ ζῶον πρὸς τὸν δεῖνα ἄνθρωπον. Διὰ τοῦτο οὐσίαν μὲν μίαν ἐπὶ τῆς θεότητος ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὥστε τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον μὴ διαφόρως ἀποδιδόναι· ὑπόστασιν δὲ ἰδιάζουσαν, ἵν' ἀσύγχυτος ἡμῖν καὶ τετραγωνισμένη ἡ περὶ Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου Πνεύματος ἔννοια ἐνυπάρχῃ* κ. τ. λ. Comp. Greg. Naz. Orat. xxix. 11, p. 530, in *Ullmann*, p. 355, note 3; and Orat. xlii. 16, p. 759, quoted by *Ullmann*, p. 356, note 3, where the distinction between *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* is prominently brought forward. *Jerome*, moreover, had objections to the statement that there were three hypostases, because it seemed to lead to Arianism; but he submitted on this point to the judgment of the Roman See; comp. Ep. xv. and xvi. ad Damasum.

[2] Greg. Naz. Orat. xli. 9: *Πάντα ὅσα ὁ πατὴρ, τοῦ υἱοῦ, πλὴν τῆς ἀγεννησίας· πάντα ὅσα ὁ υἱὸς, τοῦ πνεύματος, πλὴν τῆς γεννήσεως* κ. τ. λ. Orat. xxv. 16: *Ἴδιον δὲ πατρὸς μὲν ἡ ἀγεννησία, υἱοῦ δὲ ἡ γέννησις, πνεύματος δὲ ἡ ἔκπεμψις*; but the terms *ἰδιότης* and *ὑπόστασις* were sometimes used synonymously, *e. g.*, Greg. Naz. Orat. xxxiii. 16, p. 614. *Ullmann*, p. 357.

[3] Such vestiges are unquestionably to be found even in the most orthodox fathers, not only in the East, but also in the West. Thus, for instance, in *Hilary*, De Trin. iii. 12, and iv. 16. He designates the Father as the jubentem Deum, the Son as facientem. And when even Athanasius says, that the Son is at once greater than the Holy Spirit and equal to him (*μείζων καὶ ἴσος*), and that the Holy Spirit, too, is related to the Son as is the Son to the Father (Cont. Arian Orat. ii.), "*the idea of a subordination lies at the basis of such declarations*;" *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. p. 315.

[4] *Augustinus* Contra serm. Arian. c. 2, no. 4, (Opp. T. viii): Unus quippe

Deus et ipsa trinitas, et sic unus Deus, quomodo unus creator.—He also referred the theophanies, which were formerly ascribed to the Logos alone, to the whole Trinity. In support of this view, he appeals to the three men who appeared to Abraham; De. Trin. ii. 18. He also thinks that the sending of the Son is not only a work of the Father, but of the whole Trinity. The Father alone is not sent, because he is unbegotten (comp. the passages quoted by *Meier*, i. p. 206, ss.) [Nec pater sine filio, nec filius sine patre misit Spirit. S., sed eum pariter ambo miserunt. Inseparabilis quippe sunt opera trinitatis. Solus pater non legitur missus, quia solus non habet auctorem, a quo genitus sit, vel a quo procedat. Contra serm. Arian. c. 2, n. 4. Opp. ed. Ant. 1700. Tom. viii.] The distinctions between the persons are, in his opinion, not distinctions of *nature*, but of *relation*. But he is aware that we have no appropriate language to denote those distinctions, De Trinit. v. 10: Quum quæritur, quid tres, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen: tres personæ, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur. The persons are not to be regarded as species, for we do not say, tres equi are unum animal, but tria animalia. Better would be the comparison with three statues from one mass of gold, but this too limps, since we do not necessarily connect the conception of gold with that of statues, and the converse; ibid. vii. 11. He brings his views concerning the Trinity into connection with anthropology, but by comparing the three persons with the *memoria*, *intellectus*, and *voluntas* of man (l. c. ix. 11; x. 10, 18; xv. 7), he evidently borders upon Sabellianism; it has the appearance of mere relations, without personal shape. [Conf. 13, cap. 11.—Vellem ut hæc tria cogitarent homines in seipsis. Longe alia sunt ista tria quam illa Trinitas: sed dico ubi se exerceant et ibi probent, et sentiunt quam longe sunt. Dico autem hæc tria; esse, nosse, velle. Sum enim, et novi, et volo; sum sciens et volens; et scio esse me, et velle; et volo esse, et scire. In his igitur tribus quam sit inseparabilis vita, et una vita, et una mens, et una essentia, quam denique inseparabilis distinctio, et tamen distinctio, videat qui potest.] On the other hand, the practical and religious importance of the doctrine of the Trinity appears most worthily, where he reminds us that it is of the very nature of disinterested (unenvious) love to impart itself, De Trin. ix. 2: Cum aliquid amo, tria sunt; ego, et quod amo, et ipse amor. Non enim amo amorem, nisi amantem amem: nam non est amor, ubi nihil amatur. Tria ergo sunt: amans, et quod amatur, et (mutuus) amor. Quid si non amem nisi meipsum, nonne duo erunt, quod amo et amor? Amans enim et quod amatur, hoc idem est, quando se ipse amat. Sicut amare et amari eodem modo id ipsum est, cum se quisque amat. Eadem quippe res bis dicitur, cum dicitur: amat se et amatur a se. Tunc enim non est aliud atque aliud amare et amari, sicut non est alius atque alius amans et amatus. At vero amor et quod amatur etiam sic duo sunt. Non enim cum quisque se amat, amor est, nisi cum amatur ipse amor. Aliud est autem amare se, aliud est amare amorem suum. Non enim amatur amor, nisi jam aliquid amans, quia ubi nihil amatur, nullus est amor. Duo ergo sunt, cum se quisque amat, amor et quod amatur. Tunc enim amans et quod amatur unum est... Amans quippe ad amorem refertur et amor ad amantem. Amans enim aliquo amore amat, et amor alicujus amantis est... Retracto amante nullus est amor, et retracto

amore nullus est amans. Ideoque quantam ad invicem referuntur, duo sunt. Quod autem ad se ipsa dicuntur, et singula spiritus, et simul utrumque unus spiritus, et singula mens et simul utrumque una mens. Cf. lib. xv.*

[5] *Boëthius*, De Trin. (ad Symmach.)† c. 2: Nulla igitur in eo (Deo) diversitas, nulla ex diversitate pluralitas, nulla ex accidentibus multitudo, atque idcirco nec numerus. Cap. 3: Deus vero a Deo nullo differt, nec vel accidentibus vel substantialibus differentiis in subjecto positis distat; ubi vero nulla est differentia, nulla est omnino pluralitas, quare nec numerus; igitur unitas tantum. Nam quod tertio repetitur, Deus; quum Pater et Filius et Spir. S. nuncupatur, tres unitates non faciunt pluralitatem numeri in eo quod ipsæ sunt... Non igitur si de Patre et Filio et Spir. S. tertio prædicatur Deus, idcirco trina prædicatio numerum facit... Cap. 6: Facta quidem est trinitatis numerositas in eo quod est *prædicatio relationis;* servata vero unitas in eo quod est indifferentia vel substantiæ vel operationis vel omnino ejus, quæ secundum se dicitur, prædicationis. Ita igitur substantia continet unitatem, relatio multiplicat trinitatem, atque ideo sola sigillatim proferuntur atque separatim quæ relationis sunt; nam idem Pater qui Filius non est, nec idem uterque qui Spir. S. Idem tamen Deus est, Pater et Filius et Spir. S., idem justus, idem bonus, idem magnus, idem omnia, quæ secundum se poterunt prædicari.—Boëthius falls into the most trivial Sabellianism, by drawing an illustration of the Trinity from the cases in which we have three names for the same thing, *e. g.*, gladius, mucro, ensis; see *Baur*, Dreienigkeitsl. ii. p. 34.—The orthodox doctrine of the western church is already expressed in striking formulas by *Leo the Great*, *e. g.*, Sermo LXXV. 3: Non alia sunt Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus Sancti, sed omnia quæcunque habet Pater, habet et Filius, habet et Spiritus S.; nec unquam in illa trinitate non fuit ista communio, quia hoc est ibi omnia habere, quod semper existere. LXXV. 1, 2: Sempiternum est Patri, cœterni sibi Filii sui esse genitorem. Sempiternum est Filio, intemporaliter a Patre esse progenitum. Sempiternum quoque est Spiritui Sancto Spiritum esse Patris et Filii. Ut nunquam Pater sine Filio, nunquam Filius sine Patre, nunquam Pater *et Filius* fuerint sine Spiritu Sancto, et, omnibus existentiæ gradibus exclusis, nulla ibi persona sit anterior, nulla posterior. Hujus enim beatæ trinitatis incommutabilis deitas una est in substantia, indivisa in opere, concors in voluntate, par in potentia, æqualis in gloria. Other passages are quoted by *Perthel*, Leo der Grosse, p. 138, ss.

§ 96.

TRITHEISM, TETRATHEISM.

In keeping the three persons of the Godhead distinct from each other, much care was needed, lest the idea of *οὐσία* (essence), by which the unity was expressed, should be understood as the mere concept

* As to the mode in which Augustine made his doctrine of the Trinity intelligible to the congregation, in his sermons, see Bindemann, ii. 205 sq.

† It is doubtful whether the work De Trin. was really by Boëthius; we cite it under the customary name.

of a genus, and the ὑπόστασις viewed as an individual (a species) falling under this generic conception; for this would necessarily call up the representation of three gods. Another misunderstanding was also to be obviated; for, in assigning to God himself (the αὐτόθεος) a logical superiority above Father, Son, and Spirit, it might appear as though there were *four* persons, or even four gods. Both of these opinions were held. *John Ascusnages* of Constantinople,[1] and John Philoponus[2] of Alexandria, were the leaders of the Tritheites; while the monophysite patriarch of Alexandria, *Damianus*,[3] was accused of being the head of the Tetratheites (Tetradites), but probably by unjust inference.

[1] *Ascusnages* of Constantinople, when examined by the Emperor Justinian concerning his faith, is said to have acknowledged *one* nature of the incarnate Christ, but asserted three natures, essences, and deities in the Trinity. The tritheites, *Conon* and *Eugenius*, are said to have made the same statements to the Emperor.

[2] The opinion of *Philoponus* can be seen from a fragment (Διαιτητής) preserved by John Damascenus (De Hæresib. c. 83, p. 101, ss. Phot. Bibl. cod. 75. Niceph. xviii. 45–48, extracts from which are quoted by *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, i. 251). In his view the φύσις is the genus which comprehends individuals of the same nature. The terms essence and nature are identical; the term ὑπόστασις, or person, denotes the separate real existence of the nature, that which philosophers of the peripatetic school call ἄτομον, because there the separation of genus and species ceases. Comp. *Scharfenberg*, *J. G.*, de Jo. Philopono, Tritheismi defensore, Lips. 1768 (Comm. Th. ed. Velthusen, etc. T. i.), and *Trechsel*, in the Studien und Kritiken 1835, part 1, p. 95, ss. *Meier*, l. c. i. p. 195, ss. [Philoponus applied the ideas of Aristotle to the Trinity; he connected the two notions φύσις and εἶδος—confounding the common divine essence with the notion of species. See *Neander*, Dog. Hist. p. 310. Baur, Dogmengesch. p. 170: Philoponus maintained that nature, in the church usage, signified the special as well as the general, and that we might as well speak of three natures as of three hypostases; but yet he did not say there were three gods.]

[3] In his controversy with *Peter of Callinico*, patriarch of Antioch, *Damianus* maintained that the Father is one, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another, but that no one of them is God as such; they only possess the subsisting divine nature in common, and each is God in so far as he inseparably participates in it. The Damianites were also called Angelites (from the city of Angelium). Comp. Niceph. xiii. 49. *Schröckh*, xviii. p 624. *Münscher* von. Cölln. p. 253. *Baumgarten-Crusius*, i. p. 364. *Meier*, Trin. Lehre, p. 198: "*Such systems of dissolution are the signs of the life of these times; they exercised themselves upon dead forms, seeking help in them, instead of first trying to fill out the stiff definitions of the dogma with the living contents of the Christian ideas, which sustain the dogma.*"—Tritheism may be viewed as the extreme of Arianism, and Tetratheism as the extreme of Sabellianism; comp. *Hasse*, Anselm, 2 Thl. p. 289.

§ 97.

SYMBOLUM QUICUMQUE.

J. G. Vossius, De tribus Symbolis, Amstel. 1642. Diss. ii. *Waterland, Dan.* Critical History of the Athanasian Creed, Cambridge, 1724. 28. 8. [Works, 1843, vol. iii. pp. 97–273.] *Dennis, John*, the Athanasian Creed, 1815. Comp. *Münscher, ed. by von Cölln*, i. p. 249, 50. *Baumgarten-Crusius*, i. 124, 231, ii. 124. [*Wm. Whiston*, Three Essays, 1713. *J. Redcliff*, The Creed of Athanasius illustrated, etc., Lond. 1844. The Athanasian Creed, Mercersb. Review, April, 1859. *W. W. Harvey*, Hist. and Theol. of the Three Creeds, 2 vols. *Horne*, Hist. Ath. Creed. 1834.]

The doctrine of the church concerning the Trinity appears most fully developed, and defined in a perfect symbolical form, in what is called the *Symbolum quicumque* (commonly but erroneously called the Creed of St. Athanasius). It originated in the School of Augustine, and is ascribed by some to Vigilius Tapsensis, by others to Vincentius Lerinensis, and by some again to others.[1] By its repetition of positive and negative propositions, its perpetual assertion, and then again, denial of its positions, the mystery of the doctrine is presented, as it were, in hieroglyphs, as if to confound the understanding. The consequence was, that all further endeavors of human ingenuity to solve its apparent contradictions in a dialectic way, must break against this bulwark of faith, on which salvation was made to depend, as the waves break upon an inflexible rock.[2]

[1] According to the old story, Athanasius drew up the creed in question at the synod held in Rome in the year 341. This, however, can not be, *first*, because it exists only in the Latin language; *secondly*, from the absence of the term *consubstantialis* (ὁμοούσιος); and, *thirdly*, from the more fully developed doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit (the procession from the Son). It was generally adopted in the seventh century, under the name of Athanasius, when it was classed, as an *Œcumenical* symbol, with the Apostles' and the Nicene Creed. *Paschasius Quesnel* (Dissert. xiv. in Leonis M. Opp. p. 386, ss.) first pronounced it as his opinion that it was composed by Vigilius, bishop of Tapsus in Africa, who lived towards the close of the fifth century. Others attribute it to Vincens of Lerius, in the middle of the fifth century. *Muratori* (Anecd. Lat. T. ii. p. 212–217), conjectured that its author was Venantius Fortunatus (a Gallican bishop of the sixth century); and *Waterland* ascribes it to Hilary of Arles (who lived about the middle of the fifth century). [Comp. *Gieseler*, Church Hist. ii. p. 75 (§ 12), note 7, in the New York edition; he supposes that it originated in Spain in the seventh century.]

² SYMBOLUM ATHANASIANUM:

1. Quicumque vult salvus esse, ante omnia opus habet, ut teneat catholicam fidem. 2. Quam nisi quisque integram inviolatamque servaverit, absque dubio in æternum peribit. 3. Fides autem catholica hæc est, ut unum Deum in Trinitate et Trinitatem in unitate veneremur. 4. Neque confundentes personas, neque substantiam separantes. 5. Alia enim est persona Patris, alia Filii, alia Spiritus Sancti. 6. Sed Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti una est divinitas, æqualis gloria, æqualis majestas. 7. Qualis Pater, talis Filius, talis et Spir. S. 8. Increatus Pater, increatus Filius, increatus Spir. S. 9. Immensus Pater, immensus Filius, immensus Spiritus S. 10. Æternus Pater, æternus Filius, æternus et Spir. S. 11. Et tamen non tres æterni, sed unus æternus. 12. Sicut non tres increati, nec tres immensi, sed unus increatus et unus immensus. 13. Similiter omnipotens Pater, omnipotens Filius, omnipotens et Spiritus S. 14. Et tamen non tres omnipotentes, sed unus omnipotens. 15. Ita deus Pater, deus Filius, deus et Spir. S. 16. Et tamen non tres dii sunt, sed unus est Deus. 17. Ita dominus Pater, dominus Filius, dominus et Spir. S. 18. Et tamen non tres domini, sed unus dominus. 19. Quia sicut sigillatim unamquamque personam et Deum et dominum confiteri christiana veritate compellimur, ita tres Deos aut dominos dicere catholica religione prohibemur. 20. Pater a nullo est factus, nec creatus, nec genitus. 21. Filius a Patre solo est, non factus, non creatus, sed genitus. 22. Spir. S. a Patre et Filio non creatus, nec genitus, sed procedens. 23. Unus ergo Pater, nec tres patres; unus Filius, non tres filii; unus Spiritus S., non tres spiritus sancti. 24. Et in hac Trinitate nihil prius aut posterius, nihil majus aut minus, sed totæ tres personæ coæternæ sibi sunt et coæquales. 25. Ita ut per omnia, sicut jam supra dictum est, et unitas in Trinitate et Trinitas in unitate veneranda sit. 26. Qui vult ergo salvus esse, ita de Trinitate sentiat. (Opp. Athanasii, T. iii. p. 719.—*Walch*, Bibl. Symb. Vet. p. 136, ss.; it is also contained in the collections of the symbolical books published by *Tittman*, *Hase*, and others.*)

* While salvation, at this extreme point in the development of the doctrine, appears to be made dependent on the most refined points of dialectics, it is pleasing to hear other men, such as *Gregory of Nazianzum* (see *Ullmann*, p. 159, 170, *Neander*, Chrysost. ii. 19), raising their voices during this period, who did not attach such unqualified value to the mere orthodoxy of the understanding, and who were fully convinced of the limits of human knowledge and the insufficiency of such dogmatic definitions, Greg. Orat. 31, 33, p 577. *Ullmann*, p. 336, comp., however, p. 334, 35. *Rufinus* also says, Expos. p. 18 (in the sense of Irenæus): Quomodo autem Deus pater genuerit filium, nole discutias, nec te curiosius ingeras in profundi hujus arcanum (*al.* profundo hujus arcani), ne forte, dum inaccessæ lucis fulgorem pertinacius perscrutaris, exiguum ipsum, qui mortalibus divino munere concessus est, perdas aspectum. Aut si putas in hoc omni indagationis genere nitendum, prius tibi propone quæ nostra sunt: quæ si consequenter valueris expedire, tunc a terrestribus ad cœlestia et a visibilibus ad invisibilia properato.—Moreover, in the midst of this dialectic elaboration of the materials of the faith, we can not mistake the presence of a yet higher aim—that, viz., of bringing to distinct consciousness, not only the unity of the divine nature, but also the living longing of divine love to impart itself; in other words, the effort to maintain both the *transcendent* nature of God and his *immanence* in his works—the former in opposition to polytheism and pantheism, and the latter to an abstract deism. So far such formulas have also their edifying side, as giving witness to the struggle of the Christian mind after a satisfactory expression of what has its full reality only in the depths of the Christian heart.

b. CHRISTOLOGY.

§ 98.

THE TRUE HUMANITY OF CHRIST.

Traces of Docetism.—Arianism.

It was no less difficult to determine the relation of the divine to the human nature of Christ, than to define the relation between the three persons and the one nature of God. For the more decidedly the church asserted the divinity of the Son of God, the more the the doctrine of the incarnation of the Son had to be guarded, so as not to abridge either the true divinity or the true humanity of Christ. In opposition to Docetism, the doctrine of the human nature of Christ had indeed been so firmly established, that no one was likely to deny that he possessed a human body; and when *Hilary*, orthodox on all other points, seems to border upon Docetism, by maintaining that the body of Jesus could not undergo any real sufferings,[1] he only means that the sufferings of Christ are to be understood as a free act of his love. But two other questions arose, which were beset with still greater difficulties. In the first place it was asked, whether a human soul formed a necessary part of the humanity of Christ; and if so (as the orthodox maintained in opposition to the Arians),[2] it was still asked whether this soul meant only the animal soul, or also included the rational human spirit (in distinction from the divine).

[1] *Hilary* wishes to preserve the most intimate union between the divine and human natures of Christ, so that it may be said: totus hominis Filius est Dei Filius, and vice versa; for the same reason he says concerning the God-Man, De Trin. x. 23: Habens ad patiendum quidem corpus et passus est, sed non habuit naturam ad dolendum. (He compares it to an arrow which passes through the water without wounding it.)—Comment. in Ps. cxxxviii. 3: Suscepit ergo infirmitates, quia homo nascitur; et putatur dolere, quia patitur: caret vero doloribus ipse, quia Deus est (the usage of the Latin word *pati* allowed such a distinction to be made).—De Trin. xi. 48: In forma Dei manens servi formam assumsit, non demutatus, sed se ipsum exinaniens et intra se latens et intra suam ipse vacuefactus potestatem; dum se usque ad formam temperat habitus humani, ne potentem immensamque naturam assumptæ humanitatis non ferret infirmitas, sed in tantum se virtus incircumscripta moderaretur, in quantum oporteret eam usque ad patientiam connexi sibi corporis obedire. He opposes the purely docetic interpretation of the Impassibilitas, De Synodis 49 (*Dorner*, ii. 2, 1055): Pati potuit, et passibile esse non potuit, quia passibilitas naturæ infirmis significatio est, passio autem

est eorum, quæ sunt illata perpessio. He makes a distinction between passionis materia et passibilitatis infirmitas. Hilary, moreover, ascribes a human soul to Christ, but says that he received neither that soul nor his body from Mary; on the contrary, the God-Man has his origin in himself: comp. *Dorner*, p. 1040, ss., and the whole section.

[3] *Athan.* Contra Apollin. ii. 3: Ἄρειος δὲ σάρκα μόνην πρὸς ἀποκρυφὴν τῆς θεότητος ὁμολογεῖ· ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ ἔσωθεν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπου, τουτέστι τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸν Λόγον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ λέγει γεγονέναι, τὴν τοῦ πάθους νόησιν καὶ τὴν ἐξ ὁδοῦ ἀνάστασιν τῇ θεότητι προσάγειν τολμῶν. Comp. Epiph. Hær. 69, 19, and other passages quoted by *Münscher* von Cölln, p. 268. This notion was very prominently brought forward by the Arians, *Eudoxius* and *Eunomius*; respecting the former see *Cave*, Historia Script. Eccles. i. p. 219; concerning the latter, comp. *Mansi*, Conc. T. iii. p. 648, and *Neander*, Hist. Dogm. 300. [The doctrines of Arius were expressed still more definitely by Eunomius. The Son can not even be said to be like God; since likeness and unlikeness can only be predicated of created things. Generation from the divine essence is inconceivable; an eternal generation is unimaginable. The will is the mediating principle between the divine essence and agency. The Son of God was created according to God's will; he was eternally with God only as predestinated. *Ibid.* p. 316. In the Confession of Faith of *Eunomius*, it is stated that the Logos assumed man, both body and soul; but, doubtless, an οὐκ has dropped out—"*not* a man consisting of body and soul;" this appears from a citation of Gregory of Nyssa from Eunomius, and also from a fragment lately published by Mansi.—*Baur*, Dogmengesch. p. 161, says that Eunomius widely diverged from the original stand-point of Arius, in maintaining that essence of God could be completely conceived—particularly in reference to the point, that God must be unbegotten. Thus Arianism logically leads to putting the infinite and the finite into an abstract opposition to each other. It presents the contrast of the Aristotelian with the Platonic mode of thought.] Another party of the Arians, however, rejected the notion that the Logos had been changed into the soul of Christ, and supposed a human soul along with the Logos. Comp. *Dorner*, ii. 2, p. 1038. But even some orthodox theologians of this period used indefinite language on this point previous to the rise of the Apollinarian controversy. Comp. *Münscher* von Cölln, p. 269. *Dorner*, l. c. p. 1071, ss.

§ 99.

THE DOCTRINE OF APOLLINARIS.

Apollinaris, bishop of Laodicea, who, in other respects, had a high reputation among orthodox theologians, conceived that that higher life of reason which elevates man above the rest of creation, was not needed by *him*, in whom there is a personal indwelling of deity; or rather, that the place of this human reason was supplied in an absolute way, the Logos, or νοῦς θειος, being substituted.[1] His

intention seems to have been to honor Christ, not to detract from his dignity. He was opposed by *Athanasius*, and still more by *Gregory of Nazianzum*, and *Gregory of Nyssa*, whose efforts led to the adoption of the doctrine that Christ had a perfect human nature, consisting of a body and a rational soul, together with the divine nature.[1] The council of Constantinople (A. D. 381) condemned Apollinarianism as heretical.

[1] *Apollinaris* was led by his dialectic culture* to suppose that he might establish his argument with mathematical precision (*γεωμετρικαῖς ἀποδείξεσι καὶ ἀνάγκαις*). Of the writings in which he explained his views, only fragments are extant in the works of Gregory of Nyssa, Theodoret, and Leontius Byzantinus (who lived about the year 590); they were the following: *περὶ σαρκώσεως λογίδιον* (*ἀπόδειξις περὶ τῆς θείας ἐνσαρκώσεως*)—*τὸ κατὰ κεφάλαιον βιβλίον*—*περὶ ἀναστάσεως*—*περὶ πίστεως λογίδιον*—and some letters (in *Gallandii* Bibl. PP. T. xii. p. 706, ss. *Angelo Mai* Class. Auct. T. ix. p. 495, ss.). Comp. *Dorner*, ii. 976, and Neander, Hist. Dogm. 320. Apollinaris objected to the union of the Logos with a rational human soul, that the human being thus united to the Logos must either preserve his own will, in which case there would be no true interpenetration of the divine and the human, or that the human soul must lose its liberty by becoming united to the Logos, either of which would be absurd. "He chiefly opposed the *τρεπτόν*, or the *liberty of choice in christology*."—*Dorner*, l. c. p. 987. In his opinion Christ is not merely *ἄνθρωπος ἔνθεος*; but God *become* man. According to the threefold division of man (the trichotomistic anthropology), Apollinaris was willing to ascribe a soul to the Redeemer, since he thought that was only something intermediate between body and spirit, and the *ἡγεμονικόν* of the body. But that which itself determines the soul (*τὸ αὐτοκίνητον*), and constitutes the higher dignity of man, the *νοῦς* (the *ψυχὴ λογικὴ*) of Christ, could not be of human origin, but must be purely divine; for his incarnation did not consist in the Logos becoming *νοῦς*, but in becoming *σάρξ*. (Whether and how far Christ brought the *σάρξ* itself from heaven, or received it from Mary, see *Baur*, 595, note, and Dorner, 1007 sq. [*Dorner* says that Apollinaris held that the Logos was always potentially, or had the destination to be, man, since he was the type of humanity; but yet, that the assumption of the form (flesh) of man occurred only at his birth.]) But as the divine reason supplies the place of the human, there exists a specific difference between Christ and other men. In their case every thing has to undergo a process of gradual development, which can not be without conflicts and sin (*ὅπου γὰρ τέλειος ἄνθρωπος, ἐκεῖ καὶ ἁμαρτία*, apud. Athan. i. 2, p. 923. Comp. c. 21, p. 939: *ἁμαρτία ἐννυπόστατος*). But this could not take place in the case of Christ: *οὐδεμία ἄσκησις ἐν Χριστῷ· οὐκ ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ἀνθρώπινος*. Comp. Gregory of Nyssa, Antirrhet. adv. Apollin. iv. c. 221. At the same time Apollinaris supposed the body and soul of

* *Baumgarten-Crusius*, ii. 160, sees here a twofold Platonism; not only the distinction between *νοῦς* and *ψυχή*, but also that in place of the *νοῦς* comes a higher potence, but of the same nature.

Christ to be so completely filled and animated with the higher life of God, that he took no offense at such expressions as "God died, God is born," etc. He in fact believed that we do not adequately express the unity unless we say "Our God is crucified," and "the man is raised up to the right hand of God." He even maintained that, on account of this intimate union, divine homage is also due to the human nature of Christ, l. c. p. 241, 264. His opponents, therefore, charged him with Patripassianism. But it certainly is a mere inference made by Gregory of Nazianzum, when he attributes to Apollinaris the assertion that Christ must have possessed an irrational, animal soul, *e. g.*, that of a horse, or an ox, because he had not a rational human soul. On the other hand, Apollinaris, on his side, was not wanting in deducing similar consequences from his opponents' positions, accusing them of believing in two Christs, two Sons of God, etc. Comp. *Dorner*, p. 985, ss. *Ullmann*, Greg. v. Naz. p. 401, ss. *Baur*, Gesch. der Trinitätl. i. p. 585, ss.

[1] *Athanasius* maintained, in opposition to Apollinaris, Contra Apollinar. libri ii. (but without mentioning by name his opponent, with whom he had personal intercourse),* that it behoved Christ to be our example in every respect, and that his nature, therefore, must resemble ours. Sinfulness, which is empirically connected with the development of man, is not a necessary attribute of human nature; this would lead to Manicheism. Man, on the contrary, was originally free from sin, and Christ appeared on that very account, viz., in order to show that God is not the author of sin, and to prove that it is possible to live a sinless life (the controversy thus touched upon questions of an anthropological nature then debated).—Athanasius distinctly separated the divine from the human (comp. especially lib. ii.), but he did not admit that he taught the existence of two Christs. Comp. *Neander*, ii. 433. *Möhler*, Athanasius, ii. p. 262, ss.† *Gregory of Nazianzum* (Ep. ad Cledon. et Orat. 51) equally asserted the necessity of a true and perfect human nature. It was not only necessary, as the medium by which God might manifest himself, but Jesus could redeem and sanctify man only by assuming his whole nature, consisting of body and soul. (Similar views had been formerly held by Irenæus, and were afterwards more fully developed by Anselm.) Gregory thus strongly maintained the doctrine of the two natures of the Saviour. We must distinguish in Christ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, but not ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος. Compare the Epist. ad Nectar. sive Orat. 46, with his 10 Anathematismata against Apollinaris, and *Ullmann*, p. 396–413. The work of Gregory of Nyssa, entitled λόγος ἀντιῤῥητικὸς πρὸς τὰ Ἀπολλιναρίου (which was probably composed between the years 374 and 380), may

* On the character of this book, see Dorner, i. 984, note. [It was written after the death of Apollinaris, and very much in it has reference rather to what the tendency became, than to views actually avowed by Apollinaris himself.]

† *Möhler* compares the doctrine of Apollinaris with that of Luther. This is so far correct, as that in Luther we certainly find similar declarations; see *Schenkel*, Das Wesen des Protest. i. 313. Yet such parallels can seldom be fully carried out. Others have tried to find other correspondences with Apollinaris in later times; *Dorner* has compared his views with those of Osiander (p. 1028), and Baur with those of Servetus. (Gesch. d. Trin. iii. 104).

be found in *Zaccagni* Collect. Monum. Vett. and *Gallandi*, Bibl. Patr. vi. p. 517. Comp. *Gieseler*, i. § 83, note 30. *Rupp*, p. 139.—He opposed the followers of Apollinaris (Συνουσιασταί, Δυοφυῖται) in his Ep. Hær. 77.—The doctrine of Apollinaris was also condemned in the West by Damasus, bishop of Rome (comp. *Münscher* von Cölln, p. 277), and once more by the second Œcumenical synod of Constantinople (A. D. 381, Can i. vii.). The later disciples of Apollinaris appear to have developed the doctrine of their master in a completely Docetic manner. Comp. *Möhler*, ubi supra, p. 264, sq.

§ 100.

NESTORIANISM.

Jablonski, P. E., Exercitatio historico-theologica de Nestorianismo. Befol. 1724.—Tübinger Quartalschrift, 1835, ii. part 1. [Zeitschrift f. d. luth. Theologie, 1854. N. and the Council of Ephesus, by H. A. Miles, in the Christ. Examiner, Bost. 1853.]

The attempt to maintain the integrity of the human nature of Christ together with the divine, necessarily led from time to time to the inquiry, whether that which the Scriptures relate respecting the life and actions of the Redeemer, his birth, sufferings, and death, refers only to his humanity, or to both his divine and human nature; and, if the latter, in what way it may be said to refer to both? While the teachers of the Alexandrian school asserted in strong terms the *unity* of the divine and the human in Christ, the theologians of Antioch, *Diodorus of Tarsus*, and *Theodore of Mopsuestia*, made a strict distinction between the one and the other.[1] At last the phrase, mother of God (θεοτόκος),[2] which the increasing homage paid to Mary had brought into use, gave rise to the controversy respecting the relation of the two natures in Christ. *Nestorius*, patriarch of Constantinople, disapproved of this phrase, maintaining that Mary had given birth to Christ, but not to God.[3] *Cyril*, patriarch of Alexandria, opposed him, and both pronounced anathemas against each other.[4] Nestorius supposed, in accordance with the Antiochian mode of thought, that the divine and the human natures of Christ ought to be distinctly separated, and admitted only a συνάφεια (junction) of the one and the other, an ἐνοίκησις (indwelling) of the Deity. Cyril, on the contrary, was led by the tendencies of the Egyptian (Alexandrian) school,[5] to maintain the perfect union of the two natures (φυσικὴ ἕνωσις.) Nestorius was condemned by the synod of Ephesus (A. D. 431),[6] but the controversy was not brought to a close.

[1] *Diodorus* died A. D. 394. Some fragments of his treatise: πρὸς τοὺς Συνουσιαστάς, are preserved in a Latin translation by Mar. Mercator, edit. *Baluze*, p. 349, ss. (*Garner*, p. 317), and Leontius Byzantinus. Comp. *Mün-*

scher, edit. by von Cölln, p. 280: Adoramus purpuram propter indutum et templum propter inhabitatorem, etc.—The opinions of *Theodore* are expressed in his confession of faith, which may be found in Acta Conc. Ephes. Actio vi. quoted by *Mansi*, T. iv. p. 1347; in Marius Mercator (*Garner*, i. p. 95); *Münscher* von Cölln, p. 280. On his controversy with Apollinaris, see *Fritzsche*, p. 92, 101. Comp. *Neander*, Church Hist. ii. p. 446–95 (Torrey). Fragmentum ed. Fritzsche, p. 8: Ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ θεία φύσις ἐκ παρθένου γεγέννηται, γεγέννηται δὲ ἐκ τῆς παρθένου ὁ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς παρθένου συστάς· οὐχ ὁ θεὸς λόγος ἐκ τῆς Μαρίας γεγέννηται, γεγέννηται δὲ ἐκ Μαρίας ὁ ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβίδ· οὐχ ὁ θεὸς λόγος ἐκ γυναικὸς γεγέννηται, γεγέννηται δὲ ἐκ γυναικὸς ὁ τῇ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος δυνάμει διαπλασθεὶς ἐν αὐτῇ· οὐκ ἐκ μητρὸς τέτεκται ὁ ὁμοούσιος τῷ πατρὶ, ἀμήτωρ γὰρ οὗτος κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μακαρίου Παύλου φωνὴν, ἀλλ' ὁ ἐν ὑστέροις καιροῖς, ἐν τῇ μητρῴᾳ γαστρὶ τῇ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος δυνάμει διαπλασθεὶς, ἅτε καὶ ἀπάτωρ διὰ τοῦτο λεγόμενος.

[3] Concerning the ecclesiastical meaning of this term, which came gradually into use, see Socrat. vii. 32. *Münscher*, edit. by von Cölln, i. 286. The absurd discussions on the partus virgineus (comp. *e. g.*, Rufinus Expos. 20), where Mary, with allusion to what Ezechiel says, is called the porta Domini, per quam introivit in mundum, etc., belong to the same class. Neander (Hist. Dogm. Ryland, p. 331) says that the controversy took an unfortunate turn from the beginning, because it started from a word, and not from a doctrinal idea: "thus the fanaticism of the multitude was inflamed, and political passions had the greater play."

[4] *Anastasius*, a presbyter of Alexandria (A. D. 428), preached against the use of the term in question, and thus called forth the controversy. He was followed by *Nestorius* (a disciple of Theodore of Mopsuestia); Socrat. vii. 32. *Leporius*, a presbyter and monk at Massilia, and follower of Pelagius, had previously propounded a similar doctrine in the West, see *Münscher*, edit. by von Cölln, p. 282. The views of *Nestorius* himself are contained in iii. (ii.) Sermones Nestorii, quoted by Mar. Mercator, p. 53–74. *Mansi*, iv. p. 1197. *Garner*, ii. p. 3, ss. He rejected the appellation "mother of God" as heathenish and contrary to Heb. vii. 3. Resting, as he did, on the orthodox doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son, he could say: Non peperit creatura eum, qui est increabilis; non recentem de virgine Deum Verbum genuit Pater. In principio erat enim verbum, sicut Joh. (i. 1), ait. Non peperit creatura creatorem [increabilem], sed peperit hominem, Deitatis instrumentum. Non creavit Deum Verbum Spir. S.....sed Deo Verbo templum fabricatus est, quod habitaret, ex virgine, etc. But Nestorius by no means refused to worship the human nature of Christ in its connection with the divine, and strongly protested against the charge of separating the two natures: Propter utentem illud indumentum, quo utitur, colo, propter absconditum adoro, quod foris videtur. Inseparabilis ab eo, qui oculis paret, est Deus. Quomodo igitur ejus, qui non dividitur, honorem [ego] et dignitatem audeam separare? Divido naturas, sed conjungo reverentiam (quoted by *Garner*, p. 3). And in the fragment given by *Mansi*, p. 1201: Διὰ τὸν φοροῦντα τὸν φορούμενον σέβω, διὰ τὸν κεκρυμένον προσκυνῶ τὸν φαινόμενον ἀχώριστος τοῦ φαινομένου θεός· διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ μὴ χωριζομένου τὴν

τιμὴν οὐ χωρίζω· χωρίζω τὰς φύσεις, ἀλλ' ἑνῶ τὴν προσκύνησιν. He preferred calling Mary Θεοδόχος or Χριστοτόκος, instead of Θεοτόκος. Comp. the other passages in *Münscher* ed. by von Cölln, p. 284–286. *Baur*, Gesch. der Trinität. i. p. 727, ss.

[4] On the external history of this controversy, see the works on ecclesiastical history.—It commenced with a correspondence between Nestorius and Cyril, in which they charged each other with respectively separating and confounding the two natures of Christ. *Cyril* was supported by Cœlestine, bishop of Rome, *Nestorius* by the eastern bishops in general, and John, bishop of Antioch, in particular.—In the progress of the controversy Nestorius declared himself willing even to adopt the term θεοτόκος, if properly explained. Comp. the Acta, and especially the Anathematismata themselves in *Mansi*, v. p. 1, ss., and iv. p. 1099; in Mar. Mercator, p. 142 (*Garner*, ii. 77, ss.), reprinted in *Baumgarten's* Theologische Streitigkeiten, vol. ii. p. 770, ss. *Gieseler*, Lehrb. der Kirchengesch. i. § 88, note 20. *Münscher* von Cölln, p. 290–295.

[5] "*As the Alexandrians exalted the ὑπὲρ λόγον, so did the Antiochians the κατὰ λόγον*;" *Neander*, Hist. Dog. 334. On their differences, and the inferences which each party drew from the views of the other to its disadvantage, see ibid. The *ἀντιμετάστασις τῶν ὀνομάτων* was carried to an extreme by the Alexandrians, while the Antiochians distinguished between what is said δογματικῶς, and what is spoken πανηγυρικῶς.

[6] The acts of the Synod are given in *Mansi*, iv. p. 1123; Fuchs, iv. p. 1, ss. The synod was organized in a partisan way by Cyril.—A counter-synod was held under John, bishop of Antioch, in opposition to Cyril and Memnon; these in their turn excommunicated John and his party. The Emperor Theodosius at first confirmed the sentence of deposition which the two contending parties had pronounced upon each other, but afterwards Nestorius was abandoned by all; for John of Antioch himself was prevailed upon to give his consent to the condemnation of his friend, after Cyril had proposed a formula, the contradictions, of which, with his former Anathematismata, were but poorly slurred over (comp. *Münscher* ed. by von. Cölln, p. 297). The consequence was the separation of the Nestorian party (Chaldee Christians, Thomas-Christians) from the catholic church. On the further history of the Nestorians, see *J. S. Assemanni*, de Syris Nestorianis, in Bibl. Orient. Rom. 1728, T. iii. P. 2. "*We may call the view of Cyril* (*according to which the human is changed into the divine*), *the* MAGICAL *aspect of the union, and that of Nestorius* (*according to which the two natures are only joined together*) *the* MECHANICAL." *Dorner*, 1st ed. p. 90.

§ 101.

EUTYCHIAN-MONOPHYSITE CONTROVERSY.

The doctrine which *separated the two natures of Christ*, had been rejected by the condemnation of Nestorius. But with the growing influence and power of the party of Cyril, led by *Dioscurus*, Cyril's

successor,[1] the still greater danger arose of *confounding*, instead of *separating* the said natures. The party zeal of *Eutyches*, an archimandrite [abbot] at Constantinople, who maintained the doctrine of only one nature in Christ,[2] caused new disturbances. After Dioscurus had in vain endeavored to force the Monophysite doctrine by violent means upon the eastern church,[3] both he and his sentiments were at last condemned at the council of Chalcedon (A. D. 451). In the course of the controversy, *Leo the Great*, bishop of Rome, addressed a letter to *Flavian*, bishop of Constantinople.[4] On the basis of this Epistola Flaviana, the synod pronounced in favor of the doctrine of two natures, neither to be separated nor confounded, and, in order to prevent further errors, drew up a formula of faith, which should be binding upon all parties.[5]

[1] Respecting his character and violent conduct, especially towards Theodoret, see *Neander*, Church History, ii. 500–522. The acts of this controversy are given in *Mansi*, T. vi. vii. (*Ang. Mai.* Script. Vett. Coll. T. vii. and ix. Coll. Class. Auct. T. x. p. 408, ss.) [*Liberatus* Breviarium Causæ Nestor. et Eutychian. in *Mansi*, ix. 659. *Walch's* Ketzerhist. vi. Baur, Dreieinigkeit, i. 800. *Dorner*, Person Christi, ii. 99 sq.]

[2] *Eutyches* was charged by Eusebius of Dorylæum with the revival of Valentinian and Apollinarian errors, and deposed by a synod held at Constantinople in the year 449. See *Mansi*, vi. p. 694–754. According to the acts of this synod he taught: Μετὰ τὴν ἐνανθρώπησιν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου, τουτέστι μετὰ τὴν γέννησιν τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, μίαν φύσιν προσκυνεῖν καὶ ταύτην θεοῦ σαρκωθέντος καὶ ἐνανθρωπήσαντος. He denied that the flesh of Christ was of the same essence (ὁμοούσιος) with ours, though he would not be understood to teach that Christ brought his body with him from heaven. But when his opponents brought him at last into a corner, he went so far as to admit the sameness of essence in respect to the body. But he could not be induced to confess his belief in the existence of two natures, a divine and a human. He maintained that there had been *two* natures only πρὸ τῆς ἑνώσεως; but after that he would acknowledge only *one*. Concerning the agreement between his doctrine and that of Cyril, see *Münscher* edit. by von Cölln, p. 301.

[3] These violent proceedings were carried to an extreme length at the *Synod of Robbers*, A. p. 449 (Latrocinium Ephesinum, σύνοδος λῃστρική), the acts of which may be found in *Mansi*, vi. p. 593, ss. *Fuchs*, iv. p. 340, ss.

[4] The epistle in question is given in *Mansi*, v. p. 1359 (separately published by *K. Phil. Henke*, Helmst. 1780, 4, comp. *Griesbach*, Opusc. Acad. T. i. p. 52, ss. *Münscher* von Cölln, p. 302): Salva proprietate utriusque naturæ et substantiæ et in unam coëunte personam, suscepta est a majestate humilitas, a virtute infirmitas, ab æternitate mortalitas; et ad resolvendum conditionis nostræ debitum natura inviolabilis naturæ est unita passibili, ut quod nostris remediis congruebat, unus atque idem mediator dei et hominum, homo Jesus Christus, et mori posset ex uno et mori non posset ex altero. In integra ergo veri hominis perfectaque natura verus natus est Deus, totus

in suis, totus in nostris, etc... Qui enim verus est Deus, idem verus est homo, et nullum est in hac unitate mendacium, dum invicem sunt et humilitas hominis et altitudo deitatis. Sicut enim Deus non mutatur miseratione, ita homo non consumitur dignitate. Agit enim utraque forma cum alterius communione, quod proprium est: Verbo scilicet operante, quod verbi est, et carni exsequente, quod carnis est, etc. He then ascribes birth, hunger, nakedness, sufferings, death, burial, etc., to the human, miracles to the divine nature; the passage in John xiv. 28, refers to the former, that in John x. 30, to the latter. Comp. on Leo's Christology, *Perthel*, u. s. 146; *Baur*, 807 sq.

[1] *Mansi*, vii. 108, ss.: ... Ἑπόμενοι τοίνυν τοῖς ἁγίοις πατράσιν, ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν υἱὸν τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν συμφώνως ἅπαντες ἐκδιδάσκομεν, τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν θεότητι καὶ τέλειον τὸν αὐτὸν ἐν ἀνθρωπότητι, θεὸν ἀληθῶς καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἀληθῶς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος, ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, καὶ ὁμοούσιον τὸν αὐτὸν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, κατὰ πάντα ὅμοιον ἡμῖν χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας· πρὸ αἰώνων μὲν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς γεννηθέντα κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, ἐπ' ἐσχάτων δὲ τῶν ἡμερῶν τὸν αὐτὸν δι' ἡμᾶς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν ἐκ Μαρίας τῆς παρθένου τῆς θεοτόκου κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, ἕνα καὶ πὸν αὐτὸν Χριστὸν Υἱὸν, Κύριον, μονογενῆ ἐκ δύο φύσεων (ἐν δύο φύσεσιν)* ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως γνωριζόμενον· αὐδαμοῦ τῆς τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνῃρημένης διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν, σωζομένης δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς ἰδιότητος ἑκατέρας φύσεως καὶ εἰς ἓν πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπόστασιν συντρεχούσης· οὐκ εἰς δύο πρόσωπα μεριζόμενον, ἢ διαιρούμενον, ἀλλ' ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Υἱὸν καὶ μονογενῆ, θεὸν λόγον, κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν· καθάπερ ἄνωθεν οἱ προφῆται περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτος ἡμᾶς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ἐξεπαίδευσε· καὶ τὸ τῶν πατέρων ἡμῖν παραδέδωκε σύμβολον.

We can not fail to see a dogmatic parallel between these Christological decisions and the theological determinations of the council of Nice, with this difference only (demanded by the difference of the objects in view), that the latter understood by *φύσις* that which belongs to each nature separately, but by *ὑπόστασις*, *πρόσωπον*, that which both have in common; the reverse is the case in the decisions of the synod of Chalcedon.

§ 102.

PROGRESS OF THE CONTROVERSY.—THEOPASCHITES.

But the authority of the decision of the council of Chalcedon was not at once generally acknowledged. Many conflicts ensued[1] before the doctrine of "*two natures in one person*" was received as the orthodox doctrine of the church, and finally inserted into what is commonly called the Athanasian Creed.[2] The exact medium, however, between the two extreme views was not strictly preserved. For by

* Concerning this different reading, comp. *Mansi*, p. 106, 775, 840. *Walch*, Bibl. Symb. p. 106.

the admission of a new clause, viz., that one of the divine persons had been crucified (*Theopaschitism*), into the creed of the fifth Œcumenical Synod (A. D. 553),[1] the Monophysite notion gained the ascendency within the pale of orthodoxy.

[1] The *Henoticon* of the Emperor Zeno, A. D. 482, in Evagr. iii. c. 14 (separately published by *Berger*, Wittemb. 1723, 4), was intended to bring about a reconciliation between the contending parties, but was not followed by any permanent success. Comp. *Jablonsky*, Diss. de Henotico Zenonis. Francof. ad Viadr. 1737, 4. *Münscher* v. Cölln, p. 306, 7. It was taught that Christ was ὁμοούσιος τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, καὶ ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα. The predicate θεοτόκος was vindicated for Mary; and the Anathematismata of Cyril were justified.

[2] Symb. Athan. pars. ii.—(Comp. § 97).

27. Sed necessarium est ad æternam salutem, ut incarnationem quoque Domini nostri Jesu Christi fideliter credat. 28. Est ergo fides recta, ut credamus et confiteamur, quia Dominus noster Jesus Christus, Dei filius, Deus pariter et homo est. Deus est ex substantia Patris ante sæcula genitus: homo ex substantia matris in sæculo natus. 30. Perfectus deus, perfectus homo, ex anima rationali et humana carne subsistens. 31. Æqualis Patri secundum divinitatem, minor Patre secundum humanitatem. 32. Qui, licet deus sit et homo, non duo tamen, sed unus est Christus. 33. Unus autem non conversione divinitatis in carnem, sed assumtione humanitatis in Deum. 34. Unus omnino non confusione substantiarum, sed unitate personæ. 35. Nam sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita et Deus et homo unus est Christus. 36. Qui passus est pro salute nostra, descendit ad inferos, tertia die resurrexit a mortuis, 37. ascendit in cœlos, sedet ad dexteram Patris, inde venturus judicare vivos et mortuos. 38. Ad cujus adventum omnes homines resurgere debent cum corporibus suis et reddituri sunt de factis propriis rationem. 39. Et qui bona egerunt, ibunt in vitam æternam: qui vero mala, in ignem æternum. 40. Hæc est fides catholica, quam nisi quisquam fideliter firmiterque crediderit, salvus esse non poterit.

[3] *Petez Fullo* (ὁ γναφεὺς) was the first who introduced the clause θεὸς ἐσταυρώθη into the Trishagion, at Antioch, 463–471. [On the τρισάγιον see Gieseler, l. c. i. § 110, note 12.]—In the year 533 Justinian pronounced the phrase, *unum crucifixum esse ex sancta et consubstantiali Trinitate*, to be orthodox (Cod. L. 1. Tit. 1. 6): he did so in agreement with John II., bishop of Rome, but in opposition to his predecessor Hormisdas.—The decree of the council is given in *Mansi*, ix. p. 304: Εἴ τις οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ τὸν ἐσταυρωμένον σαρκὶ Κύριον ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν εἶναι θεὸν ἀληθινὸν καὶ κύριον τῆς δόξης, καὶ ἕνα της ἁγίας τρίαδος· ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνάθεμα ἔστω.—This victory of the advocates of Theopaschitism was only the counterpart of the one which the friends of the phrase θεοτόκος had gained in former years. Thus such expressions as "God is born, God died," came gradually into use in dogmatic theology. It was in this sense that, *e. g.*, the author of the Soliloquia Animæ (which may be found in the works of Augustine) c. 1, offered the following prayer: Manus tuæ, Domine, fecerunt me et plasmaverunt me, manus inquam illæ, quæ affixæ clavis sunt pro me.

§ 103.

VARIOUS MODIFICATIONS OF THE MONOPHYSITE DOCTRINE. APHTHARTODOCETÆ, PHTHARTOLATRI, AGNOËTÆ.

Gieseler, J. C. L., Commentatio, qua Monophysitarum veterum Variæ de Christi Persona Opiniones imprimis ex ipsorum effatis recens editis illustrantur. Parts I. II. Gött. 1838, IV.

The Monophysites themselves were not agreed on the question whether Christ possessed a corruptible or an incorruptible body? The *Phthartolatri* (Severians) maintained the former; the *Aphthartodocetæ* (Julianists) asserted the latter, in accordance with their monophysite premises respecting the nature of Christ. Different views obtained among the Aphthartodocetæ themselves on the question, whether Christ's body was created or not, and led to the formation of two distinct parties, the *Ktistolatri* and the *Aktistetæ*.[1] The omniscience of Christ necessarily followed from the Monophysite doctrine. The assertion, therefore, of *Themistius*, deacon of Alexandria, that the man Jesus was ignorant of many things (*Agnoetism*, Mark xiii. 32; Luke ii. 25), was rejected by the strict Monophysites.[2]

[1] SOURCES: Leont. Byzant. (in *Gallandii* Bibl. Patr. xii.) Niceph. Callisti, lib. xvii. *Gieseler* (in the 2d Part of the dissertation cited before) endeavors to prove that the view of the Julianists was by no means purely Docetic, but allied to that taken by *Clement of Alexandria*, *Hilary*, *Gregory of Nyssa*, etc., and that it also bore resemblance to the opinions entertained by *Apollinaris*. *Xenaias* (Philoxenus), bishop of Hierapolis, and the contemporary of *Julian*, bishop of Halicarnassus, appears as the representative of this view, comp. p. 7.—Different meanings were attached to the word φθορά, which was made at one time to denote the frailty of the living body, and its susceptibility to suffering, at another to signify the dissolubility of the corpse; ibidem, p. 4.

[2] On the orthodox side, *Gregory the Great* (Epist. x. 35, 39) declared against Agnoëtism. On the controversy in the West, with *Leporius*, a monk of Gaul (about 426), who also taught Agnoëtism in connection with the doctrines of Theodore of Mopsuestia, see Neander, Hist. Dogm. (Ryland), 339. [He contended for the unconditional transference of the predicates of the human nature to the divine, and consequently for such expressions as "God was born," "God died;" he also taught a progressive revelation of the divine Logos in the human nature to which he was united, and Agnoëtism.]

Though the orthodox church was far from giving the least countenance to Docetism, yet the ideas entertained by Origen in the preceding period (see § 66, note 6), viz., *that Christ rose from the tomb with a glorified body*, found many more friends in the

present period. Not only *Hilary*, whose views, generally speaking, come nearest to those of the Docetæ, but also *Chrysostom*, *Theodoret*, and most of the eastern theologians, with the exception of *Ephrem the Syrian*, *Gregory of Nyssa*, and *Cyril of Jerusalem*, adopted more or less the notion of Origen. Thus Chrysostom says in reference to John xxi. 10: ἐφαίνετο γὰρ ἄλλῃ μορφῇ, ἄλλῃ φωνῇ, ἄλλῳ σχήματι; in support of his opinion he appealed especially to the appearance of Christ when the doors were shut, etc. On the other hand, the last named fathers of the eastern church, as well as the western theologians, *Jerome* in particular, asserted that Christ possessed the very same body both prior and anterior to his resurrection. *Cyril* firmly maintains that Christ was ἐν σώματι παχεῖ. *Augustine* and *Leo the Great*, on the contrary, endeavored to reconcile the notion of the identity of Christ's body with the idea of its glorification. Thus Leo says in Sermo 69, de Resurrect. Dom. cap. 4 (T. i. p. 73): resurrectio Domini non finis carnis, sed commutatio fuit, nec virtutis augmento consumta substantia est. Qualitas transiit, non natura deficit: et factum est corpus impassibile, immortale, incorruptibile...nihil remansit in carne Christi infirmum, ut et ipsa sit per essentiam et non sit ipsa per gloriam. *Gregory the Great* and others used similar language.—Most of the theologians of this period also adhered to the opinion, that *Christ had quickened himself by his own power*, in opposition to the notion, entertained by the Arians, viz., that the Father had raised him from the dead. For the doctrine of the two natures in Christ led them to imagine, that the union subsisting between the divine and the human was so intimate and permanent, that both his body and soul, after their natural separation by death, continued to be connected with his Divine nature, the body in the grave, the soul in Hades. Nor did Christ stand in need of the angel to roll away the stone; this took place only in consequence of his resurrection.—His ascension was likewise brought about by an independent act of his divine nature, not by a miracle wrought by the Father upon him (generally speaking, theologians were accustomed at this time to consider the miracles of Christ as works achieved by his Divine nature). The cloud which formerly enveloped all the events of Christ's life, was now changed into a triumphal car (ὄχημα), which angels accompanied. Comp. *Athan.* De Assumt. Dom., and for further particulars see *Müller*, l. c. p. 40, ss., p. 83, ss.

§ 104.

THE DOCTRINE OF TWO WILLS IN CHRIST.—MONOTHELITES.

Combefisii, *T.*, Historia Monothelitarum, in the second volume of his Nov. Auctuarium Bibl. PP. Græco-Latin. Par. 1648, fol. *Walch*, Historie der Ketzereien, vol. ix. p. 1–606.

The attempt made by the Emperor Heraclius, in the seventh century, to re-unite the Monophysites with the Catholic church, led to the controversy respecting the two wills in Christ, kindred to that concerning his natures.[1] In agreement with *Cyrus*, patriarch of Alexandria, the emperor, hoping to reconcile the two parties, adopted the doctrine of only *one* Divine-human energy (ἐνέργεια), and of *one* will in Christ.[2] But *Sophronius*, an acute monk of Palestine, afterwards patriarch of Jerusalem (A. D. 635), endeavored to show that this doctrine was inadmissible, since the doctrine of two natures, set forth by the synod of Chalcedon, necessarily implied that of two wills.[3] After several fruitless attempts had been made

to establish the Monothelite doctrine,[1] the sixth Œcumenical Council of Constantinople (A. D. 680), with the coöperation of the bishop of Rome,[2] adopted the doctrine of *two* wills, and *two* energies, as the orthodox doctrine, but decided that the human will must always be conceived as subordinate to the divine.[3]

[1] In this way the controversy was removed from the province of pure metaphysics into the moral and practical sphere, and thus brought into connection with the anthropological disputes; as there had also been occasion for this in the Apollinarist strife (see above). But this did not help the matter itself.

[2] When the Emperor Heraclius, in the course of his campaign against Persia, passed through Armenia and Syria, he came to an understanding with the Monophysite leaders of the Severians and Jacobites, and induced *Sergius*, the orthodox patriarch of Constantinople, to give his assent to the doctrine of ἓν θέλημα καὶ μία ἐνέργεια, or of an ἐνέργεια θεανδρική. *Cyrus* (a Monophysite), whom the Emperor had appointed patriarch of Alexandria, effected, at a synod held in that place (A. D. 633), a union between the different parties. The acts of this synod are given by *Mansi*, Conc. xi. p. 564, ss., as well as the letters of Cyrus, ibid. p. 561.

[3] See Sophronii Epist. Synodica, which is given in *Mansi*, xi. 461. Those Monophysites who maintained the doctrine of two natures, and of only *one* will, were quite as inconsistent as most of the orthodox theologians in the Arian controversy, who held that the Son was of the same essence with the Father, but asserted the subordination of the Spirit.

[4] The Greek Emperor at first endeavored to settle the matter amicably, by the Ἔκθεσις [*i. e.*, an edict issued by the Emperor Heraclius, A. D. 638, in which he confirmed the agreement made by the patriarchs for the preservation of ecclesiastical union], and the Τύπος [*i. e.*, an edict issued by the Emperor Constans II., A. D. 648, in which the contending parties were prohibited from resuming their discussions on the doctrine in question]. See *Mansi*, x. p. 992, p. 1029, ss. Afterwards Martin I. and Maximus were treated with the most shameful cruelty; for further particulars see *Neander*, Church. Hist. (Torrey), iii. 186–192.

[5] Pope *Honorius* was in favor of the union, but his successors, *Severinus* and *John IV.*, opposed it. The latter condemned the doctrine of the Monothelites, and *Theodore* excommunicated Paul, patriarch of Constantinople, till the doctrine of *two* wills and *two* energies was at last adopted at the first synod of the Lateran, held under *Martin I.*, bishop of Rome, in the year 649, see *Mansi*, x. p. 863, ss.: Si quis secundum scelerosos hæreticos cum una voluntate et una operatione, quæ ab hæreticis impie confitetur, et duas voluntates, pariterque et operationes, hoc est, divinam et humanam, quæ in ipso Christo Deo in unitate salvantur, et a sanctis patribus orthodoxe in ipso prædicantur, denegat et respuit, condemnatus sit. (Comp. *Gieseler*, l. c. § 128, note 11. *Münscher* v. Cölln, ii. 78, 79.)

[6] This council (also called the First Trullan) was summoned by *Constantinus Pogonatus*. The decision of the synod was based upon the epistle of *Agatho*, the Roman bishop, which was itself founded upon the canons of the

above Lateran synod (Agathonis Ep. ad Imperatores in *Mansi*, xi. 233–286), confessing belief in duas naturales voluntates et duas naturales operationes, non contrarias, nec adversas, nec separatas, etc. This was followed by the decision of the council itself (see *Mansi*, xi. 631, ss. *Münscher*, von Cölln, ii. p. 80. *Gieseler*, l. c. § 128, notes 14–17). *Δύο φυσικὰς θελήσεις ἤτοι θελήματα ἐν Χριστῷ καὶ δύο φυσικὰς ἐνεργείας ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀμερίστως, ἀσυγχύτως, κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἁγίων πατέρων διδασκαλίαν κηρύττομεν· καὶ δύο φυσικὰ θελήματα οὐχ ὑπεναντία, μὴ γένοιτο, καθὼς οἱ ἀσεβεῖς ἔφησαν αἱρετικοί· ἀλλ' ἑπόμενον τὸ ἀνθρώπινον αὐτοῦ θέλημα, καὶ μὴ ἀντιπίπτον, ἢ ἀντιπαλαῖον, μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν καὶ ὑποτασσόμενον τῷ θείῳ αὐτοῦ καὶ παντοδυνεῖ θελήματι.*—Respecting the insufficiency of these, and the indefiniteness of the other canons of the council, see *Dorner*, 1st ed. p. 90, ss.—The Reformers did not accept the decisions of this council. The Monothelites (Pope Honorius included) were condemned. They continued to exist as a distinct sect in the mountains of Lebanon and Antilebanon under the name of Maronites (which was derived from their leader, the Syrian abbot *Maron*, who lived about the year 701). Comp. *Neander*, l. c. p. 197. [*Baur*, Dogmengesch. 2te Aufl. p. 211, says of this controversy: Its elements on the side of the Monothelites were, the unity of the person or subject, from whose one will (the divine will of the incarnate Logos) all must proceed, since two wills also presuppose two personal subjects (the chief argument of bishop Theodore of Pharan, in Mansi, Tom. xi. p. 567); on the side of the Duothelites, the point was the fact of two natures, since two natures can not be conceived without two natural wills, and two natural modes of operation. How far now two wills can be without two persons willing, was the point from which they slipped away by mere suppositions.]

§ 105.

PRACTICAL AND RELIGIOUS IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTOLOGY DURING THIS PERIOD.

Unedifying as is the spectacle of these manifold controversies, in which the person of the Redeemer is dragged down into the sphere of passionate conflicts, yet it is still cheering to see how the faith of Christians in those times was supported by that idea of the God-Man, which was above all such strife, and how it attributed to the doctrine of the one and undivided person of Christ its due import in the history of the world.

"*All the Fathers agreed, as it were with one mind, that to Christ belongs not merely the limited importance attached to every historical personage, but that his Person stands in an essential relation to the* WHOLE HUMAN RACE; *on this account alone could they make a* SINGLE INDIVIDUAL *the object of an article of faith, and ascribe to him a lasting and eternal significancy in relation to our race.*" *Dorner*, 1st ed. l. c. p. 78; compare the passages from

the fathers there cited. [They say, *e. g.*, that Christ is the primitive type after which Adam and the whole of humanity were created; the principle, the ἀρχή, of the whole new creation, in which the old is first completed; the ἀπαρχή of the whole φυρᾶμα of humanity, penetrating all; the eternal head of the race—a member of it indeed, but yet its plastic and organising principle, in virtue of the union between divinity and humanity in him perfectly realized, etc.]

SECOND DIVISION.

DOCTRINES RESPECTING ANTHROPOLOGY.

§ 106.

ON MAN IN GENERAL.

The Platonic doctrine of the preëxistence of the human soul, which none but *Nemesius* and *Prudentius* favored,[1] was almost unanimously rejected as Origenistic.[2] Along with physical *Traducianism* (favorable as was this doctrine in certain aspects to the idea of original sin, see § 55), *Creatianism* was also able to obtain more authority. According to this view, every human soul was created as such, and at a certain moment of time united with the body, developing itself in the womb. Yet the most influential teachers of the church, as Augustine and Gregory the Great, expressed themselves with reserve on this point.[3] In the West the threefold division of man (§ 54) gave way to the simpler division into body and soul, on the mutual relation of which different views obtained among the fathers of the present period.[4] Nor did they agree in their opinions respecting the image of God, though most of them admitted that it consisted in reason imparted to man, in his capacity of knowing God, and in his dominion over the irrational creation.[5] There were still some who imagined that the image of God was also reflected in the body of man; but, while the *Audiani* perverted this notion in support of gross anthropomorphism,[6] others gave to it a more spiritual interpretation. The immortality of the soul was universally believed;[7] *Lactantius*, however, did not regard it as the natural property of the soul, but as the reward of virtue.[8]

[1] The former did so as a philosopher (De Humana Natura 2, p. 76, ss. of the Oxford edit.), the latter as a poet (Cathemerin. Hymn. x. v. 161–168). [Cf. Aur. Prudent. Carmina, ed. *Alb. Dressel*, Lips. 1860.]

[2] Conc. Const. A. D. 540, see *Mansi*, ix. p. 396, ss.: Ἡ ἐκκλησία τοῖς θείοις ἑπομένη λόγοις φάσκει τὴν ψυχὴν συνδημιουργηθῆναι τῷ σώματι· καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν πρότερον, τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, κατὰ τὴν Ὠριγένους φρενοβλάβειαν.

[3] *Lactantius* maintains, Inst. iii. 18, that the soul is born with the body, and distinctly opposes Traducianism De Opif. Dei ad Demetr. c. 19: Illud

quoque venire in quæstionem potest, utrum anima ex patre, an potius ex matre, an vero ex utroque generetur. Nihil enim ex his tribus verum est, quia neque ex utroque, neque ex alterutro seruntur animæ. Corpus enim ex corporibus nasci potest, quoniam confertur aliquid ex utroque; de animis anima non potest, quia ex re tenui et incomprehensibili nihil potest decedere. Itaque serendarum animarum ratio uni ac soli Deo subjacet:

"Denique cœlesti sumus omnes semine oriundi,
Omnibus ille idem pater est,"

ut ait Lucretius; nam de mortalibus non potest quidquam nisi mortale generari. Nec putari pater debet, qui transfudisse aut inspirasse animam de suo nullo modo sentit; nec, si sentiat, quando tamen et quomodo id fiat, habet animo comprehensum. Ex quo apparet, non a parentibus dari animas, sed ab uno eodemque omnium Deo patre, qui legem rationemque nascendi tenet solus, siquidem solus efficit; nam terreni parentis nihil est, nisi ut humorem corporis, in quo est materia nascendi, cum sensu voluptatis emittat vel recipiat, et citra hoc opus homo resistit, nec quidquam amplius potest; ideo nasci sibi filios optant, quia non ipsi faciunt. Cetera jam Dei sunt omnia: scilicet conceptus ipse et corporis informatio et inspiratio animæ et partus incolumis et quæcunque deinceps ad hominem conservandum valent; *illius* munus est, quod spiramus, quod vivimus, quod vigemus.—In opposition to Traducianism, he appeals to the fact, that intelligent parents have sometimes stupid children, and vice versa, which could not well be ascribed to the influence of the stars!—In accordance with this opinion *Hilary* asserts Tract. in Ps. xci. § 3: Quotidie animarum origenes [et corporum figulationes] occulta et incognita nobis divinæ virtutis molitione procedunt. [See, also, Tract. in Psalm. cxviii. cap. i.: Igitur vel quia in terræ hujus solo commoramur, vel quia ex terra instituti conformatique sumus, anima quæ alterius originis est, terræ corporis adhæsisse creditur.] *Pelagius*, and the Semipelagians, *Cassian* and *Gennadius*, adopted substantially the same view, see *Wiggers*, Augustin und Pelagius, i. p. 149, ii. p. 354. Pelagius taught (in Symb. quoted by *Mansi*, iv. p. 355): Animas a Deo dari credimus, quas ab ipso factas dicimus, anathematizantes eos, qui animas quasi partem divinæ dicunt esse substantiæ; *Augustine* agreed with him as far as the negative aspect of this proposition was concerned, Retract. i. 1: (Deus) animum non de se ipso genuit, sed de re nulla alia condidit, sicut condidit corpus e terra; he here refers, however, directly to the creation of our first parents. But Augustine does not expressly state, whether he thinks that the soul is newly created in every case; on the contrary, he declined to investigate this point: Nam quod attinet ad ejus (animi) originem, qua fit ut sit in corpore, utrum de illo uno sit, qui primum creatus est, quando factus est homo in animam vivam, an semper ita fiant singulis singuli, nec tunc sciebam (in his treatise Contra Academicos) nec adhuc scio. Comp. Ep. 140 (al. 120), ad Honorat. (T. ii. p. 320). When *Jerome* (Contra Error. Joann. Hierosolym. § 22) derives Creatianism from the words of Christ in John v., "My Father worketh hitherto," Augustine will not allow *this* argument to be valid, since the working of God is not excluded even upon the Traducian hypothesis; comp. Neander, Hist. Dogm. (Ryland), 365. [The opinion of Augustine upon this point has been much debated: Bellarmine and Staudenmaier contend that

he was for creation; Melancthon, Klee, and others reckon him among the Traducianists; Gangauf (u. a.), Wiggers, and Ritter say that he was undecided. Bellarmine cites for Creatianism, Epist. 190, ad Optat. cap. 14: Illi, qui animas ex una propagari asserunt, quam Deus primo homini dedit, atque ita eas ex parentibus trahi dicunt, si Tertulliani opinionem sequuntur, profecto eas, non spiritus, sed corpora esse contendunt, et corpulentis seminibus exoriri, quo perversius quod dici potest? But this applies strictly only to Tertullian's corpulenta semina. He recognises the connection between Traducianism and original sin, De Lib. Arb. lib. iii. cp. 56: Deinde si una anima facta est, ex qua omnium hominum animæ trahuntur nascentium, quis potest dicere, non se pecasse, cum primus ille peccavit. In his De Anima et ejus Orig. lib. 1. cp. 19, Num. 34, he says that he could accept Creatianism if four difficulties were removed; and in De Orig. Anim. cp. 28, he designates the chief of these difficulties, in connection with the doctrine of the salvation of children not baptized: Sed antequam sciam, quænam earum potius eligenda sit, hoc me non temere sentire profiteor, eam, quæ vera est, non adversari robustissimæ ac fundatissimæ fidei, qua Christi ecclesia nec parvulos homines recentissime natos a damnatione credit, nisi per grœtiam nominis Christi, quam in suis sacramentis commendavit, posse liberari; comp. De Genesi ad Lit. Lib. x. cp. 23 Num. 39, and Epist. 169 ad Evodium, cp. 13. In Epist. 190 ad Optat. cp. 17, he says: Aliquid ergo certum de animæ origine nondum in scripturis canonicis comperi. And in Genes. ad Lit. x. 21, he says: Jam de ceterarum animarum adventu, utrum ex parentibus an desuper sit, vincant, qui poterunt; ego adhuc inter utrosque ambigo, et moveor aliquando sic, aliquando autem sic.]—The phrase mentioned before (note 2): *τὴν ψυχὴν συνδημιουργηθῆναι τῷ σώματι*, which was used by the Greek church, and is also found in the works of *Theodoret* (Fab. Hær. v. 9, p. 414), implies the doctrine commonly called Creatianism. Yet Traducianism continued to be professed not only by heterodox writers, *e. g.*, *Eunomius* and *Apollinaris*, but also by some orthodox theologians, such as *Gregory of Nyssa* (De Hom. Opif. c. 29). The last directs our attention to the fact, that body and soul belong essentially together, and can not be possibly be imagined to be separated from each other: *Αλλ' ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τοῦ διὰ ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος συνεστηκότος, μίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ κοινὴν τῆς συστάσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑποτίθεσθαι, ὡς ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ προγενέστερός τε καὶ νεώτερος γένοιτο, τοῦ μὲν σωματικοῦ προτερεύοντος ἐν αὐτῷ, τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου ἐφυστερίζοντος*, etc., which he proves by analogies drawn from nature. The views of *Anastasius Sinaïta* on this point are very materializing (Hom. in *Bandini* Monum. Eccles. Gr. T. ii. p. 54, in *Münscher* von Cölln, i. p. 332): *Τὸ μὲν σῶνα ἐκ τῆς γυναικείας γῆς* (*Thiersch* conjectures *γονῆς*, see the review in Zeitschrift f. d. luth. Theol. 1841, p. 184) *καὶ αἵματος συνίσταται· ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ διὰ τῆς σπορᾶς, ὥσπερ διά τινος ἐμφυσήματος ἐκ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀῤῥήτως μεταδίδοται.* According to *Jerome*, Ep. 78, ad Marcellin. (Opp. T. iv. p. 642, ap. Erasm. ii. p. 318), even, maxima pars occidentalium (probably of earlier times?) held the opinion, ut quomodo corpus ex corpore, sic anima nascatur ex anima et simili cum brutis animantibus conditione subsistat. But Jerome himself rejects all other systems, and designates *Creatianism* as the

orthodox doctrine;* Epist. ad Pammach. (Opp. T. iv. p. 318, ap. Erasm. ii. p. 170): Quotidie Deus fabricatur animas, cujus velle fecisse est et conditor esse non cessat.....Noli despicere bonitatem figuli tui, qui te plasmavit et fecit ut voluit. Ipse est Dei virtus et Dei sapientia, qui in utero virginis œdificavit sibi domum. The advocates of Creatianism saw in the birth of every human being something analogous to the miracle of Christ's incarnation on its physical side, without putting the one on a level with the other (which Jerome would have been the last to do); those who adopted Traducianism were compelled to consider Christ's birth as an exception to the rule; and even this exception seemed to require some limitation of the position, that Christ's human nature is consubstantial with ours. Many theologians, therefore, preferred obviating these difficulties, following Augustine's example, by directing attention to the impossibility of comprehending the origin and processes of existence. Thus *Gregory the Great*, Epp. vii. 59, ad Secundinum (Opp. ii. p. 970), says: Sed de hac re dulcissima mihi tua caritas sciat, quia de origine animæ inter sanctos Patres requisitio non parva versata est; sed utrum ipsa ab Adam descenderit, an certe singulis detur, incertum remansit, eamque in hac vita insolubilem fassi sunt esse quæstionem. Gravis enim est quæstio, nec valet ab homine comprehendi, quia si de Adam substantia cum carne nascitur, cur non etiam cum carne moritu? Si vero cum carne non nascitur, cur in ea carne, quæ de Adam prolata est, obligata peccatis tenetur? (he thus deduces Traducianism from the doctrine of original sin, the correctness of which he assumes, while the latter, on the contrary, was generally inferred from the former.)

' *Hilary* of Poitiers asserts (in Matth. Can. v. § 8), that the soul, whether in the body or out of the body, must always preserve its corporeal substance, because every thing that is created must exist in some form or other (in aliquo sit necesse est); reminding us of the views of Tertullian. Yet elsewhere he views the soul as a spiritual, incorporeal being; comp. in Ps. lii. § 7, in Ps. cxxix. § 6 (nihil in se habens corporale, nihil terrenum, nihil grave, nihil caducum).—*Augustine* frankly acknowledges the difficulty of defining the relation in which the soul stands to the body, De Morib. Eccles. Cath. c. 4: Difficile est istam controversiam dijudicare, aut si ratione facile, oratione longum est. Quem laborem ac moram suscipere ac subire non opus est. Sive enim utrumque sive anima sola nomen hominis teneat, est hominis optimum quod optimum est corporis, sed quod aut corpori simul et animæ aut soli animæ optimum est, id est optimum hominis.—On the psychological views of Augustine, comp. *Schleiermacher*, Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 169, ss. [also *Gangauf*, Metaphysische Psychologie des heiligen Augustinus, Augsburg, 1852]; on those of *Claudius Mamertus* and *Boëthius*, ibid. p. 174.—According to *Gregory the Great*, man is composed of body and soul (Mor. xiv. c. 15). The principal properties of the soul are, mens, anima et virtus; comp. *Law*, p. 370.

* *Leo the Great* likewise declares it to be the doctrine of the church (Ep. 15, ad Turrib. Opp. *Quesnel*, p. 229, quoted in *Münscher* ed. by von Cölln, p. 331, note 11: Catholica fides...omnem hominem in corporis et animæ substantiam *formari* intra materna viscera confitetur.

[6] *Greg. Nyss.* in verba: Faciamus hominem, Orat. 1, Opp. i. p. 143: Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν· τουτέστι, δώσομεν αὐτῷ λόγου περιουσίαν...Οὐ γὰρ τὰ πάθη εἰς τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰκόνα παρελήφθη, ἀλλ' ὁ λογισμὸς τῶν παθῶν δεσπότης. *Athanasius* speaks in the same manner, Orat. contra Gent. § 2. Cyrill. Hier. Cat. xiv. 10. The dominion over the animals was included. Gregory, l. c. says: ὅπου ἡ τοῦ ἄρχειν δύναμις, ἐκεῖ ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰκών. Comp. Theodoret, in Genes. Quæst. 20. Chrys. Hom. viii. in Genes. (Opp. ii. p. 65, ss.). Aug. De Catechizandis Rudib. xvii. 20; De Genesi contra Manich. c. 17; de Trin. xii. 2; Sermo xlviii. (De Cura Animæ); Quæ est imago Dei in nobis, nisi id quod melius reperitur nobis, nisi ratio, intellectus, memoria, voluntas.—The Semipelagians, *Gennadius* and *Faustus*, made a distinction between *imago* and *similitudo*, see *Wiggers*, ii. p. 356.—*Gregory the Great* regards the image of God, in which man was created, as soliditas ingenita (Mor. ix. c. 33), which was lost by the fall (Mor. xxix. c. 10), see *Lau*, p. 371. On the other traits of the first man as to body and soul, ibid. p. 372. Whether there is here a hint of the doctrine of donum superadditum, afterwards fully developed? ibid. p. 376.

[7] *Audæus* (Udo), who lived at the commencement of the fourth century in Mesopotamia, a rigid and zealous ascetic, seems to have fallen into these notions through his essentially practical tendency; comp. Epiph. Hær. 70, who speaks very mildly of Audæus and his followers: οὔ τι ἔχων παρηλλαγμένον τῆς πίστεως, ἀλλ' ὀρθότατα μὲν πιστεύων αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ἅμα αὐτῷ. Theodoret takes the opposite view, Hist. Eccles. iv. 10 (καινῶν εὑρετὴς δογμάτων), comp. Fab. Hær. iv. 10. *Schröder*, Diss. de Hæresi Audianor. Marb. 1716, 4. *Neander*, Kirchengeschichte, ii. p. 705.

[8] *Augustine*, Sermo xlviii.: Anima etiam non moritur, nec succumbit per mortem, cum omnino sit immortalis, nec corporis materia, cum sit una numero.

[9] Lact. Instit. Div. vii. 5 (in *Münscher* von Cölln, p. 336, comp. p. 338). *Nemesius* likewise (cap. i. p. 15), accedes in this point to the opinion of the earlier Greek theologians: Ἑβραῖοι δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε θνητὸν ὁμολογουμένως, οὔτε ἀθάνατον γεγενῆσθαί φασιν, ἀλλ' ἐν μεθορίοις ἑκατέρας φύσεως, ἵνα ἂν μὲν τοῖς σωματικοῖς ἀκολουθήσῃ πάθεσιν, περιπέσῃ καὶ ταῖς σωματικαῖς μεταβολαῖς· ἐὰν δὲ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς προτιμήσῃ καλὰ, τῆς ἀθανασίας ἀξιωθῇ, κ. τ. λ. On the other hand, *Gregory the Great* teaches, that even if the soul lose blessedness, it cannot lose the essentialiter vivere (Dial. iv. c. 45). The body of man, too, was originally immortal, and became mortal through sin; comp. Moral. iv. c. 28, sq. *Lau*, ubi supra, p. 371, sq. [Comp. *Wiggers*, in Zeitschrift f. d. hist. Theol. 1854.]

§ 107.

ON THE DOCTRINE OF SIN IN GENERAL.

Concerning the nature of sin, the generally received opinion was, that it has its seat in the will of man, and stands in the most intimate connection with his moral freedom. *Augustine* himself

defended this doctrine (at least in his earlier writings),[1] which was opposed to the Manichean notion, that evil is inherent in matter. *Lactantius*, on the contrary, manifested a strong leaning towards Manicheism by designating the body as the seat and organ of sin.[2] The ascetic practices then so common, sufficiently indicate that the church tacitly approved of this view. *Athanasius* regarded sin as something negative, and believed it to consist in the blindness and indolence of man, which prevent him from elevating himself to God. Similar (negative) definitions were given by *Basil the Great* and *Gregory of Nyssa*.[3] But sin was most frequently looked upon as opposition to the law of God, and rebellion against his holy will,[4] analogous to the sin of Adam, which was now generally viewed as an historical fact (contrary to the allegorical interpretation of Origen).[5]

[1] *Aug.* de Duab. Animab. contra Manich. § 12: Colligo nusquam nisi in *voluntate* esse peccatum; De Lib. Arb. iii. 49: Ipsa *voluntas* est prima causa peccandi.—In many other passages he regards sin from the negative point of view as a conversio a majori bono ad minus bonum, defectio ab eo, quod summa est, ad id, quod minus est, perversitas voluntatis a summa substantia detortæ in infimum. See the passages in *Julius Müller*, die Lehre von der Sünde, i. p. 340, ss.

[2] *Lact.* Inst. Div. ii. 12, vi. 13; De Ira Dei 15: Nemo esse sine delicto potest, quamdiu indumento carnis oneratus est. Cujus infirmitas triplici modo subjacet dominio peccati, factis, dictis, cogitationibus.

[3] *Athan.* contra gent. 4 (Opp. i. p. 4): Ὄντα δέ ἐστι τὰ καλὰ, οὐκ ὄντα δὲ τὰ φαῦλα· ὄντα δέ φημι τὰ καλὰ, καθότι ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος θεοῦ τὰ παραδείγματα ἔχει· οὐκ ὄντα δὲ τὰ κακὰ λέγω, καθότι ἐπινοίαις ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ὄντα ἀναπέπλασται. Ibid. c. 7, p. 7: Ὅτι τὸ κακὸν οὐ παρὰ θεοῦ οὐδὲ ἐν θεῷ, οὔτε ἐξ ἀρχῆς γέγονεν, οὔτε οὐσία τίς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ· ἀλλὰ ἄνθρωποι κατὰ στέρησιν τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φαντασίας ἑαυτοῖς ἐπινοεῖν ἤρξαντο καὶ ἀναπλάττειν τὰ οὐκ ὄντα καὶ ἅπερ βούλονται. Comp. that which follows. Athanasius traces the sinful propensity of man to indolence, c. 3, p. 3: Οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι κατολιγωρήσαντες τῶν κρειττόνων, καὶ ὀκνήσαντες περὶ τὴν τούτων κατάληψιν, τὰ ἐγγυτέρω μᾶλλον ἑαυτῶν ἐζήτησαν. Indolence is allied with sensuality, because it clings to what is nearest, viz., the bodily and the visible. Comp. the subsequent part of the chapter. In the same manner *Basil M.* Hexaëmeron Hom. ii. p. 19 (Paris edit. 1638), says: Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ παρὰ Θεοῦ τὸ κακὸν τὴν γένεσιν ἔχειν εὐσεβές ἐστι λέγειν, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων παρὰ τοῦ ἐναντίου γίνεσθαι, οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ζωὴ θάνατον γεννᾷ, οὔτε ὁ σκότος φωτός ἐστιν ἀρχὴ, οὔτε ἡ νόσος ὑγείας δημιουργός.....Τί οὖν φαμεν; Ὅτι κακόν ἐστιν οὐχὶ οὐσία ζῶσα καὶ ἔμψυχος, ἀλλὰ διάθεσις ἐν ψυχῇ ἐναντίως ἔχουσα πρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀπόπτωσιν τοῖς ῥᾳθύμοις ἐγγινομένη.—*Gregory of Nyssa*, Orat. Catechet. c. 5 (Opp. iii. p. 53): Καθάπερ γὰρ ἡ ὅρασις φύσεών ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, ἡ δὲ πήρωσις στέρησίς ἐστι τῆς φυσικῆς ἐνεργείας, οὕτως καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κακίαν ἀνθέστηκεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλην κακίας γένεσιν ἐννοῆσαι, ἢ

ἀρετῆς ἀπουσίαν. Comp. c. 6, c. 22, c. 28, and the Dial. de Anima et Resurrectione.

[4] That sin was *in contradiction* with God's purposes, was the practically weighty position held fast by the church in all its different definitions of sin. *"Augustine, too, every where remains true to this denial of the divine origination of sin. Though the opposite opinion has been often imposed upon him in past and present times, on account of his doctrines of the moral incapacity of human nature and of the divine predestination, yet this belongs to these groundless inferences which have been so freely drawn, especially from this great teacher of the church;" Julius Müller*, i. 308. A more precise definition is given by the theologians after the time of Augustine. Thus *Gregory I.* makes a distinction between peccatum and delictum: Peccatum est mala facere, delictum vero est bona relinquere, quæ summopere sunt tenenda. Vel certe peccatum in opere est, delictum in cogitatione; Ezech. lib. ii. Hom. 9, p. 1404. He also distinguishes between peccatum et crimen;* every crimen is a peccatum, but not *vice versa*. No one is sine peccato, but many are sine crimine (Tit. i. 6, 1 Joh. i. 8). The peccata only stain the soul, the crimina kill it; Moral. xvi. c. 12. The iniquitas, impietas, etc., are also represented as modifications of sin; Mor. xi. 42, xxii. 10. The deepest root of all sin is pride; pride produces envy, wrath, etc. The seat of sin is both in the soul and in the body; the devil is one of the chief agents in inducing man to commit sin; comp. *Lau*, p. 379, ss.

[5] *Augustine* still endeavors to reconcile the mystic interpretation of paradise with the historical; De Civit. Dei, xiii. 21. Moreover, he sees all individual sins comprised in the primitive sin; comp. Enchiridion ad Laurentium, c. 45: In illo peccato uno...possunt intelligi plura peccata, si unum ipsum in sua quasi membra singula dividatur. Nam et *superbia* est illic, quia homo in sua potius esse quam in Dei potestate dilexit; et *sacrilegium*, quia Deo non credidit; et *homicidium*, quia se præcipitavit in mortem; et *fornicatio* spiritalis, quia integritas mentis humanæ serpentina suasione corrupta est; et *furtum* quia cibus prohibitus usurpatus est; et *avaritia*, quia plus quam illi sufficere debuit, adpetivit; et si quid aliud in hoc uno admisso diligenti consideratione inveniri potest. *Gregory the Great* adopts the literal interpretation; Mor. xxxi. comp. *Lau*, p. 377, ss. The devil tempted our first parents in a threefold manner, gula, vana gloria, and avaritia. The attack itself was fourfold, by suggestio, delectatio, consensus, and defensionis audacia; Mor. iv. c. 27.

* This distinction, however, had been already made by Augustine; see below, § 111, 2.

§ 108.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIRST SIN, AND FREEDOM OF THE WILL (ACCORDING TO THE THEOLOGIANS OF THE GREEK CHURCH).

A. Hahn, Ephräm der Syrer über die Willensfreiheit des Menschen, nebst den Theorien derjenigen Kirchenlehrer bis zu seiner Zeit, welche hier besondere Berücksichtigung verdienen. (in Illgens Denkschrift der hist. theol. Gesellschaft zu Leipzig. Part 2, Leipz. 1819, p. 30, ss.). [Comp. *Landerer*, Verhältniss von Gnade und Freiheit, in Jahrb. f. deutsche Theologie, 1857, s. 556, 572, on Chrysostom, s. 549–61. *Kuhn*, d. angebliche Pelagianismus der voraugustinischen Kirchenväter, in Theol. Quartalschrift, 1853. *Wörter*, Christl. Lehre über d. Verhältniss von Gnade u. Freiheit. Band i. 1856. Band ii. 1, 1860.]

Even *those* theologians who kept themselves free from the influence of the Augustinian system, held that the sin of Adam was followed by disastrous effects upon the human race, but restricted these evils (as the fathers of the preceding period had done) to the mortality of the body, the hardships and miseries of life, also admitting that the moral powers of man had been enfeebled by the fall. Thus *Gregory of Nazianzum* in particular (to whom Augustine appealed in preference to all others) maintained, that both the νοῦς and the ψυχή have been considerably impaired by sin, and regarded the perversion of the religious consciousness seen in idolatry, which previous teachers had ascribed to the influence of demons, as an inevitable effect of the first sin. But he was far from asserting the total depravity of mankind, and the entire loss of free will.[1] On the contrary, the doctrine of the freedom of the will continued to be distinctly maintained by the Greek church.[2] *Athanasius* himself, the father of orthodoxy, maintained in the strongest terms that man has the ability of choosing good as well as evil, and even allowed exceptions from original sin, alleging that several individuals, who lived prior to the appearance of Christ, were free from it.[3] *Cyril of Jerusalem* also assumed that the life of man begins in a state of innocence, and that sin enters only with the use of free will. Similar views were entertained by *Ephräm the Syrian*, *Gregory of Nyssa*, *Basil the Great*, and others.[4] *Chrysostom*, whose whole tendency was of a practical and moral kind, insisted most of all upon the liberty of man and his moral self-determination, and passed a severe censure upon those who endeavored to excuse their own defects by ascribing the origin of sin to the fall of Adam.[5]

[1] Orat. xxxviii. 12, p. 670, xliv. 4, p. 837, xiv. 25, p. 275, xix. 13, p. 372, Carmen iv. v. 98, and other passages quoted by *Ullmann*, p. 421, ss. Comp. especially the interesting parallel which is there drawn between Gregory and Augustine, as well as between the expressions of the former in the original, and the (corrupt) translation of the latter. "*Gregory by no means taught the*

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[1] Orat. xxxviii. 12, p. 670, xliv. 4, p. 837, xiv. 25, p. 275, xix. 13, p. 372, Carmen iv. v. 98, and other passages quoted by *Ullmann*, p. 421, ss. Comp. especially the interesting parallel which is there drawn between Gregory and Augustine, as well as between the expressions of the former in the original, and the (corrupt) translation of the latter. "*Gregory by no means taught the*

doctrines afterwards propounded by Pelagius and his followers; but if all his sentiments be duly considered, it will be found that he is far more of a Pelagian than of an Augustinian;" Ullmann, l. c. p. 446.

[8] According to *Methodius* (in Phot. Bibl. Cod. 234, p. 295), man does not possess the power either of *having* desires, or of not having them (*ἐνθυμεῖσθαι ἢ μὴ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι*), but he is at liberty either to gratify (*χρῆσθαι*) them or not. Comp. *Nemes.* De Nat. Hom. c. 41: *Πᾶσα τοίνυν ἀνάγκη τὸν ἔχοντα τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κύριον εἶναι πράξεων. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ κύριος εἴη πράξεων, περιττῶς ἔχει τὸ βουλεύεσθαι.*

[9] *Athan.* Contra Gent. c. 2, p. 2: *Ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὐκ ἦν κακία, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ νῦν ἐν τοῖς ἁγίοις ἐστὶν, οὐδ' ὅλως κατ' αὐτοὺς ὑπάρχει αὐτή.* cf. Contra Arian. Or. 3 (4). Opp. T. i. p. 582, 83: *Πολλοὶ γὰρ οὖν ἅγιοι γεγόνασι καθαροὶ πάσης ἁμαρτίας.* (He alludes to Jeremiah and John the Baptist: but they can not properly be called *πολλοί*.) Nevertheless, death has reigned even over them, who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression (Rom. iv. 14).

[10] *Cyr.* Cat. iv. 19: *Ἐλθόντες εἰς τόνδε τὸν κόσμον ἀναμάρτητοι, νῦν ἐκ προαιρέσεως ἁμαρτάνομεν.* 21: *Αὐτεξούσιός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ ὁ διάβολος τὸ μὲν ὑποβάλλειν δύναται· τὸ δὲ καὶ ἀναγκάσαι παρὰ παροαίρεσιν οὐκ ἔχει τὴν ἐξουσίαν.* Cat. xvi. 23: *Εἰ γάρ τις ἀβλεπτῶν μὴ καταξιοῦται τῆς χάριτος, μὴ μεμφέσθω τῷ πνεύματι ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀπιστίᾳ.* (*Oudin*, Comm. p. 461–464, attempted in vain to contest the genuineness of the catecheses favorable to Semipelagianism.)—Concerning Ephräm, see the above dissertation.—*Basil the Great* delivered a discourse *περὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου*, the authenticity of which was denied by *Garnier* (T. ii. p. xxvi.), but in modern times again defended by *Pelt* and *Rheinwald* (Homiliarium Patrist. i. 2, p. 192). In this, though he admitted the depravity of mankind, he asserted that human liberty and divine grace must coöperate. Comp. also the Hom. de Spir. S. and *Klose*, l. c. p. 59, ss. [cf. *Landerer*, ubi supra, p. 556].—*Gregory of Nyssa* also takes for granted a universal bias to sin (De Orat. Dom. Or. v. Opp. i. p. 751, ss.), but finds no sin in infants; Orat. de infantibus qui præmature abripiuntur (Opp. iii. p. 317, ss.).

[11] See Hom. in Ep. ad Rom. xvi. p. 241; in Ep. ad Hebr. Hom. xii. p. 805. D; in Evang. Joh. Hom. xvii. p. 115 C; in 1 Epist. ad Cor. Hom. ii. p. 514, D; in Ps. l. Hom. ii. (Opp. T. iii. p. 869, D); all of which are quoted by *Münscher* von Cölln, i. p. 363, ss.; see also ep. ad Phil. Hom. i.; especially on Phil. i. 6. "*Chrysostom was so zealous for morality, that he must have considered it a point of special importance to deprive men of every ground of excuse for the neglect of moral efforts. His practical sphere of labor in the cities of Antioch and Constantinople gave a still greater impulse to this tendency. For in these large capitals he met with many who sought to attribute their want of Christian activity to the defects of human nature, and the power of Satan or of fate.*" *Neander*, Church Hist. (Torrey), ii. 658. Comp. his Chrysostomus, i. p. 51, p. 283, ss. But Chrysostom urged quite as strongly the existence of depravity in opposition to a false moral pride. Hom. vi. Montf. T. 12 (in *Neander*, Chrysostomus, ii. p. 36, 37), comp. *Wiggers*, i. p 442.

§ 109.

THE OPINIONS OF THE LATIN THEOLOGIANS BEFORE AUGUSTINE, AND OF AUGUSTINE BEFORE THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY.

During this period, as well as the preceding, the theologians of the Western church were more favorable than those of the Eastern, to the Augustinian doctrine. Even Arnobius speaks of a connatural infirmity, making man prone to sin.[1] *Hilary*, and *Ambrose* of Milan, taught the defilement of sin by birth; Ambrose appealed especially to Ps. li. 5, in support of original sin, but without determining to what extent every individual shares in the common guilt.[2] Nevertheless, neither of them excluded the liberty of man from the work of moral reformation.[3] Even *Augustine* himself, at an earlier period of his life, defended human freedom in opposition to the Manicheans.[4]

[1] *Arnobius*, Adv. Gentes, i. 27: Proni ad culpas et ad libidinis varios appetitus, vitio sumus infirmitatis ingenitæ.

[2] *Hilar.* Tract. in Ps. lviii. p. 129; in Ps. cxviii. litt. 22, p. 366. 6, and some other passages (in *Münscher* von Cölln, p. 354). [*Hilary* in Psalm. i. § 4: Ad hæc nos vitia naturæ nostræ propellit instinctus. In Matth. xviii. 13: Ovis una homo intelligendus est, et sub homine uno universitas sentienda est; sed in unius Adæ errore omne hominum genus aberravit.] *Ambrose*, Apol. David. c. 11. Opp. i. p. 846: Antequam nascamur, maculamur contagio, et ante usuram lucis, originis ipsius excipimus injuriam; in iniquitate concipimur: non expressit, utrum parentum, an nostra. Et in delictis generat unumquemque mater sua; nec hic declaravit, utrum in delictis suis mater pariat, an jam sint et aliqua delicta nascentis. Sed vide, ne utrumque intelligendum sit. Nec conceptus iniquitatis exsors est, quoniam et parentes non carent lapsu. Et si nec unius diei infans sine peccato est, multo magis nec illi materni conceptus dies sine peccato sunt. Concipimur ergo in peccato parentum et in delictis eorum nascimur. Sed et ipse partus habet contagia sua, nec unum tantummodo habet ipsa natura contagium. [*Ambrose*, Apol. David. § 71: Omnes in primo homine peccavimus et per naturæ successionem culpæ quoque ab uno in omnes transfusa est successio.] Comp. De Pœnit. i. 3. Opp. 3, p. 498: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est, sicut habes lectum, dicente David: *Ecce enim in iniquitatibus conceptus sum et in delictis peperit me mater mea.*—In Ev. Luke i. 17 (Opp. i. p. 737); Epp. Class. ii. (Opp. iii. p. 1190), and some other passages (in *Münscher* von Cölln, p. 355; after another edition)!

[3] *Hilar.* Tract. in Psalm cxviii. lit. 15, p. 329: Est quidem in fide *manendi* a Deo munus, *sed incipiendi a nobis origo est.* Et voluntas nostra hoc proprium ex se habere debet, ut velit. Deus incipienti incrementum dabit, quia consummationem per se infirmitas nostra non obtinet; meritum tamen adipiscendæ consummationis est ex initio voluntatis. Comp. also *Arnobius*,

Adv. Gentes, ii. 64: Nulli Deus infert necessitatem, imperiosa formidine nullum tenet...65. Quid est enim tam injustum, quam repugnantibus, quam invitis extorquere in contrarium voluntates, inculcare quod nolint et quod refugiant animis.

[4] De Gen. contra Manich. ii. 43 (c. 29): Nos dicimus nulli naturæ nocere peccata nisi sua; nos dicimus, nullum malum esse naturali, sed omnes naturas bonas esse.—De lib. Arb. iii. 50 (c. 17): Aut enim et ipsa voluntas est et a radice ista voluntatis non receditur, aut non est voluntas, et peccatum nullum habet. Aut igitur ipsa voluntas est prima causa peccandi, aut nullum peccatum est prima causa peccandi. Non est, cui recte imputetur peccatum, nisi peccanti. Non est ergo, cui recte imputetur, nisi volenti... Quæcunque ista causa est voluntatis: si non ei potest resisti, sine peccato ei ceditur; si autem potest, non ei cedatur, et non peccabitur. An forte *fallit* incautum? Ergo caveat, ne fallatur. An tanta fallacia est, ut caveri omnino non possit? Si ita est, nulla peccata sunt: quis enim peccat in eo, quod nullo modo caveri potest? Peccatur autem; caveri igitur potest. Comp. de Duab. Animab. contra Manich. 12, and with it the retractationes of the different passages; also de nat. et grat. 80 (c. 67).

§ 110.

THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY.

* *Wiggers, G. F.*, Versuch einer pragmatischen Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagianismus, Berlin, 1821. Hamburgh, 1833, ii. 8. [Vol. i. transl. by Prof. Emerson, Andover.] † *Lentzen, J. A.*, de Pelagianorum doctrinæ principiis, Colon. ad Rhen. 1833, 8. *J. L. Jacobi*, die Lehre des Pelagius, Lpz. 1842. [Theod. Gangauf, Metaph. Psychologie des heil. Augustinus. Augsb. 1852. *Neander*, in his Church Hist. and Hist. Dogm. 345–75. *Jul. Müller*, Der Pelagianismus, in Deutsche Zeitschrift, 1855. *Bindemann's* Augustinus. Zeller, in. Theol. Jahrbücher, 1854. *P. Schaff*, The Pelagian Controversy, Bibl. Sacra, 1848. Hampden's Bampton Lectures, Lect. iv.]

Towards the commencement of the fifth century, *Celestius* and *Pelagius* (Briton, Morgan?) made their appearance in the West.[1] The views which they held were partly in accordance with the opinions hitherto entertained by the theologians of the Greek church, but in part carried to a much greater length in the denial of natural depravity. Some of the propositions, on the ground of which the presbyter *Paulinus* accused Celestius at the synod of Carthage (A. D. 412), had been previously defended by orthodox theologians; others were directly opposed both to the doctrine of Scripture (and especially that of Paul) and the general belief of the church, and thus threatened the fundamental doctrines of the Gospel.[2] It is, however, difficult to decide how far Pelagius accorded with all these assertions, since he expressed himself very cautiously.[3] But it is certain that what is commonly called *Pelagianism* does not so much represent the single notions of a single individual, as a

complete *moral and religious system*, which formed a decided contrast to *Augustinianism*. In this conflict the former system was vanquished so far as this, that, in consequence of the turn which the controversy took, and of the great authority of *Augustine* in the West, his doctrine gained the victory over that of *Pelagius*.[1] The followers of Pelagius formed not a sect properly so called. But Pelagianism, though condemned, retained its advocates, especially as but few could fully enter into all the consequences of the Augustinian system, and find in them real inward satisfaction. It will be necessary, in order to examine more fully the antagonistic elements, to divide the subject matter of controversy into three leading sections, viz.: 1. Sin; 2. Grace and Liberty; and 3. Predestination.

[1] On the personal character and history of Celestius and Pelagius, see *Wiggers*, p. 33, ss.

[2] The 6 or 7 Capitula (the numbers vary according as several propositions are separated or joined together) are preserved in *Augustine* De Gestis Pelagii, cap. 11 (comp. de Peccato Originali, 2, 3, 4, 11, c. 2–10), as well as in the two commonitoria of *Marius Mercator* [comp. *Gieseler*, § 87, note 4]. They are the following (comp. *Wiggers*, i. p. 60):

1. Adam was created mortal, so that he would have died whether he had sinned or not;
2. Adam's sin injured only himself, and not the human race;
3. New-born infants are in the same condition in which Adam was previous to the fall (ante prævaricationem);
4. Neither does the whole human race die in consequence of Adam's death or transgression; nor does it rise from the dead in consequence of Christ's resurrection;
5. Infants obtain eternal life, though they be not baptized;
6. The law is as good a means of salvation (lex sic mittit ad regnum cœlorum) as the gospel;
7. There were some men, even before the appearance of Christ, who did not commit sin.

If we compare these propositions with the doctrines of the earlier theologians, we find that the third was held by some of the Greek Fathers (*e. g.*, Theophilus of Antioch and Clement of Alexandria, see above, § 62, note 1); that the fifth, in a modified form, was substantially defended by Gregory of Nazianzum and others, viz., that unbaptized children are at least not condemned on that account (comp. § 72); and even as to the seventh, bold as it may appear, something like it, though in a different connection, was maintained by the father of orthodoxy himself (§ 108, note 3). On the other hand, the isolated way in which the sin of Adam is viewed in the first two and the fourth propositions, all connection between this sin and that of his posterity, even in relation to the mortality of the body, being denied, would have been condemned as heresy before the tribunal of the earlier theologians. But none appears so heretical, so much opposed to the doctrine of Paul and the Gospel, as the sixth. And, lastly, the denial of the connection subsisting

between the resurrection of Christ and ours (in the fourth proposition) must have offended the common feelings and consciousness of Christians. Yet it may still be a question, how much here is to be ascribed to inferences, made for them by their opponents. See *Neander*, Church Hist. ii. 579, sq.; Hist. Dogm. 352, sq.

[3] *Augustine* perceives no other difference between Pelagius and Celestius (De Pecc. Orig. c. 12) than that the latter was more open, the former more guarded, the latter more obstinate, the former more deceitful, or, to say the least, that the latter was more straightforward (liberior), the former more cunning (astutior). *Prosper of Aquitaine* calls him, therefore, coluber Britannus (in his poem De Ingratis, append. 67.—comp. *Wiggers*, p. 40).—*Neander* (Chrysostomus, vol. ii. p. 134) judges more mildly of him: "*Pelagius is deserving of all esteem on account of his honest zeal; his object was to combat the same perverse antichristian tendency which Augustine opposed. But he was wrong in the manner in which he sought to attain his object*," etc. Comp. Church History, ii. 573. "*As he appears in his writings, he was a clear-headed, intelligent man, who possessed rather a serious and moral turn of mind, than that disposition which feels itself compelled to dive into the depths of the soul and of the spirit, and to bring to light hidden things*," p. 579.

[4] THE PRINCIPAL POINTS IN THE EXTERNAL HISTORY OF THE CONTROVERSY ARE: The condemnation of the doctrine of Pelagius at Carthage, A. D. 412. He repairs to Palestine, where *Jerome* becomes one of his most zealous opponents, and, conjointly with *Paulus Orosius*, a disciple of Augustine, accuses him at a synod held at Jerusalem (A. D. 415), under *John*, bishop of Jerusalem. John, however, did not pronounce his condemnation, but reported the whole matter to Innocent, bishop of Rome.—Synod at Diospolis (Lydda), under *Eulogius* of Cæsarea. The plaintiffs were *Heros* of Arles, and *Lazarus* of Aix. Acquittal of Pelagius. Dissatisfaction of Jerome with the decisions of this synod (Synodus miserabilis! Ep. 81).—Under *Zosimus*, the successor of Innocent, Pelagius and Celestius entertain new hopes.—Synod of the North-African bishops at Carthage, A. D. 418, and condemnation of Pelagius.—The Emperor Honorius decides the controversy.—Zosimus is induced to change his views, and publishes his Epistola Tractoria, in which the Pelagian doctrine is condemned. *Julian*, bishop of Eclanum in Apulia, undertakes to defend Pelagianism (respecting him see *Wiggers*, i. p. 43, ss.).—He was anathematized at the synod of Ephesus (A. D. 431), in (accidental?) connection with Nestorius. Still the opposite system of Augustine was not accepted in the East. [See *Wörter*, Pelagianismus. 1866.]

§ 111.

FIRST POINT OF CONTROVERSY.

Sin.—Original Sin and its Consequences.

[*J. Nirschl*, Ursprung und Wesen der Sünde nach d. Lehre des heiligen Augustinus, Regensb. 1854. *Neander*, Church History, ii. 564–625; Hist. Dogm. 362 sq. *Julius Müller*, Lehre von d. Sünde, ii. 417–494. *Niedner*, Gesch. d. Kirche, 336–346. *Voigt*, De Theoria Aug. Pelag. Götting. 1829. *Lentzen*, De Pelag. Doctr. Principiis. Colon. 1833.]

Pelagius, starting from the standpoint of mere reflection, or of the understanding in distinction from the reason, with a tendency preponderating to the ethical view of man's nature, looked upon every human individual as a moral person, complete in and bounded by himself, and sharply separated from all others. Hence sin would necessarily appear to him as the free act of the individual, so that in his view there could be no other connection between the sin of the one (Adam) and the sin of the many (his posterity), than that which exists between an example, on the one hand, and a voluntary imitation of it on the other. Every man at his birth is accordingly in the same condition in which Adam was. Neither sin nor virtue is inherent, but the one, as well as the other, develops itself in the use of freedom, and is to be put to the account only of him who exercises this freedom.[1] *Augustine*, on the contrary, with more profound conceptions, which, however, might easily prevent a clear insight into the personal and moral relations of man, considered the human race as a compact mass, a collective body, responsible in its unity and solidarity. With a predominant bias towards religion, he directed his attention more to the inner and permanent state of the soul, and its absolute relation to God, than to the passing and external actions of the individual. This tendency, proceeding from the experience of his own heart and life, led him to conjecture a mysterious connection subsisting between the transgression of Adam and the sin of all men—a connection which loses itself in the dim beginnings of nature no less than of history. Mere suppositions, however, did not satisfy his mind; but, carrying out his system in all its logical consequences, and applying a false exegesis to certain passages, he laid down the following rigid proposition as his doctrine: "*As all men have sinned in Adam, they are justly subject to the condemnation of God on account of this hereditary sin and the guilt thereof.*"[2]

[1] *Pelag.* lib. 1. De Lib. Arb., in Aug. De Pecc. Orig. c. 13: Omne bonum ac malum, quo vel laudabiles, vel vituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum *oritur*, sed *agitur* a nobis: *capaces* enim utriusque rei, non *pleni* nascimur, et ut sine virtute ita et sine vitio procreamur, atque ante actionem propriæ voluntatis id solum in homine est, quod Deus condidit; he even admits the preponderance of *good* in man, when he (according to August. De Nat. et Grat. c. 21) speaks of a *naturalis quædam sanctitas*, which dwells in man, and keeps watch in the castle of the soul over good and evil, and by which he means *conscience*. Comp. *Julian* (quoted by August. in Op. Imp. i. 105): Illud quod esse peccatum ratio demonstrat, inveniri nequit in seminibus. (122): Nemo naturaliter malus est: sed quicunque reus est, moribus, non exordiis accusatur. Other passages may be found in *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, i. p. 377, ss. [L. ii. 66: *In omnes* autem *homines* mors *pertransiit*, quia una forma judicii prevaricatores quosque etiam reliquæ comprehendit ætatis; quæ tamen

mors nec in sanctos, nec in innocentes ullos sævire permittitur, sed in eos pervadit quos prævaricationem viderit æmulatos.] Comp. Wiggers, p. 91, ss. Augustine himself protested against the expression peccatum naturæ, or peccatum naturale, which the Pelagians imputed to him, and always substituted his phrase—peccatum originale. The Pelagians considered bodily death not as a punishment of the first sin, but as a physical necessity, though Pelagius himself conceded at the synod of Diospolis, that the death of Adam was a punishment inflicted upon Adam, but only upon *him*. Aug. de Nat. et Gr. 21 (c. 19), Op. imp. i. 67; vi. 27, 30. Yet Pelagius did not deny the power of sin; he even asserted an increasing degradation of the human race; but he explained this from the long habit of sinning and bad example. Epist. ad Demetriadem, c. 8: Longa consuetudo vitiorum, quæ nos infecit a parvo paulatimque per multos corrupit annos, et ita postea obligatos sibi et addictos tenet, ut *vim quodammodo videatur habere naturæ*.

[a] A list of the works in which Augustine combatted the Pelagians, will be found in *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, p. 373. The passages bearing on this question, which can be understood, however, only in their own connection, are also given there, p. 377, ss. (Comp. De Pecc. Mer. i. 2, 4, 21; Opus Imp. vi. 30; De Pecc. Mer. i. 10; De Nupt. et Concup. i. 27, ii. 57–59; Op. Imp. i. 47; de Nupt. et Concup. i. 26; de Pecc. Orig. 36; de Con. et Grat. 28. In support of his views he appealed to infant baptism: De Pecc. Mer. i. 39, iii. 7; contra Jul. vi. 6; de Pecc. Mer. i. 21; Enchirid. 93; to the formulas of exorcism: de Pecc. Orig. 45; and principally to Rom. v. 12.) Wiggers, p. 99, ss. [De Civit. Dei, 14, 1: A primis hominibus admissum est tam grande peccatum, ut in deterius eo natura mutaretur humana, etiam in posteros *obligatione peccati et mortis necessitate transmissa*.—De Corrept. et Grat. x. (28): Adam, quia per liberum arbitrium Deum deseruit, justum judicium Dei expertus est; ut *cum tota sua stirpe*, quæ in illo adhuc posita tota cum illo peccaverat, damnaretur.—De Pecc. Orig. c. 38: Deus nihil fecit nisi quod hominem voluntate peccantem justo judicio cum stirpe damnavit, et ideo ibi quidquid etiam nondum erat natum, merito est in prævaricatrice radice damnatum; in qua stirpe damnata, tenet hominem generatio carnalis. De Nupt. et Concup. 11, c. 5: Per unius illius voluntatem malam omnes in eo peccaverunt, quando omnes ille unus fuerunt, de quo propterea singuli peccatum originale traxerunt. De Civit. Dei, viii. 14: Deus enim creavit hominem rectum, naturarum auctor non utique vitiorum; sed sponte depravatus justeque damnatus, depravatos damnatosque generabit. *Omnes enim fuimus in illo, quando fuimus ille unus*.—Nondum erat nobis singilatim creata et distributa forma, in qua singuli viveremus; sed jam natura erat seminalis, ex qua propagaremur; qua scilicet propter peccata vitiata, et vinculo mortis obstricta, justeque damnata, non alterius conditionis homo ex homine nascetur. Ibid. xiv. 15: Adam faciendo voluntatem suam non ejus, a quo factus est, universum genus humanum, propagine vitiata, *culpæ et pœnæ fecit obnoxium*. Ibid. xxii. 24: In originali malo duo sunt, *peccatum atque supplicium*.]—On *Augustine's* interpretation of Rom. v. 12 (*in quo* omnes peccaverunt, Vulg.) see Op. Imp. ii. 47, ss., 66, contra duas Epp. Pel. iv. 7 (c. 4); Julian, on the other hand, gives the following explanation: *in quo* omnes peccaverunt nihil aliud indicat, quam: quia omnes peccaverunt. Au-

gustine's exposition was confirmed by the synod of Carthage (A. D. 418). Comp. *Münscher* von Cölln, p. 381, 382. But it would be a great mistake, an atomistic procedure, to ascribe the whole theory of Augustine to this exegetical error. Deeper causes gave rise to that theory, viz.: 1. His own experience, moulded by the remarkable events in the history of his external and internal life; 2. Perhaps some vestiges of his former Manichean notions, of which he might himself be unconscious, *e. g.*, that of defilement in the act of generation (comp. De Nupt. et Concup. i. 27: Concupiscence, he says, is not attributed to the regenerate as sin, but as far as nature is concerned, it is not without sin, hence every one conceived and born in the way of nature, is under sin until he is born again through *him*—quem sine ista concupiscentia virgo concepit); 3. His realistic mode of thinking, which led him to confound the abstract with the concrete, and to consider the individual as a transient and vanishing part of the whole (massa perditionis). In connection with this mode of thinking, other causes might be, 4. His notions of the church as a living organism, and of the effects of infant baptism; 5. The opposition which he was compelled to make to Pelagianism and its possible consequences, threatening to destroy all deeper views of the Christian system. —Thus, according to Augustine, not only was physical death a punishment inflicted upon Adam and all his posterity, but he looked upon *original sin itself as being in some sense a punishment of the first transgression*, though it was also a real sin (God punishes sin by sin), and can, therefore, be imputed to every individual. But it is on this very point, first strongly emphasized by him, viz., the *imputation* of original sin, that his views differed from all former opinions, however strict they were.—He endeavored to clear himself from the charge of Manicheism (in opposition to Julian), by designating sin not as a *substance*, but as a *vitium*, a languor; he even charged his opponents with Manicheism. So, too, Augustine could very well distinguish between the *sin*, which is common to all men, and proper crime, from which the pious are preserved; Enchir. 64: Neque enim quia peccatum est omne crimen, ideo crimen est etiam omne peccatum. Itaque sanctorum hominum vitam, quam diu in hac mortali (*al.* morte) vivitur, inveniri posse dicimus sine crimine; "peccatum autem, si dixerimus quia non habemus, nosmet ipsos seducimus, et veritas in nobis non est" (1 John, i. 8).—Respecting his views of the insignificant remnant (lineamenta extrema) of the divine image left in man, and of the virtues of pagans, see *Wiggers*, p. 119, note.

§ 112.

SECOND POINT OF CONTROVERSY.

Liberty and Grace.

Pelagius admitted that man, in his moral activity, stands in need of divine aid, and could, therefore, speak of the *grace of God* as assisting the imperfections of man by a variety of provisions.[1] He supposed, however, this grace of God to be something external, and

added to the efforts put forth by the free will of man; it can even be merited by good will.[1] *Augustine*, on the other hand, looked upon grace as the creative principle of life, which generates as an abiding good that freedom of the will which is entirely lost in the natural man. In the power of the natural man to choose between good and evil, to which great importance was attached by Pelagius, as well as by the earlier church, he saw only a liberty to do evil, since the regenerate man alone can actually will the good.[2]

[1] Concerning this point *Pelagius* expresses himself as follows (in August. De Grat. c. 5): Primo loco posse statuimus, secundo velle, tertio esse. Posse in natura, velle in arbitrio, esse in effectu locamus. Primum illud, *i. e.*, posse ad Deum proprie pertinet, qui illud creaturæ suæ contulit; duo vero reliqua, h. e. velle et esse, ad hominem referenda sunt, quia de arbitrii fonte descendunt. Ergo in voluntate et opere laus hominis est, immo et hominis *et* Dei, qui *ipsius* voluntatis et operis possibilitatem dedit, quique ipsam possibilitatem gratiæ suæ adjuvat semper auxilio. Quod vero *potest* homo velle bonum atque perficere, solius Dei est. Hence man also owes to God, that he *can* will, as is said in what follows: quod possumus omne bonum facere, dicere, cogitare, illius est, *qui hoc posse donavit*, qui hoc posse adjuvat. Comp. c. 18: Habemus autem possibilitatem a Deo insitam, velut quandam, ut ita dicam, radicem fructiferam atque fecundam, etc. The freedom of the will is common to Jews, Gentiles, and Christians; *grace*, according to Pelagius himself, belongs exclusively to Christianity. Pelagius also rejected the proposition of Celestius, "gratiam Dei non ad singulos actus dari." [*Münscher* von Cölln, i. p. 386.]

[2] Pelagius considered as means of grace especially *doctrine* (as the manifestation of the divine will), promises, and trials (to which belong the wiles of Satan); but *Julian* strongly denied that the will of man is first created by grace (fabricetur, condatur); he sees in them nothing but an *adjutorium* of the undisturbed free will. Comp. Aug. de Grat. Chr. c. 8. Op. Imp. i. 94, 95. [*Münscher*, l. c. p. 387, 388.] *Julius Müller* justly remarks (in his work on Sin, 1st ed. p. 475) that Pelagius has not the idea of development; "*he has not the conception of a life unfolding itself; he only recognizes the mechanical concatenation of single acts.*" Distinction of formal and real freedom. Comp., too, Neander, Hist. Dogm. 369, on the different stages of the divine revelation of grace [corresponding, in the view of Pelagius, to its progressive deterioration].

[3] *Augustine*, on the contrary, maintains: Non lege atque doctrina inso nante forinsecus, sed interna et occulta, mirabili ac ineffabili potestate operari Deum in cordibus hominum non solum veras revelationes, sed bonas etiam voluntates (De Grat. Chr. 24). He recognises in the grace of God an inspiratio dilectionis, and considers this as the source of every thing. Nolentem prævenit, ut velit; volentem subsequitur, ne frustra velit (Enchir. c. 32).— He understands by freedom the being free from sin, that state of mind in which it is no longer necessary to choose between good and evil. The same view is expressed in his treatise De Civit. Dei xiv. 11, which was not written

against the Pelagians: Arbitrium igitur voluntatis tunc est vere liberum, cum vitiis peccatisque non servit. Tale datum est a Deo: quod amissum proprio vitio, nisi a quo dari potuit, reddi non potest. Unde Veritas dicit: *Si vos Filius liberavit, tunc vere liberi eritis.* Idque ipsum est autem, ac si diceret: si vos Filius salvos fecerit, tunc vere salvi eritis. Inde quippe liberator, unde salvator. Comp. contra duas Epp. Pel. i. 2. The freedom of the will is greater in proportion as the will itself is in a state of health; its state of health depends on its subjection to the divine mercy and grace.—Contra Jul. c. 8, he calls the human will servum propriæ voluntatis arbitrium.—Such expressions were so much misused by the monks of Adrumetum (about the year 426), that Augustine himself was compelled to oppose them (especially in his treatise De Correptione et Gratia); in general, he himself frequently appealed, from a practical point of view, to the will of man (see the next §). [For a more detailed statement of Augustine's views respecting grace and the freedom of the will, see *Münscher* ed. by von Cölln, i. § 93, and p. 388–398, where further passages are quoted.] At any rate, it was not the view of Augustine that man is like a stone or stick, upon whom grace works externally; he could conceive of grace as working only in the sphere of freedom. Comp. Contra Julianum, iv. 15: Neque enim gratia Dei lapidibus aut lignis pecoribusve præstatur, sed quia imago Dei est (homo), meretur hanc gratiam. De Peccat. Merit. et Remiss. ii. § 6: Non sicut in lapidibus insensatis aut sicut in iis, in quorum natura rationem voluntatemque non condidit salutem nostram Deus operatur in nobis. [*Julius Müller*, in his work on Sin, i. 458 sq., shows that Augustine spoke of freedom under three aspects: 1. As spontaneity, in contrast with external force. This always exists in all men. 2. Power of choice, liberum arbitrium—as in Adam before the fall—an equal power of deciding between the alternatives of good and evil. But this is a low, weak state of the will. 3. The freedom with which the Son makes us free—the determination of the soul to what is good and holy—the non posse peccare—the felix necessitas boni—the union of freedom and necessity.]

[*Baur*, Dogmengesch. 2d ed. p. 179 sq.: In the system of Pelagius every thing depends upon the principle of the freedom of the will; this is the determining and fundamental conception in his doctrine of sin and of grace. Freedom, as the absolute capacity of choice (liberum arbitrium), to determine equally for good or evil, appeared to him in such a degree to be the substantial good of human nature, that he even reckoned the capacity for evil as a *bonum naturæ*, since we can not choose good without in like manner being able to choose evil (Epist. ad Demetr. c. 2, 3).]

§ 113.

THIRD POINT OF CONTROVERSY.

Predestination.

[J. B. Mozley, Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination. Lond. 1855.]

Augustine held the doctrine of hereditary depravity, the guilt of which man has himself incurred, and from which no human power

or human determination can deliver; from which only the grace of God can save those to whom it is imparted. From these premises it would necessarily follow that God, in consequence of an eternal decree, and without any reference to the future conduct of man, has elected[1] some out of the corrupt mass to become vessels of his mercy (vasa misericordiæ), and left the rest as vessels of his wrath (vasa iræ) to a just condemnation. Augustine called the former *predestinatio*, the latter *reprobatio*, and thus evaded the necessity of directly asserting the doctrine of a predestination to evil (predestinatio duplex).[2] On the whole, he endeavored to soften the harshness of his theory by practical cautions.[3] But the doctrine in question became to many a stone of stumbling, which orthodox theologians themselves (especially those of the Greek church) endeavored by every possible means to remove.[4] This prepared the way for those practically well meant, but theoretically vague and unfounded schemes, which *Semipelagianism* (see the following section) brought to light.

[1] De Præd. Sanctorum 37 (c. 18): Elegit nos Deus in Christo ante mundi constitutionem, prædestinans nos in adoptionem filiorum: non quia per nos sancti et immaculati futuri eramus, sed elegit prædestinavitque, ut essemus. Fecit autem hoc secundum placitum voluntatis suæ, ut nemo de sua, sed de illius erga se voluntate glorietur, etc. In support of his views he appealed to Eph. i. 4, 11, and Rom. ix.: he spoke, too, of a *certus numerus electorum, neque augendus, neque minuendus*, De Corrept. et Gr. 39 (c. 13). [De Dono Perseverantiæ, c. 14: Hæc est prædestinatio sanctorum, nihil aliud; præscentia scilicet et præparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur, quicunque liberantur. Ceteri autem ubi nisi in massa perditionis justo divino judicio relinquuntur? De Corrept. et Gratia, c. 13: Hi ergo, qui non pertinent ad istum certissimum et felicissimum numerum (prædestinatorum) pro meritis justissime judicantur. De Præd. Sanc. c. 19: Dicet (apostolus) ideo nos electos in Christo et prædestinatos ante mundi constitutionem, ut essemus sancti et immaculati....non quia futuros tales nos esse præscivit, sed ut essemus tales per electionem gratiæ suæ...c. 10: Si quæratur, unde quisque sit dignus, non desunt, qui dicunt, voluntate humana; nos autem dicimus, gratia vel prædestinatione divina. *Schmid*, Dogmengesch. p. 59. *Baur*, in his *Dogmengesch.* p. 184, cites the following passage from De Correps. et Gratia, c. 9, as bringing together the series of divine acts in respect to the elect: Quicunque in Dei providentissima dispositione præsciti, prædestinati, vocati, justificati, glorificati sunt, non dico etiam nondum renati, sed etiam nondum nati, jam filii Dei sunt et omnino perire non possunt. This, says Baur, exhibits what is hardest and most incomprehensible in the doctrine of Augustine.]—He refutes the objections of the understanding by quoting Rom. ix. 20, and adducing examples from sacred history. Even in *this* life worldly goods, health, beauty, physical and intellectual powers, are distributed unequally, and not always in accordance with human views of merit, ibid. 19, c. 8. Christ himself was predestinated to be the Son of God: De

Pred. 31 (c. 15). He even calls Christ the præclarissimum lumen prædestinationis et gratiæ; Neander, Hist. Dogm. 374.

[3] Augustine teaches a predestination to punishment and condemnation, but not a direct predestination to sin; comp. Enchiridion, c. 100. The passage, 1 Tim. ii. 4, brought to prove the universality of grace, he explains as meaning that no age, condition, sex, etc., is excluded from grace, and adduces in illustration, Luke xi. 42, where "omne olus" means every kind of herbs; comp. Enchiridion, c. 103, and Epist. 107 (Ad Vitalem): comp. *A. Schweizer*, Centraldogmen, i. 45. [De Dono Perseverantiæ, c. 8: Cur gratia non secundum merita hominum datur? Respondeo, quoniam Deus misericors est. Cur ergo, inquit, non omnibus? Et hic respondeo, quoniam Deus judex est.]

[4] De Dono Persev. 57 (c. 22): Prædestinatio non ita populis prædicanda est, ut apud imperitam vel tardioris intelligentiæ multitudinem redargui quodammodo ipsa sua prædicatione videatur; sicut redargui videtur et præscientia Dei (quam certe negare non possunt) si dicatur hominibus: "Sive curratis, sive dormiatis, quod vos præscivit qui falli non potest, hoc eritis." Dolosi autem vel imperiti medici est, etiam utile medicamentum sic alligare, ut aut non prosit, aut obsit. Sed dicendum est: "Sic currite, ut comprehendatis, atque ut ipso cursu vestro ita vos esse præcognitos noveritis, ut legitime curreretis," et si quo alio modo Dei præscientia prædicari potest, ut hominis segnitia repellatur, 59... *de ipso autem cursu vestro bono rectoque condiscite vos ad prædestinationem divinæ gratiæ pertinere.*

[5] Notwithstanding the condemnation of Pelagius at the synod of Ephesus, the system of Augustine did not exert any influence upon the theology of the Eastern church. *Theodore of Mopsuestia* wrote (against the advocates of Augustinianism): πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας φύσει καὶ οὐ γνώμῃ πταίειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, 5 books (Photii Bibl. Cod. 177, some Latin fragments of which are preserved by Mar. Mercator ed. Baluz. *Fritzsche*, p. 107, ss. On the question whether it was directed against Jerome, or against Augustine? see *Fritzsche*, l. c. p. 109, and *Neander*, Church Hist. (Torrey), ii. 651, and Hist. Dogm. (Ryland), 387). *Theodoret*, *Chrysostom*, *Isidore of Pelusium*, and others, continued to follow the earlier line of the dogmatic development. See the passages in *Münscher* von Cölln, i. p. 408–410, and comp. § 108.

§ 114.

SEMIPELAGIANISM AND THE LATER TEACHERS OF THE CHURCH.

Gefficken, J., Historia Semipelagianismi Antiquissima, Gött. 1826, 4. *Wiggers*, de Joh. Cassiano Massiliensi, qui Semipelagianismi auctor vulgo perhibetur. Commentt. ii. Rost. 1824, 25, 4; *by the same:* Versuch einer pragmat. Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagianismus. Vol. ii. *Neander*, Denkwürdigkeiten, vol. iii. p. 92, ss.

In opposition both to the extreme Augustinians (Predestinarians)[1] and to Augustinianism itself, a new system was formed, upon which Monachism undoubtedly exerted a considerable influence (as its

deepest roots are essentially Pelagian), but which also proceeded in part from a more healthy, practical, and moral tone. Its advocates endeavored to pursue a middle course between the two extremes, viz., Pelagianism and Augustinianism, and to satisfy the moral as well as the religious wants of the age, by the partial adoption of the premises of both systems, without carrying them out in all their logical consequences.[2] The leader of the Gallican theologians (Massilienses) who propounded this new system, afterwards called *Semipelagianism*, was *John Cassian*, a disciple of Chrysostom,[3] whom *Prosper of Aquitania* and others combated.[4] He was followed by *Faustus, bishop of Rhegium*,[5] who gained the victory over *Lucidus*, a hyper-Augustinian presbyter, at the *Synod of Arles* (A. D. 472). For several decennia Semipelagianism continued to be the prevailing form of doctrine in Gaul,[6] till it met with new opposition on the part of *Avitus of Vienne*,[7] *Cæsar of Arles*,[8] *Fulgentius of Ruspe*,[9] and others. After a variety of fortunes, Augustinianism obtained the preponderance even in Gaul, by means of the Synods of *Arausio* (Orange) and *Valence* (A. D. 529), but with the important restriction, that the doctrine of predestination to evil was not adopted.[10] Boniface II., bishop of Rome, in accordance with the measures adopted by his predecessors, confirmed these decisions (A. D. 530).[11] "*Gregory the Great transmitted to subsequent ages the milder aspect of the Augustinian doctrine, in its relations to practical Christianity rather than to speculation.*"[12]

[1] Under (doctrinal) Predestinarians, are usually included the monks of Adrumetum, in the province of Byzacene, in North Africa, and Lucidus, mentioned below, who taught the doctrine of a prædestinatio duplex; still it is satisfactorily proved, that (historically) "*a sect, or even a separate party of Predestinarians who dissented from Augustine never existed*" (as was formerly erroneously supposed). Comp. *Wiggers*, ii. p. 329, ss. 347. This error was spread by *J. Sirmond*, Historia Prædestinatiana (Opp. T. iv. p. 267, ss.), and the work edited by him under the title Prædestinatus, 1643, in which the Prædest. Hæresis is mentioned as the ninetieth in the order of heresies (reprinted in *Gallandi* Bibl. x.). Comp. also *Walch*, Historie der Ketzereien v. p. 218, ss. *Neander*, Church History, ii. 641–3. *Gieseler*, i. § 113, notes 4, 9–11). [On this work, Prædestinatus, see *Neander*, Hist. Dogm. 381; the Jesuits were charged with having forged it. *Baur*, Dogmengesch. 155, note, says that Neander maintains, without sufficient reason, that the second part of the book (it is in three parts) was not by the author himself, but was a current Augustinian treatise. Baur says that the whole work was really by a Semipelagian, and intended to make Predestinarianism odious by carrying it out to the most revolting consequences: *e. g.*, "the predestined may sin ever so much and resist, without his own will he will attain salvation; and on the other hand, he who is destined to death strives in vain;" illustrated in the instances of Judas and Paul.]

[8] According to the reports made by *Prosper* and *Hilary*, scil. Prosperi (428, 29), to Augustine (in *Wiggers*, p. 153, *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, i. p. 411), the treatise of Augustine, entitled De Correptione et Gratia, had excited some commotion among the Gallican theologians and monks, in consequence of which he wrote the further treatises De Præd. Sanctorum, and De Dono Perseverantiæ. Though these Gallican theologians differed in some particulars from Cassian (see *Wiggers*, p. 181), yet there was a considerable agreement between their doctrine and his. Comp. also *Neander*, ii. 633.

[9] Comp. above § 82, note 21. Of his Collationes, the thirteenth is the most important. Prosper complains of his syncretism, Contra Collatorem, c. 5: Illi (Pelagiani) in omnibus justis hominum operibus liberæ voluntatis tuentur exordia, nos bonarum cogitationum ex Deo semper credimus prodire principia, tu *informe* nescio quid *tertium* reperisti.—This *tertium* consisted in the following particulars: *a.* Cassian, who detested the profana opinio and impietas Pelagii (see *Wiggers*, ii. p. 19, 20), regarded the natural man neither as morally healthy (as Pelagius did), nor as morally dead (like Augustine), but as diseased and morally weakened (dubitari non potest, inesse quidem omnia animæ naturaliter virtutum semina beneficio creatoris inserta, sed nisi hæc opitulatione Dei fuerint excitata, ad incrementum perfectionis non poterunt pervenire, Coll. xiii. 12). *b.* He insisted so much more than Pelagius on the necessity and spiritual nature of divine grace (Coll. xiii. 3), that he even ventured to assert that men are sometimes drawn to salvation against their will (nonnunquam etiam inviti trahimur ad salutem, comp. Inst. Cœn. xii. 13. *Wiggers*, p. 85). But in opposition to Augustine, he restricted only to a few (*e. g.*, Matthew and Paul) what the latter would extend to all, and appealed to the example of Zaccheus, Cornelius the centurion, the thief on the cross, and others, in proof of his opinion. In general, he ascribed the *ascensus* to God, as well as the *descensus* to earthly things, to the free will of man, and looked upon grace as rather *co-operans*, though he does not express himself very distinctly. Only we must take care not to refer all the merits of the saints to God, so as to leave to human nature nothing but what is bad. *c.* He understood the redemption through Christ in a more general sense, and thus rejected the doctrine of predestination (in the sense of Augustine and the hyper-Augustinians). The assertion that God would save only a few appeared to him an ingens sacrilegium (Coll. xiii. 7). An outline of his complete system is given by *Wiggers*, p. 47–136. [1. Man is not dead in sin, but diseased; freedom is not lost but lamed. 2. Freedom and grace concur, sometimes the one leading, and again the other; the initiation is usually in the will, but God draws some against their will; grace is internal. 3. Predestination on the basis of prescience. Comp. Baur, Dogmengesch. 187, who says that the result was merely that the two antagonistic positions of predestination and free will stood over against each other, unreconciled. But still the result was to show, that as the divine always stands above the human, so it is essential to the church system that the absolute importance of grace should not be yielded, at least in the formal statements of doctrine.]

[1] *Augustine* himself combated Semipelagianism in the above works.

Wiggers gives a sketch of the controversy between Prosper on the one hand, and Cassian and the Semipelagians on the other, p. 136, ss.

[6] *Faustus* first presided over the monastery of Lerina, which was for some time the chief seat of Semipelagianism. On *Vincentius Lerinensis* comp. *Wiggers*, p. 208, ss.; on Faustus and his doctrine, ibid. p. 224, ss., 235, ss. Respecting the doctrine of original sin, the views of Faustus come nearer to Augustine's opinions than do those of Cassian; on the other hand, his ideas of the nature of grace are more external (Pelagian) than those of the latter; comp. *Wiggers*, p. 287.—But he bestows more attention upon the third point of controversy—doctrine of predestination. He decidedly rejects the doctrine of unconditional election by making a distinction between predetermination and foreknowledge, the former of which is independent of the latter; De Grat. et lib. Arbitrio i. *Wiggers*, p. 279, ss. Faustus uses *e. g.* the following arguments, which savor strongly of anthropomorphism: When I accidentally cast my eyes upon a vicious action, it does not follow that I am guilty of it, because I have seen it. Thus God foresees adultery, without exciting man to impurity; he foresees murder, without exciting in man the desire for its commission, etc. *Wiggers*, p. 282, 283. In speaking of the doctrine of unconditional predestination, as propounded by his opponent Lucidus, he used the strongest terms: lex fatalis, decretum fatale, fatalis constitutio, originalis definitio vel fatalis, and looked upon it as something heathenish; *Wiggers*, p. 315. He believed in universal atonement. [Among the modifying Augustinians, says *Baur*, Dogmengesch. 187, was the author of the work De Vocatione omnium Gentium, who, in a peculiar manner, while holding Augustine's view of grace, conceived of original sin in a merely negative way, as the want of good, or as the mere following of natural instinct. The will remains the same, its object is different; to the good it can be directed only by God; but every one can obtain this direction, since there is a universal as well as special efficacy of grace.]

[7] Comp. Gennadius Massiliensis and Ennodius Ticinensis, in *Wiggers*, p. 350, ss. A summary view of the Semipelagian doctrine in general, and its relation to both Augustinianism and Pelagianism, is given in the form of a table by *Wiggers*, p. 359–64.

[8] *Wiggers*, p. 368.

[9] *Wiggers*, p. 369, concerning his book De Gratia et Lib. Arbitrio.

[10] *Wiggers*, p. 369, ss. *Fulgentius*, carrying the doctrine of imputation still farther than Augustine, consigned to everlasting fire not only those infants that died without being baptized, but also the immature fœtus; De Fide ad Petrum, c. 30, quoted by *Wiggers*, p. 376. But in reference to predestination, he endeavored carefully to avoid all exaggerations which might give offense to Christian feelings (*Neander*, Church Hist. ii. 650). After the interference of the Scythian monks, he expressly blamed those who asserted the doctrine of predestination to evil, though he maintained himself a prædest. duplex (but in a different sense); *Neander*, l. c. p. 652. Grace is in his opinion præveniens, as well as comitans and subsequens. (Ep. ad Theodorum de Conversione a Seculo, quoted by *Wiggers*, p. 386.)

[11] *Mansi*, T. viii. p. 711, ss. Aug. Opp. T. x. part ii. Append. p. 157, ss. *Wiggers*, p. 430. *Münscher* ed. by von Cölln, p. 417. The conclusion

is the most important part: [Hoc etiam secundum catholicam fidem, credimus, quod accepta per baptismum gratia omnes baptizati Christo auxiliante et coöperante, quæ ad salutem pertinent, possint et debeant, si fideliter laborare valuerint, adimplere.] Aliquos vero ad malum divina potestate prædestinatos esse non solum non credimus, sed etiamsi sunt, qui tantum malum credere velint, cum omni detestatione illis anathema dicimus. On the synod of Valence, see *Mansi*, viii. 723, ss. App. p. 162.

[11] Among the earlier popes *Celestine* and *Gelasius I.*, had condemned Semipelagianism: *Hormisdas*, on the contrary, pronounced a very mild judgment in opposition to the Scythian monks, without, however, denying the doctrine of Augustine. See Bonifacii II. Epist. ad Cæsarium, given by *Mansi*, T. viii. p. 735, and App. 161, ss.

[12] Comp. *Neander*, Church Hist. ii. p. 144. *Wiggers*, de Gregario M. ejusque Placitis Anthropologicis, Rost. 1838. *Lau*, p. 379, ss. The views of *Gregory* are most fully developed in Moralia. iv. c. 24; comp. xv. c. 15, 51; ix. c. 21, 34, and many other passages. Along with strict Augustinianism, we find in his writings Semipelagian modifications. For his views respecting the doctrine of grace, see Mor. xx. 4; Hom. in Ezech. i. 5. *Lau*, p. 403, ss. He also distinguishes between gratia prævenions and subsequens. The former is operans, but at the same time coöperans. The gratia subsequens is a help: ne inaniter velimus, sed possimus implere. See Mor. xxii. c. 9: Sancti viri sciunt, post primi parentis lapsum de corruptibili stirpe se editos, et non virtute propria, sed prævenient gratia superna ad meliore se vota et opera commutatos: et quidquid sibi mali inesse conspiciunt, de mortali propagine sentiunt meritum; quidquid vero in se boni inspiciunt, immortalis gratiæ cognoscunt donum, eique de accepto numere debitores fiunt, qui et prævenicndo dedit iis bonum velle quod noluerunt, et subsequendo concessit bonum esse, quod volunt.—Gregory further maintains, that grace can be lost, Mor. xxv. 8 (we know what we are, but we do not know what we shall be); while, on the other hand, he appears to assert the irresistibility of grace (Mor. ix. 9: sicut nemo obstitit largitati vocantis, ita nullus obviat justitiæ relinquentis); again, he says that the humble will accept, the proud reject the gift of God (Mor. xxx. 1; Evang. lib. ii. Hom. 22); comp. *Lau*, p. 410, 411. [On *Gregory*, compare *Wiggers*, in the Zeitschrift f. hist. Theologie, 1854, on the History of Augustinian Anthropology after the Condemnation of Semipelagianism, p. 7–43. Gregory agrees with Augustine on the primitive state. As to the fall, he asserts a primitive weakness in Adam; he calls original sin a disease, and admits a certain necessity of sinning; free will is not annulled, but weakened; man can withstand grace; predestination is only of the elect—yet he denies the absolute decree. "Bonum quod agimus, et Dei est, et nostrum; Dei, per prævenientem gratiam; nostrum, per obsequentem liberam voluntatem." "Suprema pietas prius agit in nobis aliquid sine nobis, ut subsequente quoque nostro libero arbitrio bonum, quod jam appetimus, agat nobiscum: quod tamen per impensam gratiam in extremo judicio ita remunerat in nobis, ac si solis præcessisset ex nobis."]

It is worthy of notice, that in this protracted controversy the objective aspect of anthropology was far more developed than the subjective. The doctrine of the economy of

redemption still remains in an imperfect state, as may be seen, *e. g.*, from the indefinite manner in which the terms justificare and justificatio (= justum facere, see *Wiggers*, p. 380) were used, and from the want of proper definitions of the nature of faith. *Wiggers*, therefore, justly closes his account of this controversy by saying: "*A more profound examination of the nature of faith would even then have given a very different appearance to Christian anthropology.*" It should further be observed, that the Augustinian doctrine of predestination rested on the premises contained in his views of original sin. Adam was free *before* the fall, and consequently stood out of the sphere of predestination, though God *foreknew* his transgression (Aug. de Civ. Dei xii. 21). Later theologians first extended predestination (the supra-lapsarians) even to Adam, and thus completed the doctrine of predestination in a speculative way. Thus it was reserved for the Reformation to finish the work which Augustine left incomplete; the *Lutherans*, by developing the doctrine of faith and justification, the *Calvinists*, by developing that of absolute predestination. On the other hand, the Roman Catholic church either placed itself in opposition to its own father (in the Council of Trent and among the Jesuits), or simply adhered to the doctrine propounded by him (the Jansenists). *Neander*, Dogmengesch. 369, has drawn attention to the fact, that with Augustine justification and sanctification run into each other, while Pelagius views justification in a more external manner.

SECOND CLASS.

CHURCH DOCTRINES EITHER NOT CONNECTED, OR BUT REMOTELY, WITH THE HERESIES OF THE AGE.

(DIDACTIC PART.)

§ 115.

INTRODUCTION.

THE doctrinal views on fundamental points, which had been matured by controversy, exerted more or less influence upon the development of other dogmas. Thus, the further theological definitions respecting the nature and attributes of God, creation, etc., were moulded by the views on the Trinity; those which relate to the atonement of Christ, and the significance of the Lord's Supper, were closely connected with the opinions held concerning the person of Christ; those respecting baptism and the sacraments as means of grace, were determined by anthropological definitions; and, lastly, eschatology was influenced by all the other doctrines together. Even the more general definitions concerning the nature of Christianity, the canon and its relation to tradition, etc., are in some way or other connected with one or another of the fundamental dogmas.

Nevertheless, we are justified in treating of these doctrines separately, inasmuch as in some respects, at least, they were not affected by the contests, and present themselves rather in continuity with former views.

1. APOLOGETIC AND NORMAL DOCTRINES (PROLEGEMENA).

§ 116.

THE IDEA OF RELIGION AND REVELATION.

Though the theologians of the present period had not the conception of a merely abstract religion, without a positive historical basis and shape, yet we meet in the writings of *Lactantius* with a more

precise definition of the word *religion*, which was borrowed from the Latin. He applies the term in question not only to the external forms of worship (as Tertullian had done before him), but—though with an incorrect etymology—to the union and fellowship of men with God, which he also regards as something purely human.[1] Faith in revelation was required as a necessary condition.[2]

[1] Lact. Inst. iv. 28: Hac enim conditione gignimur, ut generanti nos Deo justa et debita obsequia præbeamus, hunc solum noverimus, hunc sequamur. *Hoc vinculo pietatis obstricti Deo et religati sumus, unde ipsa religio nomen accepit, non, ut Cicero interpretatus est, a relegendo.* Comp. iii. 10: Summum igitur bonum hominis in sola religione est; nam cætera, etiam quæ putantur esse homini propria, in cæteris quoque animalibus reperiuntur. 11: Constat igitur totius humani generis consensu, religionem suscipi oportere. He compared it with *sapientia* (iv. 4), from which it is not to be separated. By sapientia he understands the knowledge, by religio, the worship, of God. God is the source of both. The one without the other leads to such errors, as paganism represents on the one hand in the unbelieving philosophers (the apostate and disinherited sons), and, on the other, in the superstitious multitudes (the runaway slaves).—*Augustine* follows the terminology of Tertullian; he contrasts religio with fides or pietas; De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. ii. 2, see *Baumgarten-Crusius*, ii. p. 751, and comp. *Nitzsch*, über den Religionsbegriff der Alten, Theologische Studien und Kritiken, i. 3, 4. [*Redslob*, Sprachliche Abhandlungen, 1840. *J. G. Müller*, Bildung und Gebrauch d. Wortes Religio, in Stud. u. Krit. 1835, Heft, i. *Lechler*, Idea of Religion, transl. from Stud. u. Krit. 1851, in Bibl. Sacra, Andover, 1852, by *W. Stearns*.]—Concerning the *nature* of religion, and the question whether it principally consists in *knowledge*, or in the *form of worship*, or whether it consists in spiritual fellowship with God, see the controversy between Eunomius and his opponents in § 125, and *Neander*, Church History, ii. p. 401.

[2] On the necessity of *faith* in revelation in general, see *Rufini* Expos. Fidei (in Fell's edition of Cypr.), p. 18: Ut ergo intelligentiæ tibi aditus patescat, recte primo omnium te credere profiteris; quia nec navem quis ingreditur et liquido ac profundo vitam committit elemento, nisi se prius credat posse salvari, nec agricola semina sulcis obruit et fruges spargit in terram, nisi credideret venturos imbres, affuturum quoque solis teporem, quibus terra confota segetem multiplicata fruge producat ac ventis spirantibus nutriat. Nihil denique est, quod in vita geri possit, si non credulitas ante præcesserit. Quid ergo mirum si accedentes ad Deum credere nos primo omnium profitemur, cum sine hoc nec ipsa exigi possit vita communis? Hoc autem idcirco in principiis præmisimus, quia pagani nobis objicere solent, quod religio nostra, quia quasi rationibus deficit, in sola credendi persuasione consistat. Comp. *Augustine*, de Utilitate Credendi, c. 13: Recte igitur catholicæ disciplinæ majestate institutum est, ut accedentibus ad religionem fides persuadeatur ante omnia. *He* too shows, that without faith there can be no friendship even among men (c. 10), no filial love and piety (c. 12). Augustine knows of no other religion than positive Christianity, and insists that reason should submit to it; for *faith* precedes the knowledge of reason,

l. c. c. 14; Deinde fateor, me jam Christo credidisse et in animum induxisse, id esse verum, quod ille dixerit, etiamsi nulla ratione fulciatur. Reason would never have saved man from darkness and misery, nisi summus Deus *populari quadam clementia* divini intellectus auctoritatem usque ad ipsum corpus humanum declinaret atque submitteret, cujus non solum *præceptis*, sed etiam *factis* excitatæ animæ redire in semetipsas et respicere patriam etiam sine disputationum concertatione potuissent.....Mihi autem certum est, nusquam prorsus a Christi auctoritate discedere, non enim reperio valentiorem (contra Academ. l. iii. c. 19, 20). Comp. de Vera Rel. c. 5; de Moribus Eccles. Cath. c. 7: Quare deinceps nemo ex me quærat sententiam meam, sed potius audiamus oracula, nostrasque ratiunculas divinis submittamus affatibus. Comp. *Bindemann's* Augustine, ii. p. 113 sq.

§ 117.

WRITINGS IN DEFENSE OF CHRISTIANITY.

In proportion as the polemical tendency of the present period prevailed over the apologetic, the proofs of the truth and divinity of Christ's religion lost originality, and most writers were satisfied with the mere repetition of former statements.[1] The attacks of *Porphyry*, *Julian the Apostate*, and others, however, called forth new efforts in defense of Christianity;[2] the accusations of the heathen, when Christianity was established as the religion of the world upon the ruins of the Western empire, induced *Augustine* to compose his apologetical treatise De Civitate Dei.

[1] Among the apologists *previous* to the apostasy of Julian, *Arnobius* (Adversus Gentes) deserves to be noticed. His argument *a tuto*, ii. 4, is as follows.....nonne purior ratio est, ex duobus incertis et in ambigua exspectatione pendentibus id potius credere, quod aliquas spes ferat, quam omnino quod nullus? In illo enim periculi nihil est, si quod dicitur imminere cassum fiat et vacuum: in hoc damnum est maximum, *i. e.*, salutis amissio, si cum tempus advenerit aperiatur non fuisse mendacium...*Eusebius* of Cæsarea likewise defended Christianity in his Præpar. and Demonstr. Evang. (§ 82, note 1): *Athanasius* in his λόγος κατὰ Ἕλληνας, etc.; Julius Formicus Maternus, De Errore Profanarum Religionum (between 340 and 350).

[2] *Eusebius*, l. c., *Theodoret*, *Augustine*, and others combated Porphyry: Eusebius also opposed Hierocles in a separate treatise. *Cyril of Alexandria* wrote 10 books against the Emperor Julian, who charged Christianity with contradictions.—The dialogue entitled Philopatris, formerly ascribed to Lucian, may have been composed under the same emperor, see *Neander*, Church History, ii. p. 89. On the apologetic writings of this period, see Gieseler, Dogmengesch. 274 sq. [The Spanish presbyter, *Irosius*, Historiæ adv. Paganos. The last important work in the Greek church against the heathen was *Theodoretus* Ἑλληνικῶν θεραπευτικὴ παθημάτων, about 440. Against

the Jews, *Eusebius*, Demonstr. Evang.; *Chrysostom*, Adv. Jud. Orat. viii.; *Augustine*, Tract. adv. Judaeos.]

[*Baur*, Dogmengesch. 156, says that Athanasius, Eusebius of Cæsarea, and Augustine elevated apologetics, by representing Christianity as the perfect religion in comparison with all others—viewing it in the light of the philosophy of religion and of the general religious history of mankind. Augustine's work, De Civitate Dei, is the grandest attempt to consider Christianity as realizing the idea of a divine plan and order for the world—as containing the immanent idea of the world and its history; even the greatness of the Roman empire is fully seen only in its relation to Christianity.]

§ 118.

MIRACLES AND PROPHECY.

[Isaac Taylor, Ancient Christianity, 4th ed. 1844, ii. 233–336, The Nicene Miracles.]

Since the Christians were constantly accustomed to appeal to miracles and prophecies in support of the truth of their religion, it became important to define more precisely the idea of a miracle. *Augustine* did this by defining miracles as events which deviate not so much from the order of nature in general, as from that particular order of nature which is known to us.[1] With regard to prophecies, many passages of the Old Test. were still applied to the Messiah, which had no reference to him, and the truly Messianic passages were taken in a narrower sense than historical interpretation required.[2] The apologists also appealed to Christ's prophecy respecting the destruction of Jerusalem, which had long since received its accomplishment, to the fate of the Jewish nation,[3] and the similar judgment with which God had visited the old Roman world, and compared these events with the triumphant spread of the gospel.[4] And, lastly, even Augustine takes notice of the Sibylline oracles, mentioned by Lactantius.[5]

[1] Augustine de Utilitate Cred. c. 16: Miraculum voco, quidquid arduum aut insolitum supra spem vel facultatem mirantis apparet. De Civ. Dei lib. xxi. c. 8: Omnia portenta *contra* naturam dicimus esse, sed non sunt. Quomodo est enim contra naturam quod Dei fit voluntate, quum voluntas tanti utique conditoris conditæ rei cujusque natura sit? Portentum ergo fit non contra naturam, sed *contra quam est nota natura*... quamvis et ipsa quæ in rerum natura omnibus nota sunt, non minus mira sint, essentque stupenda considerantibus cunctis, si solerent homines mirari nisi rara.—The nearer the Canon of the Bible was brought to a conclusion, the more necessary it became to make a distinction between the miracles related in Scripture, as historically authenticated facts, and those miracles which were generally believed still to occur in the church. Respecting faith in miracles in general, Augus-

tine employed a free criticism; De Civit. Dei xxi. c. 6, 7 (in reference to wonderful natural phenomena, but his language is also applicable to other miraculous stories of the age): Nec ergo volo temere credi cuncta, quæ posui, exceptis his, quæ ipse sum expertus. Cetera vero sic habeo, ut neque affirmanda, neque neganda decreverim. Comp. De Util. Cred. l. c.; De Vera Rel. 25 (Retract. i. c. 13)...Concerning the miracles related in Scripture, it was of importance to distinguish the miracles performed by Jesus from those wrought by Apollonius of Tyana, to which Hierocles and others appealed. Augustine, therefore, directed attention to the benevolent design of Christ's miracles, by which they are distinguished from those which are merely performed for the purpose of gaining the applause of men (*e. g.*, the attempt to fly in the presence of an assembled multitude), De Util. Cred. l. c. Comp. *Cyril Alex.* Contra Jul. i. 1.: Ἐγὼ δὲ, ὅτι μὲν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀπηλλάγμεθα ἐμβροντησίας καὶ πολὺς ἀποτειχίζει λόγος τῶν ἐκείνων τερθρείας τὰ χριστιανῶν, φαίην ἄν· κοινωνία γὰρ οὐδεμία φωτὶ πρὸς σκότος, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μερὶς πιστῷ μετὰ ἀπίστου.—On the view of *Gregory the Great* respecting miracles, see *Neander*, Kirchengesch. iii. p. 294, 95.

[1] *Augustine* gives a canon on this point, De Civit. Dei xvii. c. 16, ss., comp. xviii. 29, ss., and below, § 122, note 4.

[2] *Aug.* De Civ. Dei iv. 34.....Et nunc quod (Judæi) per omnes fere terras gentesque dispersi sunt, illius unius veri Dei providentia est. Comp. xviii. c. 46.

[3] *Arnob.* ii. p. 44, 45: Nonne vel hæc saltem fidem vobis faciunt argumenta credendi, quod jam per omnes terras in tam brevi temporis spatio immensi nominis hujus sacramenta diffusa sunt? quod nulla jam natio est tam barbari moris et mansuetudinem nesciens, quæ non ejus amore versa molliverit asperitatem suam et in placidos sensus adsumta tranquillitate migraverit? *Aug.* De Civ. Dei v. 25, 26, xviii. 50....inter horrendas persecutiones et varios cruciatus ac funera Martyrum prædicatum est toto orbe evangelium, contestante Deo signis et ostentis et variis virtutibus, et Spiritus Sancti muneribus: ut populi gentium credentes in eum, qui pro eorum redemtione crucifixus est, Christiano amore venerarentur sanguinem Martyrum, quem diabolico furore fuderunt, ipsique reges, quorum legibus vastabatur Ecclesia, ei nomini salubriter subderentur, quod de terra crudeliter auferre conati sunt, et falsos deos inciperent persequi, quorum causa cultores Dei veri fuerant antea persecuti.

[4] Lactantius iv. 15, sq., Augustine De Civ. Dei xviii. 23. Cyril Alex. Contra Jul. i. 1. But the enemies of Christianity maintained, even in the times of Lactantius, non esse illa carmina Sybillina, sed a Christianis conficta atque composita.

§ 119.

SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE—BIBLE AND TRADITION.

During the present period both the *Bible* and *Tradition* were regarded as the sources of Christian knowledge.[1] The statement of

Augustine, that he was induced by the authority of the church alone to believe in the Gospel, only proves that he considered the believer (subjectively), but not the Bible (objectively), to be dependent on that authority.[3] It was rather the case, that in ecclesiastical controversies and elsewhere the Bible was appealed to as the highest authority,[4] also in practice most urgently recommended to the people. It was constantly held in reverence as the purest source of truth, the book of books.[4]

[1] Nihil aliud præcipi volumus, quam quod Evangelistarum et Apostolorum fides et traditio incorrupta servat; *Gratian* in Cod. Theod. l. xvi. tit. vi. 1, 2.

[2] Adv. Man. 5: Evangelio non crederem, nisi me ecclesiæ catholicæ commoveret auctoritas. This passage is to be compared in its whole connection: see *Lücke*, Zeitschrift für evangel. Christen. i. 1, 4. Lücke justly rejects, ibid. p. 71, the expedient adopted by older protestant theologians, *e. g.*, *Bucer* and *S. Baumgarten* (Untersuchung theologischer Streitigkeiten, vol. iii. p. 48), viz., to assign to the imperfect tense the signification of the pluperfect "*according to the African dialect.*" Comp. also Neander, Hist. Dogm. (Ryland), p. 276. [Protestant theologians have been disposed to explain it as meaning, "I was first led to the Bible by the tradition of the church;" but without doubt it rather means, "The authority of the church is the witness for the divinity of the Scriptures; for how could I convince unbelievers if I were not permitted to appeal to the authority of the church? I must depend upon this to know what the canon of Holy Writ is, and its right interpretation." Yet in arguing against the Donatists, he proves the authority of the church from the Scriptures, allowing no argument to be valid which was not derived from this source.] On a similar declaration of *Gregory the Great*, that he reverenced the four general councils as much as the four Gospels (Lib. i. Ep. 25, and lib. iii. Ep. 10), see *Lau*, ubi supra, p. 330.

[3] *Athanasius* Contra Gent. i. p. 1, b.: Αὐτάρκεις μὲν γάρ εἰσιν αἱ ἁγίαι καὶ θεόπνευστοι γραφαὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπαγγελίαν. Cyrillus Hierosol. Cat. 4 et 5. *Chrys.* Contra Anomœos xi. (Opp. i. p. 542). *Augustine* Doct. Christ. i. 37: Titubabit fides, si scripturarum sacrarum vacillet auctoritas. Ibid. ii. 9; De Baptismo contra Donatistas, ii. 3, and many other passages, especially Ep. 19 ad Hieron. (comp. § 122, 2).

[4] *Aug.* Ep. 137 (Opp. ii. p. 310): [Scriptura Sacra] omnibus [est] accessibilis, quamvis paucissimis penetrabilis. Ea, quæ aperte continet, quasi amicus familiaris sine fuco ad cor loquitur indoctorum atque doctorum.—De Doct. Christ. ii. 42: Quantum autem minor est auri, argenti vestisque copia, quam de Ægypto secum ille populus abstulit in comparatione divitiarum, quæ postea Hierosolymæ consecutus est, quæ maxime in Salomone ostenduntur, tanta fit cuncta scientia, quæ quidem est utilis, collecta de libris gentium, si divinarum scripturarum scientiæ comparetur. Nam quicquid homo extra didicerit, si noxium est, ibi damnatur, si utile est, ibi invenitur. Et cum ibi quisque invenerit omnia, quæ utiliter alibi didicit, multo abundantius ibi inveniet ea, quæ nusquam omnino alibi, sed in illarum tantummodo Scripturarum mirabili altitudine et mirabili humilitate discuntur. Comp. Theodoret.

Protheoria in Psalm. (Opp. T. i. p. 602); Basilii M. Hom. in Ps. i. (Opp. i. p. 90); *Rudelbach*, l. c. p. 38, and *Neander*, Gewichtvolle Aussprüche alter Kirchenlehrer über den allgemeinen und rechten Gebrauch der heil. Schrift, in his Kleine Gelegenheitsschriften, Berlin, 1839, p. 155, ss. *Chrysostom*, too, is far from making salvation dependent on the letter of Scripture. In his opinion it would be much better, if we needed no Scripture at all, provided the grace of God were as distinctly written upon our hearts as the letters of ink are upon the book. (Introduct. to the Homilies on Matth. Opp. T. vii. p. 1). In the same manner *Augustine* says, De Doctr. Christ. i. 39: Homo itaque fide, spe et caritate subnixus, eaque inconcusse retinens, non indiget Scripturis nisi ad alios instruendos. Itaque multi per hæc tria etiam in solitudine sine codicibus vivunt Unde in illis arbitrare jam impletum esse quod dictum est (1 Cor. xiii. 8): Sive prophetæ evacuabuntur, sive linguæ cessabunt, sive scientia evacuabitur, etc.

§ 120.

THE CANON.

Lücke, über den neutestamentlichen Kanon des Eusebius von Cäsarea. Berlin, 1816. *Spittler*, *L. T.*, Kritische Untersuchung des 60sten Laodicäischen Kanons. Bremen, 1777.—On the other side: *Bickel*, in the Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 1830, part 3, p. 591, ss. [*Stuart*, Critical History and Defense of the Old Test. Canon, p. 438, ss. 447, ss. *Westcott*, Hist. Canon N. Test. Lond. 1855. *C. Wordsworth*, Inspiration and Canon, Phil. reprint, 1851. *Credner*, Gesch. d. N. Test. Kanons, ed. Volckmar, Berlin, 1860. *Ewald*, Gesch. d. Volkes Israel, Bd. vii. 1859. *H. J. Holtzmann*, Kanon und Tradition, Tübing. 1859.]

The more firmly the doctrine of the church was established, the nearer the Canon of the Sacred Scriptures, the principal parts of which had been determined in the times of *Eusebius*,[1] was brought to its completion. The synods of Laodicea,[2] of Hippo, and (the third) of Carthage,[3] contributed to this result. The theologians of the Eastern church distinctly separated the later productions of the Græco-Jewish literature (*i. e.*, the apocryphal books, Libri Ecclesiastici) from the Canon of the Old Testament Hebrew national literature. But although *Rufinus*[4] and *Jerome* endeavored to maintain the same distinction in the Latin church, it became the general custom to follow the Africans and Augustine in doing away with the distinction between the canonical and apocryphal books of the Old Test., and in considering both as one.[5]—The Canon of the Manicheans differed considerably from that of the Catholic church.[6]

[1] Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. iii. 25, adopts three classes, viz., ὁμολογούμενα, ἀντιλεγόμενα, νόθα (whether and in how far the last two classes differed, see *Lücke*, l. c.).—To the first class belong the four Gospels, the Acts of the

Apostles, the Epistles of Paul (including the Epistle to the Hebrews), the first Epistle of John, and the first Epistle of Peter; to the Antilegomena belong the Epistles of James, Jude, the second of Peter, and, lastly, the second and third Epistles of John. With regard to the book of Revelation, the opinions differ. The following are reckoned among the *νόθα*; Acta Pauli, the Shepherd of Hermas, the Apocalypse of Peter, the Epistle of Barnabas, and the Apostolical constitutions. The *ἄτοπα καὶ ὀνοσεβῆ* ranked below the *νόθα*.

[3] The Synod of Laodicea was held about the middle of the fourth century (between the years 360 and 364). In the 59th canon it was enacted, that no uncanonical book should be used in the churches, and in the 60th a list was given of the canonical books in *Mansi*, ii. 574. The doubts of *Spittler* Bickel has endeavored to refute in his dissertation (referred to above) in the Theol. Stud. und Kritiken for 1830. In this list all the Hebrew writings of the Old Testament are received, and the apocryphal books excluded (with the exception of the book of Baruch and the Epistle of Jeremiah). The canon of the New Test. is the same as ours, except the book of Revelation, which, however, was considered genuine in Egypt (by Athanasius and Cyril). But mention is made of the seven Catholic Epistles, and the Epistle to the Hebrews, is ascribed to Paul (especially on the authority of Jerome).—For further particulars see the introductions to the New Test., and Giesceler, Dogmengesch. 287. [Comp. Thornwell's Apocrypha, 1847.]

[4] A. D. 393, and A. D. 397. These synods number the Apocrypha of the Old Test. among the canonical books. Comp. the 36th canon Conc. Hippon. in *Mansi*, iii. 924, and Concil. Carth. 11. c. 47, *Mansi*, iii. 891. Innocent I. (A. D. 405) and Gelasius I. (A. D. 494?) confirmed their decisions.

[5] *Rufinus*, Expos. Symb. (l. c.) p. 26: Sciendum tamen est, quod et alii libri sunt, qui non catholici, sed ecclesiastici a majoribus appellati sunt, ut est Sapientia Salomonis et alia Sapientia, quæ dicitur filii Syrach, qui liber apud Latinos hoc ipso generali vocabulo Ecclesiasticus appellatur.....Ejusdem ordinis est libellus Tobiæ et Judith et Maccabæorum libri. He places the Shepherd of Hermas on the same footing with the Apocrypha of the Old Test., and maintains that they might be read, but not quoted, as authorities, "ad auctoritatem ex his fidei confirmandam." Comp. Hier. in Prologo Galeato, quoted by *De Wette*, Einleitung, i. p. 45. *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. 284 sq., is very instructive upon the Apocrypha, and the way it was treated in this period. [*Origen*, in his Hexapla, had carried out the distinction between the old Hebrew books and those extant only in Greek; and all the Greek fathers of this period followed his example. Athanasius distinguishes the *κανονιζόμενα*, the *ἀναγινωσκόμενα* (not canonical, but useful), and the *ἀπόκρυφα* (fictitious works by heretics). In the Old Test. he received only 22 Hebrew works; what is now called the Apocrypha he reckoned in the second class, and in the third class he put the so-called pseudepigrapha. The Greek church to the present day follows this order. The fact that they (and Origen) put Baruch and the Epistle of Jeremiah, was in consequence of these works being appended to the genuine writings of Jeremiah in the MSS. of the Septuagint.—In the Latin church, Hilary, Rufinus, and Jerome, also followed Origen. Jerome enumerates the 22 books of the Old Test., and adds

quidquid extra hos est, est inter apocrypha ponendum. But the Latin church generally followed Ambrose, Augustine, and the above named councils.—As to the New Test., it was generally received, in the course of the fourth and fifth centuries, in the form in which we now have it. As the church became more united, those that had doubted about some of the books accepted the general tradition. In the fourth century all of the seven General Epistles were received as a part of the canon. Jerome, in his Epist. ad Dardanum, says the only differences were, that the Latin churches did not receive the Epist. to the Hebrews, nor the Greek church the Apocalypse, though he himself held both to be genuine. In Africa the Hebrews was in the canon of Augustine and of the councils of Hippo and Carthage. Innocent I., in his Epist. ad Exsuperium, A. D. 405, puts the Hebrews in the canon. In the East the Apocalypse was received by Athanasius and Cyril of Alex., and also by Ephräm the Syrian and Epiphanius; but Cyril of Jerusalem, Gregory of Nazianzum, Chrysostom, and Theodoretus, did not recognize it. Since the sixth century, however, it has been in the Greek canon. Athanasius applies the same distinctions to the books of the New Test., etc., as (above) to the Old; he receives as canonical those we now have; as *ἀναγινωσκόμενα*, the so-called Doctrine of the Apostles and the Shepherd of Hermas; as *ἀπόκρυφα*, the works falsely ascribed to apostles. So Rufinus makes three classes, reckoning the Shepherd of Hermas and the Judgment of Peter among the Libri Ecclesiastici.]

[5] Aug. De Doct. Chr. ii. 8, and other passages quoted by *De Wette*, l. c. Comp. *Münscher*, Handb. iii. p. 64, ss. *Gregory the Great*, Mor. lib. xix. c. 21: Non inordinate agimus, si ex libris, licet non canonicis, sed tamen ad ædificationem ecclesiæ editis testimoniam proferamus. He makes only a relative distinction between the Old and New Test., lib. i. Hom. 6, in Ezech.: Divina eloquia, etsi temporibus distincta, sunt tamen sensibus unita. Comp. *Lau*, 331.

[6] *Münscher*, l. c. p. 91, ss. *Trechsel*, über den Kanon, die Kritik und Exegese der Manichäer. Bern. 1832. 8. The authenticity of the Old Test., and the connection between the Old and the New Testaments, were defended in opposition to the Manicheans, especially by *Augustine*, De Mor. Eccles. Cath. i. c. 27, De Utilitate Credendi, and elsewhere.

§ 121.

INSPIRATION AND INTERPRETATION.

[*Davidson S.*, Sacred Hermeneutics, p. 111–162. Lee on Inspiration, Appendix G, pp. 423–443.] On the literature, comp. § 32.

The idea of inspiration, in this as in the previous period, was understood by some in a dynamic and spiritual sense, by others in a mechanical and external sense. Not only were the contents of Holy Writ considered as divinely inspired,[1] but it was also esteemed an offense to suppose the possibility of chronological errors and histori-

cal contradictions on the part of the sacred penman.[2] And yet, in other instances, their different peculiarities as men were not overlooked, but made use of, to explain the diversities of their mode of thought and style.[3]—The Origenistic allegorical system of interpretation gave way in the East to the sober grammatical method of the Antiochian school.[4] In the West, on the contrary, some intimations of Augustine led to the adoption of a fourfold sense of Scripture, which was afterwards confirmed by the scholastic divines of the next period.[5]

[1] This may be seen from certain general phrases which, having originated in the preceding period, had now come into general use, such as *θεία γραφή*, *κυριακαὶ γραφαί*, *θεόπνευστοι γραφαί*, cœlestes litteræ (Lact. Inst. iv. c. 22), as well as the simile of the lyre (comp. § 32, note 4), which was applied in a somewhat different sense by Chrys. Hom. de Ignat. Opp. ii. p. 594.

[2] *Eusebius* of Cæsarea says that it is *θρασὺ καὶ προπετές* to assert that the sacred writers could have substituted one name for another, *e. g.*, Abimelech for Achish (Ἀγχοῦς); Comment. in Ps. xxxiii. in *Montfaucon*, Coll. Nov. T. i. p. 129. That *Chrysostom* designates the words of the apostle, not as his, but as words of the Holy Spirit, or of God (in Ev. Joh. Hom. i. Opp. T. viii. p. 6, de Lazaro Conc. 4. Opp. i. p. 755, and elsewhere), may partly be ascribed to his practical and rhetorical tendency. As he calls the mouth of the prophets the mouth of God (in Act. App. Hom. xix. Op. T. ix. p. 159), so *Augustine* (De Consensu Evv. i. 35) compares the apostles with the hands which noted down that which Christ, the head, dictated. He also calls (in Conf. vii. 21) the Sacred Scriptures venerabilem stilum Spir. S. He communicates to Jerome his theory of inspiration in the following manner (Ep. 82. Opp. ii. p. 143): Ego enim fateor caritati tuæ, solis eis Scripturarum libris, qui jam canonici appellantur, didici hunc timorem honoremque deferre, ut nullum eorum auctorem scribendo aliquid errasse firmissime credam. Ac si aliquid in eis offendero litteris, quod videatur contrarium veritati, nihil aliud, quam vel mendosum esse codicem,* vel interpretrem non assecutum esse, quod dictum est, vel me minime intellexisse non ambigam. Alios autem ita lego, ut quantalibet sanctitate doctrinaque præpolleant, non ideo verum putem, quia ipsi ita senserunt, sed quia mihi vel per illos auctores canonicos, vel probabili ratione, quod a vero non abhorreat, persuadere potuerunt. Nevertheless, he admits (ibid. p. 150, § 24) that the canonical authority may be restricted, inasmuch as in reference to the dispute between Paul and Peter, he concedes to the former an undoubted superiority. Comp. De Civ. Dei xviii. 41: Denique auctores nostri, in quibus non frustra sacrarum litterarum figitur et

* A challenge to textual criticism! [So, too, De Consensu Evangelistarum, comparing the accounts of Mark and Luke of the words from heaven at Christ's baptism: Illud vero quod *nonnulli codices* habent secundum Lucam, hoc illa voce sonuisse quod in Psalmo scriptum est: "Filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te;" *quanquam in antiquioribus codicibus Græcis non inveniri perhibeatur, tamen si aliquibus fide dignis exemplaribus confirmari possit*, quid aliquid quam utrumque intelligendum est quolibet verborum ordine de cœlo sonuisse. Comp. Lee, loc. cit. p. 424.]

terminatur canon, absit ut inter se aliqua ratione dissentiant. Unde non immerito, cum illa scriberent, eis Deum vel per eos locutum, non pauci in scholis atque gymnasiis litigiosis disputationibus garruli, sed in agris atque in urbibus cum doctis atque indoctis tot tantique populi crediderunt.—His opinion concerning the miraculous origin of the Septuagint version accords with that of the earlier fathers, ibid. c. 42-44, where he attributes (as many ultra-Lutherans afterwards did in reference to the Lutheran translation) the defects of that translation to a kind of inspiration which had regard to the circumstances of the times. But behind this fantastic notion lies the grand idea of a revelation, which continues to manifest itself in a living way—an idea which is above the narrow adherence to the letter, and is expressed in the belief in tradition.—Similar views probably induced *Gregory the Great* to say in reference to the researches of learned men relative to the author of the book of Job, that it was not necessary to know the pen with which the King of kings had written his royal letter, but that it sufficed to have a full conviction of its Divine contents. Thus he assigns, on the one hand, the authorship of this book to the Holy Spirit, while, on the other, he leaves open all discussions concerning the human instruments—discussions which were chiefly dreaded in later times. Gregory the Great, Moral. in Job, præf. c. 1, § 2; the other views of Gregory, see in *Lau*, ubi supra.

[3] Thus *Theodore of Mopsuestia*, who in this respect went perhaps farther than any other writer, assumed different degrees of inspiration. He ascribed to Solomon, not the gift of prophecy, but only that of wisdom, and judged of the book of Job and the Song of Solomon only from the human point of view. Hence the fifth Œcumenical Council found fault with him on this very account; *Mansi*, ix. 223. [Comp. Lee, ubi supra, p. 443–8.] But *Chrysostom*, and also *Jerome*, admitted human peculiarities, the one in reference to the gospels (Hom. i. in Matth.), the other with respect to the apostle Paul (on Gal. v. 12). *Chrysostom* even finds a proof of their credibility in the minor disagreements of the gospels; for, he says, if all agreed in every thing, the enemies would suspect collusion (in Matth. Hom. 1, § 2). Jerome finds in Paul solecisms, hyperbata (transpositions of words and clauses), and abrupt periods (on Ephes. iii. and Gal. v. 12). *Basil the Great* says respecting the prophets (in the commentary on Isaiah commonly ascribed to him, Opp. T. i. p. 379, ed. Ben.): "As it is not every substance which is fitted to reflect images, but only such as possess a certain smoothness and transparency, so the effective power of the Spirit is not visible in all souls, but only in such as are neither perverse nor distorted" (*Rudelbach*), p. 28. *Augustine* (De Consensu Evang. ii. 12) asserts, that the evangelists had written, ut quisque meminerat, ut cuique cordi erat, vel brevius vel prolixius: but he is careful not to be misunderstood, lib. i. c. 2: Quamvis singuli suum quendam narrandi ordinem tenuisse videantur, non tamen unusquisque eorum velut alterius ignarus voluisse scribere reperitur, vel ignorata prætermisisse, quæ scripsisse alius invenitur: sed sicut unicuique inspiratum est, non superfluam coöperationem sui laboris adjunxit.—*Arnobius* calls the style of the biblical writers sermo trivialis et sordidus (Adv. Gent. i. 58), but he also sees in this proof of their truthfulness: Nunquam enim veritas sectata est fucum, nec quod exploratum et certum est, circumduci se patitur orationis per ambi-

tum longiorem. The barbarisms and solecisms he compares (c. 59) to thorns on fruit. Etenim vero dissoluti est pectoris in rebus seriis quærere voluptatem, et cum tibi sit ratio cum male se habentibus atque ægris, sonos auribus infundere dulciores, non medicinam vulneribus admovere. Moreover, even the language of the schools has its abnormities: Quænam est enim ratio naturalis aut in mundi constitutionibus lex scripta, ut *hic paries* dicatur et *hæc scella*? etc.—Concerning *Gregory Nazianzen*, comp. Orat. ii. 105, p. 60. See *Ullmann*, p. 305, note.—*Epiphanius* opposed very decidedly the notions derived from the old μαντική (comp. § 32), according to which the inspired writers were entirely passive, and supposed that the prophets enjoyed a clear perception of the divine, a calm disposition of mind, etc. Comp. Hær. 48, c. 3, and *Jerome* Procem. in Nahum, in Habacuc et in Jesaiam: Neque vero, ut Montanus cum insanis feminis somniat, Prophetæ in extasi sunt locuti, ut nescirent, quid loquerentur, et quum alios erudirent, ipsi ignorarent, quod docerent. Though Jerome allows that human (*e. g.*, grammatical) faults might have occurred, yet he guards himself against any dangerous inferences which might be drawn from his premises (Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. lib. ii. ad cap. iii. 1): Nos, quotiescunque solœcismos aut tale quid annotamus, non Apostolum pulsamus, ut malevoli criminantur, sed magis Apostoli assertores sumus, etc. According to him, the divine power of the word itself destroyed these apparent blemishes, or caused believers to overlook them. "*The opinion of these theologians manifestly was, that the external phenomena do not preclude the reality of the highest influences of divine grace.*" *Rudelbach*, p. 42.*

[4] *Theodoret*, who may be considered as the representative of this tendency, rejects both the false allegorical and the bare historical systems of interpretation, Protheoria in Psalmos (ed. Schulze), T. i. p. 603, in *Rudelbach*, p. 36. (He calls the latter a Jewish rather than Christian interpretation.) Comp. *Münter*, über die antiochen. Schule, l. c. and *Neander*, Church History, ii. p. 353. The hermeneutical principles of Theodore of Mopsuestia are here of special weight. See Neander, Dog. Hist. p. 283–5. [*Neander*, judging from Theodore's general position, conjectured the value of his commentaries in this matter, "if more of them had come down to us." The conjecture has been confirmed by the discovery of the commentaries. See the extracts as given by Jacobi, in the notes to Neander's Hist. of Doctrines, in Ryland's translation, as above.]

[5] It is remarkable that *Augustine*, on the one hand, understands all biblical narratives in their strictly historical, literal sense; and, on the other, leaves ample scope for allegorical interpretation. Thus he takes much pains De Civ. Dei xv. 27, to defend the account of the ark of Noah against mathematical and physical objections (he even supposes a miracle by which carnivorous animals were changed into herbivorous); nevertheless, he thinks that all this had happened only ad præfigurandum ecclesiam, and represents the clean and unclean animals as types of Judaism and Paganism, etc. [Comp.

* Thus Jerome and Chrysostom answered those who would put the epistle to Philemon out of the Canon, because it contained only human matters, who took umbrage at the φαιλόνης which the apostle ordered (2 Tim. iv. 13), that employment in human affairs did no damage to divine things. See Neander, Hist. Dogm. p. 284.

also *Davidson*, l. c. p. 138, where another specimen is given.] The passage De Genes. ad Litter. ab. init.: In libris autem omnibus sanctis intueri oportet, quæ ibi æterna intimentur, quæ facta narrentur, quæ futura prænuntientur, quæ agenda præcipiantur, has given rise to the doctrine of a fourfold sense of Scripture; comp. with it De Util. Cred. 3: omnis igitur scriptura, quæ testamentum vetus vocatur, diligenter eam nosse cupientibus quadrifariam traditur, secundum historiam, secundum ætiologiam, secundum analogiam, secundum allegoriam; the further exposition of his views is given ibid. [*Davidson*, l. c. p. 137]. According to *Augustine*, seven things are necessary to the right interpretation of Scripture, Doctr. Christ. ii. 7: *timor*, *pietas*, *scientia*, *fortitudo*, *consilium*, *purgatio cordis*, *sapientia*. But he who will perfectly interpret an author, must be animated by love to him, De Util. Cred. 6: Agendum enim tecum prius est, ut auctores ipsos non oderis, deinde ut ames, et hoc agendum quovis alio modo potius, quam exponendis eorum sententiis et literis. Propterea quia, si Virgilium odissemus, imo si non eum, priusquam intellectus esset, majorum nostrorum commendatione diligeremus, nunquam nobis satisfieret de illis ejus quæstionibus innumerabilibus, quibus grammatici agitari et perturbari solent, nec audiremus libenter, qui cum ejus laude illas expediret, sed ei faveremus, qui per eas illum erasse ac delirasse conaretur ostendere. Nunc vero cum eas multi ac varie pro suo quisque captu aperire conentur, his potissimum plauditur, per quorum expositionem melior invenitur poëta, qui non solum nihil peccasse, sed nihil non laudabiliter cecinisse ab eis etiam, qui illum non intelligunt, creditur.....Quantum erat, ut similem benevolentiam præberemus eis, per quos locutum esse Spiritum Sanctum tam diuturna vetustate firmatum est! Even *misunderstanding* of the Scriptures (according to Augustine) is not corrupting, so long as the regula caritatis is observed; one may err about a text without becoming a liar. He who, with good intent, though with wrong exegesis, is steering loosely towards the *one* end of edification (the love of God), is like him who runs to the goal across the fields instead of in the beaten road. Yet we must always try to set such an one right, lest he get into the way of wandering from the true road, and so in the end run to perdition; De Doct. Christ. i. 36.

§ 122.

TRADITION AND THE CONTINUANCE OF INSPIRATION.

The belief in the inspiration of the Scriptures neither excluded faith in an existing tradition, nor in a continuance of the inspirations of the Spirit. Not only transient visions, in which pious individuals received divine instructions and disclosures,[1] were compared to the revelations recorded in Scripture, but still more the continued illumination which the fathers enjoyed when assembled in council.[2] But as the Scriptures were formed into a canon, so, too, in course of time it became necessary to lay down a canon, to which the ecclesiastical tradition, developing itself on its own historical foundation,

might be made subject, so that every spirit need not be believed. Such an one was more definitely sketched by *Vincens of Lerins*, who laid down the three criteria of *antiquitas* (vetustas), *universitas*, and *consensio*, as marks of true ecclesiastical tradition; and thus the *quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est* was fixed as the canon of what had authority in the church.[3]

[1] Comp. *Münscher*, Handbuch, iii. p. 100: "*Such exalted views on inspiration can not appear strange to us, since they existed in an age when Christians believed and recorded numerous divine revelations and inspirations still granted to holy men, and especially to monks.*"—Such revelations, of course, were supposed not to be contradictory either to Scripture, or to the tradition of the church. Thus the voice from heaven, which said to Augustine; "*Ego sum, qui sum*,"—and "*tolle lege*," directed him to the Scriptures. Confessions, viii. 12.

[2] The decisions of the councils were represented as decisions of the Holy Spirit (placuit Spiritui Sancto et nobis). Comp. the letter of Constantine to the church of Alexandria, Socrat. i. 9: Ὁ γὰρ τοῖς τριακοσίοις ἥρεσεν ἐπισκόποις, οὐδέν ἐστιν ἕτερον, ἢ τοῦ Θεοῦ γνώμη, μάλιστά γε ὅπου τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα τοιούτων καὶ τηλικούτων ἀνδρῶν διανοίαις ἐγκείμενον τὴν θείαν βούλησιν ἐξεφώτισεν. The Emperor, indeed, spoke thus as a layman. But Pope *Leo the Great* expressed himself in the same way, and claimed inspiration not only for councils (Ep. 114, 2, 145, 1), but also for emperors and imperial decretals (Ep. 162, 3. Ep. 148, 84, 1), even for himself (Ep. 16, and Serm. 25). Comp. *Griesbach*, Opusc. i. p. 21. Gregory the Great, too, declares that he ascribes to the first four Œcumenical Councils equal authority with the four gospels. Concerning the somewhat inconsistent opinions of *Gregory of Nazianzum* (Ep. ad Procop. 55), on the one hand, and of *Augustine* (De Bapt. contra Don. ii. c. 3), and *Facundus* of Hermiane (Defensio Trium Capitul. c. 7), on the other, see *Neander*, Church Hist. ii. 177, and Hist. Dogm. 278. In accordance with his views on the relation of the Septuagint to the original Hebrew (§ 121), *Augustine* supposes that the decisions of earlier councils were completed by those of later ones, without denying the inspiration of the former, since "*the decision of councils only gives public sanction to that result which the development of the church had reached.*" Inspiration accommodates itself to the wants of the time. Respecting this "economy," and its abuses, see *Münscher*, l. c. p. 156, ss.

[3] Commonitorium, or Tractatus pro Catholicæ Fidei Antiquitate et Universitate (composed in the year 433). *Vincentius* sets forth a twofold source of knowledge: 1. Divinæ legis auctoritas. 2. Ecclesiæ catholicæ traditio. The latter is necessary on account of the different interpretations given to Scripture. The sensus ecclesiasticus is the only right one. Vincentius, like Augustine, also supposes that tradition may in a certain sense *advance*, so that an opinion, respecting which the church has not as yet pronounced a decision, is not to be considered heretical; but it may afterwards be condemned as such, if it be found contrary to the more fully developed faith of the church. Thus many of the opinions of the earlier Fathers might be vindicated as archaisms. [*Baur*, Dogmengesch. 159 sq., says that the notion

of tradition was already more methodically and definitely fixed than any other doctrine of the church. The canon of Vincens, he states, was brought forward in relation to the Augustinian predestination—the latter could not stand this test. This canon was mechanical, allowing no room for progress, and it also contradicted the principle of the sufficiency of the Scriptures.]

2. THE DOCTRINE CONCERNING GOD.

§ 123.

THE BEING OF GOD.

The prevailing tendency to dialectic demonstrations led to the attempt to prove, in a logical way, the existence of God, which the Christian faith had received as an uncontested axiom.[1] In the writings of some of the fathers, both of the preceding and present periods, *e. g.*, *Athanasius* and *Gregory of Nazianzum*, we meet with what may be called the *physico-theological* argument, if we understand by it an argument drawn from the beauty and wisdom displayed in nature, which is always calculated to promote practical piety. But both these writers mistrusted a merely objective proof, and showed that a pure and pious mind would best find and know God.[2] The *cosmological* proof propounded by *Diodorus of Tarsus*,[3] and the *ontological* argument of *Augustine* and *Boëthius*,[4] lay claim to a higher degree of logical precision and objective certainty. The former argument was based upon the principle that there must be a sufficient ground for every thing. Augustine and Boëthius inferred the existence of God from the existence of general ideas—a proof which was more fully developed in the next period by *Anselm*.

[1] Even *Arnobius* considered this belief to be an *axiom*, and thought it quite as dangerous to attempt to *prove* the existence of God as to deny it; Adv. Gent. i. c. 33: Quisquamne est hominum, qui non cum principis notione diem nativitatis intraverit? cui non sit ingenitum, non affixum, imo ipsis pæne in genitalibus matris non impressum, non insitum, esse regem ac dominum cunctorum quæcunque sunt moderatorem?

[2] *Athanasius*, Adv. Gent. i. p. 3, ss. (like Theophilus of Antioch, comp. § 35, note 1), starts with the idea, that none but a pure and sinless soul can see God (Matt. v. 8). He too compares the heart of man to a mirror. But as it became sullied by sin, God revealed himself by means of his *creation*, and when this proved no longer sufficient, by the prophets, and, lastly, by the Logos.—*Gregory of Nazianzum* argues in a similar way; he infers the existence of the Creator from his works, as the sight of a lyre reminds us both of him who made it, and of him who plays it; Orat. xxviii. 6, p. 499; comp. Orat. xxviii. 16, p. 507, 508; Orat. xiv. 33, p. 281. *He* too appeals to Matth. v. 8. "Rise from thy low condition by thy conversation, by purity

of heart unite thyself to the pure. Wilt thou become a divine, and worthy of the Godhead? Then keep God's commandments, and walk according to his precepts, *for the act is the first step to knowledge.*" *Ullmann*, p. 317.—*Augustine* also propounds in an eloquent manner, and in the form of a prayer, what is commonly called the physico-theological argument (Conf. x. 6): Sed et cœlum et terra et omnia, quæ in eis sunt, ecce undique mihi dicunt, ut te amem, nec cessant dicere omnibus, ut sint inexcusabiles, etc. *Ambrose*, *Basil the Great*, *Chrysostom*, and others, express themselves in much the same manner.

[a] *Diodorus* κατὰ εἱμαρμένης in Phot. Bibl. Cod. 223, p. 209, b. The world is subject to change. But this change presupposes something constant at its foundation; the variety of creatures points to a creative unity; for change itself is a condition which has had a commencement: Εἰ δέ τις ἀγένητον λέγοι αὐτῶν τὴν τροπὴν, τὸ πάντων ἀδυνατώτερον εἰσάγει· τροπὴ γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶν ἀρχόμενον, καὶ οὐκ ἄν τις εἴποι τροπὴν ἄναρχον· καὶ συντόμως εἰπεῖν, τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτῶν ζώων τε καὶ σωμάτων ἡ πάνσοφος τροπὴ, καὶ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ χρωμάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιοτήτων ἡ ποικίλη διαφορὰ μονονουχὶ φωνὴν ἀφίησι μήτε ἀγέννητον μήτε αὐτόματον νομίζειν τὸν κόσμον, μήτ' αὖ ἀπρονόητον, θεὸν δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ εὖ εἶναι παρασχόμενον σαφῶς εἰδέναι καὶ ἀδιστάκτως ἐπίστασθαι.

[b] *August.* De Lib. Arbitr. lib. ii. c. 8–15. There are general ideas, which have for every one the same objective validity, and are not (like the perceptions of sense) different and conditioned by the subjective apprehension. Among these are the mathematical truths, as $3+7=10$; here, too, belongs the higher metaphysical truth—truth in itself, *i. e.*, wisdom (veritas, sapientia). The absolute truth, however, which is necessarily demanded by the human mind, is God himself. [He asserts that man is composed of existence, life, and thinking, and shows that the last is the most excellent; hence he infers that that by which thinking is regulated, and which, therefore, must be superior to thinking itself, is the summum bonum. He finds this summum bonum in those general laws which every thinking person must acknowledge, and according to which he must form his opinion respecting thinking itself. The sum total of these laws or rules is called *truth* or *wisdom* (veritas, sapientia). The absolute is, therefore, equal to truth itself. God is truth. Illa veritatis et sapientiæ pulcritudo, tantum adsit perpetua voluntas fruendi, nec multitudine audientium constipate secludit venientes, nec peragitur tempore, nec migrat locis, nec nocte intercipitur, nec umbrâ intercluditur, nec sensibus corporis subjacet. De toto mundo ad se conversis qui diligunt eam omnibus proxima est, omnibus sempiterna; nullo loco est, nusquam deest; foris admonit, inter docet; cernentes se commutat omnes in melius, a nullo in deterius commutatur; nullus de illa judicat, nullus sine illa judicat bene. Ac per hoc eam manifestum est mentibus nostris, quæ ab ipsa una fiant singulæ sapientes, et non *de* ipsa, sed *per* ipsam de ceteris judices, sine dubitatione esse potiorem. Tu autem concesseras, si quid supra mentes nostras esse monstrarem, Deum te esse confessurum, *si adhuc nihil esset superius.* Si enim aliquid est excellentius, ille potius Deus est: *si autem non est, jam ipsa veritas Deus est. Sive ergo illud sit, sive non sit, Deum tamen esse negare non poteris.* Comp. Ritter, Christl. Phil. i. 407–411.]—*Boëthius*

expresses himself still more definitely, De Consol. Phil. v. Prosa 10; he shows that empirical observation and the perception of the imperfect lead necessarily to the idea of perfection and its reality in God: Omne enim, quod imperfectum esse dicitur, id diminutione perfecti imperfectum esse perhibitur. Quo fit, ut si in quolibet genere imperfectum quid esse videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse necesse sit: Etenim perfectione sublata, unde illud quod imperfectum perhibetur extiterit, ne fingi quidem potest. Neque a diminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum cepit exordium, sed ab integris absolutisque procedens, in hæc extrema atque effœta dilabitur. Quod si.... est quædam boni fragilis imperfecta felicitas, esse aliquam solidam perfectamque non potest dubitari....Deum rerum omnium principum *bonum* esse, communis humanorum conceptio probat animorum. Nam cum nihil Deo melius excogitari queat, id quo melius nihil est, bonum esse quis dubitet? ita vero bonum esse Deum ratio demonstrat, ut perfectum quoque in eo bonum esse convincat. Nam ni tale sit, rerum omnium princeps esse non poterit. .....Quare ne in infinitum ratio procedat, confitendum esse summum Deum summi perfectique boni esse plenissimum. Compare *Schleiermacher* Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 166: "*Augustine is said to have given the first proof of the existence of God. But we are not to understand this in an objectionable manner, as though he would demonstrate this in an objective way; he only desires to show that the idea of God is at the foundation of all human thought.*"—*Gregory the Great* also reasons in a similar way; Moral. xv. c. 46; comp. *Lau*, p. 347.

[*Baur*, Dogmengesch. 162: Augustine went into the most profound speculation about the nature of God. On the one hand he viewed God in such an abstract and negative way, that he must appear to be wholly indefinable, and we could only say what he is not (De Trin. v. 2); on the other hand, he held fast to the two most essential ideas about God, viz., that he is the *essentia* (De Trin. v. 3), the immanent being of all being, and the bonum incommunicabile. To remove all finite conceptions, he defines the knowledge of God as an absolute identity with itself, as the immediate vision of that which is eternally present (De Civ. Dei, xi. 10, 21; xii. 17).—The peculiarity of the Augustinian proof of the being of God consists in this, that he starts from thinking (thought) itself, not from thought with any definite contents, and not from the idea of God, but from thought as such. All subjective thought presupposes objective truth. Thought itself involves the idea of God. His argument is an analysis of thought itself, and not an inference from the imperfect to the perfect.]

§ 124

THE NATURE OF GOD.

The definitions of orthodox theologians respecting the Trinity had this peculiarity, that, on the one hand, they were based on the supposition that God may be known by means of his revelation, and, on

the other, implied that the contents of that same revelation, as unfolded by the church in definite conceptions, are a *mystery*. These theologians, therefore, took no offense at the contradiction involved in such definitions, but found it quite natural that the understanding should here come short. The Arians, on the contrary, in accordance with their more rationalistic system, particularly as carried out to all its logical consequences by *Eunomius*, demanded the possibility of a complete knowledge of God.[1]—Though the ideas concerning the divine Being, and the doctrinal definitions of the church, were still mixed up with much that savored of anthropomorphism,[2] yet the speculative tendency of the most eminent theologians of the present period kept them on an elevation, where they avoided all gross representations of the Godhead. Thus *Athanasius* taught that God is above all essence; *Augustine* doubted whether it would be proper to call God a *substance*.[3] *Gregory of Nazianzum*, on the other hand, showed that it is not sufficient merely to deny the sensuous.[4] The gross and carnal notions of the *Audians* concerning God met with little approval,[5] while the *Monophysites*, by blending the divine and the human, promoted anthropomorphism under the mask of Christian orthodoxy.[6]

[1] According to Socrat. iv. 7, *Eunomius* maintained that God knows no more about his nature than we do. It does not follow (he further maintained) that because the minds of some are impaired by sin, that the same is true in reference to all. The natural man indeed does not possess the knowledge in question; but what is the use of a revelation which reveals nothing? Christ has opened unto us a way to the perfect knowledge of God. He is the door, viz., to this knowledge. Eunomius attached the greatest importance to the theoretical, didactic part of Christianity, and supposed its very essence to consist in the *ἀκρίβεια τῶν δογμάτων*. Comp. the refutations of Gregory of Nazianzum, Gregory of Nyssa, and of Basil. The latter reminds him (Ep. 16) of the impossibility of explaining the nature of God, since he can not explain the nature even of an ant! Accused on the orthodox side of transforming theology into technology, the Arian *Philostorgius*, on the contrary, thought it praiseworthy that Eunomius had abandoned the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God, which *Arius* himself defended. Hist. Eccles. x. 2, 3. This last statement also favors the conclusion, that the accusations of his opponents were something more than their own inferences from his doctrines, as Gieseler, Dogmengesch. p. 303, seems to assert. Comp. *Neander*, Hist. Dogm. 311, and his Chrysostom, i. 355. *Klose*, Gesch. d. Lehre des Eunomius, Kiel, 1833, p. 36 sq., *Ullmann's* Greg. p. 318 sq.

[2] Examples are given by *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, i. p. 136. [*Athanas.* De Decret. Syn. Nic. c. 11. *Cyril*, Catech. iv. 5. *August.* Ep. 178. 14, 18, De Divers. Quæst. 20.] Comp. also *Lact.* Inst. vii. 21, where he calls the Holy Spirit purus ac liquidus, and in aquæ modum fluidus.

[3] *Athan.* Contra Gent. p. 3: *Ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, ὑπερούσιος.* *Aug* De Trin. v. 2, vii. 5, prefers the use of the word *essentia* to *substantia*, comp.

de Civ. Dei xii. 2, though he himself (Ep. 177, 4), speaks of God as *substantialiter ubique diffusus.** Comp. *Boëthius* De Trin. c. 4: Nan quum dicimus: Deus, substantiam quidem significare *videmur*, sed eam, quæ sit *ultra substantiam*. Augustine's writings, however, contain many profound thoughts relative to the knowledge of God. But every thing he says shows how much he felt the insufficiency of language to express the nature of God; De Doctr. Christ. i. c. 6: Imo vero me nihil aliud quam dicere voluisse sentio. Si autem dixi, non est quod dicere volui. Hoc unde scio, nisi quia Deus ineffabilis est: quod autem a me dictum est, si ineffabile esset, dictum non esset. Ac per hoc ne ineffabilis quidem dicendus est Deus, quia et hoc cum dicitur, aliquid dicitur. Et fit nescio quæ pugna verborum, quoniam si illud est ineffabile, quod dici non potest, non est ineffabile quod vel ineffabile dici potest. Quæ pugna verborum silentio cavenda potius quam voce pacanda est. Et tamen Deus, cum de illo nihil digne dici possit, admisit humanæ vocis obsequium et verbis nostris in laude sua gaudere nos voluit. Nam inde est quod et dicitur Deus.—On this account he, as well as Tertullian (§ 38, note 3), assigns to anthropomorphism its proper position, De Vera Rel. 50: Habet enim omnis lingua sua quædam propria genera locutionum, quæ cum in aliam linguam transferuntur, videntur absurda; and the subsequent part of the passage; De Genesi c. 17: Omnes, qui spiritaliter intelligunt scripturas, non membra corporea per ista nomina, sed *spiritales potentias* accipere didicerunt, sicut galeas et scutum et gladium et alia multa.—But he prefers this anthropomorphism, which forms an idea of God from corporeal and spiritual analogies, though it may be erroneous, to the purely imaginary speculations of a conceited idealism, De Trinit. Lib. i. ab init. It is not *we* that know God, but God who makes himself known to us, De Vera Rel. c. 48: Omnia, quæ de hac luce mentis a me dicta sunt, nulla quam eadem luce manifesta sunt. Per hanc enim intelligo vera esse quæ dicta sunt, et hæc me intelligere per hanc rursus intelligo.—The same spirit is expressed in the beautiful passage from the (spurious) Soliloq. Animæ c. 31: Qualiter cognovi te? Cognovi te in te; cognovi te non sicut tibi es, sed certe sicut mihi es, et non sine te, sed in te, quia tu es lux, quæ illuminasti me. Sicut enim tibi es, soli tibi cognitus es; sicut mihi es, secundum gratiam tuam et mihi cognitus es. ...Cognovi enim te, quoniam Deus meus es tu (comp. Cyril of Jerusalem below, § 127, note 1).—According to *Gregory the Great*, Mor. xx. c. 32, our knowledge of God does not correspond to his nature. But it is not on that account false; we now see him in image. Thus none can look steadfastly into the sun when it rises; but from the mountains it shines upon we perceive that it is rising, comp. *Lau*, p. 348, ss.

[4] Orat. xxviii. 7–10, p. 500 sqq. in *Ullmann*, p. 530. The negative knowledge of God is of no more use than to be told that twice five are neither 2, nor 3, nor 4, nor 5, nor 20, nor 40, without being told that it is 10.—Gregory thinks that the words ὁ ὤν and θεός are, comparatively speaking, the best expressions to denote the divine being; but gives the preference to the name ὁ ὤν, partly because God applied it to himself (Ex. iii. 14),

* The (Pseudo-) Dionysius the Areopagite (De Divinis Nominibus) goes still further, having no hesitation in saying that God, because elevated above all being, is τὸ μὴ ὄν. [Comp. *Baur*, Dogmengesch. 161. *Hipler*, Dionys. Regensb. 1861. *Darras*, St. Denys. Paris, 1863.]

partly because it is more significant. For the term θεός is a derivative, and to be understood relatively (like the name *Lord*); but the appellation ὁ ὤν is in every respect independent, and belongs to none but God. Orat. xxx. 17 and 18, p. 552, 553. *Ullmann*, p. 324, note.

[5] Comp. above § 106, note 5.

[6] Comp. what is said respecting Theopaschitism, § 102, note 3.

§ 125.

THE UNITY OF GOD.

Polytheism and Gnosticism having been defeated, it was of less importance in the present period, than in the preceding, to defend the *unity* of God. The dualism of the Manicheans alone called for a defense of Monotheism against those outside of the church.[1] The definitions respecting the Trinity, moreover, made it necessary that the church should distinctly declare that the doctrine of the Trinity does not exclude that of the *unity* of God.[2] In treating of this subject, theologians used much the same language as those of the former period.[3]

[1] *Athanasius* Contra Gent. p. 6, combated the dualism of the Gnostics. In opposition to the Manicheans, *Titus of Bostra* (Contra Manich. lib. i. in Basnagii Mon. t. 1. p. 63, ss.),* *Didymus of Alexandria* (ibid. p. 204, 205), *Gregory of Nyssa* (contra Manich. Syllogismi x. Opp. iii. p. 180), *Cyril of Jerusalem* (Cat. vi. 20, p. 92 [94]), and *Augustine* in his polemical writings, defended the doctrine of *one* Divine being. These objections, however, did not make the desired impression upon the Manichees, since they really held that only the good being, the ground of all, was God; comp. Giesceler, Dogmengesch. 302.

[2] Comp. *e. g.* the Symbolum Athanasianum, § 97: et tamen non sunt tres Dii, etc. On the controversy with the Tritheites and Tetratheites, see § 96.

[3] E. g. *Lact.* i. 3. *Arnob.* lib. iii. *Rufin.* Expos. p. 18: Quod autem dicimus, Orientis ecclesias tradere unum Deum, patrem omnipotentem et unum Dominum, hoc modo intelligendum est, unum non numero dici, sed universitate. Verbi gratia: si quis enim dicit unum hominem, aut unum equum, hic unum pro numero posuit; potest enim et alius homo esse et tertius, vel equus. Ubi autem secundus vel tertius non potest jungi, unus si dicatur, non numeri, sed universitatis est nomen. Ut si e. c. dicamus unum solem, hic unus ita dicitur, ut alius vel tertius addi non possit: unus est enim sol. Multo magis ergo Deus cum unus dicitur, unus non numeri, sed universitatis vocabulo notatur, *i. e.*, quia propterea unus dicatur, quod alius non sit.

* [Titi Bostr. quæ ex Opere contra Manich. edito in codice Hamburgensi servata sunt græce ed. P. Ant. de Lagarde, Berol. 1854.—The same work, libri quatuor syriace, also edited by Lagarde, Berol. 1859.]

§ 126.

THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

Several theologians, *e. g.*, *Gregory of Nazianzum*, *Cyril of Jerusalem*, and others, maintained that what we call the attributes of God, are only expressions by which we designate his relation to the world, and that these predicates are either negative or figurative.[1] But *Augustine* proved, in a very acute manner, that the attributes of God can not be separated from his nature as contingent phenomena.[2] Other theologians of the present period were equally cautious in defining particular attributes, *e. g.*, those of omniscience and omnipresence.[3] Some endeavored to refine the idea of the retributive justice of God, and to defend it against the charge of arbitrariness;[4] while others again sought to reconcile the omniscience of God, and consequently his foreknowledge, with human liberty.[5]

[1] *Gregory* says, Orat. vi. 12, p. 187: "There can be no *antagonism* in the Godhead, because it would *destroy* its very nature; the Godhead, on the contrary, is in such perfect harmony not only with itself, but also with other beings, that some of the *names* of God have a particular reference to this agreement. Thus he is called '*peace and love.*'" Among the attributes of God he assigns (next to his eternity and infinity) the first place to love, see *Ullmann*, p. 333.—*Cyril* of Jerusalem maintains that our ideas of God, and the attributes which we ascribe to him, are not adequate to his nature, Cat. vi. 2, p. 87 (Oxon. 78): Λέγομεν γὰρ οὐχ ὅσα δεῖ περὶ θεόν (μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ ταῦτα γνώριμα), ἀλλ' ὅσα ἡμετέρα ἀσθένεια βαστάσαι δύναται. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ, τί ἐστι Θεὸς, ἐξηγούμεθα· ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ ἀκριβὲς περὶ αὐτοῦ οὐκ οἴδαμεν, μετ' εὐγνωμοσύνης ὁμολογοῦμεν· ἐν τοῖς γὰρ περὶ Θεοῦ μεγάλη γνῶσις, τὸ τὴν ἀγνωσίαν ὁμολογεῖν (comp. also the subsequent part of the passage). *Arnobius* Adv. Gentes, iii. 19, protests very strongly against all predicating of attributes: Quis enim Deum dixerit fortem, constantem, frugi, sapientem? quis probum? quis sobrium? quis immo aliquid nosse? quis intelligere? quis providere? quis ad fines officiorum certus actionum suarum decreta dirigentem? Humana sunt hæc bona, et ex oppositione vitiorum existimationem meruerunt habere laudabilem. Quis est autem tam obtusi pectoris, tam bruti, qui humanis bonis Deum esse dicat magnum? aut ideo nominis majestate præcellere, quod vitiorum careat fœditate? Quidquid de Deo dixeris, quidquid tacitæ mentis cogitatione conceperis, in humanum transiit et corrumpitur sensum; nec habet propriæ significationis notam, quod nostris dicitur verbis, atque ad negotia humana compositis. Unus est hominis intellectus de Dei natura certissimus, si scias et sentias, nihil de illo posse mortali oratione depromi.

[2] De Civ. Dei xi. 10: Propter hoc itaque natura dicitur simplex, cui non sit aliquid habere, quod vel possit amittere; vel aliud sit habens, aliud quod habet; sicut vas aliquem liquorem, aut corpus colorem, aut aër lucem sive

fervorem, aut anima sapientiam. Nihil enim horum est id quod habet: nam neque vas liquor est, nec corpus color, nec aër lux sive fervor, neque anima sapientia est. Hinc est, quod etiam privari possunt rebus quas habent, et in alios habitus vel qualitates verti atque mutari, ut et vas evacuetur humore quo plenum est, et corpus decoloretur, et aër tenebrescat, et anima desipiat, etc. (This reasoning is identical with the proposition of *Schleiermacher*, that in that which is absolute the subject and the predicate are one and the same thing; see his work, Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 166.) Comp. *Boëthius* De Trin. 4: Deus vero hoc ipsum, quod est, Deus est; nihil enim aliud est, nisi quod est, ac per hoc ipsum Deus est. *Gregory the Great* treats of the attributes of God in the same manner, comp. *Lau*, p. 350, ss.

[3] God does not *know* things, because they are, but things are, because he *knows* them, *Aug.* l. c.: Ex quo occurrit animo quiddam mirum, sed tamen verum, quod iste mundus nobis notus esse non posset, nisi esset: Deo autem nisi notus esset, esse non posset. *Arnobius* had already taught (i. 31), that God is cause, place, and space (prima causa, locus et spatium rerum). So, too, Augustine says, loc. cit. qu. 20: Deus non alicubi est; quid enim alicubi est, continetur loco, quid loco continetur, corpus est. Non igitur alicubi est, et tamen quia est et in loco non est, in illo sunt potius omnia, quam ipse alicubi. He also excluded not only the idea of place, but (in reference to the *eternity* of God) that of succession of time, Conf. ix. 10. 2: *Fuisse* et *futurum esse* non est in vita divina, sed *esse* solum, quoniam æterna est. Nam fuisse et futurum esse non est æternum. Comp. de Civ. Dei xi. 5.—He also rejected the notion of Origen (condemned by Justinian) that God had created only as many beings as he could see to; De Civ. Dei xii. 18.

[4] *Lactantius* wrote a separate treatise: De Ira Dei (Inst. lib. v.) on this subject. His principal argument is the following: If God could not hate, he could not love; since he loves good, he must hate evil, and bestow good upon those whom he loves, evil upon those whom he hates. Comp. *Augustine*, de Vera Rel. c. 15: Justa vindicta peccati plus tamen clementiæ Domini quam severitatis ostendit. Ita enim nobis sic adetur a corporis voluptatibus ad æternam essentiam veritatis amorem nostrum oportere converti. Et est justitiæ pulchritudo cum benignitatis gratia concordans, ut, quoniam bonorum inferiorum dulcedine decepti sumus, amaritudine pœnarum erudiamur. De Civ. Dei i. 9, and elsewhere.

[5] *Chrys.* in Ep. ad Eph. Hom. i. (on ch. i. 5), distinguishes in this respect between an *antecedent* (*θέλημα προηγούμενον*), and a *subsequent* will (*θέλημα δεύτερον*). According to the former (*τὸ σφοδρὸν θέλημα, θέλημα εὐδοκίας*), all are to be saved, according to the latter sinners must be punished. Comp. the section on Predestination. [*August.* De Civ. Dei v. c. 9, de Lib. Arbitr. iii. c. 4. *Boëthius* De Cons. Phil. v.]

§ 127.

CREATION.

After the idea of generation from the essence of the Father was applied to the Son of God alone, and employed to denote the differ-

ence between him and the other persons of the Trinity on the one hand, and between him and all created beings on the other, the idea of *creation* was limited by a more precise definition. The views of Origen were combated by *Methodius*,[1] and rejected by the chief supporters of orthodoxy, viz., *Athanasius* and *Augustine*.[2] The figurative interpretation of the narrative of the fall fell into disrepute along with the allegorical system of interpretation. It became the more necessary to abide by the historical view of the Mosaic account, inasmuch as it forms the basis of the history of the fall, and its objective historical reality was the foundation of the Augustinian theology. But Augustine endeavored, even here, to spiritualize the literal as much as possible, and to blend it with the allegorical.[3] The dualistic theory of emanation held by the Manicheans and Priscillianists was still in conflict with the doctrine of a creation out of nothing.[4]

[1] In his work περὶ γενητῶν. Extracts from it are given by Photius Bibl. cod. 235, p. 301.

[2] *Athan.* Contra Arian. Orat. ii. (Opp. T. i. p. 336). *Augustine* endeavored to remove the idea of time from the notion of God, and to save the doctrine that the creation had a beginning in time, by representing God as the author of time. Conf. xi. 10, ss. c. 13 :.... Quæ tempora fuissent, quæ abs te condita non essent? Aut quomodo præterirent, si nunquam fuissent? Cum ergo sis operator omnium temporum, si fuit aliquod tempus, antequam feceras cœlum et terram, cur dicitur, quod ab opere cessabas? Id ipsum enim tempus tu feceras, nec præterire potuerunt tempora, antequam faceres tempora. Si autem ante cœlum et terram nullum erat tempus, cur quæritur, quid tunc faciebas? Non enim erat tunc, ubi non erat tempus. *Nec tu tempore tempora præcedis;* alioquin non omnia tempora præcederes. *Sed præcedis omnia præterita celsitudine semper præsentis æternitatis*, et superas omnia futura, quia illa futura sunt, et cum venerint, præterita erunt; tu autem idem ipse es, et anni tui non deficiunt.*—Cf. de Civ. Dei vii. 30: xi. 4–6: xii. 15–17.

[3] Thus he said, in reference to the six days: Qui dies cujusmodi sint, aut perdifficile nobis, aut etiam impossibile est cogitare, quanto magis dicere; De Civ. Dei xi. 6. Concerning the seventh day (ibid. 8), his views are very nearly those of Origen: Cum verò in die septimo requievit Deus ab omnibus operibus suis et sanctificavit eum, nequaquam est accipiendum *pueriliter*, tamquam Deus laboraverit operando, qui *dixit* et *facta sunt*, verbo intelligibili et sempiterno, non sonabili et temporali. Sed requies Dei requiem significat eorum, qui requiescunt in Deo, sicut lætitia domus lætitiam significat

* "*A confounding of the antagonism of the ideal and the real with that of the universal and particular, is the reason why in the above we neither have creation in time clearly enounced, nor yet the difference from (contrast with) the emanation theory distinctly brought out.... To make Augustine consistent, we must distinguish the eternal being of ideas in the divine intelligence, from that act of God by which they become productive. The former is then their ideal, the latter their real side,*" *etc.* *Schleiermacher*, Gesch. der Phil. i. p. 167.

eorum, qui lætantur in domo, etiamsi non eos domus ipsa, sed alia res aliqua lætos facit, etc. On the system of chronology, comp. xii. 10. On the whole, see *Bindemann's* Augustine, ii. 425 sq.

[4] *Baur*, Manichæischen Religionssystem, p. 42, ss.: "*The Manichean system acknowledges no creation, properly speaking, but only a mixture, by means of which the two opposite principles so pervade each other, that their product is the existing system of the world, which partakes of the nature of both.*" Comp. the statements of the Manichean Felix, which are there given. On the Priscillianists, see Orosii Commonitor. ad August. *Neander*, Church Hist. ii. 3, p. 710–718. *Baumgarten-Crusius*, Compend. i. p. 111. [*Gieseler*, i. § 86. *J. M. Mandernach*, Gesch. des Priscillianismus, Trier. 1851.]

§ 128.

THE RELATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

After the distinguishing characteristics of each of the persons of the Trinity had been more precisely defined (§ 95), the question arose among the theologians, to which of the persons the work of creation was to be assigned? While in the so-called Apostles' Creed, God the Father was simply and solely declared to be creator of the world, in the Nicene Creed the Son was said to have part in the creation, and the council of Constantinople asserted the same with regard to the Holy Ghost.[1] *Gregory of Nazianzum* maintained, in accordance with other theologians of this period, that the work of creation had been brought about by the Son, and completed by the Holy Ghost.[2] Following Augustine, the Western divines regarded creation as an act of the Triune God.[3]

[1] Symb. Ap.: Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem, creatorem cœli et terræ. Comp. what *Rufinus* says on this passage: he shows that all things are created *through* the Son. The Nicene Creed calls the Father *παντοκράτορα πάντων ὁρατῶν τε καὶ ἀοράτων ποιητήν*, but says in reference to the Son: *δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο, τά τε ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ*. The symbol of Constantinople calls the Holy Spirit *τὸ ζωοποιοῦν*.

[2] Orat. xxxviii: 9, p. 668:.....*καὶ τὸ ἐννόημα ἔργον ἦν, λόγῳ συμπληρούμενον καὶ πνεύματι τελειούμενον*. He calls the Son also *τεχνίτης λόγος*. Comp. *Ullmann*, p. 490.

[3] Thus *Fulgentius* of Ruspe De Trin. c. 8, and others.

§ 129.

DESIGN OF THE UNIVERSE.—PROVIDENCE.—PRESERVATION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD.

That creation was not for the sake of God,[1] but of man, was maintained as a doctrine and rhetorically set forth.[2] In opposition

to a mechanical view of the universe, the profound *Augustine* directed attention to the connection subsisting between creation and preservation.[1] Special care was bestowed during the present period upon the doctrine of providence, on which *Chrysostom* and *Theodoret* in the East, and *Salvian* in the West, composed separate treatises.[2] They took special pains to show, in accordance with the spirit of Christianity, that the providence of God extends to particulars.[3] *Jerome*, however, did not agree with them, and, thinking it derogatory to the Divine Being to exercise such special care respecting the lower creation, maintained that God concerns himself only about the genus, but not about the species.[4] He thus prepared the way for the distinction made by the African bishop *Junilius* (who lived about the middle of the sixth century), between gubernatio generalis and gubernatio specialis,[7] which, though justifiable from the theological standpoint, yet, when mechanically understood, was prejudicial to the idea of God as a living God.

[1] Thus *Augustine* maintained, De Vera Rel. 15, that the angels in serving God do not profit him, but themselves. Deus enim bono alterius non indiget, quoniam a se ipso est.

[2] *Nemesius* de Nat. Hom. i. p. 30, sq. (ed. Oxon. 1671): Ἀπέδειξεν οὖν ὁ Λόγος τὴν τῶν φυτῶν γένεσιν μὴ δι' ἑαυτὴν, ἀλλ' εἰς τροφὴν καὶ σύστασιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων γεγενημένην; and in reference to the animals he says, p. 34: κοινῇ δὲ πάντα πρὸς θεραπείαν ἀνθρώπων συντελεῖν πέφυκε, καὶ τὰ μὴ ταῖς ἄλλαις χρείαις χρήσιμα. In support of his views he adduces the example of useful domestic animals, and observes with regard to noxious animals, that they were not so prior to the fall, and that man possesses even now means sufficient to subdue them.—Comp. *Chrys.* Hom. πρὸς τοὺς καταλείψαντας τὴν ἐκκλησίαν (Opp. T. vi. p. 272. Ed. *Bauermeister*, p. 8): Ἥλιος ἀνέτειλε διὰ σὲ, καὶ σελήνη τὴν νύκτα ἐφώτισε, καὶ ποικίλος ἀστέρων ἀνέλαμψε χορός· ἔπνευσαν ἄνεμοι διὰ σὲ, ἔδραμον ποταμοί· σπέρματα ἐβλάστησαν διὰ σὲ, καὶ φῶτα ἀνεδόθη, καὶ τῆς φύσεως ὁ δρόμος τὴν οἰκείαν ἐτήρησε τάξιν, καὶ ἡμέρα ἐφάνη καὶ νὺξ παρῆλθε, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γέγονε διὰ σέ. But Chrysostom also teaches that God created the world δι' ἀγαθότητα μόνην, De Prov. i. T. iv. p. 142. Comp. *Aug.* de Div. Quæst. 28 (Opp. T. vi.). *Gregor. Nyss.* Or. Catech. c. 5; de Hominis Opificio c. 2, *Lact.* Inst. vii. 4.

[3] His general views on the subject may be seen in De Morib. Eccles. Cath. c. 6: Nullum enim arbitror aliquo religionis nomine teneri, qui non saltem animis nostris divina providentia consuli existimet.—He then objects particularly to the popular notion of a master-builder whose work continues to exist, though he himself withdraws. The world would at once cease to exist, if God were to deprive it of his presence; De Genesi ad Litt. iv. c. 12; Enchirid. ad Laurent. c. 27. He defends himself against the charge of pantheism, De Civ. Dei vii. 30: Sic itaque administrat omnia, quæ creavit, ut etiam ipsa proprios exercere et agere motus sinat. Quamvis enim nihil esse possint sine ipso, non sunt quod ipse. "*The world exists not apart from God,*

every thing is in God; this, however, is not to be understood as if God were space itself, but in a manner purely dynamic;" *Schleiermacher*, Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 168. *Gregory* of Nazianzum uses similar language, Orat. xvi. 5, p. 302, see *Ullmann*, p. 491.

[4] *Chrys.* 3 books de Fato et Providentia.—*Theodoret*, 10 orations περὶ τῆς θείας προνοίας.—*Salvianus* De Gubernatione Dei sive de Prov. Comp. also *Nemesius* de Natura Hominis (περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου), c. 42, ss.

[5] This is indirectly proved by *Arnob.* Adv. Gent. iv. 10, p. 142 (viz., in opposition to polytheism): Cur enim Deus præsit melli uni tantummodo, non præsit cucurbitis, rapis, non cunilæ, nasturtio, non ficis, betaceis, caulibus? Cur sola meruerint ossa tutelam, non meruerint ungues, pili, cæteraque alia, quæ locis posita in obscuris et verecundioribus partibus, et sunt casibus obnoxia plurimis, et curam magis deorum, diligentiamque desiderant. A direct proof is given by *Nemesius*, l. c. c. 44, p. 333: Πάντα γὰρ ἤρτηται τοῦ Θεοῦ θελήματος· καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀρύεται τὴν διαμονὴν καὶ σωτηρίαν. Ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀτόμων καὶ πεπληθυσμένων ὑπόστασις προνοίας ἐστὶ δεκτική, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ζώων τῶν ἀρχαῖς τισι καὶ ἡγεμονίαις διοικουμένων, ὧν πολλὰ εἴδη· καὶ γὰρ μέλισσαι καὶ μύρμηκες καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν συναγελαζομένων ὑπό τισιν ἡγεμόσι τέτακται, οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ πειθόμενα. Nemesius, however, makes a distinction between *creation* and *providence*, and gives a definition of the latter, c. 42, p. 308: Οὐ γὰρ ταὐτό ἐστι πρόνοια καὶ κτίσις· κτίσεως μὲν γὰρ τὸ καλῶς ποιῆσαι τὰ γινόμενα· προνοίας δὲ τὸ καλῶς ἐπιμεληθῆναι τῶν γενομένων; and c. 43, p. 315: Πρόνοια τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἐκ Θεοῦ εἰς τὰ ὄντα γινομένη ἐπιμέλεια· ὁρίζονται δὲ καὶ οὕτως αὐτήν· πρόνοιά ἐστι βούλησίς Θεοῦ, δι' ἣν πάντα τὰ ὄντα τὴν πρόσφορον ἐκβαίνει κ. τ. λ. Generally speaking, we find here a complete system of teleology.

[6] *Hier.* Comment. in Abacuc c. 1 (Opp. T. vi. p. 148): Sicut in hominibus etiam per singulos currit Dei providentia, sic in ceteris animalibus generalem quidem dispositionem et ordinem cursumque rerum intelligere possumus; verbi gratia: quomodo nascatur piscium multitudo et vivit in aquis, quomodo reptilia et quadrupedia oriantur in terra et quibus alantur cibis. Ceterum absurdum est ad hoc Dei deducere majestatem, ut sciat per momenta singula, quot nascantur culices, quotve moriantur [comp. on the other hand Matth. x. 29, 30], quæ cimicum et pulicum et muscarum sit multitudo in terra, quanti pisces in mari natent, et qui de minoribus majorum prædæ cedere debeant. Non simus tam fatui adulatores Dei, ut, dum potentiam ejus etiam ad ima detrahimus, *in nos ipsi injuriosi simus* (!), eandem rationabilium quam irrationabilium providentiam esse dicentes.—A similar notion had been already advanced by Arnobius, who does not even grant that God created the lower animals (Adv. Gent. ii. 47), from which indeed it must follow that there was a special providence for them (iv. 10).

[7] *Junil.* de Partibus Legis Divinæ, l. ii. c. 3, ss. (Bibl. Max. PP. T. x. p. 345). *Münscher*, by Cölln, i. p. 154. General providence manifests itself in the preservation of the genus, and the circumstances in which it is placed; special providence is displayed, 1, in the care of God for angels and men; 2, in that of the angels for men; and 3, in that of men for themselves.

§ 130.

THEODICY.

The controversy with the Manichees, whose notions were to some extent adopted by *Lactantius*,[1] required a more precise definition of the nature of evil, and such a distinction between physical and moral evil, as would represent the latter as the true source of the former. Hence the evils existing in the world were regarded either (objectively) as the necessary consequence and punishment of sin, or (subjectively) as phenomena which, though good in themselves, assumed the appearance of evil, only in consequence of our limited knowledge, or the corruption of our hearts, or the perverse use of our moral freedom. But the wise and pious, looking forward to that better time which is to come, use those evils as means of advancing in knowledge, and of practicing patience.[2]

[1] Inst. Div. ii. c. 8. Here he advances the unsatisfactory notion, which even Augustine seems to have entertained (Enchir. ad Laur. c. 27), that evil would exist, though it were merely for the sake of contrast; as if good were good only by the contrast which it forms with bad, and would cease to be so if there were no contrast.

[2] *Athan.* Contra Gent. c. 7. *Basil M.* in Hexaëm. Hom. ii. 4. Hom. quod Deus non est auctor malorum (the passage should be read in its connection) Opp. T. ii. p. 78 (al. i. p. 361). *Klose*, p. 54–59. *Greg. Nyss.* Orat. Catech. c. 6. *Greg. Naz.* Orat. xiv. 30, 31, xvi. 5 (quoted by *Ullmann*, p. 493). *Chrys.* in 2 Tim. Hom. viii. (Opp. xii. 518, E.). *Aug.* de Civ. Dei xi. 9: Mali enim nulla natura est, sed amissio boni mali nomen accepit. Comp. c. 22. Fire, frost, wild beasts, poison, etc., may all be useful in their proper place, and in connection with the whole; it is only necessary to make such a use of them as accords with their design. Thus poison causes the death of some, but heals others; meat and drink injure only the immoderate. ... Unde nos admonet divina providentia, non res insipienter vituperare, sed utilitatem rerum diligenter inquirere, et ubi nostrum ingenium vel firmitas deficit, ita credere occultam, sicut erant quædam, quæ vix potuimus invenire; quia et ipsa utilitatis occultatio, aut humilitatis exercitatio est aut elationis attritio; cum omnino natura nulla sit malum, nomenque hoc non sit nisi privationis boni. Sed a terrenis usque ad cœlestia et a visibilibus usque ad invisibilia sunt aliis alia bona meliora; ad hoc inæqualia, ut essent omnia, etc. Comp. de Vera Rel. c. 12. Evils are beneficial as punishments, ibid. c. 15. . amaritudine pœnarum erudiamur. On the question, why the righteous have to suffer as well as the unrighteous, see de Civ. Dei i. 8–10. Christians rise above all trials only by love to God: *toto mundo est omnino sublimior mens inhærens Deo*, De Morib. Eccles. Cath. c. 11. This seems to be the turning-point of every theodicy (Rom. viii. 28).

§ 131.

ANGELOLOGY AND ANGELOLATRY.

J. P. Carpzovii Varia Historia Angelicorum ex Epiphanio et aliorum veterum Monumentis eruta. Helmst. 1772, 4. *Keil*, Opuscula Academica, ii. p. 548, ss.

When the ideas of generation and procession from the Father came to be exclusively applied to the Son and the Holy Ghost, it also began to be stated more and more sharply that the angels are creatures, and not æons emanating from the essence of God.[1] Nevertheless, they were still regarded as highly endowed beings far superior to mankind.[2] Reverence was paid to them; but *Ambrose* was the only father during this period—and he did it merely in a passing remark—who recommended the invocation of angels.[3] But both the prohibition of the worship of angels (angelolatry) by the synod of Laodicea (about the middle of the fourth century), and the testimony of *Theodoret* prove, that such a worship must have been practised in some parts of the East (perhaps coming from earlier ages).[4] *Theodoret*, as well as *Augustine*, opposed the adoration, or at least the invocation, of angels, which was disapproved of even by *Gregory I.*, who would have it that it was confined to the Old Testament dispensation.[5] But the practice of dedicating churches to angels,[6] which was favored by emperors and bishops, would necessarily confirm the people in their belief, that angels heard and answered prayer, notwithstanding all dogmatic explanations. As to other dogmatic definitions concerning the nature of angels, *Gregory of Nazianzum* asserted that they were created prior to the rest of the world; others, *e. g.*, Augustine, dated their existence from the first day of creation.[7] In the work of *Pseudo-Dionysius* (De Hierarchia Cœlesti), which, though composed during the present period, did not come into general use till the next, the angels were systematically divided, almost in the style of a natural history, into three classes and nine orders.[8]

[1] *Lact.* Inst. iv. c. 8: Magna inter Dei filium et *cæteros* [sic] *angelos* differentia est. Illi enim ex Deo taciti spiritus exierunt..... Ille vero cum voce ac sono ex Dei ore processit.

[2] *Basil M.* de Spir. S. c. 16, calls the angels ἀέριον πνεῦμα, πῦρ ἄϋλον according to Ps. civ. 4, and hence ascribes to them a certain corporeity. *Gregory af Nazianzum* says, Orat. vi. 12, p. 187:.....φῶς εἰσι καὶ τελείου φωτὸς ἀπαυγάσματα. According to Orat. xxviii. 31, p. 521, ss., the angels are servants of the divine will, powerful partly by original and partly by derived strength, moving from place to place, every where present, and

ready to assist all, not only by reason of their zeal to serve, but also on account of the lightness of their bodies; different parts of the world are assigned to different angels, or placed under their dominion (Orat. xlii. 9, p. 755, and 27, p. 768), as *he* knows who has ordained and arranged all things. They have all *one* object in view (Orat. vi. 12, p. 187), and act all according to the *one* will of the creator of the universe. They praise the divine greatness, and ever behold the eternal glory; not that God may thus be glorified, but that unceasing blessings may flow even upon those beings who stand nearest to God. Comp. *Ullmann*, p. 494, 95. *Augustine* calls the angels *sancti angeli*, De Civ. Dei xi. 9. In another passage, in a more rhetorical strain (Sermo 46), they are called domestici Dei, cœli cives, principes Paradisi, scientiæ magistri, doctores sapientiæ, illuminatores animarum, custodes earum corporum, relatores et depensores bonorum. *Fulgentius of Ruspe*, De Trin. c. 8 (on the authority of great and learned men), asserts that they are composed of body and spirit; they know God by the latter, and appear to men by means of the former. According to *Gregory the Great*, the angels are limited (circumscripti) spirits, without bodies, while God alone is incircumscriptus; Dial. lib. iv. c. 29; Moral. ii. c. 3. He also terms them rationalia animalia, see *Lau*, loc. cit. p. 357 sq.

[3] *Ambrose* De Viduis, cap. ix. § 55: Videtis enim quod magno peccatc obnoxia minus idonea sit quæ pro a precetur, certe quæ pro se impetret. Adhibeat igitur ad medicum alios precatores. Ægri enim, nisi ad eos aliorum precibus medicus fuerit invitatus, pro se rogare non possunt. Infirma est caro, mens ægra est, et peccatorum vinculis impedita, ad medici illius sedem debite non potent explicare vestigium. *Obsecrandi sunt angeli, qui nobis ad præsidium dati sunt:* martyres obsecrandi, quorum videmur nobis quoddam corporis pignore patrocinium vindicare. Possunt pro peccatis rogare nostris, qui proprio sanguine, etiamsi quæ habuerunt, peccata luerunt... Non erubescamus *eos intercessores nostræ infirmitatis* adhibere, quia et ipsi infirmitatem corporis, etiam cum vincerent, cognoverunt. Though he thus mentions angels and martyrs as mediating persons, yet soon after he counsels men tc the direct invocation of the Divine physician himself.

[4] *Theodoret* ad Col. ii. 18, and iii. 17 (quoted by *Münscher* von Cölln, i. 86).—Conc. Laod. (A. D. 320–372?) in Can. 35; *Mansi* ii. p. 570; see *Fuchs*, ii. p. 330, ss.; *Bruns*, Bibl. Eccles. i. p. 77. *Gieseler*, Church History, i. § 99, note 32–34, § 121, note 7: Ὅτι οὐ δεῖ χριστιανοὺς ἐγκαταλείπειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἀπιέναι καὶ ἀγγέλους ὀνομάζειν καὶ συνάξεις ποιεῖν ἅπερ ἀπηγόρευται. It is worthy of notice that Dionysius translates *angulos* instead of *angelos*.

[5] *Theodoret*, l. c. *Eusebius* (Præp. Evang. vii. 15) already makes a distinction between τιμᾶν and σέβειν. Only the first is to be rendered to the angels. *Aug.* De Vera Rel. c. 55: Neque enim et nos videndo *angelos* beati sumus, sed videndo *veritatem*, qua etiam ipsos diligimus angelos et his congratulamur.... Quare honoramus eos caritate, non servitute. Nec eis templa construimus; nolunt enim, se sic honorari a nobis, quia nos ipsos, cum boni sumus, templa summi Dei esse noverunt. Recte itaque scribitur (Rev. xxii.) hominem ab angelo prohibitum, ne se adoraret, sed unum Deum, sub quo ei esset et ille conservus. Comp. Contra Faust. xx. 21, Conf. x. 42, and other

passages quoted by *Keil*, l. c. p. 552. Yet, in his Sermons, he insists upon the duty of loving the angels and of honoring them. He also believes in tutelary angels. *Gregory M.* in Cant. Cant. c. 8 (Opp. T. ii. p. 454).

[6] Constantine the Great had built a church at Constantinople (Μιχαήλιον) to St. Michael,* Sozom. Hist. Eccl. ii. 3; and *Theodoret* (l. c.) says in reference to the Phrygians and Pisidians: Μέχρι δὲ τοῦ νῦν εὐκτήρια τοῦ ἁγίου Μιχαὴλ παρ' ἐκείνοις καὶ τοῖς ὁμόροις ἐκείνων ἐστιν ἰδεῖν. The Emperor Justinian, and Avitus, bishop of Vienne (†523) also formally dedicated to angels churches built in honor of them.

[7] *Greg. Naz.* xxxviii. 9, p. 668. All the angels together form, in his opinion, the κόσμος νοητός, as distinct from the κόσμος αἰσθητός, ὑλικὸς καὶ ὁρώμενος. Comp. *Ullmann*, p. 497. *Augustine* expresses himself differently, De Civ. Dei xi. 9. In his opinion, they are the light which was created in the beginning before all other creatures; at the same time, he so explains the dies unus (instead of primus, יוֹם אֶחָד), that this *one* day of light included the other days of creation, and then continues: Cum enim dixit Deus: *fiat lux, et facta est lux*, si recte in hac luce creatio intelligitur angelorum, profecto facti sunt participes lucis æternæ, quod [quæ] est ipsa incommutabilis sapientia Dei, per quam facta sunt omnia, quem dicimus unigenitum Dei filium, ut ea luce illuminati, qua creati, fierent lux, et vocarentur dies participatione incommutabilis lucis et diei, quod est verbum Dei, per quod et ipsi et omnia facta sunt. Lumen quippe verum, quod illuminat omnem hominem in hunc mundum venientem, hoc illuminat et omnem angelum mundum, ut sit lux non in se ipso, sed in Deo: a quo si avertitur angelus, fit immundus.

[8] Some of the earlier theologians, *e. g.*, *Basil the Great*, and *Gregory of Nazianzum*, held that there were different orders of angels on the basis of different names given to them in Scripture. Basil de Spir. S. c. 16. Gregory Orat. xxviii. 31, p. 521, mentions ἀγγέλους τινὰς καὶ ἀρχαγγέλους, θρόνους, κυριότητας, ἀρχὰς, ἐξουσίας, λαμπρότητας, ἀναβάσεις, νοερὰς δυνάμεις ἢ νόας. He does not, however, distinctly state by what these different classes are distinguished, since he thinks these internal relations of the world of spirits beyond the reach of human apprehension; *Ullmann*, p. 494. Comp. *Augustine* Enchirid. ad Laur. 58: Quomodo autem se habeat beatissima illa et superna societas, quæ ibi sint differentiæ personarum, ut cum omnes tamquam generali nomine angeli nuncupentur.....ego me ista ignorare confiteor. Sed nec illud quidem certum habeo, utrum ad eandem societatem pertineant sol et luna et cuncta sidera, etc. But *Pseudo-Dionysius*, hardly a century after Augustine, seems to have understood the subject much better; in his Hierarchia Cœlestis (Ed. *Lansselii*, Par. 1615 fol.) c. 6, he divided the whole number of angels into three classes (hierarchies), and subdivided each class into three orders (τάγματα): i. 1. Θρόνοι, 2. Χερουβίμ, 3. Σεραφίμ, ii. 4. κυριότητες, 5. ἐξουσίαι, 6. δυνάμεις, iii. 7. ἀρχαί, 8. ἀρχάγγελοι, 9. ἄγγελοι. He nevertheless observed that the last term, as well as

* It was so called, not because it was *consecrated* to the archangel Michael, but because it was believed that he appeared there (Sozomen, ii. 3); comp. *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. p. 332.

δυνάμεις οὐράνιαι, was common to all (c. 11).* *Gregory the Great* followed him (Hom. in Ezekiel xxxiv. 7, Opp. Tom. i. p. 1603, al. ii. p. 477), and knows the following nine classes: Angeli, Archangeli, Virtutes, Potestates, Principatus, Dominationes, Throni, Cherubim atque Seraphim, which he brought into connection with the nine precious stones spoken of in Ezek. xxviii. 13. At the same time he holds that the angels, through love, have all in common; see *Lau*, p. 359.

§ 132.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

Metaphysical definitions of the nature of angels were of less interest in the religious and moral, and consequently in the dogmatic point of view, than the question, whether angels, like men, possessed a free will, and were capable of sinning? It was generally admitted that this had been the case prior to the fall of the evil angels. But theologians did not agree in their opinions respecting another point, viz., whether the good angels who at first resisted temptation will never yield to it, or whether it is possible that they too may fall into sin? *Gregory of Nazianzum*, and still more decidedly *Cyril of Jerusalem*, pronounced in favor of the latter view,[1] *Augustine* and *Gregory the Great* adopted the former.[2]

[1] *Gregory* thought that the angels were not ἀκίνητοι, but δυσκίνητοι to evil (Orat. xxviii. 31, p. 521), and supposed that this necessarily follows from the fact that Lucifer once fell, Orat. xxxviii. 9, p. 668. Orat. xlv. 5, p. 849. *Ullmann*, p. 496. Comp. also *Basil the Great* (de Spir. S. c. 16).—But *Cyril* of Jerusalem (Cat. ii. 10) insisted that the predicate "sinless" should be applied to none but Christ, and maintained that the angels too stood in need of pardon.—Comp. *Lactantius* Inst. vii. 20: Angeli Deum metuunt, quia *castigari* ab eo possunt inenarrabili quodam modo.

[2] *Augustine* de Ver. Rel. i. 13: Fatendum est enim, et angelos natura esse mutabiles, si solus Deus est incommutabilis; sed ea voluntate, qua magis Deum quam se diligunt, *firmi et stabiles manent in illo* et fruuntur majestate ipsius, ei uni libentissime subditi. According to the Enchiridion, c. 28, the good angels received, after the fall of the evil ones, what they had not had before, viz., certam scientiam, qua essent de sua sempiterna et nunquam

* Pseudo-Dionysius, however (cap. 1 and 2), endeavored to remove the gross and sensuous ideas about the forms of the angels, and designated the common terminology as ἀπότομον τῶν ἀγγελικῶν ὀνομάτων σκευήν (durum angelicorum nominum apparatum); comp. his mystical interpretation of the symbols of angels in cap. 15. [*Baur*, Dogmengesch. p. 172, says that in this hierarchy, where all is measured by quantitative distinctions, the difference between the Platonic and Christian view becomes evident—the Christian view being, that there is a direct union of God and man; and that Augustine (De Civ. Dei, 9, 16) well expressed this difference, by directly denying the Platonic thesis—*nullus Deus miscetur homini*.]

casura stabilitate securi; this idea is evidently in accordance with his anthropological views about the donum perseverantiæ, and is distinctly brought forward in De Civ. Dei xi. 13: Quis enim catholicus christianus ignorat nullum novum diabolum ex bonis angelis ulterius futurum: sicut nec istum in societatem bonorum angelorum ulterius rediturum? Veritas quippe in Evangelio sanctis fidelibusque promittit, quod erunt æquales angelis Dei? quibus etiam promittitur, quod ibunt in vitam æternam. Porro autem si nos certi sumus nunquam nos ex illa immortali felicitate casuros, illi vero certi non sunt: jam potiores, non æquales eis erimus, profecto etiam ipsi certi sunt suæ felicitatis æternæ. Comp. Pseudo-Dionys. c. 7. *Gregory the Great* also asserted that the good angels obtained the confirmatio in bono as a gift of God; Ezech. lib. i. hom. 7, Mor. v. c. 38, and xxxvi. c. 7, *Lau*, p. 362.

§ 133.

DEVIL AND DEMONS.

[Isaac Taylor, Ancient Christianity, 4th ed. 1844, vol. ii. 137–222, on the Ancient Demonolatry.]

According to the prevailing opinion of the age, *pride* was the immediate and real cause of the fall of the evil spirits.[1] Almost all the theologians of this period, with the exception of *Lactantius*, whose notions resembled those of the dualistic Manicheans,[2] regarded the devil as a being of limited power,[3] whose seductions Christian believers were able to resist.[4] *Didymus of Alexandria* and *Gregory of Nyssa* ventured—though with great caution—to revive the notion of Origen, that there was still hope of the final conversion of the devil.[5] *Cyril of Jerusalem*, *Jerome*, and *Augustine* combated this opinion, which was condemned in the sixth century by the Emperor Justinian, together with the other errors of Origen.[6] It was, moreover, supposed that demoniacal powers were still in operation,[7] and were most effectually resisted not only by the moral, but also by the physical and magical efficacy of the name of Christ, and the sign of the cross.[8]

[1] *Eusebius* Demonst. Evang. iv. 9. *Augustine* De Vera Rel. i. 13: Ille autem angelus magis se ipsum, quam Deum diligendo subditus ei esse noluit et *intumuit per superbiam*, et a summa essentia defecit et lapsus est, et ob hoc minus est quam fuit, quia eo quod minus erat frui voluit, quum magis voluit sua potentia frui, quam Dei. De Catechiz. Rudibus § 30: *Superbiendo* deseruit obedientiam Dei et Diabolus factus est. De Civ. Dei xii. c. 6: Cum vero causa miseriæ malorum angelorum quæritur, ea merito occurrit, quod ab illo qui summe est aversi ad se ipsos conversi sunt, qui non summe sunt: et hoc vitium quid aliud quam superbia nuncupatur? *Initium* quippe *omnis peccati superbia*. Comp. Enchirid. ad Laurent. c. 28. *Envy* was joined

with *pride;* comp. *Gregory of Nazianz.* Orat. xxxvi. 5, p. 637, and vi. 13, p. 187. *Ullmann*, p. 499. *Gregory of Nyssa*, Orat. Catech. c. 6: Ταῦτα δὲ [viz., the excellence of the first man] τῷ ἀντικειμένῳ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν φθόνον πάθους ὑπεκκαύματα ἦν. *Cassian*, Collat. viii. 6, makes mention of both superbia and invidia. *Gregory the Great* also emphasizes pride; by this the devil was seduced to strive after a privata celsitudo; Moral. xxi. c. 2; xxxiv. c. 21; *Lau*, p. 365.—The idea of lasciviousness was put more and more into the background. *Chrysostom*, *Theodoret*, *Cyril* of Alexandria, *Augustine*, and *Cassian*, gave also a more correct interpretation of the passage in Gen. vi. 2, which was misunderstood by earlier theologians: although *Eusebius* (Præp. Ev. v. 4), *Ambrose* de Noë et Arca, c. 4, and *Sulpicius Severus* (Hist. Sacra, i. 3), explained it in a sense similar to that which was formerly attached to it (§ 52, note 3). Comp. *Chrys.* Hom. in Gen. xxii. (Opp. T. ii. p. 216). [S. R. Maitland, in Brit. Mag. xxi. p. 389 sq., and in his Essays (on False Worship, p. 19 sq.), 1856. *C. F. Keil*, in Zeitschrift f. d. luth. Theol. 1855 and 1859; *Engelhardt*, ibid. 1856. *Delitzsch*, review of Kurtz in Reuter's Repertorium, 1857. Bibliotheca Sacra, Andover, 1850. Journal of Sacred Lit. Oct. 1858.] *Theodoret* in Gen. Quæst. 47 (Opp. T. i. p. 58): Ἐμβρόντητοι ὄντες καὶ ἄγαν ἠλίθιοι, ἀγγέλους τούτους ἀπέλαβον; and Fab. Hær. Ep. v. 7, Opp. iv. p. 402: Παραπληξίας γὰρ ἐσχάτης τὸ τοῖς ἀγγέλοις προσάψαι τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀκολασίαν. *Cyril Alex.* Contra Anthropomorphitas, c. 17 (Opp. T. vi. p. 384); Contra Julian, lib. ix. p. 296, 297. *Augustine* De Civ. Dei xv. 23; quæst. 3 in Gen.; Cassian Coll. viii. c. 20, 21. [Comp. *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, i. p. 90–92.] *Hilary* (in Ps. cxxxii. p. 403), mentions the earlier interpretation, but without approval. *Philastrius*, on the contrary, numbers it among the heresies, Hær. 107 (De Gigantibus tempore Noë).

[1] Inst. ii. 8. Previous to the creation of the world God created a spirit like unto himself (the Logos), who possessed the attributes of the Father; but after that he created another spirit, in whom the divine seed did not remain (in quo indoles divinæ stirpis non permansit). Moved by *envy* he apostatized, and changed his name (contrarium sibi nomen ascivit). The Greek writers call him διάβολος, the Latin criminator, quod crimina, in quæ ipse illicit, ad Deum deferat (hence the appellation obtrectator). He envies especially his predecessor (the first-born), because he continued to enjoy the favor of God.—Lactantius thus agrees with the other theologians in supposing that envy was the cause of the fall. But his peculiar manner of representing Satan, as it were, as the second Son of God, and of drawing a parallel between him and the first-born, reminds us of Gnostic and Manichean notions. In another passage (now wanting in many MSS., but probably omitted at an early period to save the reputation of Lactantius), he calls the Logos the right, and Satan the left hand of God. If the passage in question were genuine, it would go to prove very clearly that the views of Lactantius on this subject were essentially Manichean, though the unity of the Father would be still preserved above the antagonism of Logos and Satan; but this notion would justly expose its author to the charge of Arianism. This seems to have been felt by those critics who omitted the above passage. Comp. the note of *Cellarius* in the edition of *Bünemann*, i. p. 218. Comp. cap. ix.

where the term *Antitheus* occurs (Arnob. Contra Gent. iv. 12, and *Orelli* on that passage). *Augustine* opposed the Manichean notion; contra Faust. 21, 1, and 2.*

[8] *Gregory the Great* calls him outright a stupid animal, since he entertains hopes respecting heaven without being able to obtain it, and is caught in his own net; Mor. xxxiii. c. 15. *Lau*, p. 364.

[4] *Gregory of Nazianz.* Orat. xl. 10, p. 697, makes special mention of the *water of baptism*, and the *Spirit*, as the means, by which to quench the arrows of the wicked. Satan had no power over Christ; deceived by his human appearance, he took him for a mere man. But the Christian who is united to Christ by faith, can likewise resist him, Orat. xxiv. 10, p. 443: Παχύτεραι γὰρ αἱ καθαραὶ ψυχαὶ καὶ θεοειδεῖς πρὸς θήραν τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος, κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα σοφιστικὸς ᾖ καὶ ποικίλος τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν. The assertion of *Hilary* on Ps. cxli. p. 541, quidquid inquinatum homines gerunt, a Diabolo suggeritur, met with opposition on the part of *Gennadius* De Eccles. Dogm. c. 48: Non omnes malæ cogitationes nostræ semper Diaboli instinctu excitantur, sed aliquoties ex nostri arbitrii motu emergunt. Comp. also *Chrys.* De Prov. c. 5 (Opp. iv. 150). *Augustine* De Advers. Leg. ii. 12, and elsewhere.

[5] *Didym.* Enarr. Epp. Cathol. e vers. lat. (Bibl. PP. Max. T. iv. p. 325, C), in commenting on 1 Pet. iii. 22, merely says that Christ accomplished the work of redemption for all rational beings (cuncta rationalia). *Gregory of Nyssa* expressed himself more explicitly, Orat. Catech. c. 26 (see in *Münscher* von Cölln, i. p. 97), but Germanus contested the genuineness of the passage in Photius Cod. 233. *Orosius*, too, complained, in a letter to Augustine (Opp. Aug. T. viii.), that some men revived the erroneous views of Origen on this point.

[6] *Cyril* of Jerusalem, Cat. iv. p. 51, ascribed to the devil an obdurate heart and incorrigible will; comp. *Augustine* ad Orosium contra Priscillian. et Orig. c. 5, ss. (Opp. T. viii. p. 433, ss.); De Civ. Dei xxi. 17:.....Qua in re misericordior profecto fuit Origenes, qui et ipsum Diabolum atque angelos ejus post graviora pro meritis et diuturniora supplicia ex illis cruciatibus eruendos atque sociandos sanctis angelis credidit. Sed illium et propter hoc et propter alia nonnulla.....non immerito reprobavit ecclesia. He shows, too, that the final deliverance of the devil necessarily follows from the idea of the remission of the punishments of hell in the case of all condemned men; but that this notion, being opposed to the word of God, is only the more perverse and dangerous, in proportion as it seems gracious and mild in the eyes of men. [*Jerome*, Ep. 84, and Pammach. et Ocean. p. 528, Ep. 124, ad Avitum, p. 920.]—Concerning the final condemnation of Origen's opinion, see *Mansi*, T. ix. p. 399, 518.—According to *Gregory the Great*, the devil still enjoys, even in his condemned estate, a potentia sublimitatis, Mor. xxiv. 20; xxxii. c. 12, 15. He rejoices in scattering evil broadcast, and has great power, which, however, has been broken by Christ. Final punishment will be inflicted upon him after the general judgment. Before this he will appear as Anti-Christ; *Lau*, p. 365 sq., gives the passages.

[7] *Eusebius* Præp. Ev. iii. c. 14–16. *Aug.* De Civ. Dei ii. c. 24; x. 21:

* The very appropriate passage quoted by *Baumgarten-Crusius*, p. 987: Diabolus non simpliciter Deus est, sed illis Deus existit, qui illum Christo anteponunt (according to 2 Cor. iv. 4), is the same in sense, though the identical words are not found here.

Moderatis autem præfinitisque temporibus, etiam potestas permissa dæmonibus, ut hominibus quos possident excitatis inimicitias adversus Dei civitatem tyrannice exerceant.—*Posidonius*, a physician, combated (according to Philostorgius Hist. Eccl. viii. c. 10), the current opinion that madness proceeds from demoniacal influences, asserting that, Οὐχὶ δαιμόνων ἐπιθέσει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐκβακχεύεσθαι, ὑγρῶν δέ τινων κακοχυμίαν τὸ πάθος ἐργάζεσθαι, μηδὲ γὰρ εἶναι παράπαν ἰσχὺν δαιμόνων, ἀνθρώπων φύσιν ἐπηρεάζουσαν. The popular view, nevertheless, continued to be defended in most theological systems.

[8] *Athanasius* De Incarn. Verbi Dei c. 48, Opp. T. i. p. 89. *Cyril* Hier. Cat. xiii. 36: [Ὁ σταυρὸς] σημεῖον πιστῶν καὶ φόβος δαιμόνων·.....ὅταν γὰρ ἴδωσι τὸν σταυρὸν, ὑπομιμνήσκονται τοῦ ἐσταυρωμένου, φοβοῦνται τὸν συντρίψοντα τὰς κεφαλὰς τοῦ δράκοντος. *Cassian* Coll. viii. 19, distinguishes the true power of faith which defeats the demons, from the magical power, which even the ungodly may exert over evil spirits, when these obey them as servants (familiares). The poem of Severus Sanctus Endelechius, De Mortibus Bonum, contains a lively description of the magical efficacy of the sign of the cross against demoniacal influences, even in the animal kingdom. (Comp. the edition of *Piper*, Gött. 1835, 8: a number of other passages on the point in question are quoted from the works of the fathers in the introduction to this edition.)

V. 105, ss.: Signum, quod perhibent esse crucis Dei,
Magnis qui colitur solus in urbibus,
Christus, perpetui gloria numinis,
Cujus filius unicus:
Hoc signum mediis frontibus additum
Cunctarum pecudum certa salus fuit.
Sic vero Deus hoc nomine præpotens
Salvator vocitatus est.
Fugit continuo sæva lues greges,
Morbis nil licuit. Si tamen hunc Deum
Exorare velis, credere sufficit:
Votum sola fides juvat.

3. SOTERIOLOGY.

§ 134.

REDEMPTION THROUGH CHRIST.

The Death of Jesus.

Döderlein, De Redemtione a Potestate Diaboli, insigni Christi Beneficio (Diss. Inaugur. 1774, 75), in his Opuscula Academica, Jena, 1789. *Baur*, die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung, pp. 67–118. [Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, iii. 1, p. 157 sq. 1859, cf. § 68.]

The doctrine of the devil occupied during this period a prominent place in Soteriology, inasmuch as *Gregory of Nyssa* and other theo-

logians still maintained the notion previously held, that God defrauded the devil by a dishonest exchange.[1] Though the idea in this form was opposed by *Gregory of Nazianzum*,[2] yet it prevailed for some time under different modifications.[3] Meanwhile the idea of a penalty endured on the part of God gained the preponderance, after its advocacy by Athanasius.[4] To this was soon added the further notion, that by the giving up of the infinitely precious life of Jesus, more than the debt was paid; though this is found rather in rhetorical amplifications of the theme than in strict dogmatic definitions.[5] Generally speaking, the doctrine was not presented in a final and conclusive form. Along, however, with the objective mode of regarding the death of Christ, we also find the subjective; including in the latter not only the ethical (in which the death of Christ is viewed as a pattern for our imitation),[6] but also the typical and symbolical (mystical), reposing upon the idea of an intimate connection of the whole human race with Christ as its head.[7] It was, moreover, generally held that the redemptive principle was found not only in the death of the Saviour, but in his whole divine and human manifestation and life.[8] Free scope was still left to investigation respecting the particular *mode* of redemption.[9]

[1] *Gregory of Nyssa*, Orat. Cat. c. 22–26. The train of his argument is as follows: Men have become slaves of the devil by sin. Jesus offered himself to the devil as the ransom which should release all others. The crafty devil assented, because he cared more for the *one* Jesus, so much superior to them, than for all the rest. But, notwithstanding his craft, he was deceived, since he could not retain Jesus in his power. It was, as it were, a deception on the part of God* (ἀπάτη τίς ἐστι τρόπον τινά), that Jesus veiled his Divine nature, which the devil would have feared, by means of his humanity, and thus deceived the devil by the appearance of flesh. But Gregory allows such a deception according to the jus talionis; the devil had first deceived men, for the purpose of seducing them; but the design of God in deceiving the devil was a good one, viz., to redeem mankind. (Gregory's arguments looks very much like the well-known maxim, "that the end sanctifies the means."—This dramatic representation of the subject includes, however, that other more profound idea, carried out with much ingenuity in many of the wondrous legends of the middle ages, that the devil, notwithstanding his subtility, is at last outwitted by the wisdom of God, and appears in the comparison as a stupid devil.) Comp. *Ambrose* in Ev. Luc. Opp. iii. Col. 10. i.: Oportuit *hanc fraudem* Diabolo fieri, ut susciperet corpus Dominus Jesus, et corpus hoc corruptibile, corpus infirmum, ut crucifigeretur ex infirmitate. *Rufinus*, Expos. p. 21: Nam sacramentum illud susceptæ carnis hanc habet causam, ut divina filii Dei virtus velut hamus quidam habitu humanæ carnis obtectus...principem mundi invitare possit ad agonem: cui ipse carnem suam velut escam tradidit, ut hamo eum divini-

* The close affinity between this supposition and Docetism, which ever and anon endeavored to crop out, is very plain. See *Baur*, l. c. p. 82, 83.

tatis intrinsecus teneret insertum et effusione immaculati sanguinis, qui peccati maculam nescit, omnium peccata deleret, eorum duntaxat, qui cruore ejus postes fidei suæ significassent. Sicuti ergo hamum esca conseptum si piscis rapiat, non solum escam cum hamo non removet, sed ipse de profundo esca aliis futurus educitur: ita et is, qui habebat mortis imperium, rapuit quidem in mortem corpus Jesu, non sentiens in eo hamum divinitatis inclusum; sed ubi devoravit, hæsit ipse continuo, et disruptis inferni claustris, velut de profundo extractus traditur, ut esca ceteris fiat (in allusion to certain passages in Scripture, especially to Job: Adduces draconem in hamo et pones capistrum circa nares ejus), *Leo M.* Sermo xxii. 3, and other passages (see Perthel, u. s. p. 171 sq.). *Greg. M.* in Ev. L. i. Hom. 16, 2, and 25. 8. quoted by *Münscher* von Cölln, i. p. 431 (comp. *Lau*, l. c. p. 445, ss.); and *Isidore Hispal.* Sent. lib. iii. dist. 19 (illusus est Diabolus morte Domini quasi avis), quoted by *Baur*, p. 79.

[*Baur*, Dogmengesch. 189 sq. The three chief elements of the doctrine were: 1. The idea of justice—the right of the devil, etc., and the satisfaction of it. 2. The deception practiced upon the devil, further carried out by Gregory of Nyssa, in the idea that the Saviour, in his incarnation, deceived the devil by his very flesh. 3. The necessity of this mode of redemption is not absolute, but relative; Divine omnipotence might have chosen another, but this was the most fitting. *Thomasius*, Christi Person u. Werk. iii., gives the result of the discussion in this period hus: The two theories of deliverance from the devil and atonement by sacrifice, gradually pass over into each other—and this by means of the intermediate idea of death. In proportion, however, as the death is referred to the divine causality, and viewed in the light of Genes. ii. 17, and Gal. iii. 10, Christ's death, too, is viewed as punishment for human sin, as the bearing of the curse, and is consequently referred to the divine justice. A theory of satisfaction begins to be developed. The thought of a reconciliation of justice with mercy, though frequently adduced to explain the redemption from the devil, is only seldom, and, in the way of allusion, applied to the atonement. But it is already evident to what the main drift of the doctrine is tending.]

[1] Orat. xlv. p. 691, C: "We were under the dominion of the wicked one, inasmuch as we were sold unto sin, and exchanged pleasure for vileness. If it now be true that a ransom is always paid to him who is in the possession of the thing for which it is due, I would ask, to whom was it paid in this case? and for what reason? Perhaps to Satan himself? But it would be a burning shame to think so (φεῦ τῆς ὕβρεως). For in that case the robber had not only received *from* God, but God himself (in Christ) as a ransom and an exceedingly great recompense of his tyranny.....Or is it paid to the Father himself? But in the first place it might be asked, how could that be, since God did not hold us in bondage? And again, how can we satisfactorily explain it, *that the Father delighted in the blood of the only begotten Son?* since he did not even accept the offer of Isaac, but substituted the sacrifice of a ram in the place of a rational being? Is it not then evident that the Father received the ransom, not because he demanded or needed it, but on account of the divine economy (διὰ τὴν οἰκονομίαν), and because man is to be sanctified by the incarnation of God; that having subdued the

tyrant, he might deliver and reconcile us to himself by the intercession of his Son?" See *Ullmann*, p. 456, '57. Gregory was, nevertheless, disposed to admit some artifice on the part of Christ in the contest in which he conquered Satan. "It consisted in this, that Christ assumed the form of man, in consequence of which the devil thought that he had only to do with a being like ourselves, while the power and glory of the Godhead dwelt in him." Orat. xxxix. 13, p. 685. *Ullmann*, l. c.

[3] The doctrine received an essential modification in the statement of *Augustine* (De Trin. xiii.), that the devil, who had overstepped his power, was conquered in the struggle. He had overstepped his power in this, that he thought he could treat the sinless Jesus as a slave, like the other sons of Adam, which last, in fact, belonged to him as prisoners, according to the rights of war. Now, too, he lost the right to the latter, so far as they belong to Christ. Comp. *Baur*, Versöhnungslehre, p. 68 sq. *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. 382. [This, too, says Gieseler, was the view of Hilary of Poitiers, Leo the Great, and Gregory the Great. Another representation was this—redemption was the result of a conflict in which Jesus conquered the devil. He conquered him so far as this, that the devil could not seduce him to commit the least sin; by this victory he made amends for the defeat suffered in Adam, and thus broke the dominion which the devil had on the ground of this defeat. This view is found in Hilary, Leo the Great, Gregory the Great, and, among the Greeks, in Theodoretus.]

[4] De Incarnat. c. 7, ss. God had threatened to punish transgressors with death, and thus could not but fulfill his threatening: *Οὐκ ἀληθὴς γὰρ ἦν ὁ θεὸς, εἰ, εἰπόντος αὐτοῦ ἀποθνήσκειν ἡμᾶς, μὴ ἀπέθνησκεν ὁ ἄνθροπος κ. τ. λ.* But, on the other hand, it was not in accordance with the character of God, that rational beings, to whom he had imparted his own Spirit (Logos) should fall from their first state in consequence of an imposition practiced upon them by the devil. This was quite as contrary to the goodness of God (*οὐκ ἄξιον γὰρ ἦν τῆς ἀγαθότητος τοῦ θεοῦ*) as it would have been contrary to his justice and veracity not to punish the transgressor. (Here the premises of the later theory of Anselm!) When the Logos perceived that nothing but death could save man from ruin, he assumed a human body, because the Logos himself, *i. e.*, the immortal Son of God, could not die. He offered his human nature as a sacrifice for all, and fulfilled the law by his death. By it he also destroyed the power of the devil (*ἠφάνιζε τὸν θάνατον τῇ προσφορᾷ τοῦ καταλλήλου*, c. 9. p. 54), etc. Comp. *Möhlers*, Athanasius, i. p. 157. *Baur*, p. 94, ss. [*Baur*, Dogmengesch. 189: To set aside the devil, Athanasius put personified death in his place, which was deceived in the same way.] Concerning the similar, though more general notions of *Basil the Great* (Hom. de Gratiar. Actione—Hom. in Ps. xlviii. and xxviii.—de Spir. Sancto 15), comp. *Klose*, p. 65. *Cyril* also says, Cat. xiii. 33: *Ἐχθροὶ ἦμεν θεοῦ διὶ ἁμαρτίας, καὶ ὥρισεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἁμαρτάνοντα ἀποθνήσκειν· ἔδει οὖν ἓν ἐκ των δύο γενέσθαι, ἢ ἀληθεύοντα θεὸν πάντας ἀνελεῖν ἢ φιλανθρωπευόμενον παραλῦσαι τὴν ἀπόφασιν. Ἀλλὰ βλέπε θεοῦ σοφίαν· ἐτήρησεν καὶ τῇ ἀποφάσει τὴν ἀλήθειαν, καὶ τῇ φιλανθρωπίᾳ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, κ. τ. λ. Eus.* Dem. Ev. x. 1. *Cyr. Alex.* de Recta Fide ad Regin. (Opp. T. v. P. ii. p. 132); in Ev. Joh.

(Opp. T. iv. p. 114). [Comp. *Hilary* in Ps. liii. 12: Passio suscepta voluntarie est, officio ipsa satisfactura pœnali: *Ambrose* de Fuga Sæc. c. 7: (Christus) suscepit mortem ut impleretur sententia, satisfieret indicato per maledictum carnis peccatricis usque ad mortem. *Giesseler*, Dogmengesch. 383, finds the basis of the later satisfaction theory in Athanasius, Cyril of Jerusalem, and, though less fully drawn out, in Eusebius of Cæsarea, Gregory Nazianzum, Cyril of Alex., and Chrysostom. The points are: God threatened death to man as a penalty for disobedience. This threat could not be unfulfilled, if God be true. But, on the other hand, God's love to man forbade the destruction of all men. And so he adopted the expedient of allowing Jesus to die instead of man, so that both his truth and his love might be inviolate. *Thomasius*, Christi Person, iii. p. 191 sq., gives a full view of the theory of Athanasius, as the most important in the patristic literature—summed up (De Inc. Verbi, 13): "The Logos assumed a mortal body, in order thus to fulfill the law for us, to bring the vicarious sacrifice, to destroy death, to give immortality, and so to restore the divine image in humanity." His death was "the death of all, "the death of humanity," etc.]

[1] *Cyr. Hier.* l. c.: Οὐ τοσοῦτον ἡμάρτομεν, ὅσον ἐδικαιοπράγησεν ὁ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τεθεικώς. *Chrys.* in Ep. ad Rom. Hom. x. 17: Ὥσπερ εἴ τις ὀβολοὺς δέκα ὀφείλοντά τινα εἰς δεσμωτήριον ἐμβάλοι, οὐκ αὐτὸν δὲ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ παιδία, καὶ οἰκέτας δι' αὐτόν· ἐλθὼν δὲ ἕτερος μὴ τοὺς δέκα ὀβολοὺς καταβάλοι μόνον, ἀλλὰ μύρια χρυσοῦ τάλαντα χαρίσαιτο, καὶ εἰς βασιλικὰς εἰσαγάγοι τὸν δεσμώτην....οὕτω καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν γέγονε· πολλῷ γὰρ πλείονα ὧν ὀφείλομεν κατέβαλεν ὁ Χριστὸς, καὶ τοσούτῳ πλείονα, ὅσῳ πρὸς ῥανίδα μικρὰν πέλαγος ἄπειρον. On similar ideas of *Leo the Great*, as well as concerning his entire theory of redemption, see *Griesbach*, Opuscula, p. 98, ss.

[2] It is worthy of notice, that especially *Augustine*, on practical grounds, brought this ethical import of the death of Christ very prominently forward (to counterbalance, as it were, the theory of redemption so easily misunderstood): Tota itaque vita ejus disciplina morum fuit (de Vera Rel. c. 16). Christ died, that no one might be afraid of death, nor even of the most cruel manner of putting persons to death; De Fide et Symb. c. 6; De divers. Quæst. qu. 25 (Opp. T. vi. p. 7). The love of Christ displayed in his death should constrain us to love him in return; De Catech. Rud. c. 4: Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Hoc autem ideo, quia finis præcepti et plenitudo legis charitas est, ut et nos invicem diligamus, et quemadmodum ille pro nobis animam suam posuit, sic et nos pro fratribus animam ponamus..... Nulla est enim major ad amorem invitatio, quam prævenire amando, et nimis durus est animus, qui dilectionem si nolebat impendere, nolit rependere. See, too, the extracts from his Sermons, in *Bindemann*, ii. p. 222. [Comp., too, Contra Faust. Manich. xiv. 1: Suscepit autem Christus sine reatu supplicium nostrum, ut inde solveret reatum nostrum et finiret supplicium nostrum, Cf. Comm. in Gal. iii. 13, cited in *Thomasius* (u. s.), iii. 211.] Comp. *Lactantius* Inst. Div. iv. 23, ss. *Basil M.* de Spir. S. c. 15.

[3] Thus *Gregory* of Nazianzum says, Orat. xxiv. 4, p. 439: "He has ascended the cross, and taken me with him, to nail my sin on it, to triumph over the serpent, to sanctify the tree, to overcome lust, to lead Adam to sal-

vation, and to restore the fallen image of God."..... Orat. xlv. 28, p. 867. "God became man, and died, that we might live: we have died with him, to be purified; we are raised from the dead with him, since we have died with him; we are glorified with him, because we have risen with him from the grave." *Ullmann*, p. 450. Comp. Orat. xxxvi. p. 580, quoted by *Münscher* ed. by von Cölln, i. p. 435, and the passages cited there from *Hilary*, de Trin. ii. 24, and *Augustine* de Trinitate, iv. 12 [*Athan.* de Incarn. c. 44. *Greg. Nyss.* Orat. Cat. c. 16, 32].

[8] Comp. in its connection the passage quoted from Athanasius in note 4. *Gregory of Nyssa* also says (Orat. Catech. c. 27), that not alone the death of Christ effected the redemption of man, but also the circumstance that he preserved an unspotted character in all the moments of his life:... *μολυνθείσης τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ζωῆς (τὸν Χριστὸν) ἐν ἀρχῇ τε καὶ τελευτῇ καὶ τοῖς διὰ μέσου πᾶσιν ἔδει διὰ πάντων γενέσθαι τὴν ἐκπλύνουσαν δύναμιν, καὶ μὴ τῷ μέν τι θεραπεῦσαι τῷ καθαρσίῳ τὸ δὲ περιϊδεῖν ἀθεράπευτον.* *Augustine*, De Vera Rel. c. 26, represents Christ as the second Adam, and contrasts him as the homo justitiæ with the homo peccati; as sin and ruin are the effects of our connection with Adam, so redemption is the effect of a living union with Christ. Comp. De Libero Arbitrio iii. 10; De Consensu Evang. i. c. 35, where he places the real essence of redemption in the manifestation of the God-man. In like manner the redemption work is summarily stated by *Gregory the Great*, Mor. xxi. 6: Ad hoc Dominus apparuit in carne, ut humanam vitam admonendo excitaret, exemplo præbendo accenderet, moriendo redimeret, resurgendo repararet; comp. *Lau*, p. 435. Hence *Baur* says, l. c. p. 109, 10; "*That the reconciliation of man to God, as effected by the incarnation of God in Christ, and the consequent consciousness of the union of the divine with the human, constitutes the higher general principle, including all particulars, which was adopted by the theologians of that age.... Thus was formed a theory of the atonement, which we may term the mystical, inasmuch as it is founded on a general comprehensive view of the subject, rather than on dialectic definitions.*" [*Baur*, Dogmengesch. p. 190. The chief contrast to this mystic view was found in the Arians and Apollinarists; the former putting the reconciliation in the bare proclamation of the forgiveness of sins (no real mediation between God and man), and the latter in likeness to Christ.—Both the mystic and moral views are united in *Theodore* of Mopsuestia; redemption is the completion of human nature—what in Adam is found only ideally (in idea), is in Christ perfectly realized. It consists not so much in removing sin and guilt, as in a participation in what Christ, through his resurrection, has become for us—immortality and an absolutely unchangeable divine life, through union with Christ. Comp. *Fritzsche*, Theod. Ep. Mops, p. 55 sq.]

[9] Thus *Gregory* of Nazianzum, Orat. xxxiii. p. 536, numbered speculations on the death of Christ among those things, on which it is useful to have correct ideas, but not dangerous to be mistaken, and placed them on the same level with questions concerning the creation of the world, the nature of matter and of the soul, the resurrection, general judgment, etc. Comp. *Baur*, p. 109.—*Eusebius* of Cæsarea (Demonstr. Evang. iv. 12) merely enumerates various reasons for the death of Christ, without bringing them into connec-

tion. Christ died, 1. In order to prove that he is the Lord over both the quick and the dead; 2. To redeem from sin; 3. To atone for sin; 4. To destroy the power of Satan; 5. To give his disciples a visible evidence of the reality of the life to come (by his resurrection); and 6. To abrogate the sacrifices of the Old Test. dispensation.

The more anxious theologians were to adduce the reasons which led Christ to suffer, the more natural was it to ask, whether God could have accomplished the work of redemption in any other way. *Augustine* rejects such idle questions in the manner of Irenæus; De Agone Christi, c. 10: Sunt autem stulti, qui dicunt: Non poterat aliter sapientia Dei homines liberare, nisi susciperet hominem, et nasceretur ex femina, et a peccatoribus omnia illa pateretur. Quibus dicimus: *poterat* omnino *sed si aliter faceret, similiter vestræ stultitiæ displiceret.* [*Aug.* de Trin. xiii. 10. *Greg. Naz.* Orat. ix. p. 157. *Greg. Nyssa*, Orat. Cat. c. *Basil the Great* (Hom. in Ps. xlviii. § 3) maintained that the death of the God-man was *necessary* to accomplish the salvation of mankind.] On the other hand, *Gregory the Great* concedes that the death of Christ was not absolutely necessary, since we could have been delivered from suffering in other ways; yet God chose this way, in order at the same time to set before our eyes the highest example of love and self-sacrifice; Moral. xx. c. 36; *Lau*, p. 445. [But compare Moralia, xxii. 40.] Further particulars may be found in *Münscher*, Handbuch, iv. p. 292, ss.; *Baur*, p. 85. *Rufinus* gives a mystical interpretation of the various separate elements of the passion of Christ, Expos. Symb. ap. p. 22, ss.

Concerning *the extent of the atonement*, it may be observed, that *Didymus of Alexandria* (on 1 Peter, iii. 22, in *Gallandii* Bibl. PP. T. iv. p. 325: Pacificavit enim Jesus per sanguinem crucis suæ quæ in cœlis et quæ in terra sunt, omne bellum destruens et tumultum), and *Gregory of Nyssa*, in some degree (Orat. Catech. c. 25, where he speaks of πᾶσα κτίσις), revived the idea of Origen, that the effects of Christ's death were not limited to this world, but extended over the whole universe; Gregory also asserted that the work of redemption would not have been necessary, if all men had been as holy as Moses, Paul, Ezekiel, Elijah, and Isaiah (Contra Apollin. iii. p. 263). [*Cyril* of Jerusalem, De Recta Fide; the injustice of the sinner was not so great as the justice of him who gave his life for us. *Chrysost.* Ep. ad Rom. Hom. x.; Christ paid far more for us than we were indebted, as much more as the sea is more than a drop.] The opposite view was taken by *Augustine*, who, in accordance with his theory, thought that all men stood in need of redemption, but limited the extent of the atonement; comp. the former sections on the doctrine of original sin, and on predestination; and Contra Julian vi. c. 24. *Leo the Great*, on the contrary, enlarged the extent of the atonement, Ep. 134, c. 14: Effusio sanguinis Christi pro injustis tam fuit dives ad pretium, ut, si universitas captivorum in redemptorem suum crederet, nullum diaboli vincula retinerent.—According to *Gregory the Great*, redemption extends even to heavenly beings; Moral. xxxi. c. 49. *Lau*, p. 431.

A dramatic representation of the *Descensus ad Inferos* (first found in the ecclesiastical confessions, in the third Sirmian Formula, 359), in imitation of the Evang. Nicodemi, is given in the discourse: De Adventu et Annunciatione Joannis (Baptistæ) apud inferos, commonly ascribed to Eusebius of Emisa; comp. also Epiphanius, in Sepulcr. Christi. Opp. ii. p. 270; *Augusti's* edition of Euseb. of Emisa, p. 1, ss. On the question whether the system of Apollinaris caused the introduction of the said doctrine into the Apostles' Creed, as well as concerning the relation in which they stood to each other, see *Neander*, Church Hist. (Torrey), ii. 433, note; and particularly Hist. Dogm. (Ryland), p. 323. [This assertion involves an anachronism. "It is certainly difficult to perceive how Apollinaris could give his assent to it; yet we are not justified in asserting that he did not acknowledge it, although Athanasius does not specially refer to it."] This is a striking remark of *Leo the Great* (Serm. lxi. in *Perthel*, p. 153, note), that for the sake of the disciples the duration of this intermediate state was contracted as much as possible, so that his death rather resembled sleep (sopor) than death.

Lastly, the statements about the *subjective* appropriation of the merits of Christ on the part of the individual Christian were made to conform to the above views, and to the anthropological definitions (§ 107–114). Comp. *Münscher*, Handbuch, iv. p. 295, 319. This much is certain, that the benefits of the atonement are chiefly referred to the *consequences of original sin*, and that, consequently, they accrued in the fullest measure to the baptized. How far, now, sins committed after baptism are atoned for by the death of Jesus, or whether this satisfaction must be found somewhere else —on this there is no satisfactory answer. Comp. *Lau*, Greg. d. Grosse, p. 430, 458.

4. THE CHURCH AND ITS MEANS OF GRACE.

§ 135.

THE DOCTRINE ABOUT THE CHURCH.

Two causes contributed to determine the doctrine about the *Church:* 1. The external history of the church itself, its victory over paganism, and its rising power under the protection of the state. 2. The victory of Augustinianism over the doctrines of the *Pelagians,*[1] *Manicheans,*[2] and *Donatists,*[3] which in different ways threatened to destroy ecclesiastical unity. The last mentioned puritanic and separatistic system, like that of Novatian in the preceding period, maintained that the church was composed only of saints. In opposition to them, following *Optatus of Mileve,*[4] *Augustine* asserted, that the church consists of the sum total of all who are baptized, and that the (ideal) sanctity of the church was not impaired by the impure elements externally connected with it.[5] The bishops of Rome then impressed upon this catholicism the stamp of the papal hierarchy, by already claiming for themselves the primacy of Peter.[6] But however different the opinions of the men of those times were respecting the seat and nature of the true church, the proposition laid down by former theologians, that *there is no salvation out of the church,* was firmly adhered to, and carried out in all its consequences.[7]

[1] The Pelagians were in so far unchurchly as, in their abstract mode of looking at things, they considered only the *individual* Christian as such, and overlooked the mysterious connection between the individual and the totality. Their strict ethical ideas led necessarily to Puritanism; hence the synod of Diospolis (A. D. 415) blamed Pelagius for having said: ecclesiam hic esse sine macula et ruga; Augustine de Gestis Pelagii, c. 12. Before this time some Christians in Sicily, who, generally speaking, agreed with the Pelagians, had asserted: Ecclesiam hanc esse, quæ nunc frequentatur populis et sine peccato esse posse; August. Ep. clvi.

[2] The Manicheans, by separating the Electi from the rest (Auditores), gave countenance to the principle of an ecclesiola in ecclesia; and besides the great body of the Manichean church itself formed, as the one elect world

of light, a dualistic contrast with the vast material (hylozoist) mass of darkness. "*The Manichean church is in relation to the world what the limited circle of the Electi is in relation to the larger assembly of the Auditores; that which is yet variously divided and separated in the latter, has its central point of union in the former.*" *Baur*, Manich. Religionssystem, p. 282.

[3] On the external history of the Donatists, comp. the works on ecclesiastical history [and especially *F. Ribbeck*, Donatus und Augustinus, oder der erste entscheidende Kampf zwischen Separatismus und d. Kirche. Elberfeld, 1857. *A. Roux*, De Augustin Adversario Don. 1838]. Sources: *Optatus Milevitanus* (about the year 368), De Schismate Donatistarum, together with the Monumenta Vett. ad Donatist. Hist pertinentia, ed. *L. E. Du Pin*, Par. 1700, ss. (Opp. Aug. T. ix.) *Valesius*, De Schism. Donat. in the Appendix to Eusebius. *Noriſius* (edited by *Ballerini* brothers), Ven. 1729, iv. fol. *Walch*, Ketzergeschichte, vol. iv. Concerning the derivation of the name (whether from Donatus a casis nigris, or from Donat M.?) see *Neander*, Church History, ii. 187. The question at issue, viz., whether Cæcilian could be invested with the episcopal office, having been ordained by a Traditor, and the election of another bishop in the person of Majorinus, led to further dogmatic discussions on the purity of the church. In the opinion of the Donatists, the church ought to be *pure* (sine macula et ruga). It must, therefore, exclude, without exception, unworthy members (1 Cor. v. and especially passages from the Old Test.). When the opponents of the Donatists appealed to the parable of the tares and the wheat (Matth. xiii.), the latter applied it (according to our Saviour's own interpretation) to the *world*, and not to the *church*. *Augustine*, however, asserted, mundum ipsum appellatum esse pro ecclesiæ nomine.

[4] Concerning the opinions of *Optatus* (which are stated in the second book of his treatise: De Schismate Donatistarum) see *Rothe*, Anfänge der christlichen Kirche, p. 677, ss. He developed the views of Cyprian. There is but one church. It has five ornamenta or dotes: 1. Cathedra (the unity of episcopacy in the Cathedra Petri); 2. Angelus (the bishop himself); 3. Spiritus Sanctus; 4. Fons (baptism); 5. Sigillum, *i. e.*, Symbolum catholicum (according to Sol. Song, iv. 12). These dotes are distinguished from the sancta membra ac viscera of the church, which appear to him of greater importance than the dotes themselves. They consist in the sacramenta et nomina Trinitatis.

[5] *Augustine* composed a separate treatise, entitled: De Unitate Ecclesiæ, on this subject.—Comp. contra Ep. Parmeniani, and De Baptismo. He proceeded, no less than the Donatists, on the principle of the purity of the church, and advocated a rigorous exercise of ecclesiastical discipline; but this should not lead to the depopulation of the church. Some elements enter into the composition of the house of God which do not form the structure of the house itself; some members of the body may be diseased, without its being thought necessary to cut them off at once; though the disease itself belongs no more to the body than the chaff which is mixed up with wheat forms a part of it. Augustine makes a distinction between the corpus Domini verum and the corpus Domini permixtum seu simulatum (de Doctr. Christ. iii. 32), which stands in connection with his negative view concerning the

nature of evil. Multi sunt in sacramentorum communione cum ecclesia et tamen jam non sunt in ecclesia (De Unit. Eccles. 74).*

The grammarian *Tichonius* adopted an intermediate view, viz., that there is a corpus Domini bipartitum, one part of which consists of the real, the other of seeming Christians; see *Neander*, Church Hist. ii. p. 210. The necessity of being externally connected with the church is set forth by Augustine in the same manner as by Tertullian and Cyprian; De Unit. Eccles. c. 49: Habere caput Christum nemo poterit, nisi qui in ejus corpore fuerit, quod est ecclesia. Ep. xli. § 5: Quisquis ab hac catholica ecclesia fuerit separatus, quantumlibet laudabiliter se vivere existimet, hoc solo scelere, quod a Christi unitate disjunctus est, non habebit vitam, sed Dei ira manebit super eum. So, too, *Gregory the Great;* see Lau, p. 470.

["Any other than the empirically existing church Augustine could not conceive, despite the concessions he was obliged to make. *Jovinian*, on the other hand, lived in the abstract idea of the internal supersensible church, to which we belong only through the baptism of the Spirit;" *Baur*, Dogmengesch. p. 196. *Neander*, Hist. Dogm. p. 395–7, says that the distinction between the *visible* and the *invisible* church might have led to an agreement between Augustine and the Donatists. Augustine endeavored to establish the distinction, but he was afraid to follow out the idea to the full extent, and his notions became obscure. He spoke of those (De Bapt. iv. 1–4) who are in the house of God per communionem sacramentorum, and those who are outside of the house—per perversitatem morum. And De Unit. Eccles. 74: Multi sunt in sacramentorum communione cum ecclesia, et tamen jam non sunt in ecclesia. Further, "those who appear to be in the church, and contradict Christ, and therefore do not belong to that church which is called the body of Christ."—In *Jovinian* (Cf. Hieron. contra Jovinian. B. Lindner, De Joviniano et Vigilantio, etc.) a Protestant element is discernible. "In this spirit he carried on a warfare against hypocrisy, the quantitative scale of morals, the *censilia evangelica;* he laid the utmost stress on the principle of a living faith, and the unity of the principle of Christian life."....."The church, he says, is founded on Faith, Hope, and Love;"..."in this church there is nothing impure; every one is taught of God; no one can break into it by violence, or steal into it by artifice." "As Jovinian taught the Pauline doctrine of faith, so he did the Pauline idea of the invisible church, while Augustine obstructed the development of his similar fundamental idea by a mixture with the catholic idea of the church."]

* *Leo M.* Sermo I. in Natale Apostolorum Petri et Pauli: Ut inenarrabilis gratiæ per totum mundum diffunderetur effectus, Romanum regnum divina providentia præparavit, etc. Comp. Sermo II. (al. iv. 3): Transivit quidem in Apostolos alios vis illius potestatis, sed non frustra uni commendatur, quod omnibus intimetur. Petro enim singulariter hoc creditur, quia cunctis ecclesiæ rectoribus proponitur. Manet ergo Petri privilegium, ubicunque ex ipsius fertur æquitate judicium; nec nimia est vel severitas vel remissio, ubi nihil

* In both the miraculous draught of fishes, the one *before*, and the other *after*, the resurrection of Christ (Luke v. and John xxi.), Augustine finds types of the church here and hereafter; Sermo 248–252 (Opera, Tom. v.). Comp. *Bindemann*, ii. 187 sq.

erit legatum, nihil solutum, nisi quod Petrus aut ligaverit, aut solverit. Comp. *Perthel*, l. c. p. 237, note 4, and the passages quoted by him.

[7] Comp. § 71. *Lactantius* makes the same assertion, though he is not in all respects churchly; Instit. Div. iii. 30.—iv. 14. ab init.: Hæc est domus fidelis, hoc immortale templum, in quo si quis non sacrificaverit, immortalitatis præmium non habebit. *Rufinus*, however, does not yet demand fides *in* Ecclesiam, and thus most clearly distinguishes faith in the church from faith in God and Christ, Expos. Fid. 26, 27. *Gregory the Great* regards the church as the robe of Christ, as individual souls are also the robe of the church; Moral. xx. c. 9. It is the civitas Domini, quæ regnatura in cœlo adhuc laborat in terra; Ezech. lib. ii. Hom. 1; comp. *Lau*, p. 468 sq. Heretics were said to be beyond the pale of the *church*, but not beyond that of *Christianity;* they were accused of defective faith (*kakopistia*), and not of all want of faith (*apistia*). *Augustine* calls them quoquomodo Christiani; De Civ. Dei 18, c. 51. Comp. *Marheineke* (in Daub's Studien, l. c.) p. 186.

§ 136.

THE SACRAMENTS.

The idea of the *Holy Sacraments* was more precisely defined and limited in this period; they are the organs by which the church works upon the individual Christian, and transmits the fullness of divine life, which dwells within it, to the members. *Augustine* saw in them the mysterious union of the (transcendent) Word with the external (visible) element,[1] but expressed no definite opinion respecting the number of sacraments.[2] *Pseudo-Dionysius* (in the fifth century) already spoke of six ecclesiastical mysteries;[3] but even during the present period the chief importance was attached to *baptism* and the *Lord's Supper*.[4]

[1] *Augustine*, Serm. 272 (Opp. T. v. 770): Dicuntur *Sacramenta*, quia in eis aliud videtur, aliud intelligitur. Quod videtur, speciem habet corporalem: quod intelligitur fructum habet spiritalem; this gave rise to the definition of the Augustinian school (in Ev. Joh. Tract. 31. c. 15, and De Cataclysmo): *Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum*. Grace works through the sacraments, but is not necessarily confined to them (cf. in Levit. lib. iii. quæstio, 84). [Quomodo et Moses sanctificat et Dominus? Non enim Moses pro Domino, sed Moses visibilibus sacramentis per ministerium suum; Dominus autem invisibile gratia per spiritum sanctum, ubi est totus fructus etiam visibilium sacramentorum.—De Catechiz. Rudibus, 50: Sacramenta signacula quidem rerum divinarum esse visibilia, sed res ipsas invisibiles in eis honorari.—*Neander*, in his Hist. Dogm. p. 399, says, that according to Augustine, "there was only one Justificatio, which was foreshadowed in the Old Testament. Sensible signs are necessary in a religious community; but yet these can have no effect on the spirit: they can not impart holiness and *justifica-*

tion, but merely serve as the signs and vehicles of divine grace, which is the only source of *justification*." *Baur*, Dogmengesch. 193, says of Augustine, that he put the essence of the sacrament in the distinction of a twofold element, a sensible and a supersensible, related as are the sign and the thing signified; and that which mediates between them is the word. The rational tendency of the Arians showed its antagonism to the prevailing views in the position of Eunomius, that the real essential mystery of piety is not found in mystic symbols, but in precise doctrines; in Greg. Nyss. c. Eunomium xi. ed. Paris, 1638, T. ii. p. 704.]

[3] *Augustine* reckoned not only matrimony ("sacramentum nuptiarum," De Nupt. et Concupiscentia, i. 11), and holy orders ("sacramentum dandi baptismum," De Baptism. ad Donatist. i. 2, and Contra Parmen. ii. 30), but also occasionally other sacred ceremonies among the sacraments (the word taken in a more comprehensive sense), so far as he understood by sacramentum, omne mysticum sacrumque signum. Thus he applies (De Peccat. Orig. c. 40) the term sacrament to exorcism, the casting out, and the renunciation, of the devil at baptism; and even to the rites of the Old Testament: circumcisio carnis, sabbatum temporale, neomeniæ, sacrificia atque omnes hujusmodi innumeræ obeservationes; Expos. Epist. ad Galat. c. iii. 19. (Opp. iii. P. ii. p. 692). Comp. *Wiggers*, Augustin und Pel. vol. i. p. 9, note. That he so constantly adopted the number four may perhaps be explained from the general preference which he gave to Aristotelianism (c. Ep. Parm. ii. c. 13). *Neander*, Church Hist. ii. p. 663, 664. *Leo the Great* also employed the term sacramentum in reference to the most heterogeneous things, comp. *Perthel*, p. 219, note; and Gregory the Great used it sometimes in a more comprehensive, sometimes in a more limited sense, comp. *Lau*, p. 480.

[4] De Hier. Eccles. c. 2–7. 1. *Baptism* (*μ. φωτίσματος*); 2. *The Lord's Supper* (*μ. συνάξεως, εἶτ' οὖν κοινωνίας*); 3. *Unction* (*confirmation?* *μ. τελετῆς μύρου*); 4. *Holy Orders* (*μ. τῶν ἱερατικῶν τελειώσεων*); 5. *Monachism* (*μ. μοναχικῆς τελειώσεως*), which afterwards ceased to be reckoned among the sacraments; 6. *The rites performed on the dead* (*μ. ἐπὶ τῶν ἱερῶς κεκοιμημένων*—they were not the same with the unctio extrema, as the unction in question was not applied to dying persons, but to the corpse; yet there was some analogy between the one and the other).—Matrimony, on the other hand, which Augustine mentioned, was wanting in this list.

[5] This was done, *e. g.*, by *Augustine*, Sermo 218, 14: Quod latus, lancea percussum, in terram sanguinem et aquam manavit, procul dubio sacramenta sunt, quibus formatur ecclesia (De Symb. ad Catech. c. 6); and by *Chrysostom* in Joh. Hom. 85. (Opp. T. viii. p. 545), who attributed the same import to the same occurrence.—On the relation of the sacraments of the New Testament to those of the Old, see Augustine De Vera Rel. c. 17

§ 137.

BAPTISM.

The notions developed in the preceding period concerning the high importance and efficacy of baptism were more fully carried out

in the present, in a rhetorical way, by *Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzum*, and *Gregory of Nyssa*,[1] and defined with more dogmatic precision by *Augustine*.[2] Neither the baptism of blood, nor that of tears, lost its significance.[3] The theologians of the Greek church zealously defended infant baptism,[4] while Augustine brought it into more intimate connection with the doctrine of original sin (in opposition to the Pelagians), and adduced it as an additional proof of the said doctrine.[5] Salvation was denied to unbaptized children.[6] Concerning the baptism of heretics, *Basil the Great* and *Gregory of Nazianzum* followed the views of Cyprian; though Gregory did not make the validity of baptism depend on the worth of the person who performs the ceremony.[7] But by the influence of Augustine, the mode adopted by the Romish church became, with certain modifications, the prevalent one.[8] The Donatists continued to insist upon the necessity of rebaptizing heretics.[9] The baptism of the Manicheans consisted in a kind of lustration altogether different from the baptism of the Catholic church.[10] Among the strict Arians, the Eunomians were distinguished from the orthodox church by baptizing not in the name of the Trinity, but in that of the death of Christ.[11]

[1] All three composed separate discourses on baptism. *Basil, M.*, de Baptismo (Opp. T. ii. p. 117); *Greg. Naz.* Or. 40; *Greg. Nyss.* de Bapt. Christi (Opp. T. iii. p. 371). Gregory of Nazianzum gave a number of different names to Christian baptism, which he carefully distinguished from the baptisms of Moses and John: *τὸ φώτισμα λαμπρότης ἐστὶ ψυχῶν, βίου μετάθεσις, ἐπερώτημα τῆς εἰς θεὸν συνειδήσεως* (1 Pet. iii. 21). *τὸ φώτισμα βοήθεια τῆς ἀσθενείας τῆς ἡμετέρας· τὸ φώτισμα σαρκὸς ἀπόθεσις, πνεύματος ἀκολούθησις, λόγου κοινωνία, πλάσματος ἐπανόρθωσις, κατακλυσμὸς ἁμαρτίας, φωτὸς μετουσία, σκότων κατάλυσις· τὸ φώτισμα ὄχημα πρὸς θεὸν, συνεκδημία Χριστοῦ, ἔρεισμα πίστεως, νοῦ τελείωσις, κλεῖς οὐρανῶν βασιλείας, ζωῆς ἀμείψις, δουλείας ἀναίρεσις, δεσμῶν ἔκλυσις, συνθέσεως μεταποίησις· τὸ φώτισμα, τί δεῖ πλείω καταριθμεῖν; τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ δώρων τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον, ὥστερ ἅγια ἁγίων καλεῖται τινα... οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸ παντὸς ἄλλων τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν φωτισμῶν ὂν ἁγιώτερον καλεῖται δὲ ὥσπερ Χριστὸς, ὁ τούτου δοτὴρ, πολλοῖς καὶ διαφόροις ὀνόμασιν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ δώρημα, κ. τ. λ.* He also repeated the appellations formerly used, such as *λοῦτρον, σφραγὶς*, etc. "*The following is the principal thought on which this abundance of names is founded: all the blessings of Christianity appear, as it were, concentrated in one point in baptism, and are dispensed all together in one moment; but all these names can only in so far be applied to baptism, as the person to be baptized possesses the right disposition, without which none can enter into the kingdom of heaven, founded by Christ.*" Ullman, p. 461, where the other passages bearing on this subject are given. In order to prove the necessity of baptism; Gregory further speaks of a *three-fold birth* of man (Or. 40, 2, ab init.), viz., natural birth (*τὴν ἐκ σωμάτων*), that through baptism, and that through the resurrection.

The first of these is of the night, is slavish and connected with lusts (*νυκτερινή τέ ἐστι καὶ δούλη καὶ ἐμπαθής*); the second is as clear as daylight and free, delivers from lusts, and elevates to a higher spiritual life (*ἡ δὲ ἡμερινὴ καὶ ἐλευθέρα καὶ λυτικὴ παθῶν, πᾶν τὸ αὐτὸ γενέσεως κάλυμμα περιτέμνουσα, καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄνω ζωὴν ἐπανάγουσα*).—On *Basil the Great* comp. *Klose*, p. 67, ss.; on *Gregory of Nyssa* see *Rupp*, p. 232, ss. Comp. also *Cyril* Hier. Cat. xvii. c. 37; he ascribed to baptism not only the virtue of taking away sin (from the negative point of view), but also that of a miraculous elevation of the powers of life; Cat. iii. 3, xix. xx. *Cyril Alex.* Comm. in Joh., Opp. T. iv. p. 147. [*Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, i. p. 462, 463.]

[3] *Augustine* Ep. 98, 2: Aqua exhibens forinsecus *sacramentum gratiæ* et spiritus operans intrinsecus *beneficium gratiæ*, solvens vinculum culpæ, reconcilians bonum naturæ, regenerans hominem in uno Christo, ex uno Adam generatum. Concupiscence remains even in those who are baptized, though their guilt is pardoned; De Nupt. et Concup. i. 28 (c. 25) [Enchir. ad Laur. 43 and 64].—He who is not baptized can not obtain salvation. As for the thief who was admitted by Christ into paradise without baptism, Augustine supposed that he was baptized with blood, instead of water; or he might have been baptized with the water which flowed from the side of Jesus (!), unless it were assumed that he had received baptism at some former time; De Anima et ejus Origine i. 11 (c. 9.), ii. 14(c. 10.), 16, c. 12. According to *Leo the Great*, the baptismal water which is filled with the Holy Ghost, is in relation to the regenerate man, what the womb of the Virgin filled with the same Spirit was in relation to the sinless Redeemer, to whom she gave birth; Sermo 24. 3; 25. 5 (in *Griesbach*, p. 153). Comp. *Perthel*, p. 213 sq.

[3] Thus *Gregory* of Nazianzum adds a fourth baptism to the three already mentioned (viz., the baptisms of Moses, John, and Christ), that of martyrdom and of blood with which Christ himself was baptized; this baptism surpasses the others, since it is so much less stained with sin. Yea (he adds) I know even a *fifth*, viz., that of tears (*τὸ τῶν δακρύων*), but it is still more difficult, because it is necessary to wet one's couch every night with tears; Orat. xxxix. 17, p. 688. But....."how many tears have we to shed, before they equal the flood of the baptismal bath?" Orat. lx. 9, p. 696. *Ullmann*, p. 459, 465, 480.

[4] *Gregory of Nazianzum* (Orat. lx.) opposed the delay of baptism, which had its ground partly in deference to the sacrament, partly in perverse and immoral tendencies, partly in absurd prejudices.* Comp. *Ullmann*, p. 466, ss. Concerning the baptism of infants, he declared (*Ullm.* p. 713) "that it was better that they should be sanctified without their own consciousness, than that they should depart being neither sealed nor consecrated" (*ἢ ἀπελθεῖν ἀσφράγιστα καὶ ἀτέλεστα*). In support of his view he appealed to the rite of circumcision, which was a type of baptism, and performed on the eighth day (comp. the opinion of Fidus, § 72, note 6); also to the striking

* Comp. *e. g.*, the Confessions of Augustine, i. c. 11. *Gregory of Nyssa* also opposed the delay in a separate discourse, *πρὸς τοὺς βραδύνοντας εἰς τὸ βάπτισμα* (Opp. T. ii. p. 215), *Chrysostom* uses similar language. Comp. *Neander*, Chrysostomus, i. p. 6, and 74–77. *A. F. Büsching*, De Procrastinatione Baptismi apud Veteres ejusque Causis. Halæ, 1747. 4.

of the blood on the door-posts, etc. Gregory, nevertheless, thought that healthy children might wait till the third year, or somewhere thereabout, because they would be able then to hear and to utter something of the words (μυστικόν τι) used at the performance of the rite, though they might not perfectly understand them, but have only a general impression about them (τυπούμενα). His judgment, however, was mild concerning those children who die before baptism, because he well distinguished between intentional and unintentional delay. Yet he did not grant that they would obtain perfect salvation. Comp. *Ullmann*, l. c.

[5] That *Gregory* did not, like Augustine, make an intimate connection between baptism and original sin, is evident from his assertion (Orat. 40, quoted by *Ullmann*, p. 476), that sins committed by children from ignorance could not be imputed to them on account of their tender age. Comp. what *Chrysostom* said on this subject according to the quotation of Julian given by *Neander*, Church Hist. ii. p. 666: Hac de causa etiam infantes baptizamus, cum non sint coinquinati peccato, ut eis addatur sanctitas, justitia, adoptio, hæreditas, fraternitas Christi, ut ejus membra sint; the opinions of *Theodore* of Mopsuestia are also stated there.* *Augustine* did not combat the Pelagians because they rejected baptism, but because they did not draw the same inferences from the rite in question, which he drew from it. The Pelagians admitted that the design of baptism was the remissio peccatorum, but they understood by it the remission of future sins. *Julian* went so far as to anathematize those who did not acknowledge the necessity of infant-baptism; Opus. imp. contra Jul. iii. 149. "*Though the Pelagians might have been easily induced by their principles to ascribe a merely symbolical significance to baptism, as an external rite, yet in this, as well as in many other respects, they could not develop their system entirely independent of the ecclesiastical tradition of their age; they endeavored, therefore, to reconcile it in the best possible manner with their principles, which owed their origin to quite different causes.*" *Neander*, Church Hist. ii. p. 668. ["Baptism received a higher dogmatic importance from the Augustinian doctrine of original sin. The assertion of its necessity is one of the points of difference between Augustine and Pelagius." *Baur*, u. s. p. 198.]

[6] Concerning infants that die without being baptized, *Pelagius* expressed himself in cautious terms (quo non eant, scio, quo eant, nescio). [Pelagius, that he might not be compelled to say that unbaptized children were lost, made a distinction between eternal life and the kingdom of heaven, or blessedness in general and the blessedness of Christians (Aug. de Pecc. Orig. c. 21; De Pecc. Mer. 1, 18). The Pelagians could not recognize in the case of children a baptism for the forgiveness of sins; they could only refer it to

* *Neander* traces the difference of opinion existing between the Eastern and Western church with regard to baptism to their different mode of viewing the doctrine of redemption; the former regarded rather the positive, the latter the negative aspect. [The positive aspect is the ennobling of human nature; the negative the relation to sin. "Accordingly, in the East, baptism was regarded chiefly as indicating exaltation to a higher stage, for which the original powers of man were not sufficient." Gregory of Nazians. says, "It is a more divine creation, something higher than the original endowments of nature," etc.]

sanctification in Christ (August. c. duas Ep. Pelagii). Comp. Baur, loc. cit.] *Ambrose* de Abrah. ii. 11, had previously taught: Nemo ascendit in regnum cœlorum, nisi per sacramentum baptismatis.... *Nisi enim quis renatus fuerit ex aquo et spiritu sancto, non potest introire in regnum Dei.* Utique nullum excipit, non infantem, non aliqua præventum necessitate. Habeant tamen illam opertam pœnarum immunitatem, nescio an habeant regni honorem. Comp. *Wiggers*, i. p. 422. *Augustine's* views on this point were at first milder, De libero Arb. iii. c. 23; but afterwards he was compelled, by the logical consequences of his own system, to use harsher expressions. His line of argument is as follows: Every man is born in sin, and stands, therefore, in need of pardon. He obtains this by baptism; it cleanses children from *original sin*, and those who are baptized in later years, not only from original sin, but also from their actual transgressions before the baptism. (Enchir. ad Laurent. 43.) Since baptism is the only and necessary condition of salvation (comp. note 2), it follows that unbaptized children are condemned (this fully accorded with his views on predestination). He was, nevertheless, disposed to look upon this condemnation as *mitissima* and *tolerabilior* (Ep. 186. 27. [c. 8]; De Pecc. Mer. i. 28. [c. 20]), though he opposed the doctrine condemned by the synod of Carthage, in Canon ii. (A. D. 419), of an intermediate state, in which unbaptized infants were said to be; Comp. Sermo 294: Hoc novum in ecclesia, prius inauditum est, esse salutem æternam præter regnum cœlorum, esse salutem æternam præter regnum Dei. With regard to *baptized* children, Augustine, as well as the catholic church in general, supposed (the former in accordance with his idealistic doctrine of the church) that the church represents (by means of the godfathers and godmothers) the faith of the children. Ep. 98 ad Bonifacium, c. 10: Parvulum, etsi nondum fides illa, quæ in credentum voluntate consistit, jam tamen ipsius fidei sacramentum fidelem facit. Nam sicut credere respondetur, ita etiam fidelis vocatur, non rem ipsa mente annuendo, sed ipsius rei sacramentum percipiendo.... Parvulus, etiamsi fidem nondum habeat in cogitatione, non ei tamen obicem contrariæ cogitationis opponit, unde sacramentum ejus salubriter percipit. Consequently—a passive faith? "*His view seems to have been somewhat as follows: As the child is nourished by the natural powers of his mother after the flesh, before his bodily, independent existence is fully developed, so is he nourished by the higher powers of his spiritual mother, the church, before he has attained unto independent spiritual development and self-consciousness. This idea would be true to a certain extent, if the visible church corresponded to its ideal.*" *Neander*, Church Hist. ii. p. 670.

[1] *Basil* Ep. Can. 1, declared the baptism at least of heretics void when the baptismal formula differed from that of the catholic church, or even when a different meaning was attached to it; thus he rejected the baptism of the Montanists, because they understood Montanus to be the Paraclete. But he was disposed to admit schismatics without baptism, and as a general rule (milder than Cyprian) advised compliance with the custom of each separate church.—*Gregory of Nazianzum* rejected the baptism of *notorious* heretics (τῶν προδήλως κατεγνωσμένον). Generally speaking, he did not make the efficacy of baptism depend on the external ecclesiastical, nor on the inherent moral worth (ἀξιοπιστία) of the person who administered the

baptism.—He illustrated this by the case of two rings, the one made of gold, the other of brass, bearing the same royal stamp; Orat. 40, in *Ullmann*, p. 473–475.

[8] De Baptismo contra Donatistas lib. vii. (in Opp. Ben. Tom. ix.). It is interesting to see how Augustine seeks to justify Cyprian, from whom he differs; the passages are given in *Münscher* ed. by von Cölln, p. 477.—The limitation spoken of was, that the rite of baptism, if performed out of the catholic church, might be considered valid, but that so far from proving a blessing to the baptized, it would increase their guilt if they did not afterwards join the catholic church. Thus "*the exclusiveness of the catholic church, objected to on the one side, was carried to its extreme length on the other;*" *Rothe*, Anfänge der christlichen Kirche, p. 685.—The ceremony of the laying on of hands, as a sign of consecration, was also employed in the case of those who came over to the church. *Leo the Great* insisted upon this point, Ep. 159, 7. 166, 2. 167, 18. (*Griesbach*, p. 155.)

[9] Thus the Donatist, *Petilianus*, maintained that whoever received baptism from an unbeliever, did not receive faith, but guilt. Augustine argued against him (Contra Epistol. Parmeniani; see *Neander*, Hist. Dogm. 400). The Donatist doctrine was condemed by the Conc. Arel. 314, can. 8. *Optatus Mil.* De Schism. Donat. v. c. 3....Quid vobis (Donatistis) visum est, non post nos, sed post Trinitatem baptisma geminare? Cujus de sacramento non leve certamen innatum est, et dubitatur, an post Trinitatem in eadem Trinitate hoc iterum liceat facere. Vos dicitis: Licet; nos dicimus; Non licet. Inter Licet vestrum et Non licet nostrum natant et remigant animæ populorum.

[10] Concerning the baptism of the Manicheans, on which we have but "*scanty information*," comp. *Baur*, Manich. Religionssystem, p. 273.

[11] *Socrat.* v. 24, blamed the Eunomians, because .....τὸ βάπτισμα παρεχάραξαν· οὐ γὰρ εἰς τριάδα, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν τοῦ Χριστοῦ βαπτίζουσι θάνατον. They probably avoided the use of the common formula, which Eunomius elsewhere adduces as a proof that the Spirit is the third, in order to avoid a possible misunderstanding, in the orthodox sense, among the unlearned. Comp. *Klose*, Eunomius, p. 32. *Rudelbach*, über die Sacramentsworte, p. 25. According to Sozom, vi. 26, the Eunomians are said to have rebaptized all who joined their party. Eunomius (on anti-Trinitarian grounds) was opposed to the trine immersion in baptism (see *Höfling*, Die Taufe, i. 55).

§ 138.

THE LORD'S SUPPER.

Marheineke (comp. § 73), p. 32–65. *K. Meyer*, p. 18–38. *Ebrard* (§ 73), p. 278 sq. *Kahnis*, ubi supra. *Rückert*, 350 sq., 403 sq. [Cardinal *Wiseman*, attempts (Essays, vol. 3) to show that Amphilochius, bishop of Iconium, in the fourth century, taught a real change (on the basis of new accounts of the Constantinopl› Council of 1166). Syriac Ch. on the Eucharist, by Prof. *Lamy*, of Louvain; see Journal of Sacred Lit.

Jan. 1860, p. 374 sq. *Philip Freeman*, Principles of Divine Service. 2 Parts. Lond 1855–7. Christian Remembrancer, Oct. 1853. *Engelhardt* in Zeitschrift f. d. luth. Theol. 1842. *D. Rock*, Hierurgia; Transubst. and Mass Expounded from Inscriptions in the Catacombs, etc., 2d ed. 1855. *J. Kreusser*, d. heilige Messopfer. Paderborn, 1854. *Julius Müller*, Abendmahl, in Herzog's Encyclopädie. *Steitz*, in Jahrb. f. d. Theologie, 1864–5.]

Corresponding to the mysterious union between the two natures of Christ in one and the same person, was the idea of a mystical connection subsisting between the body of Christ and the bread in the Lord's Supper, and between his blood and the wine.[1] This idea, which had taken its rise in the preceding period, was now farther carried out by means of the more fully developed terminology of the church, and by the introduction of liturgical formulas, which substituted mystical ceremonies for the simple apostolical rite.[2] The mysterious and often bombastic rhetoric of the fathers, especially *Gregory* of Nyssa, the two *Cyrils*, and *Chrysostom*, in the Greek church, and *Hilary* and *Ambrose* in the Latin, makes it uncommonly difficult to decide what dogmatic notions are to be attached to their expressions. By their changing imagery we are sometimes led to think of an ideal, sometimes of a substantial change; now of a subjective change on the part of the participant, and again of an objective change in what is received; sometimes it is a wonderful conjunction of the head and the body of Christ (consubstantiality); sometimes a total change of the elements of the Lord's Supper into this body (transubstantiation, real transformation).[3] Yet still the symbolic view appears, alongside of the metabolic, in some teachers of the Greek church, as in *Eusebius of Cæsarea*, *Athanasius*, *Gregory Nazianzen*, and *Theodoretus*.[4] But it is most unambiguous in the Western theologian, *Augustine*.[5] Although the latter appears to have faith in the wonderful healing virtues of the sacrament,[6] yet he decidedly opposed the superstitious reverence of it.[7] *Gelasius*, bishop of Rome, still spoke decidedly against a formal transubstantiation.[8] In respect to the idea of *sacrifice* as connected with it, this was further developed in this period, especially by *Gregory the Great*, in the form that the sacrificial death of Christ was truly repeated in the daily sacrifice of the mass.[9]

[1] Compare *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. 408. The idea which lies at the basis of most of the statements about the Lord's Supper may be said to be this—that as the Logos was once united with the flesh, so in the Supper he is now united with the bread and wine; and thus the controversy about the natures of Christ is in some degree repeated in the sacramental sphere. [*Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. 408 sq., argues that the fathers, with all their strong expressions, could not have meant to teach transubstantiation, for the following chief reasons: 1. That the change is so often compared with that of water in baptism, and of chrism in consecration. 2. That it is likened to the union of the Logos with the flesh—where there was no transformation of the flesh.

3. The church fathers (many of them) argue against the Monophysites, on the ground that as there was in the Lord's Supper no change, so none in the incarnation. 4. They frequently call the elements *τύπος, ἀντίτυπα*, figura, signum, etc. *Baur*, Dogmengesch. p. 194, says that the majority of the fathers of this period often speak of the bread and wine as the body and blood of Christ, in such terms as seem to involve the doctrine of a real change; but yet, comparing these with their other statements, and seeing how fluctuating is the form of their conceptions, we can really find in them only an obscure and exaggerated identification of figure and fact.—*Neander*, Hist. Dogm. p. 406 sq., gives the different modifications of opinions thus: 1. The sensuous realistic view of Justin and Irenæus, adopted by Cyril of Jerusalem, Chrysostom, and Hilary, teaching an actual interpenetration of the bread and wine with the body and blood of Christ. 2. A more spiritual view, though with a realistic element at its basis, in Augustine. 3. The school of Origen (excepting Gregory of Nyssa) separated more distinctly the symbol and the divine reality, *e. g.*, Eusebius of Cæsarea, Greg. Nazianz., etc.]

[2] On such names as *λατρεία ἀναίμακτος, θυσία τοῦ ἱλασμοῦ* (*Cyril* Myst. V.), *ἱερουργία, μετάληψις τῶν ἁγιασμάτων, ἁγία (μιστική) τράπεζα, μυστικὴ εὐλογία, ἐφόδιον* (in reference to the administration of the Lord's Supper to the sick), as well as on the formulas commonly used in connection with the rite of consecration, comp. *Suicer*, Thesaurus sub vocib.; *Touttée* in Diss. ad Cyr. Hier. 3, p. ccxxxiii. ss. *Marheineke*, l. c. p. 33, ss. *Augusti*, Archæologie, vol. viii. p. 32, ss. The sacrament is frequently described as a *tremendum* (as *φοβερόν, φρικτόν, φρικωδέστατον*). It is also characteristic that the fourth petition in the Lord's Prayer is almost uniformly referred, in a mystical way, to the Lord's Supper.

[3] *Gregory of Nyssa** draws a parallel, in a most adventurous style, between the process of physical nutrition and the subsistence of the spiritual body of the believer upon the body and blood of Christ in the eucharist. Like the earlier fathers, he sees in this holy food a *φάρμακον ἀθανασίας*, an antidote to the mortality wrought by sin; comp. Oratio Catech. 37. As by the divine Logos the bread, in the eating thereof, is transformed into the essence of the body united with divinity, so, in the Lord's Supper, the bread and the wine are transformed into the body united with the Logos (*τὸ δὲ σῶμα τῇ ἐνοικήσει τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὴν θεϊκὴν μετεποιήθη*); compare the whole passage in *Münscher*, edited by v. Cölln, i. 490 sq. *Rupp*, 238 sq. *Rückert* (ubi supra, 403 sq.) investigates this at length, and comes to the conclusion, perhaps too unfavorable: "*Gregory shattered the Supper of the Lord; he cast away all that is glorious in its nature, and in its place left only a magical instrumentality, which, without any influence on the spiritual life, is only (?) designed to nourish the body for immortality.*" On *Cyril* of Jerusalem, see ibid. 410; among other things, he infers from John vi., which

* The difficulty of describing and classifying the different opinions of the fathers of this period about the Lord's Supper, is seen in the contradictory views of the most recent writers in this matter—*Ebrard, Kahnis, Rückert*. The categories, too, proposed by the latter, viz., *symbolical* and *metabolical*, are not sufficient; for the idea of *μεταβολή* is nowhere definitely settled, and, in the same writer, the metabolical and the symbolical views cross one another.

he interprets of the Lord's Supper, that those who do not receive this Supper lose salvation (Comm. in Joh. iv. p. 361, A).

Cyril of Jerusalem so connected (Cat. xxii. § 6) the miracle performed at the marriage at Cana with the *μεταβολὴ* of the elements in the Lord's Supper, that it is difficult not to suppose that he believed in a real and total change, the more so as he adds: *Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησίς σοι τοῦτο ὑποβάλλει, ἀλλὰ ἡ πίστις σε βεβαιούτω· μὴ ἀπὸ τῆς γεύσεως κρίνῃς τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς πίστεως πληροφοροῦ ἀνενδοιάστως, σώματος καὶ αἵματος Χριστοῦ καταξιωθείς*; and yet he says, § 3: *ἐν τύπῳ ἄρτου δίδοταί σοι τὸ αἷμα*, etc. Does this mean under the *image*, or under the *form*, of the bread? "*which, however, is no longer bread, but something else*" (as *Rückert* interprets it). But as he spoke (Cat. xxi. 3) of a similar change effected in the oil which was used at the performance of the rite of consecration, without thinking of a real metaphysical change of the substance of the oil into the substance of the Holy Spirit, the interpretation remains a matter of doubt; comp. *Neander*, Hist. Dogm. p. 412. Here then is found "*not indeed a completely developed, but yet a very decided doctrine of transformation, approaching the extreme point;*" *Rückert*, p. 420. But Cyril undoubtedly supposed a real union, spiritual and corporeal, of the communicant with Christ (*σύσσωμοι καὶ σύναιμοι Χριστοῦ, χριστόφοροι γινόμεθα*), and thought that we participate in the nature of Christ by the assimilation of his body and blood to our members, etc. Cat. xxiii. Comp. Ebrard, 278, Rückert, 415, who cite the passages fully.—*Chrysostom* regards the institution of the Lord's Supper as a proof of the highest love of the Redeemer to mankind, inasmuch as he not only gave them an opportunity of seeing him, but also enabled them to partake of his body, Hom. 45, in Joh. (Opp. T. viii. p. 292).* He too teaches a *real* union with Christ: *Ἀναφύρει ἑαυτὸν ἡμῖν, καὶ οὐ τῇ πίστει μόνον, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ τῷ πράγματι σῶμα ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦ κατασκευάζει*, Hom. 83, in Matth. (Opp. T. vii. p. 869); comp. Hom. 24, in Ep. ad Cor. (Opp. T. ix. p. 257), and other passages quoted by *Marheineke*, l. c. p. 44. Chrysostom probably did not have the notion of a descent of the body of Christ from heaven into the bread (*Rückert*, p. 424). On the other hand, he, like other church teachers, (*e. g.*, Cyril of Jerusalem, Cat. xxiii., § 15), supposed that the substance of the bread was not, like other food, again rejected from the body, but consumed, as is the wax in the burning of the light—*οὕτως καὶ ὧδε νόμιζε συναναλίσκεσθαι τὰ μυστήρια τῇ τοῦ σώματος οὐσίᾳ*; De Pœnit. Hom. 9 (Opera, ii. 350). Yet Chrysostom distinguishes between the spiritual (*νοητόν*) and the sensuous (*αἰσθητόν*) in the Lord's Supper. "If we were incorporeal, Christ would nourish us with incorporeal things (*ἀσώματα*); but since the soul is tied to the body, God gives us *ἐν αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητα*;" comp. the passage on Matth. before cited in *Münscher* ed. by von Cölln, p. 502. *Ebrard*, p. 284, ss.—*Hilary*, de Trin. viii. 13, says, in reference to Christ: Naturam carnis suæ ad naturam æternitatis sub sacramento nobis communicandæ carnis admiscuit, that which Irenæus calls *ἕνωσις πρὸς ἀφθαρσίαν*. *Ambrose* (de Initiandis Mysteriis, c. 8. and 9) re-

* He speaks very strongly of a *manducatio oralis*, of a *ἐμπῆξαι τοὺς ὀδόντας τῇ σαρκὶ καὶ συμπλακῆναι*.

gards the Lord's Supper as the living bread which came down from heaven (John vi. 51), and which is none other but Christ himself. If blessings pronounced by men (viz., the prophets even of the Old Test.) possessed the power of changing the natural elements, how much more must the same be true in reference to the sacrament? Quodsi tantum valuit Sermo Eliæ, ut ignem de cœlo promeret, non valebit Christi sermo ut species mutet elementorum? As the rod of Moses was transformed into a serpent, and the Nile into blood, so this change comes about through the power of grace, which is mightier than the power of nature. All things are created by the Word (Christ): to effect a simple change (mutatio) can not be too difficult for him, who is the author of creation. *The very body which was in a miraculous way brought forth by the Virgin, is at the same time the body of the sacrament.* Nevertheless, he says (in contradiction to the assumption of a real change): Ante benedictionem verborum cœlestium species nominatur, post consecrationem corpus Christi *significatur;* and in reference to the wine: ante consecrationem aliud dicitur, post consecrationem *sanguis nuncupatur.* (But it ought not to be forgotten, that critical doubts have been raised respecting the genuineness of this book.) Against *Ebrard*, p. 306 sq., see *Rückert*, u. s. He calls Ambrose "the pillar on which rests the mediæval doctrine of the Lord's Supper;" p. 464.

[1] *Eusebius of Cæsarea*, Demonstr. Evangel. i. 10, and Theol. eccles. iii. 12, *Neander*, Hist. Dogmas, p. 411, *Athanasius*, Ep. iv. ad Serap. (in *Neander*, p. 409). [*Neander* says of Eusebius, that "he was partial to such expressions as the following: Christians are admonished to celebrate the remembrance of Christ by the symbols of his body and blood" (Demonstr. Evang. i. c. 40). In his interpretation of John vi. (Theol. Eccl. iii. c. 12), he says, we are not to believe that Christ spoke of his present body, or enjoined the drinking of his corporeal and sensuous blood; but the words which he spake are spirit and life, so that his words themselves are his flesh and blood. Eusebius also connected a supernatural, sanctifying power with the outward Supper. Neander says of Athanasius, that he represents a spiritual view, with a realistic element at its basis; in commenting on John vi., he says that the eating and drinking of the body and blood of Christ are not to be understood literally; Christ wished to lead his disciples to the conception of a spiritual nourishment. See his Ep. iv. ad Serapionem. *Jacobi*, in the note to Neander's Hist. Dogmas, p. 409, quotes from the Festal Letters of Athanasius, translated by Larsow, Letter vii.: "Bread and wine, as symbols of the nourishing divine power of the Logos. Not only here is this bread food for the righteous,... but also in heaven we eat such food, for the Lord is also the nourishment of the higher spirits, and of angels, and is the delight of the whole heavenly host."] *Gregory of Nazianzum* called the bread and wine symbols and types (*ἀντίτυπα*)* of the great mysteries, Orat. xvii. 12, p. 325. *Ullmann*, p. 484.—Deserving of special note is a fragment of a letter addressed by *Chrysostom* to *Cesarius*, a monk, the authenticity of which is

* Comp. *Suicer*, Thes. T. i. p. 383, ss., and *Ullmann*, l. c., who oppose the interpretation of Elias Cretensis and of John of Damascus. According to the one, *ἀντίτυπα* meant the same as *ἰσότυπα*; according to the other, Gregory only meant that the bread and wine were *ἀντίτυπα before* the consecration.

more than questionable.* It is here said: Sicut enim antequam sanctificetur panis, panem nominamus, divina autem illum sanctificante gratia, mediante sacerdote, liberatus est quidam ab appellatione panis, dignus autem habitus dominici corporis appellatione, etiamsi natura panis in ipso permansit, et non dua corpora, sed unum corpus filii prædicamus. Comp. *Neander*, Hist. Dogm. 408. Chrysostom's disciple, *Nilus*, made a clear distinction between the symbol and the thing represented by it, comparing (Lib. i. ep. 44, see *Neander*, l. c.) the bread after consecration to a document which having been confirmed by the emperor, is called a *Sacra*. The distinction made by *Theodoret* between the sign aud the thing signified, was intimately connected with the similar distinction which he drew between the human and the divine natures of Christ; Dial. ii. Opp. iv. p. 126: *Οὐδὲ γὰρ μετὰ τὸν ἁγιασμὸν τὰ μυστικὰ σύμβολα τῆς οἰκείας ἐξίσταται φύσεως. Μένει γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς προτέρας οὐσίας, καὶ τοῦ σχήματος καὶ τοῦ εἴδους, καὶ ὁρατά ἐστι καὶ ἁπτὰ, οἷα καὶ πρότερον ἦν. Νοεῖται δὲ ἅπερ ἐγένετο, καὶ πιστεύεται καὶ προσκυνεῖται, ὡς ἐκεῖνα ὄντα ἅπερ πιστεύεται. Παράθες τοίνυν τῷ ἀρχετύπῳ τὴν εἰκόνα καὶ ὄψει τὴν ὁμοιότητα. Χρὴ γὰρ ἐοικέναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τὸν τύπον.* He also contrasted the *μεταβολὴ τῇ χάριτι* with the *μεταβολὴ τῆς φύσεως*, Dial. i. p. 26. (We do not see, then, why *Rückert* puts him among the *metabolists* instead of the *symbolists*.)

* *Augustine*, in interpreting the words pronounced by our Saviour at the institution of this ordinance, reminds us of their figurative import; Contra Adamant. c. 12. 3. He says, too, that the language of John vi. is highly figurative; Contra Advers. Leg. et Prophetar. ii. c. 9. (The controversy in which he was engaged with the Manicheans led him to defend the figurative style of the Old Test. by adducing similar examples from the New.) He even supposed that the characteristic feature of the sacraments consists in this, that they contain symbols, Ep. 98, 9: Si sacramenta quandam similitudinem earum rerum, quarum sacramenta sunt, non haberent, omnino sacramenta non essent. Ex hac autem similitudine plerumque etiam ipsarum rerum nomina accipiunt. The sacrament in question is the body of Christ—secundum quendam modum, but not absolutely; and its participation is a communicatio corporis et sanguinis ipsius (Ep. 54, 1); comp. De Doctr. Chr. iii. 10, 16. In the passage last mentioned, he calls the partaking of Christ's body, in the literal (Capernaitic) sense of the word (John vi. 33), facinus vel flagitium, and continues as follows: Figura est ergo, præcipiens passioni Dominicæ communicandum et suaviter atque utiliter recondendum in memoria, quod pro nobis caro ejus crucifixa et vulnerata sit; comp. De Civ. Dei xxi. c. 25. Respecting the body of Christ he says, Ep. 146: Ego Domini corpus ita in cœlo esse credo, ut erat in terra, quando ascendit in cœlum, comp. *Marheineke*, p. 56, ss.; *Neander*, Church Hist. ii. 674; *Ebrard*, 309. —On the connection subsisting between the views of Augustine concerning the Lord's Supper and those respecting baptism, comp. *Wiggers*, ii. p. 146; on the connection subsisting between these and his views of the sacraments in general, comp. above, § 137, note 2.

* Comp. Opus. Imperf. contra Julian, iii. 162; see *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch.

* In Chrysostom. Opera, iii. 742. On the history of this fragment, see *Rückert*, p. 429.

p. 407. [Augustine here relates, that a mother made a plaster of the sacred bread, laid it upon the eyes of her son, born with sealed eyes, and so healed him.] This view of the magical efficacy of the Lord's Supper he held in common with the greatest teachers of the East; thus Gregory of Naz., comp. Orat. viii. 17 sq., and Ep. 240, *Ullmann's* Gregory, p. 483.—The dread of spilling any of the wine was the same as in the previous period. With this is allied the warning of *Cyril of Jerusalem*, that when a drop of the consecrated wine remains hanging on the lips, the eyes and brow must be wet with it (Cat. xxiii. c. 22); *Gieseler*, ubi supra.—On the *Communion of Children*, which was customary particularly in the Latin church, see the works on Archæology. [Gelasius, bishop of Rome, writes, about A. D. 495: No one should venture to exclude any child from this sacrament, "without which no one can attain to eternal life." In this prohibition is seen the value attached to infant communion. Comp. *Neander*, p. 412.]

[7] *Augustine*, De Trinit. iii. 10: Possunt habere honorem tanquam religiosa, sed non stuporem tanquam mira. De Doctr. Christ. iii. 9, he calls the New Testament sacraments, in contrast with the Old Testament ceremonies, factu facillima, intellectu augustissima, observatione castissima, which, however, are to be honored, not carnali servitute, but spiritali libertate. To take the signs for the thing signified, he terms a servilis infirmitas.

[8] *Gelasius*, De duab. Natur. in Christo, in Bibl. Max. PP. T. viii. p. 703, quoted by *Meyer*, p. 34. *Münscher* edit. by von Cölln, p. 504: Certe sacramenta, quæ sumimus, corporis et sanguinis Christi, divina res est, propter quod et per eadem divinæ efficimur participes naturæ *et tamen esse non desinit substantia vel natura panis et vini*. Et certe imago et similitudo corporis et sanguinis Christi in actione mysteriorum celebrantur. Satis ergo nobis evidenter ostenditur, hoc nobis in ipso Christo Domino sentiendum, quod in ejus imagine profitemur, celebramus et sumimus, ut sicut in hanc, scilicet in divinam transeant, Sancto Spiritu perficiente, substantiam, *permanente tamen in suæ proprietate naturæ*, sic illud ipsum mysterium principale, cujus nobis efficientiam virtutemque veracitur repræsentant.

[9] After the example of Cyprian, the idea of a sacrifice is distinctly set forth by most of the fathers of this period. Thus by *Gregory* of Nazianzum (Orat. ii. 95, p. 56. *Ullmann*, p. 483), and *Basil* the Great, Ep. 93, though without any more precise definition (*Klose*, p. 72); so, too, by *Leo the Great* (Sermo lxvi. 2; clvi. 5), see *Perthel*, p. 218, note (against *Griesbach*, who interprets it only tropically); against *Perthel*, see *Rückert*, p. 479 sq. On *Ambrose* (who first used the word *missa* directly of the celebration of the Lord's Supper), *Chrysostom*, and *Augustine*, see *Rückert*, and the Histories of Doctrines by *Neander* and *Gieseler*. But *Gregory the Great* speaks most distinctly (Moral. Lib. xxii. 26) of a *quotidianum immolationis sacrificium*, and connects it with masses for souls; see *Lau*, p. 484 sq., and the passages he cites.

5. THE DOCTRINE OF THE LAST THINGS.

§ 139.

MILLENNARIANISM.—THE KINGDOM OF CHRIST.

The contest in which *Origen* had engaged against the advocates of Millennarianism, was soon after his death adjusted in his favor. His disciple, *Dionysius of Alexandria*, succeeded more by persuasion than by force in imposing silence on the followers of *Nepos*, an Egyptian bishop, who adhered to the letter of Scripture, and were opposed to all allegorical interpretation, and had the presbyter *Coracion* for their leader after the death of Nepos.[1] Millennarianism was from that time supported by but a few of the eastern theologians.[2] In the West the chiliastic expectations were advocated by *Lactantius*,[3] but combated by *Augustine*, who had himself once entertained similar views.[4] Besides, it was very natural that Christianity should confidently expect a longer existence on earth, after it had become connected with the state, and been permanently established. Thus the period of Christ's second coming, and of the destruction of the world, was inevitably deferred from time to time, and it was only extraordinary events that caused men for a season to look forward to these events as nigh at hand.—The notion of *Marcellus*, that Christ's *heavenly* kingdom itself will at some future period come to an end (founded on 1 Cor. xv. 25), forms a remarkable parallel to Millennarianism.[5]

[1] On the treatise of Nepos (A. D. 255), entitled: ἔλεγχος τῶν ἀλληγορικῶν, and that of Dionysius, περὶ ἐπαγγελιῶν, as well as on the entire controversy, comp. Euseb. vii. 24. Gennadius De Dogm. Eccles. c. 55. *Mosheim* Comment. p. 720–28. *Neander*, Church Hist. i. 652. Coracion retracted his former views in consequence of a disputation brought about by Dionysius.

[2] *Methodius*, who was in part an opponent of Origen, propounded millennarian notions in his treatise, The Feast of the Ten Virgins (a dialogue on chastity), which was composed in imitation of Plato's Symposium; Orat. ix. § 5 (in *Combefisii* Auctuar. Noviss. Bibl. PP. Græc. Pars. i. p. 109). *Neander*, Church Hist. i. p. 720. According to Epiph. Hær. 72, p. 1013 (comp. Hier. in Jes. Lib. xviii.), *Apollinaris*, too, held millennarian notions, and wrote a treatise in two books against the work of Dionysius, which met with great success at the time: Quem non solum (says Jerome, l. c.) suæ sectæ homines, sed nostrorum in hac parte duntaxat plurima sequitur multitudo. Concerning the millennarian views of *Bar Sudaili*, abbot of Edessa, in Mesopotamia, towards the close of the fifth century, comp. *Neander*, l. c. ii. p. 555.

[3] Inst. vii. 14–26, c. 14: Sicut Deus sex dies in tantis rebus fabricandis laboravit, ita et religio ejus et veritas in his sex millibus annorum laboret necesse est, malitia prævalente ac dominante. Et rursus, quoniam perfectis operibus requievit die septimo eumque benedixit, necesse est, ut in fine sexti millesimi anni malitia omnis aboleatur e terra et regnet per annos mille justitia, sitque tranquillitas et requies a laboribus, quos mundus jamdiu perfert. In the subsequent part of the chapter he gives a full description of the state of the political, the physical, and the religious world antecedent to the millennial kingdom, and appeals both to the Sibylline oracles and to the Hystaspes. Comp. *Corrodi*, ii. p. 410, 423, 441, 455.

[4] Sermo 159 (Opp. T. v. p. 1060), which may be compared with De Civ. Dei xx. 7.....Quæ opinio esset utcunque tolerabilis, si aliquæ deliciæ spiritales in illo sabbato adfuturæ sanctis per Domini præsentiam crederentur. *Nam etiam nos hoc opinati fuimus aliquando.* Sed cum eos, qui tunc resurrexerint, dicant immoderatissimis carnalibus epulis vacaturos, in quibus cibus sit tantus ac potus, ut non solum nullam modestiam teneant, sed modum quoque ipsius incredulitatis excedant: nullo modo ista possunt nisi a carnalibus credi. Hi autem, qui spiritales sunt, istos ista credentes χιλιαστὰς appellant græco vocabulo, quos, verbum e verbo exprimentes, nos possumus Milliarios nuncupare. The first resurrection (Revel. xx. 5) is explained by Augustine as the deliverance of the soul from the dominion of sin in this life; as, in general, an orthodoxy which maintains the authority of the Apocalypse, and yet will not allow millennarianism, can only escape from its difficulties by an arbitrary exegesis, like that of Augustine on this passage.

[5] Comp. the works on Marcellus quoted § 92, 6; *Klose*, p. 42, ss., and the passages cited by him. *Cyril* of Jerusalem, Cat. xv. 27 (14 *Milles*), combating this opinion, appeals to the words of the angel (Luke i. 33), and of the prophets (Dan. vii. 13, 14, etc.); in reference to 1 Cor. xv. 25, he asserts that the term ἄχρις includes the terminus ad quem.—*Klose*, p. 82, questions whether Photinus adopted the views of Marcellus. [Comp. *Willenborg*, Die Orthdoxie d. Marcellus von Ancyra. Münster, 1859.]

§ 140.

THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY.

The idea of a two-fold resurrection, taken from the book of Revelation, still held by *Lactantius*,[1] afterwards shared the fate of Millennarianism.[2] Though *Methodius* combated Origen's idealistic doctrine of the resurrection,[3] yet several of the eastern theologians adopted it,[4] till the zealous Anti-Origenist party succeeded in the ensuing controversies in establishing their doctrine, that the body raised from the tomb is in every respect identical with that which formed in this life the organ of the soul. *Jerome* even went so far as to make this assertion in reference to the very hairs and teeth.[5] *Augustine's* views on this point were, during the earlier part of his

life, more in accordance with the Platonic and Alexandrian mode of thinking; but afterwards he gave the preference to more sensuous notions, though he was at much pains to clear the doctrine in question as far as possible from all gross and carnal additions.[a] Later definitions have reference rather to unessential points.[b]

[1] Inst. vii. 20: Nec tamen universi tunc (*i. e.*, at the commencement of the millennial reign) a Deo judicabuntur, sed ii tantum qui sunt in Dei religione versati. Comp. c. 26:....Eodem tempore (*i. e.*, at the end of the world after the millennial reign) fiet secunda illa et publica omnium resurrectio, in qua excitabuntur injusti ad cruciatus sempiternos.

[a] *Augustine* De Civ. Dei xx. 7: De his duabus resurrectionibus Joannes ....eo modo locutus est, ut earum prima a quibusdam nostris non intellecta, insuper etiam in quasdam ridiculas fabulas verteretur. Comp. Epiphan. Ancor. § 97, p. 99. Gennad. lib. i. c. 6, et 25.

[b] Περὶ ἀναστάσεως λόγος. Phot. Bibl. cod. 234. *Rössler*, i. p. 297. Comp. Epiph. Hær. 64, 12–62.

[c] *Gregory* of Nazianzum, *Gregory* of Nyssa, and partly also *Basil* the Great, adopted the views of Origen. Thus Gregory of Nazianzum (Orat. ii. 17, p. 20, and in other places) rested belief in immortality principally on this, that man, considered as a spiritual being, is of divine origin, and consequently has an immortal nature. The body which perishes is transient, but the soul is the breath of the Almighty, and the deliverance from the fetters of the body is the most essential point of future happiness; see *Ullmann*, p. 501, 2. Similar statements are made by Gregory of Nyssa, De Anima et Resurrectione (Opp. T. iii. p. 181 [247]), see *Rupp*, p. 187, ss., and *Münscher*, Handbuch, iv. p. 439. Both Gregory of Nazianzum and Gregory of Nyssa compared (in the manner of Origen), *e. g.*, the body of man to the coats of skins with which our first parents were clothed after the fall. Concerning the more indefinite views of *Basil* (Hom. viii. in Hexaëmeron, p. 78, and In Famem, p. 72), see *Klose*, p. 77. *Titus of Bostra* (fragm. in Joh. Damasceni Parallela Sacra Opp. T. ii. p. 763) propounded a more refined doctrine of the resurrection. *Chrysostom*, though asserting the identity of the body, Hom. x. in 2 Ep. ad Cor. (Opp. T. ix. p. 603), kept to the Pauline doctrine, and maintained in particular the difference between the present and the future body: Σὺ δέ μοι σκόπει, πῶς διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων δείκνυσι (ὁ Ἀπ.) τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῶν μελλόντων πρὸς τὰ παρόντα· ἐλπὼν γὰρ ἐπίγειον (2 Cor. v. 1) ἀντέθηκε τὴν οὐρανίαν κ. τ. λ. *Synesius*, a Christian philosopher of Cyrene, frankly acknowledged that he could not adopt the popular notions on this point (which some interpreted as a complete denial of the doctrine of the resurrection). Comp. Evagrius Hist. Eccl. i. 15, and Ep. 105 ad Euoptium fratrem, in the note of *Valesius* on that passage. [Comp. Synesius, Opera Omnia, ed. Krabinger, Landshut, 1850; and his Homilies traduites pour la première fois, par B. Kolbe, Berlin, 1850.]

[d] *Epiphanius*, *Theophilus of Alexandria*, and *Jerome* may be considered as the representatives of this zealous party. The last two had themselves formerly entertained more liberal views, nor did Theophilus even afterwards

hesitate to ordain *Synesius* as bishop of Ptolemais; see *Münscher*, Handbuch, iv. p. 442.* But they opposed, with especial vehemence, *John of Jerusalem* and *Rufinus*. Jerome was by no means satisfied (Apol. contra Ruf. lib. 4, Op. T. ii. p. 145) with the language of Rufinus, even when he asserted the resurrection *hujus* carnis (in the Expos. Symbol. app.), and still less with the caution of *John*, who distinguished (rightly in the exegetical point of view) between flesh and body. He therefore made the following definite assertions (Adv. Errores Joann. Hier. ad Pammach. Opp. T. ii. p. 118, ss.), which he founds especially on Job xix. 26: Caro est proprie, quæ sanguine, venis, ossibus nervisque constringitur.....Certe ubi pellis et caro, ubi ossa et nervi et sanguis et venæ, ibi carnis structura, ibi sexus proprietas.....Videbo autem in ista carne, quæ me nunc cruciat, quæ nunc præ dolore distillat. Idcirco Deum in carne conspiciam, quia omnes infirmitates meas sanavit.—And so goes on to say in reference to the resurrection-bodies: Habent dentes, ventrem, genitalia et tamen nec cibis nec uxoribus indigent. From the stridor dentium of the condemned, he infers that we shall have teeth; the passage: Capilli capitis vestri numerati sunt, proves, in his opinion, that not even our hairs will be wanting. But his principal argument is founded on the identity of the body of believers with that of Christ. In reference to 1 Cor. xv. 50, he lays great stress upon the use of the term *possidere* regnum Dei, which he distinguishes from the resurrectio. Comp. *Prudentius* (Apotheos. 1063, ss.):

> Nosco meum in Christo corpus resurgere. Quid me
> Desperare jubes? Veniam, quibus ille revenit
> Calcata de morte viis. Quod credimus, hoc est:
> Et totus veniam, nec enim minor aut alius quam
> Nunc sum restituar. Vultus, vigor et color idem,
> Qui modo vivit, erit. *Nec me vel dente vel ungue*
> *Fraudatum* revomet patefacti fossa sepulcri.

Augustine propounded the more liberal view, De Fide et Symb. c. 10: Tempore immutationis angelicæ non jam caro erit et sanguis, sed tantum corpus—in cœlestibus nullo caro, sed corpora simplicia et lucida, quæ appellat Ap. spiritalia, nonnulli autem vocant ætheria; the opposite view is set forth in his Retractiones, p. 17. The whole doctrine is fully developed in Enchirid. ad Laur. 84–92, and De Civ. Dei xxii. c. 11–21; Erit ergo spiritui subdita caro spiritalis, sed tamen caro, non spiritus, sicut carni subditus fuit spiritus ipse carnalis, sed tamen spiritus, non caro. In reference to the general aspect of the doctrine he says, Ad Laur. c. 88, ss.: Non perit Deo terrena materies, de qua mortalium creatur caro, sed quemlibet pulverem cineremve solvatur, in quoslibet halitus aurasque diffugiat, in quamcunque aliorum corporum substantiam vel in ipsa elementa vertatur, in quorumcunque animalium, etiam hominum cedat carnemque mutetur, illi animæ humanæ puncto temporis redit, quæ illam primitus, ut homo fieret, cresceret, viveret, animavit;

* He accepted the bishopric only on the condition, that he might retain his free opinions.

but this admits of some limitation: Ipsa itaque terrena materies, quæ discedente anima fit cadaver, non ita resurrectione reparabitur, ut ea, quæ dilabuntur et in alias atque alias aliarum rerum species formasque vertuntur (quamvis ad corpus redeant, unde lapsa sunt), ad easdem quoque corporis partes, ubi fuerunt, redire necesse sit (this would be impossible especially in the case of the hair and nails.).... Sed quemadmodum, si statua cujuslibet solubilis metalli aut igne liquesceret, aut contereretur in pulverem, aut confunderetur in massam, et eam vellet artifex ex illius materiæ quantitate reparare, nihil interesset ad ejus integritatem, quæ particula materiæ cui membro statuæ redderetur, dum tamen totum, ex quo constituta fuerat, restituta resumeret. Ita Deus mirabiliter atque ineffabiliter artifex de toto, quo caro nostra constiterat, eam mirabili et ineffabili celeritate restituet. Nec aliquid attinebit ad ejus reintegrationem, utrum capilli ad capillos redeant et ungues ad ungues: an quicquid eorum perierat, mutetur in carnem et in partes alius corporis revocetur, curante artificis providentia, ne quid indecens fiat. Nor is it necessary to suppose, that the differences of size and stature will continue in the life to come, but every thing will be restored in the proportions of the divine image. Cap. 90: Resurgent igitur Sanctorum corpora sine ullo vitio, sine ulla deformitate, sicut sine ulla corruptione, onere, difficultate, etc. All will have the stature of the full-grown man, and, as a general rule, that of thirty years old (the age of Christ), De Civ. Dei lib. i. c. 12. He gives particular statements respecting children, De Civ. Dei lib. i. c. 14; the different sexes, c. 17; concerning children born prematurely and lusus naturæ, ib. c. 13, and Ad Laur., 85, 87. Moreover: Si quis in eo corporis modo, in quo defunctus est, resurrecturum unumquemque contendit, non est cum illo laboriosa contradictione pugnandum; De Civ. Dei l. i. c. 16. On the similar views of *Gregory the Great*, see *Lau*, p. 510, ss.

[1] The opinion of Origen having been condemned by the decisions of synods (*Mansi* ix. p. 399 and 516) on the narrow basis of this orthodoxy there could be but sight modifications. To these belong, *e. g.*, the controversy which arose between *Eutychius*, patriarch of Constantinople, who maintained that the resurrection body was impalpabilis, and *Gregory the Great*, bishop of Rome, who denied it (Greg. M. Moral. in Jobum lib. xiv. c. 29. *Münscher*, Handbuch, p. 449); and the controversy which took place between the Monophysitic Philoponites and the Cononites respecting the question, whether the resurrection was to be considered as a new creation of matter, or as a mere transformation of the form? Comp. Timoth. de Recept. Hæret. in *Cotelerii* Monnm. Eccles. Græcæ, T. iii. p. 413, ss. *Walch*, Historie der Ketzereien, vol. viii. p. 762, ss. *Münscher*, Handbuch, iv. p. 450, 451. *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch, 427. [The theory of *Philoponus* rested on his Aristotelian principle, that matter and form are inseparable, and that with the death of the body both matter and form are destroyed; consequently, there must be a new creation.—One view condemned as Origenistic was, that the bodies will be raised in the spherical form, that being the most perfect; another, that the bodies will at some future time be annihilated.]

§ 141.

General Judgment—Conflagration of the World.—Purgatory.

Höpfner, De Origine Dogmatis de Purgatorio. Hal. 1792. J. F. Cotta, Historia Succincta Dogmatis de Pœnarum Infernalium Duratione. Tübing. 1774. [*Passaglia* De Æternite Pœnarum, Ratisb. 1854.]

The views concerning the general judgment were still substantially founded on the representations of Scripture, but more fully described and pictorially represented, in the foreground and background, by the phantasy of the age.[1] The fathers of the preceding age believed in a general conflagration which was to accompany the general judgment, as well as to destroy the world, and ascribed to it a purifying power.[2] The shape given to this by *Augustine* was, that this purifying fire (ignis purgatorius) has its seat in Hades, *i. e.*, the place in which the souls of the departed were supposed to remain until the general resurrection.[3] This idea, as well as further additions on the part of other theologians, especially *Cesarius of Arles*,[4] and *Gregory the Great*,[5] prepared the way for the more definite doctrine of purgatory. This doctrine being brought afterwards into connection with the doctrine of the mass, was made subservient to the purposes of the hierarchy, and contributed to obscure the evangelical doctrine of salvation.

[1] The end of the world will be preceded by signs in the sun, the moon, and the stars; the sun will be changed into blood, the moon will not give her light, etc. Comp. *Basil the Great*, Hom. 6, in Hexaëm. p. 54, (al. 63.) *Lactantius* vii. 19, ss., c. 25, (he has regard to the Sibylline oracles). Short descriptions of the general judgment are given by *Gregory of Nazians.* Orat. xvi. 9, p. 305, ss., and xix. 15, p. 373.—According to *Basil*, Moral. Regula. 68, 2, the coming of our Lord will be sudden, the stars will fall from heaven, etc., but we ought not to think of this manifestation as τοπικὴ ἢ σαρκική, but ἐν δόξῃ τοῦ πατρὸς κατὰ πάσης τῆς οἰκουμένης ἀθρόως, see *Klose*, p. 74. Comp. Hom. in Ps. xxxiii. p. 184 (al. 193, 94), Ep. 46.—According to *Cyril of Jerusalem*, the second coming of our Lord will be announced by the appearance of a cross, Cat. 15. 22; comp. the whole description, 19–33.—*Augustine* endeavored dogmatically to define the facts which are represented in figurative language,* instead of giving rhetorical descriptions, as the Greek theologians loved to do; he therefore sought to bring the doctrine of retribution into agreement with his doctrine of pre-

* He points out (De Gestis Pel. c. 4, § 11) the variety of figurative expressions used in Scripture in reference to this subject, which can hardly be combined in *one* representation.

destination; see De Civ. Dei xx. 1: Quod ergo in confessione tenet omnis ecclesia Dei veri, Christum de cœlo esse venturum ad vivos ac mortuos judicandos, hunc divini judicii ultimum diem dicimus, *i. e.* novissimum tempus. Nam per quot dies hoc judicium tendatur, incertum est: sed scripturarum more sanctarum diem poni solere pro tempore, nemo qui illas litteras quamlibet negligenter legerit, nescit. Ideo autem cum diem judicii dicimus, addimus ultimum vel novissimum, quia et nunc judicat et ab humani gereris initio judicavit, dimittens de paradiso, et a ligno vitæ separans primos homines peccati magni perpetratores; imo etiam quando angelis peccantibus non pepercit, quorum princeps homines a se ipso subversus invidendo subvertit, procul dubio judicavit. Nec sine illius alto justoque judicio et in hoc aërio cœlo et in terris, et dæmonum et hominum miserrima vita est erroribus ærumnisque plenissima. Verum etsi nemo peccasset, non sine bono rectoque judicio universam rationalem creaturam perseverantissime sibi Domino suo hærentem in æterna beatitudine retineret. Judicat etiam non solum universaliter de genere dæmonum atque hominum, ut miseri sint propter primorum meritum peccatorum; sed etiam de singulorum operibus propriis, quæ gerunt arbitrio voluntatis, etc.—As to the transactions of the general judgment itself, see ibid. c. 14.

[8] Comp. § 77, note 6. This idea of a purifying fire is very distinctly set forth by *Gregory* of Nazianzum, in Orat. xxxix. 19, p. 690. (*Ullmann*, p. 504). Less definitely in Orat. xl. 36, p. 780. (*Ullmann*, p. 505).—Roman Catholic commentators have inferred too much in support of their theory from the general expression πυρὶ καθαιρομένη, which *Gregory* of Nyssa makes use of—De iis qui præmature abripiuntur (Opp. iii. p. 312); see *Schröckh*, Kirchengeschichte xiv. p. 135. *Basil the Great* supposes (Hom. 3. in Hexaëmeron, p. 27) that the fire which is to destroy the world has existed from the beginning of creation, but that its effects are neutralized by a sufficient quantity of water, until the consumption of the latter; see *Klose*, p. 73.

[9] *Augustine* agrees with other theologians in his general views concerning the conflagration of the world, De Civ. Dei xx. 18; in the same place he endeavors to give a satisfactory reply to the question, where the righteous will be during the general conflagration? Possumus respondere, futuros eos esse in superioribus partibus, quo ita non adscendet flamma illius incendii, quemadmodum nec unda diluvii. Talia quippe illis inerunt corpora, ut illic sint, ubi esse voluerint. Sed nec ignem conflagrationis illius pertimescent immortales atque incorruptibiles facti: sicut virorum trium corruptibilia corpora atque mortalia in camino ardenti vivere illæsa potuerunt. Like the earlier theologians Augustine brings the idea of a purification wrought by the fire into connection with 1 Cor. iii. 11–15; see Enchirid. ad Laur. § 68. In the next section he continues as follows (in reference to the disposition to cling too much to earthly goods): Tale aliquid *etiam post hanc vitam fieri* incredibile non est, et utrum ita sit, quæri potest. Et aut inveniri aut latere nonnullos fideles *per ignem purgatorium*, quanto magis minusve bona pereuntia dilexerunt, tanto tardius citiusve salvari: non tamen tales, de quibus dictum est, quod regnum Dei non possidebunt, nisi convenienter

pœnitentibus eadem crimina remittantur. Comp. De Civ. Dei l. i. c. 24, 26; Quæst. ad Dulc. § 13. At the synod of Diospolis it was objected to *Pelagius*, that he taught that at the last judgment the godless and sinners would not be spared, but burn in everlasting fire—to which he replied, that this was according to the gospel, and that whoever taught otherwise was an Origenist. But Augustine conjectures, that Pelagius thereby meant to deny the purifying fire; comp. *Wiggers*, i. 195: *Neander*, Church History (*Torrey*), ii. 584, Note 675. [As quoted by *Neander*, the objection reads: "In die judicii iniquis et peccatoribus non esse parcendum, sed æternis eos ignibus esse exurendos;" and *Neander* adds, that it is probable that *Pelagius* was combating those who held out the promise of final salvation to a dead church-faith, not connected with a change of heart," etc.—and that this interpretation "is confirmed by Augustine's remark on this passage in his De Gestis Pelagii."] Whether *Prudentius* taught it? see *Schröckh*, Kirchengesch. vii. p. 126.

[4] Sermo viii. 4. in August. Opp. T. v. Append.; the passage is quoted by *Münscher* ed. by von Cölln, i. p. 62. He makes a distinction between capitalia crimina and minuta peccata. None but the latter can be expiated either in this life by painful sufferings, alms, or placability manifested towards enemies, or in the life to come by the purifying fire (longo tempore cruciandi).

[5] *Gregory the Great* may rightly be called with *Schröckh*, the "*inventor of the doctrine of purgatory*," if on such a subject we may speak of invention. On the one hand, he lays down (Dial. iv. 39) the doctrine of purgatory, which in Augustine still has the character of a private opinion, as *an article of faith*, saying: De quibusdam levibus culpis esse ante judicium purgatorius ignis *credendus* est and rests his opinion on Matth. xii. 31. (He thinks that some sins are not pardoned till after death, but to that class belong only what are called minor sins, such as talkativeness, levity, and dissipated life).* On the other hand, he was the first writer who clearly propounded the idea of a deliverance from purgatory by intercessory prayer, by masses for the dead (sacra oblatio hostiæ salutaris) etc., and adduced instances in support of his view, to which he himself attached credit. Comp. Dial. iv. 25 and 57, Moral. ix. c. 34; *Schröckh*, Kirchengesch. xvii. p. 255, ss.; *Neander*, Church Hist. iii. p. 135, ss.; *Lau*, p. 485, 508, seq. If we compare Gregory's doctrine with the former (more idealistic) notions concerning the efficacy of the purifying fire, we may adopt the language of *Schmidt* (Kirchengesch. iii. p. 280); "*The belief in a lasting desire after a higher degree of perfection, which death itself can not quench*, DEGENERATED INTO A BELIEF IN PURGATORY."

[6] Abuses were already found as to prayers for the dead: and *Aerius*, presbyter at Sebaste (about A. D. 360) wished to have them abolished, but they still continued. At first they prayed *for* martyrs and saints (Epiphanius, 75, § 7).

* According to Gregory, the passage on which earlier teachers relied, 1 Cor. iii. 13, may be referred to tribulations in hac vita, but he himself prefers the usual interpretation, and understands by the wood, hay, and stubble, mentioned in iii. 12, unimportant and slight *sins!*

Augustine, on the other hand, thought; Injuria est pro martyre orare, cujus nos debemus orationibus commendari (Sermo xvii.). It became a more general ecclesiastical observance to introduce into the intercession of the saints a petition for the shortening of the pangs of purgatory.

§ 142.

THE STATE OF THE BLESSED AND THE DAMNED.

Gregory of Nazianzum, and some other theologians, supposed that the souls of the righteous prior to the resurrection of the body, are at once admitted into the presence of God (without respect to the doctrine about Hades); while the majority of the ecclesiastical writers of this period[1] believed that men do not receive their full reward till after the resurrection of the body[2] and the general judgment. According to *Gregory of Nazianzum*, *Gregory of Nyssa*, and other theologians who adopted the views of Origen, the blessedness of heaven consists in more fully developed knowledge, in intercourse with all the saints and righteous, and partly in the deliverance from the fetters of the body; *Augustine* added that the soul then obtained its true liberty. But all writers admitted the difficulty of forming just views on this subject.[3] The sufferings of the damned were represented as the opposite of the pleasures of the blessed, and in the descriptions of the punishments of hell greater prominence was given to gross sensuous representations. Many were disposed to regard the fire in question as a material fire; though *Lactantius* depicted it in more refined images, while others painted it in terrible descriptions.[4] There were still some theologians who favored the idea of degrees both of bliss and torture.[5] Concerning the duration of the punishments of hell the opinion was more general, that they are eternal,[6] but yet *Arnobius* maintained that they would at last cease, though with the annihilation of the individual[7]; and even the Origenistic humanity, in a few of its representatives, still dared to express a glimmer of hope in favor of the damned.[8] *Jerome* at least admitted, that those among the damned who have been *orthodox*, enjoy a kind of privilege.[9] And, lastly, it is a remarkable fact, which however admits of a satisfactory solution, that *Augustine* entertained milder views on this point than *Pelagius*,[10] who, as well as the practical *Chrysostom*,[11] maintained the eternal duration of the punishments of hell, in accordance with his strict doctrine of moral retribution. The doctrine of the restitution of all things shared the fate of Origenism,[12] and made its appearance in after ages only in connection with other heretical notions, and especially with the otherwise anti-Origenistic Millennarianism.

[1] Orat. x. p. 173, 174. Comp. Gennad. De Dogm. Eccles. c. 46. *Gregory the Great*, Moral. l. iv. c. 37. *Eusebius*, too, relates (De Vita Constant. iii. 40), that Helena, the mother of the emperor, went immediately to God, and was transformed into an angelic substance (*ἀνεστοιχειοῦτο.*)

[2] Thus *Ambrose*, De Bono Mortis c. 10; de Cain et Abel, l. ii. c. 2: Solvitur corpore anima et post finem vitæ hujus, adhuc tamen futuri judicii ambiguo suspenditur. Ita finis nullus, ubi finis putatur. *Hilary*, Tract. in Ps. cxx. p. 383. *Augustine*, Enchirid. ad Laur. § 109: Tempus, quod inter hominis mortem et ultimam resurrectionem interpositum est, animas abditis receptaculis continet; sicut unaquæque digna est vel requie vel ærumna, pro eo, quod sortita est in carne cum viveret: comp. Sermo 48. Even some of the Greek theologians taught, that no man receives his full reward before the general judgment. *Chrys.* in Ep. ad Hebr. Hom. xxviii. (Opp. T. xii. p. 924) et in 1 Ep. ad Corinth. Hom. xxxix. (Opp. xi. p. 436). He there defends the belief in the Christian doctrine of the *resurrection* as distinct from a mere hope in the *continued existence* of the soul after death. *Cyril of Alex.* Contra Anthropom. c. 5. 7, ss.

[3] According to *Gregory of Nyssa*, Orat. Catech. c. 40, the blessedness of heaven cannot be described by words. *Gregory of Nazianzum*, Orat. xvi. 9, p. 306, supposes it to consist in the perfect knowledge of God, and especially of the Trinity (*θεωρία τριάδος*)—in full accordance with the intellectual and contemplative tendency predominant in the eastern church at that time. Gregory, however, does not restrict the enjoyment of eternal happiness to the intuitive vision and knowledge of God; but, inasmuch as this knowledge itself is brought about by a *closer union with God*, the blessedness of the redeemed in heaven will also consist in this inward union with God, in the perfect peace both of the soul and of the heavenly habitations, in the intercourse with blessed spirits, and in the elevated knowledge of all that is good and beautiful; Orat. viii. 23, p. 232. Rhetorical descriptions are found in Orat. vii. 17, p. 209, vii. 21, p. 213. *Ullmann*, p. 502. *Basil the Great* depicts this blessedness for the most part in a negative way: Homil. in Ps. cxiv. p. 204, quoted by *Klose*, p. 76. *Augustine* also begins, De Civ. Dei xxii. 29, 30, with the confession: Et illa quidem actio, vel potius quies atque otium, quale futurum sit, *si verum velim dicere, nescio;* non enim hoc unquam per sensus corporis vidi. Si autem mente, *i. e.*, intelligentia vidisse me dicam, quantum est aut quid est nostra intelligentia ad illam excellentiam?—According to Augustine the happiness of the blessed consists in the enjoyment of heavenly peace which passes knowledge, and the vision of God, which cannot be compared with bodily vision. But while Gregory of Nazianzum assigned the first place to *theological* knowledge (insight into the Trinity), Augustine founded his theory of the blessed life upon *anthropology*. The blessed obtain true liberty, by which he understood that they *can* no longer sin: nam primum liberum arbitrium, quod homini datum est, quando primum creatus est rectus, potuit non peccare, sed potuit et peccare; hoc autem novissimum eo potentius erit, quo peccare non poterit. Verum hoc quoque Dei munere, non suæ possibilitate naturæ. Aliud est enim, esse Deum, aliud participem Dei. Deus natura peccare non potest; particeps

vero Dei ab illo accipit, ut peccare non possit.... And as with freedom, so with immortality: Sicut enim prima immortalitas fuit, quam peccando Adam perdidit, posse non mori, novissima erit, non posse mori. Augustine, moreover, thought, that the blessed retain the full recollection of the past, even of the sufferings which befell them while on earth; but so that they do not feel what was painful in these. They also know the torments of the damned without being disturbed in their own happiness (similar views were expressed by Chrysostom, Hom. x. in 2 Ep. ad. Corinth. Opp. T. xi. p. 605). God is the end and object of all desire, and thus the essential substance of the blessedness: Ipse erit finis desideriorum nostrorum, qui sine fine videbitur, sine fastidio amabitur, sine fatigatione laudabitur.—*Cassiodorus*, De Anima c. 12 (Opp. T. ii. p. 604, 605), gives a summary of what earlier theologians had taught concerning the eternal happiness of the blessed.

[4] *Lactantius* vii. 21..... Quia peccata in corporibus contraxerunt (damnati), rursus carne induentur, ut in corporibus piaculum solvant; et tamen non erit caro illa, quam Deus homini superjecerit, huic terrenæ similis, sed insolubilis ac permanens in æternum, ut sufficere possit cruciatibus et igni sempiterno, cujus natura diversa est ab hoc nostro, quo ad vitæ necessaria utimur, qui, nisi alicujus materiæ fomite alatur, extinguitur. At ille divinus per se ipsum semper vivit ac viget sine ullis alimentis, nec admixtum habet fumum, sed est purus ac liquidus et in aquæ modum fluidus. Non enim vi aliqua sursum versus urgetur, sicut noster, quem labes terreni corporis, quo tenetur, et fumus intermixtus exsilire cogit et ad cœlestem naturam cum trepidatione mobili subvolare. Idem igitur divinus ignis una eademque vi atque potentia et cremabit impios et recreabit, et quantum e corporibus absumet, tantum reponet, ac sibi ipse æternum pabulum subministrabit. Quod poëtæ in vulturem Tityi transtulerunt, ita sine ullo revirescentium corporum detrimento aduret tantum ac sensu doloris afficiet.—*Gregory of Nazianzum* supposed the punishment of the damned to consist essentially in their separation from God, and the consciousness of their own vileness (Orat. xvi. 9, p. 306): Τοῖς δὲ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων βάσανος, μᾶλλον δὲ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ ἀπερρίφθαι θεοῦ, καὶ ἡ ἐν τῷ συνειδότι αἰσχύνη πέρας οὐκ ἔχουσα. *Basil the Great*, on the contrary, gives a more vivid description of that punishment, Homil. in Ps. xxiii. (Opp. T. i. p. 151), and elsewhere. Comp. *Klose*, p. 75, 76. *Münscher*, Handbuch, iv. p. 458. *Chrysostom* exhausts his eloquence in depicting the torments of the damned in repulsive pictures; in Theod. Lapsum i. c. 6, (Opp. T. iv. p. 560, 561). Nevertheless in other places, *e. g.*, in his Ep. ad Rom. Hom. xxxi. (Opp. x. p. 396), he justly observes, that it is of more importance to know how to escape hell, than to know where it is, and what is its nature. *Gregory of Nyssa* (Orat. Catech. 40) endeavours to turn the thoughts away from all that is sensuous (the fire of hell is not to be looked upon as a material fire, nor is the worm which never dies an ἐπίγειον θηρίον). *Augustine* too sees, that first of all separation from God is to be regarded as the death and punishment of the damned (De Morib. Eccles. Cath. c. 11); but he leaves it to his readers to choose between the more sensuous, or the more spiritual mode of inter-

pretation; it is at all events better to think of both at once; De Civit. Dei xxi. 9, 10; comp. Greg. M. Moral. xv. c. 17.

[6] *Gregory of Nazianzum* rests his idea of different degrees of blessedness on John xiv. 2, comp. Orat. xxvii. 8, p. 493, xiv. 5, p. 260, xix. 7, p. 367, xxxii. 33, p. 601. *Ullmann*, p. 503. *Basil the Great* sets forth similar views in Eunom. lib. 3, p. 273. *Klose*, p. 77. *Augustine* too supposed the existence of such degrees, De Civ. Dei xxii. 30. 2. He admits that it is impossible to say *in what* they consist, quod tamen futuri sint, non est ambigendum. But in the absence of any feeling of envy whatever, no one's happiness will be the less because he does not enjoy so high a position as others. Sic itaque habebit donum alius alio minus, ut hoc quoque donum habeat, ne velit amplius.—*Jerome* even charged Jovinian with heresy, because he denied the degrees in question; Adv. Jov. lib. ii. Op. T. ii. p. 58, ss.—According to *Augustine* there are also degrees of condemnation, De Civ. Dei xxi. 16: Nequaquam tamen negandum est, etiam ipsum æternum ignem pro diversitate meritorum quamvis malorum aliis leviorem, aliis futurum esse graviorem, sive ipsius vis atque ardor pro pœna digna cujusque varietur (he thus admitted a relative cessation of damnation) sive ipse æqualiter ardeat, sed non æquali molestia sentiatur. Comp. Enchir. ad Laur. § 113. Greg. M. Moral. ix. c. 39, lib. xvi. c. 28. The opinions of the fathers were most wavering respecting children that die without being baptized. (Comp. § 137. 5).

[7] This opinion was principally founded on the use of the word *αἰώνιος* in Matth. xxv. 41, 46: it must have the same meaning in reference to both life and punishment. Thus *Augustine* says, De Civ. Dei xxi. 23: Si utrumque æternum, profecto aut utrumque cum fine diuturnum, aut utrumque sine fine perpetuum debet intelligi. Paria enim relata sunt, hinc supplicium æternum, inde vita æterna. Dicere autem in hoc uno eodemque sensu, vita æterna sine fine erit, supplicium æternum finem habebit, multum absurdum est. Unde, quia vita æterna Sanctorum sine fine erit, supplicium quoque æternum quibus erit, finem procul dubio non habebit. Comp. Enchirid. § 112. It is superfluous to quote passages from other fathers, as they almost all agree.

[8] *Arnobius*, Adv. Gentes, ii. 36 and 61: Res vestra in ancipiti sita est, salus dico animarum vestrarum, et nisi vos adplicatis dei principis notioni, a corporalibus vinculis exsolutos expectat mors saeva, non repentinam adferens extinctionem, sed per tractum temporis cruciabilis pœnæ acerbitate consumens.

[9] Some faint traces of a belief in the final remission of punishments in the world to come, are to be found in those writings of *Didymus* of Alexandria, (one of the representatives of this tendency), which are yet extant, especially in his treatise De Trinitate, edited by *Mingarelli*, A. D. 1769: comp. *Neander*, Church Hist. ii. 1, p. 349, 677. *Gregory of Nyssa* speaks more distinctly on this point, Orat. Cat. c. 8 and 35, in *λόγος περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ ἀναστάσεως*, and in his treatise De Infantibus, qui mature abripiuntur (Opp. T. iii. p. 226–29 and 322, ss.), pointing out the corrective design of the punishments inflicted upon the wicked: comp. *Neander*, l. c. *Münscher*, Handbuch, iv. p. 465. (Germanus, patriarch of Constantinople in the ninth

century, endeavored to suppress these passages; see *Münscher*, l. c.) *Rupp* p. 261. *Gregory of Nazianzum* gives (Orat. xl. p. 665, *Ullmann*, p. 505) but faint hints of a hope of the final remission of the punishments of hell (as φιλανθρωπότερον καὶ τοῦ κολάζοντος ἐπαξίως). He makes an occasional allusion to the notion of Origen concerning an ἀποκατάστασις, *e. g.* Orat. xxx. 6. p. 544.—*Diodorus of Tarsus* and *Theodore of Mopsuestia* belonged to this milder tendency. (The passages may be found in Assemani Bibl. Orient. T. iii. p. 1, p. 228–24. Phot. Bibl. Cod. lxxxi. p. 200. Mar. Mercator Opp. p. 346, ed. Balluzii.) Comp. *Neander*, l. c. p. 677; [and Hist. Dogm. pp. 414, 415, with Jacobi's note.] *Augustine* (Enchirid. § 112) and *Jerome* (ad Avit. Opp. T. ii. p. 103, and ad Pammach. p. 112) refer to these milder views which to some extent prevailed in the West.

[9] Jerome (Comment. in Jes. c. lxvi. at the close): et sicut diaboli et omnium negatorum et impiorum, qui dixerunt in corde suo: Non est Deus, credimus æterna tormenta, sic peccatorum et impiorum et *tamen* [!] Christianorum, quorum opera in igne probanda sunt atque purganda, moderatum arbitramur et mixtam clementiæ sententiam. "*This impious opinion, according to which all who were not Christians, were condemned to everlasting torments, but slothful and immoral Christians, lulled asleep in carnal security, could not fail to gain friends.*" *Münscher*, Handbuch, iv. p. 473.

[10] *Augustine* indeed maintained with all strictness the eternity of punishments as seen above; but when *Pelagius* asserted at the synod of Diospolis: in die judicii iniquis et peccatoribus non esse parcendum, sed æternis eos ignibus esse exurendos; et si quis aliter credit, Origenista est (comp. § 141, note 3), he urged milder views in opposition to him (De gestis Pelagii, c. 3, § 9–11) in accordance with the highest principle: Judicium sine misericordia fiet illi, qui non fecit misericordiam. With his supposition, as already intimated, of a gradual diminution of punishment, and of degrees in the same, the gradual vanishing of it was put at a minimum. (Comp. also what is said note 5.)

[11] It might have been expected that the milder disposition of *Chrysostom* would have induced him to adopt opinions more in accordance with those of his master Diodorus of Tarsus; in Hom. 39, in Ep. 1 ad Cor. Opp. x. p. 372, he alludes indeed to the view of those who endeavour to prove that 1 Cor. xv. 28 implies an ἀναίρεσις τῆς κακίας, without refuting it. But his position in the church, and the general corruption of morals, compelled him to adopt more rigid views: comp. in Theodor. Lapsum l. c., in Epist. 1 ad Thessal. Hom. 8: Μὴ τῇ μελλήσει παραμυθώμεθα ἑαυτούς· ὅταν γὰρ πάντως δέῃ γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν ἡ μέλλησις ὠφελεῖ· πόσος ὁ τρόμος; πόσος ὁ φόβος τότε; κ. τ. λ. in Ep. 2, Hom. 3, and other passages.—Comp. the mode of Origen's teaching concerning this point, in § 78, note 6.

[12] Comp. the acts of the Synod of Constantinople (A. D. 544), Can. xii. quoted by *Mansi*, T. ix. p. 399.

THIRD PERIOD.

FROM JOHN DAMASCENUS TO THE AGE OF THE REFORMATION, A. D. 730–1517.

THE AGE OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

(SCHOLASTICISM IN THE WIDEST SENSE OF THE WORD).

A. GENERAL HISTORY OF DOCTRINES DURING THE THIRD PERIOD.

§ 143.

CHARACTER OF THIS PERIOD.

Engelhardt, Dogmengeschichte, vol. ii. *Münscher*, Lehrbuch der Dogmengesch. edited by *von Cölln*, vol. ii. *Ritter*, Gesch. d. Philosophie, Bd. vii. [Christliche. Philos. 2 Bde., 1859.] *Gieseler*, Dogmengeschichte. [*F. Rehm*, Gesch. des Mittelalters, 3 Bde. Marburg, 1821. *H. Leo*, Gesch. des M. Alt. Halle, 1830. *Hallam's* Middle Ages. *H. H. Milman*, History of Latin Christianity, 2d ed., 6 vols., Lond., 1859; 8 vols., New York, 1861. *Chs. Hardwick*, Hist. Christ. Church in Middle Ages, Cambridge, 1853. *Robertson's* History, 590–1122, Lond. 1856. *E. Chastel*, Le Christianisme et l'Eglise au moyen âge, Paris, 1859. *S. R. Maitland*, Essays on the Dark Ages, 2d ed., 1851. *Capefigue*, l'Eglise au moyen âge, 2 Tom., Paris, 1852. *Damberger*, Synchronistische Gesch. d. Kirche und d. Welt im Mittelalter, xiv. Tom., 1854. *K. R. Hagenbach*, Vorlesungen über d. Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters, 1 Theil. Leipz. 1860.]

A NEW period in the history of doctrines may be said to commence with the publication of the *Exposition* of *John Damascenus*,[1] a Greek monk, inasmuch as from that time there was manifested, a more definite attempt to arrange systematically, and to prove dialectically, what had been obtained by a series of conflicts.[2] The structure of ecclesiastical doctrine was completed with the exception of a few parts, *e. g.* the doctrine of the sacraments. But the main pillars of *Theology* and *Christology* were firmly established by the decisions of councils held during the preceding period; and Augustinism had given (at least in the West) a definite character to Anthropology,

to the doctrine of salvation connected with it, and, lastly, to the doctrine of the church. Consequently, all that still remained to be done for the church doctrine, consisted partly in the collection and completion of existing materials, partly in the endeavor to sift them, and partly in the effort made to prove dialectically particular points. Nevertheless the works written in this period are not devoid of originality, and a spirit of independent investigation.

[1] The title of this work is: Ἔκδοσις [ἔκθεσις] ἀκριβὴς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως (it forms, properly speaking, the third part of a greater work, entitled: πηγὴ γνώσεως). An edition of it was published by Mich. Le Quien, Par. 1712, ii. fol.; see also his Dissertt. vii. Damascenicæ. Comp. *Schröckh*, Kirchengeschichte, vol. xx. p. 222, ss. *Rössler*, Bibliothek der Kirchenväter, vfii. p. 246–532. Gieseler, Dogmengesch. p. 437.

[2] We found traces of a systematic treatment during the former two periods in the writings of Origen (περὶ ἀρχῶν), and of Augustine (Enchiridion and De Doctrina Christiana), but they were only beginnings. "*John Damascenus is undoubtedly the last of the theologians of the Eastern church, and remains in later times the highest authority in the theological literature of the Greeks.* HE MAY HIMSELF BE CONSIDERED AS THE STARTING-POINT OF THE SCHOLASTIC SYSTEM OF THE GREEK CHURCH, WHICH IS YET TOO LITTLE KNOWN." *Dorner*, Entwicklungsgeschichte, der Christologie, p. 113. (*Tafel*, Supplementa Histor. Eccles. Græcor. sec. XI. XII. 1832, p. 3, ss. 9, ss.) On the importance of John Damascenus in relation to the West, see *Dorner*, l. c.

§ 144.

THE RELATION OF THE SYSTEMATIC TENDENCY TO THE APOLOGETIC.

The labors of apologists, which had been of less importance even in the preceding period, were naturally limited to a still narrower circle during the present, since Christianity had become almost exclusively the religion of the civilized world. All that remained to combat was Mohammedanism and Judaism.[1] German and Slavonic paganism appeared in comparison with Christian civilization as a sort of barbarism, which was opposed not so much with the weapons of scientific discussion, as by the practical efforts of missionaries, and sometimes by physical force.[2] But when, especially towards the close of the present period, doubts, within Christianity itself, were raised by philosophy concerning the truth of revelation, in a more or less open way, apologists were again compelled to enter the lists.[3]

[1] The Jews were combated in the ninth century among others by *Agobard*, archbishop of Lyons, in his works: De Insolentia Judæorum—De Judaicis

Superstitionibus. Compare *Schröckh*, Kirchengesch. xxi. p. 300, ss.; and by *Amulo* (Amularius), archbishop of Lyons, in his treatise: contra Judæos; *Schröchk*, l. c. p. 310. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries they were opposed by *Gielebert of Westminster*; he wrote: Disputatio Judæi cum Christiano de fide christiana, in Anselmi Cantuar. Opp. p. 512–523. Paris 1721, fol. *Schröckh*, xxv. p. 358; by *Abelard* in his work: Dialogus inter Philos. Judæum et Christianum (*Rheinwald*, Anecdota ad Hist. Eccles. pertinent. Berol. 1835, T. 1); by *Rupert, Abbot of Duytz:* Annulus seu Dialogus Christiani et Judæi de Fidei Sacramentis, *Schröckh*, l. c. p. 363, ss.; and by *Richard of St. Victor*, who wrote de Emmanuele libri duo, *Schröckh*, l. c. p. 366, ss. In the thirteenth century they met with an opponent in the person of *Raimund Martini*, who composed the treatises: Pugio Fidei, Capistrum Judæorum, *Schröckh*, l. c. p. 369, ss., etc. The Mohammedans were combated by *Euthymius Zigabenus* (in the 24th chapter of his work entitled: *πανοπλία*, edited by *Beurer* in Frid. Sylburgii Saracenicis, Heidelb. 1595. 8): by *Raimund Martini* in his treatise: Pugio fidei, *Schröckh*, xxv. p. 27, ss.; by *Peter the Venerable of Clugny*, in his work: Advers. nefandam Sectam Sarazenorum (*Martène*, Collect. Ampl. Monum. T. ix. p. 1121), *Schröckh*, l. c. p. 34, and xxvii. p. 245: and still later by *Æneas Sylvius* (Pope Pius II.) who wrote: Ep. 410, ad Mahom. II. *Schröckh*, xxxii. p. 291, ss. All these apologetic works are, however, in their form rather *polemic;* they are chiefly "*declamations, in which untempered zeal not unfrequently ran out into invectives; Baur*, Lehrbuch, p. 172. On the opposition to Islamism in the middle ages, see *Gass*, ubi supra, § 146.

[1] Concerning this point compare the works on ecclesiastical history (the chapters on the spread of Christianity). The same method was partly adopted with reference to the Jews and Mohammedans.

[2] *Savonarola*, Triumphus Crucis, de Fidei Veritate, 4 books; comp. *Rudelbach*, Hieronym. Savonarola, Hamb. 1835, p. 375, ss. *Marsilius Ficinus*, De Rel. Christ. et Fidei Pietate, Opuscul. See *Schröckh*, Kirchengesch. xxxiv. p. 343, ss.

§ 145.

THE POLEMICS OF THIS PERIOD.—CONTROVERSIES WITH HERETICS.

Engelhardt, Dogmengeschichte, vol. ii. ch. 3. p. 51, ss.

The heresies which made their appearance during the present period differed from former heretical tendencies, in being opposed to the whole ecclesiastical system rather than to any particular doctrines. With regard to doctrinal tenets they agreed for the most part with the heretical notions of the Gnostics and Manichees, but sometimes demanded a return to the simple and unadulterated doctrine of the Bible.[1] There were some few heresies of a doctrinal character, *e. g.* the Adoptian heresy, and the views of Gottschalk

and Berengar, as well as some bold assertions on the part of scholastic theologians (such as Roscelinus and Abelard), which gave rise to controversies within the church, and called forth decisions of synods.[1] It was not until the close of the period, that struggles against the existing order of things prepared the way for a change in the general religious views of the age, and thus introduced the period of the Reformation.[2]

[1] To the hereretical sects belong in the East the *Paulicians* (comp. § 85, note 4), and the *Bogomiles* (concerning their doctrinal tenets, compare *Mich. Psellus*, περὶ ἐνεργείας δαιμόνων διάλ, ed. Hasenmüller. Kil. 1688.— *Euthym. Zigabenus*, Panoplia P. ii. tit. 23. *Wolf, J. Ch.*, hist. Bogomilorum Dss. III. Vit. 1712, 4. **Engelhardt*, kirchenh. Abhandlungen, Erl. 1832, No. 2); in the West the *Cathari* (Leonistæ), *Manicheans* (Paterini, Publicani, Bugri, boni homines), the followers of *Peter of Bruis*, and *Henry of Lausanne* (Petrobrusiani, Henriciani); and in later times, the *Waldenses* and *Albigenses*, the *Turlupines*, the *Beghards*, *Beguines*, *Fraticelli*, *Spirituales*, etc. Compare the works on ecclesiastical history, especially *Füsslin*, Kirchen und Ketzer-historie der mittlern Zeiten, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1770, ss. iii. (The history of doctrines can consider these sects only in general.) *Mosheim*, de Beghardis et Beguinabus. Lips. 1790, 8. *Ch. Schmidt*, Histoire et Doctrine de la Secte des Cathares ou Albigeois, Genève, 1849. [Ibid. in Niedner's Zeitschrift, 1852: Actenstücke zur Gesch. *Hahn's* Gesch. d. Secten, Bd. ii., 1847. *A. W. Dieckhoff*, Die Waldenser, Göttingen, 1851. *Herzog*, De Origine... Waldensium, 1848 (comp. Dieckhoff in Reuter's Repertorium, 1850.) *Bender*, Gesch. d. Waldenser, Ulm, 1850. *Maitland's* Essays, on Wald. and Albigenses, 1852. *Herzog*, Die romanischen Waldenser, 1853; Dieckhoff in reply, 1858. Articles in New Englander, 1852; (London) Quarterly, 1858; Theological Critic, 1851. On the Ritual of the the Cathari, *Ed. Cunitz*, in Beiträge zur theol. Wissenschaft, Bd. iii. iv. 1853–4.]

[2] Comp. the sections on Trinity, Christology, Predestination, and the Lord's Supper, in the special history of doctrines.

[3] See the works on ecclesiastical history, and *Flathe*, Geschichte der Vorläufer der Reformation. Leipz. 1835, ii. (comp. § 155).

§ 146.

THE GREEK CHURCH.

* *Ullmann*, Nicolaus von Methone, Euthymius Zigabenus und Nicetas Choniatce, oder die dogmatische Entwickelung der griechischen Kirche im 12ten Jahrhundert, (Studien und Kritiken 1833, part 3, p. 647, ss.) *W. Gass*, Gennadius und Pletho, Aristotelismus und Platonismus in der griechischen Kirche, uebst einer Abhandlung über die Bestreitung des Islam in Mittelalter, Bresl. 1844. [*I. P. Fallmerayer*, Gesch. d. Morea im Mittelalter, Stuttg. 1830. *G. Finlay*, Hist. of Byzantine and Greek Empires; 6 vols., Lond. J. G. Pitzipios, L'Eglise Orientale, etc., Rome, 1854. Acta et Diplomata Græca medii Aevi Sacra et Profana, ed. Miklosch et Jos. Müller, Tom. 1. 1859. Dean *Waddington*. Hist of Greek Church, new ed. 1854.]

After the appearance of Augustine in the preceding period, the Greek church ceased to take the lead of the Western in the dogmatic point of view; in the present period it receded from the theatre of a living development, after it had erected its monument in John of Damascus. The theologians who followed John Damascenus, such as *Euthymius Zigabenus*,[1] *Nicolas, bishop of Methone*,[2] *Nicetas Choniates*,[3] and *Theophylactus*,[4] the shadows of former grandeur, are parallel with the scholastic divines of the West.—The principal doctrinal writers among the Chaldean Christians, separated from the orthodox church (the followers of Nestorius), were *Ebed Jesu*,[5] among the Jacobites (Monophysites), *Jacob, bishop of Togritum*,[6] and *Abulfaradsh*.[7]

He is also called *Zigadenus*, and died about the year 1118, a monk at Constantinople. At the request of the Emperor Alexis Commenus, he wrote his principal work: Πανοπλία δογματικὴ τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως ἤτοι ὁπλοθήκη δογμάτων, see *Schröckh*, Kirchengesch. xxix. p. 332, ss. 373, and *Ullmann*, l. c. p. 19, ss. The original work was only once printed, at Tergovisto, in Wallachia, in the year 1711. Comp. Fabric. Bibl. Græca. vol. vii. p. 461. There is a Latin translation of it by *Pet. Franc. Zino*, Venet. 1555, fol., which was reprinted in Maxima Bibl. PP. Lugd. T. xix. p. i. ss.—He also composed exegetical treatises.

[2] Methone was a town in Messenia. Concerning his life little is known. Some maintain that he lived in the eleventh century, others assert with more probability that he lived in the twelfth; comp. *Ullmann*, l. c. p. 57. His principal work is the refutation of *Proclus*, a Platonic philosopher, entitled: Ἀνάπτυξις τῆς θεολογικῆς στοιχειώσεως Πρόκλου Πλατωνικοῦ; it was edited by Director *Vœmel*, Frankf. on the Maine, 1825, 8. To this is to be added: Nicol. Meth. Anecdoti, P. i. et ii. 1825, 26. "*The work of Nicolas of Methone is undoubtedly one of the best writings of that time.*" Ullmann, l. c. With regard to the history of doctrines, his discussions on the atonement are of most importance (§ 179).

[3] His family name was *Acominatus*. He was called Choniates after his native town Chonæ (formerly Colossæ), in Phrygia: he died after the year 1206.—Of his Θησαυρὸς ὀρθοδοξίας in 27 books, only the first five (and probably the most important) are known in the Latin translation of *Morelli*, published Par. 1569, 8, and reprinted in Max. Bibl. PP. T. xxv. p. 54, ss. This work was intended to complete the Panoplia of Euthymius. Comp. *Schröckh*, xxix. p. 338, ss. *Ullmann*, p. 30, ss.

[4] Archbishop of the Bulgarians in Acrida; he died in 1107. He is chiefly known as an exegetical writer, and by his polemics against the Latin church: De iis, in quibus Latini accusantur.

[5] He was bishop of Nisibis, and died A. D. 1318. On his treatise: Margarita sive de vera fide, comp. *Assemani*, Bibl. Orient. T. iii. P. i. (An account of it is given by *Pfeifer*, vol. ii. p. 407).

[6] He died A. D. 1231. On his work: Liber Thesaurorum see *Assemani*, l. c. T. ii. p. 237. (*Pfeifer*, vol. i. p. 250).

' He occupied the metropolitan see of Edessa, was also called Barhebræus, and died A. D. 1286. On his work: Candelabrum Sanctorum de fundamentis, see *Assemani*, l. c. p. 284.

On the Mystics of the Greek Church, see § 153.

§ 147.

THE WESTERN CHURCH.

Bousset, Einleitung in die Allgemeine Geschichte der Welt bis auf Kaiser Karl den Grossen, übersetzt und mit einem Anhange historisch-kritischer Abhandlungen vermehrt von *J. A. Cramer*, 7 vols. Lipz. 1757–1786.

During the two former periods the Western Church was principally represented by the ecclesiastical writers of Gaul and Italy, as well as by the theologians of the African school. When the renown of the latter writers, as well as the glory of the Roman and Byzantine empires, had passed away, a new system of Christian theology developed itself among the *Germanic* nations. We have here to distinguish three leading periods: I. The age of the *Carlovingians*, including the periods before and after Charlemagne, until the commencement of the scholastic period. II. The age of scholasticism proper (from the eleventh century to the middle of the fifteenth). III. The period of transition to the Reformation (the fifteenth century, and especially the second half of it).

It is of course impossible to draw distinct lines of separation. Thus scholasticism is prefigured in the period mentioned as the first by John Scotus Erigena; the second period merges so gradually into the third, that for some time both tendencies (the scholastic, which was fast disappearing, and that which manifested itself in the writings of reformers) accompanied each other. Many writers, *e. g. Ritter*, make scholasticism begin as early as the ninth century; but the tenth century breaks the thread in such a way, that what precedes is rather a prelude, than the first act of a drama: "*blossoms before the time, which are hence without fruit; two centuries elapsed before the spring time came;*" Hasse (in the work cited in the following section, p. 21, comp. p. 32).

§ 148.

THE AGE OF THE CARLOVINGIANS.

† *Staudenmaier*, Johann Scotus Erigena und die Wissenschaft seiner Zeit. First Part, Frankfort on the Main, 1834. *Kuntsmann*, Hrabanus Magnentius Maurus, Mainz. 1841. *Ritter*, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. vii. *Hasse*, Anselm von Canterbury, Bd. ii. p. 18–21. [*Rettberg*, Kirchengesch. Deutschlands, Bd. 1, Die Franken, 1848. *Krafft*, Gesch. d. German Völker. *A. F. Ozanam*, La Civilisation Chrétienne chez les Francs, Paris, 1849. *F. Monnier*, Histoire des Luttes dans les Temps Carlovingiens. Paris, 1852. *Th. Christlieb*, Leben und Lehre des Joh. Scotus Erigena: mit Vorwort von Prof. Dr. Lauderer, Gotha. 1860.]

The collection of Sentences composed by *Isidore of Seville*, and others of similar import,[1] furnished the rough material, while the schools and colleges founded by Charlemagne contributed to call forth spiritual activity. The *venerable Bede*,[2] and *Alcuin*[3] were distinguished for the clearness of their views, among the number of those who exerted more or less influence upon the age of the Carlovingians, though they did not go so far as to set forth any connected system of theology. By the former, the study of dialectics was introduced into the Anglo-Saxon, and by the latter into the Frank, cathedral and cloister schools. *Claudius, bishop of Turin*,[4] and *Agobard, archbishop of Lyons*,[5] also exerted a greater influence by arousing the minds of the people, and promoting practical reforms, than by investigations of a strictly doctrinal character. It was only the ecclesiastical controversies of the age which called forth in a few a more distinct display of theoretical ingenuity.[6] *John Scotus Erigena*, however, shone as a meteor in the theological firmament. Possessed of a high degree of originality, he endeavored, after the manner of Origen, to demonstrate theology in a philosophical manner, but his speculative tendency led this bold investigator, who first again entered upon the path of speculation, at the same time into the abyss of dangerous errors.[7]

[1] Comp. § 82, note 30, and Ritter, vii. p. 171. In addition to Isidore, the compilers of the seventh century are: *Tajo* of Saragossa, who lived about the year 650, and *Ildefonsius* of Toledo, A. D. 659 and 669. Comp. *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, ii. p. 5.

[2] He was born about the year 672, and died A. D. 735 in England. He is celebrated as a historian, and by his efforts for the promotion of education among the clergy. His commentaries, sermons, and epistles, contain much that is of importance in the history of doctrines. *Schröckh*, Kirchengesch. xx. p. 126, ss. Allgemeine Encyclopædie, viii. p. 308–12. *Herzog's* Real-encycl. Bd. 1. His works were published Paris 1544, 1554. Bas. 1563. Colon. 1612, 1688, viii. fol. [Works, ed. by *J. A. Giles*, with his Life, 12 vols., 8vo., Lond., 1843, sq. Historia Ecclesiastica, et Opera Hist. Minora, ed. Stevenson: another edition by *Hussey;* trans. by Giles, 1845, (previous translation by Stapleton 1565, 1723.)—On Bede's Anthropology, see *Wiggers* in Zeitschrift f. d. hist. Theol., 1857. Bede and his Biographers, Dublin Review, July, 1854. On his Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, see Christ. Remembrancer, Lond., July, 1859.]

[3] He is also known by the names of Flaccus Albinus, and Alschwinus; he was born in the county of York, became a tutor to Charlemange, and died A. D. 804. His work: De Fide sanctæ et individuæ Trinitatis, in 3 books, contains a whole system of theology. Comp. *Bossuet*, transl. by Cramer, vol. v. sect. 2, p. 552–59. Concerning the part which he took in the Adoptian controversy, etc., see the special history of doctrines. Comp Alcuins Leben von *F. Lorenz*. Halle 1829, 8: [also translated, London.] *Schröckh*,

Kirchengesch. xix. p. 77, ss. 419, ss. xx. p. 113, ss. 217, ss. 348, 585, ss. *Neander*, Church Hist. iii. p. 76, and elsewhere. His works were published by *J. Frobenius*, Ratisb. 1777, ii. fol. [*F. Monier*, Alcuin, and his Religious and Literary Influence among the Franks, Paris, 1853. Life sketched in Christian Review, vol. xi.]

[4] He was a native of Spain (perhaps a disciple of Felix of Urgella), adopted the doctrinal tenets of Augustine, was a teacher during the reign of Louis the Pious, and died A. D. 840. His commentaries contain much dogmatical matter. Comp. *Schröckh*, l. c. xxiii. p. 281. *Neander*, l. c. iii. p. 429, et passim. *Ch. Schmidt*, Claudius, in Zeitschrift f. d. hist. Theol., 1843.

[5] He was born A. D. 779, and died A. D. 840. He opposed, like Claudius, many of the superstitions of the age. Concerning his polemical writings against the Jews, see § 144; on his refutation of Felix of Urgella, comp. the special history of doctrines. Comp. also *Schröckh*, l. c. xxiii. p. 249. *Neander*, l. c. iii. p. 168. His works were published Par. 1605, 8; more fully by Balluze, Paris, 1660, (Max. Bbl. Patrum, T. xiv., and Gallandii Bibl. Patr. xiii.). Comp. *Hundeshagen* Commentatio de Agobardi Vita et Scriptis, Pars I., Giessæ, 1831, and his article in Herzog's Realencyclop.

[6] This was the case with *Rabanus* (Hrabanus) *Magnentius Maurus*, *Paschasius Radbert*, *Ratramnus*, *Servatus Lupus*, *Hincmar of Rheims*, *Florus Magister*, *Fredegis of Tours*, and others in the controversies concerning predestination, the Lord's Supper, etc. On their writings see the works on ecclesiastical history, and *Münscher* edit. by von Cölln, ii. p. 6 and 7. *Ritter*, Gesch. d. Phil. vii. On Fredegis, see *Hasse*, p. 20.

[7] He was also called Scotigena, lived at the court of Charles the Bald, and died after the year 877. Comp. *Hjort*, Scotus Erigena oder von dem Ursprung einer christlich. Philosoph. Kopenh. 1823, 8. *Schröckh*, l. c. xxi. p. 208, ss. xxiii. 481–84. *Neander*, iv. p. 444, ss. *Staudenmaier*, l. c. and his essay; Lehre des Joh. Scot. Erig. über das menschl. Erkennen, mit Rücksicht auf einschlägige Theorien früherer und späterer Zeit, in the Freiburger Zeitschr. für Theol. iii. 2. **Frommüller*, die Lehre des Joh. Scot. Erigena vom Wesen des Bösen. in Tüb. Zeitschr. für Theol. 1830, part i. p. 49, ss. part 3, p. 74, ss. De Joanne Sc. Erig. Comment. (anonymous), Bonn, 1845. His principal writings are: Dialogus de Divisione Naturæ lib. v. (ed. **Th. Gale.* Oxon. 1681)—De Prædestinatione Dei.—Of his edition of Pseudo-Dionysius: Opera S. Dionysii latine versa, only the Hierarchia Cœlestis is extant in the first volume of the works of Hugo of St. Victor. [*M. Saint-René Taillandier*, Scot. Erigène et la Phil. Scholastique, Paris, 1843. *F. Monnier*, De Gottschalci et J. Scot. Erig. Controversia, Paris, 1853. His Life in North British Mag., 1855: his Use of Scripture, in Journal of Classical and Sacred Philol., 1854. Articles in Christ. Examiner, (*J. Hill*), vol. 46: in Univ. Quarterly (*H. Ballou*), vol. vii. The best edition of his works, by *Floss*, Paris, 1853: vol. 122 of Migne's Patrologia. *B. Hauréau*, Un Ouvrage inconnu de *J. S. E.* in Révue de l'Instruction publique, 1859: comp. Hauréau, in his Hist. of Scholastic Philos. *F. A. Staudenmaier*, J. Scot. Erig. und die Wissenschaft seiner Zeit. Thl. i. Freib. 1854. F. *Christlieb*, Leben und Lehre des Joh. Scot. Erig. Gotha, 1860.] "*In his profound views concerning the Divine omnipresence and universal revelation*,

and his view of philosophy and religion, as only different manifestations of the same spirit, he stood alone, and so high above the times in which he lived, that he was not condemned by the church until the thirteenth century" (Hase). Comp. *Ritter*, vii. 206–296 [and Christl. Phil. i. 409–467], who says: "*He is an enigma among the many riddles which these times present. Among the philosophical men of his century he is as preëminent for the clearness of his thoughts, as was Charlemagne among the princes.*"* *Hasse* aptly says of the system of Erigena, that "if not a revival of Gnosticism, it is at least Origenism upon a higher stage" (ubi supra, p. 21).

§ 149.

SCHOLASTICISM IN GENERAL.

* *Bulæi* Historia Universitatis Parisiensis, Par. 1665–73. vi. fol. *Semler*, Einleitung in die dogmatische Gottesgelehrsamkeit (prefixed to Baumgartens evang. Glaubenslehre, vol. i. p. 16, ss.) *Brucker*, Historia Philosophiæ, Tom. iii. **Tennemann*, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. viii. and ix. **Hegel*, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. iii. part 2. *Cramer*, l. c. vol. 5. *Engelhardt*, Dogmengeschichte, p. 14, ss. *Baur*, Lehre von der Versöhnung, p. 142, ss. [*Hampden, R. D.*, the Scholastic Philosophy considered in its relation to Christian Theology, in a course of Lectures delivered at the Bampton Lectures. London, 1837. The works of *Ritter*, cited above, also, a sketch by him of the Scholastic Philosophy in Raumer's Hist. Taschenbuch, 1856. *B. Hauréau*, De la Philos. Scolastique. Memoire couronné, 2 vols. Paris, 1850. *Patru*, De la Philos. au moyen âge, Paris, 1848. *Cousin*, Preface to Abælardi Opera, 4to. Paris, 1836. *F. D. Maurice*, Hist. of Med. Philos. (from Encycl. Metropol.) Lond., 1856. *Landerer*, in Herzog's Encycl. *Kaulich*, Schol. Phil. 1863. *Stöckl*, 1865.]

The exceedingly bold attempt of Scotus Erigena to effect a union between philosophy and theology, remained for some time isolated, but reappeared, though in a less free spirit, in what is properly called *Scholasticism*.[1] The scholastic divines had not, like the theologians of the earlier Alexandrian school, to trace out the philosophical ideas that lay at the basis of a new and vigorous form of religion (Christianity), for whose systematic development little had been done: nor yet like them to accommodate Christianity to a culture (the ancient, classical), which was already rooted in society. On the contrary, it was their task to lay the foundation of a system of modern Christian philosophy on a system of doctrines, which had been handed down from antiquity in a partially corrupt form.[2] But in the absence of an independent philosophical system, they again had recourse to ancient philosophy, and formed

* Between the dawning of Scholasticism in the 9th century, and its proper historical growth from the 11th to the 13th, intervenes the 10th century, famed for its barbarism, (see *Baronius*), in which the only man prominent in doctrines is *Gerbert* (Pope Sylvester II.). Comp. on him, *Hock*, Gerbert oder Papst Sylvester II., und sein Jahrhundert, Wien., 1837. *Ritter* Gesch. d. Phil. vii., 300 *sq.* [and Christliche Philosophie. Also, *Büdinger*, Gerbert's Wissenschaftl. und Polit. Stellung, Abthlg. I., 1851. A review of Hock in the Université Catholique, Aug. 1854.]

an alliance with Aristotelianism, quite as unnatural as that which former theologians had formed with Platonism. Their philosophical inquiries had more regard to the form[2] than to the matter, and were of a dialectic rather than of a speculative kind. Hence they were not so much exposed to the danger of letting loose their imagination, and entering upon vague and indefinite discussions (like the Gnostics),[4] as to the adoption of narrow views, and to the wasting their energies upon particulars and minutiæ. Thus a refined and subtile philosophy of the understanding gradually brought about the downfall of scholasticism. On the other hand, the endeavor of theologians to arrive at precise theological definitions, their scientific proof of the doctrines, and the noble confidence which they displayed in the reasonableness of Christianity (notwithstanding existing prejudices), constituted the favorable aspect and the merit of scholasticism.[4] At all events, it is certain, that this grand attempt led to the very opposite of that which was intended, that the freedom of thought was followed by the bondage of the letter, the confidence of faith ended in shameful skepticism.[4]

[1] On the appellations Scholasticism, etc., see *du Fresne*, p. 739. *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. 446. The derivation of the term in question, however, is not etymological, but historical. Comp. *Schleiermacher*, Kirchengesch. p. 466, ss. On the misleading and confusing character of the name, see *Ritter*, vii. 111. Yet it would also be impracticable to give it up.

[2] During the preceding period *Cassiodorus* had given a summary of the dialectics of Aristotle, and *Boëthius* had translated a part of his Organon. But it was not until the present period that theologians became more generally acquainted with Aristotelianism, see § 151. Platonism, on the other hand, forms as it were the morning and the evening of the philosophy of the middle-ages; the one is represented by Scotus Erigena, the other by Marsilius Ficinus and others; even during the first period of scholasticism several of its adherents were under the influence of Platonism; it was not till the 13th century that it was supplanted by Aristotelianism. "*It is only*" (says *Ritter*, vii. 70, comp. pp. 80, 90, *sq.*), "*an old fable of old ignorance, when it is said that the middle ages were exclusively devoted to the Aristotelian philosophy.*"

[4] "*Scholasticism is the progress of the church towards a school, or, as Hegel expresses it, doubtless in the same sense, the fathers developed the church, because the mind once developed required a developed doctrine; in after ages there were no more patres ecclesiæ but doctores. The fathers of the primitive church had to produce the material, or to expound that which was expressed in its simplest and most direct form in the Christian dogma; they had further to analyze this material into distinct doctrines and formulas, to present it to the religious world, and procure its general adoption. Scholasticism, on the contrary, presupposed all this. The material and the contents were given;... it became now the task of theologians to effect a reunion between that which had become objective to consciousness (as it were, put outside of*

itself) *and the mind itself, to restore the object to the subject; to mediate between the two in consciousness.*" *Baur*, Versöhnungslehre, p. 147, 148. Comp. *Baumgarten-Crusius*, Lehrbuch, i. p. 445. *Hegel*, Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. iii. p. 138.

[4] "*Those who compare the systems of Christian theologians with those of the Gnostics, for the most part forget that the systems of the latter have not the logical connection of philosophical reason, but only that of imagination.* *Staudenmaier*, Erigena, p. 370.

[5] As early as the time of Semler complaints were made of the unjust treatment which the scholastic divines had to suffer; Semler himself says: "*The poor scholastici have been too much despised, and that frequently by people who would not have been good enough to be their transcribers.*" And Luther himself, though he contributed much to the downfall of scholasticism, wrote to Staupitz: Ego scholasticos cum judicio, non clausis oculis lego.....*Non rejicio omnia eorum*, sed nec omnia probo, see *de Wette*, i. p. 102. Comp. also *Möhlers* Schriften und Aufsätze, vol. i. p. 129, ss. *Ullmann* (Joh. Wessel. p. 12) calls the scholastic theology, "*in its commencement a truly scientific advance upon the past, in its entire course a great dialectic preparatory school of Christianity in the West, in its completion, like the Gothic cathedrals, a grand, and highly finished production of the human mind.*"

[6] See *Baur*, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, p. 11, 154, ss.

§ 150.

THE PRINCIPAL SCHOLASTIC SYSTEMS.

a. First Period of Scholasticism, to the time of Peter the Lombard.

The scholastic spirit was first awakened in the monastic schools founded by Charlemagne and his successors. It was principally cultivated in the monastery of Bec in Normandy, where *Lanfranc* was a teacher.[1] His disciple, *Anselm of Canterbury*, setting out from belief in the positive creed of the church, sought to attain the elevation of philosophical knowledge, as is manifest no less in his theory of satisfaction, than in his proof of the existence of God.[2] His views on those points, as well as on the reality of general ideas, were opposed by *Roscelinus*,[3] and *Peter Abelard*,[4] the former of whom rested faith (in opposition to the theory of Anselm) on the evidence of knowledge, while the latter defended nominalism in opposition to realism. *Hildebert a Lavardino* (first, bishop of Mans, and afterwards archbishop of Tours)[5] adhered, like Anselm, with whom he was contemporary, to the positive creed of the church. *Gilbert of Poitiers*, on the contrary, was (like Roscelinus and Abelard) charged with heterodoxy.[6]—A peculiar tendency which con-

nected mysticism with scholasticism, manifested itself in the writings of *William of Champeaux*,[1] the tutor of Abelard, as well as in those of *Hugo of St. Victor*,[2] and *Richard of St. Victor*.[3]—After *Robert Pulleyn*, and other theologians besides those already named, had endeavored to prove the doctrine of the church philosophically,[4] *Peter Lombard* (who lived in the twelfth century) collected the existing materials in his "Sentences," and by his peculiar mode of treatment gave rise to that stiff and heavy method which after him was for a long time predominant.[5]

[1] He died A. D. 1089. He came into notice principally by his controversy with *Beranger*, as will be more fully shown in the special history of doctrines. His works were published by d'Achery, Paris, 1648, fol. Comp. *Möhler*, gesammelte Schriften und Aufsätze, Regensburg, 1839, i. p. 39.—On the foundation of the monastery Bec, comp. *Möhler*, l. c. [*A. Charma*, Notice sur Lanfranc, Paris, 1851. *Wilks'* Three Archbishops, Lond., 1859. *Milman's* Latin Christianity, vol. ii.]

[2] He was born at Aosta, in Piedmont, about the year 1034, occupied the see of Canterbury from the year 1093 (whence he is called Cantuariensis), and died A. D. 1109. "*He, and nobody else, is the father of scholasticism; for he gave form and language to the philosophical spirit which had been at work in the church since the time of Isidore, and which had almost come to an expression in Berengar and Lanfranc; and put it in the way of becoming an element of historical progress.*" *Hasse*, ubi supra, p. 32. Of his philosophical writings the most important is the work entitled: Monologium et Proslogium (it contains a proof of the existence of God, and the doctrine of the Trinity): extracts from it are given by *Cramer*, v. 2. p. 341–372. Among his theological works are: De Casu Diaboli, but especially the treatise: Cur Deus Homo? lib. ii. (which contains a theory of the incarnation of Christ, and the redemption of man). In addition to these works he wrote: De Conceptu Virginali et Originali Peccato, de Libero Arbitrio, de Concordia Præscientiæ et Prædestinationis nec non Gratiæ Dei cum Libero Arbitrio, etc.—Opp. ed. **Gabr. Gerberon.* Par. 1675, f. 1721, ii. f. (Ven. 1744). A manual edition of the treatise: Cur Deus Homo, was published by *Heyder*, Erl. 1834, 8. Concerning his life and works, comp. *†*Möhler*, gesammelte Schriften und Aufsätze. Regensb. 1839, i. p. 32, ss.; on his doctrines, comp. Möhler, l. c. p. 129, ss.—*Billroth, I. G. F.* de Anselmi Cantuariensis Proslogio et Monologio. Lips. 1832, 8. *Franck*, Anselm von Canterbury, Tüb. 1842, and *J. A. Hasse*, Anselm von Canterbury, 1st Part, Lps. 1843: 2d Part (Anselm's doctrines), 1852. *Ritter*, Gesch. d. Phil. vii. 315–354 [and Christl. Phil. i. 490–7]. *Rémusat*, Anselm de Cant. Paris, 1854. *Kling*, in Herzog's Realencycl. [A translation of the 1st Part of *Hasse's* Anselm, abridged by *Turner*, Lond., 1850. *M. A. Charma*, St. Anselm, Paris, 1853. Anselm's Proslogium, transl. in Bib. Sacra, Andover, 1851 (by Maginnis), with Gaunilo's Reply and Anselm's Apology: his Cur Deus Homo, transl. by J. G. Vose, in the same periodical, 1854–5. His Meditations and Prayers to the Holy Trinity, [edited by Dr.

Pusey,] Lond., 1856. Comp. Studien. und Krit., 1853 (Kling): Revue des deux Mondes (Saisset) 1853: Methodist Quarterly, 1853. Wilks' Three Archbishops, Lond. 1859.]

[8] He is also called Rucelinus or Ruzelin; he was born in Lower Britanny, and was canon at Compiègne in the eleventh century. He is commonly regarded as the founder of the nominalists; see *Chladenii* Diss. hist. eccles. de Vita et Hæresi Roscelini. Erl. 1756, 4. On the contrast between nominalism and realism, more fully discussed in works on the history of philosophy, see *Baumgarten-Crusius*, De vero Scholasticorum Realium et Nominalium Discrimine et Sententia theologica. Jen. 1821, 4; *Engelhardt* Dogmengeschichte, p. 16, 17, and the essay, mentioned note 4, p. 73, as. *Baur*, Lehrbuch, p. 165. This conflict was not without some importance for theology, as will be more particularly seen in the doctrine of the Trinity. The part which theologians took in the work of reformation (*e. g.* in the times of Huss) depended, generally speaking, more or less on the views which they adopted with regard to these systems. [Comp. Landerer in Herzog's Real. Encyclop. A new document, published by Hauréau, in L'Athenæum Franc., 1855, p. 308. Roscel. Epist. ad Abæl. ed. Schmeller, München, 1851.]

[9] The original form of his name was *Abaielard*. He was born A. D. 1079 at Palais near Nantes, died 1142. Concerning the history of his eventful life, see *Bayle*, Dictionnaire, *Gervaise*, *Berington*, *Schlosser*, and others; *Neander*, der heilige Bernhard, p. 112, as. His *works* were published: Opp. Abælardi et Heloisæ, ed. *Andr. Quercetanus* (Duchesne) Par. 1616, 4; they contain: De Fide S. Trinitatis s. Introductio ad Theologiam in 3 libros divisa. —His Libri V. Theologiæ Christianæ were first edited by *Edm. Martène*, Thesaur. Anecd. T. v. Concerning his Dialogus, see § 144, note 1. The unpublished works of Abelard are edited by *Cousin* in the Collection de Documents inédits sur l'Histoire de France, publiés par ordre du Roi et par les soins du ministre de l'instruction publique. Deuxième série: Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard, pour servir à l'histoire de la philosophie scolastique en France. Paris, 1836, 4. [Vol. ii. 1859. Comp. *Goldhorn* in Geradorf's Repert. Jan. 1860. *Victor Cousin*, über die erste Periode der Scholastik; dem wesentlichen historischen Inhalte nach mitgetheilt von I. G. v. *Engelhardt*. Zeitschrift für die historische Theologie. Jahrg. 1846, i. p. 56–133.] Comp. also: *Lewald E. A.*: Commentatio de Operibus Petri Abælardi, quas e codicibus manuscriptis Victor Cousin edidit. (Heidelb. 1739, 4). The judgment of *Cousin* concerning Abelard is as follows: "*As St. Bernard represents the conservative spirit and Christian orthodoxy in his faults and the narrowness of his views, as well as by his admirable good sense, his depth without subtlety, and his pathetic eloquence, so Abelard and his school represent in some sense the liberal and innovating spirit of the time, with its frequently deceitful promises, and the unavoidable mixture of good and evil, of reason and extravagance.*"—Comp. also *Frerichs*, Comment. theol. critica de Petri Abæl. Doctrina, Jen. 1827, 4to; *Franck*, ein Beitrag zut Würdigung Abälards, in the Tübinger Zeitschrift 1840, 4. p. 4. According to *Baur* (Trinitätslehre, II. p. 457), Abelard is more of a dialectic than of a speculative thinker. Concerning the relation in which he stands to Rationalism,

comp. the same work, p. 500, 501. *Ritter* (Geschichte der Philosophie, vii. p. 161), considers him "*less freethinking than imprudent.*" *Rémusat*, Abélard, Paris, 1845, 2 Tom. *Rettberg* in Herzog's Realencycl. *Böhringer*, Die Kirche Christi, und ihre Zeugen, ii. 2. [*J. H. Goldhorn*, De Summis Princip. Theol. Abælard, Lips., 1836. *Lindenkohl*, De Pet. Abæl. libro Sic et Non, Marb., 1851; also his and Henke's edition of the work, 1851. *J. H. Rheinwold*, Pet. Abæl. Epitome Theol. Christ. Berol., 1835. *C. A. Wilkens*, Petr. Abælard, 1855. *G. Shuster*, Abæl. et Heloise, Hamb., 1860.]

[8] He was born either A. D. 1055 or 57, and died A. D. 1134. Though a disciple of Berengar, he did not adopt all his views. He was bishop of Mans from the year 1097, and raised to the archiepiscopal dignity A. D. 1125. For some time he was thought to be the author of the Tractatus Theol., which modern researches have assigned to Hugo of St. Victor (see note 8). Comp. *Liebner*, in the Theolog. Studien und Kritiken, 1831, part 2, p. 254, ss.—His opinions on the Lord's Supper are also of importance, as will be seen in the special history of doctrines.

[9] He was also called Porretanus or Porseta (de la Porrée) and died A. D. 1154. Concerning his life and works comp. *Otto Fresing*, de Gestis Friderici, Lib. i. c. 46, 50–57. *Cramer*, vi. p. 530–552. His principal opponent was *St. Bernard, abbot of Clairval* (Clairvaux), who had also combated Roscelinus and Abelard. See *Neander*, der heilige Bernhard, p. 217, ss. *Ritter*, vii. 437. [*Lipsius* in Ersch u. Gruber's Encyclop.]

[7] Guilelmus de Campellis; he died A. D. 1121. He was the founder of the school of *St. Victor*, in one of the suburbs of Paris (A. D. 1109), from which, generally speaking, the *mystical* scholastics came. Respecting him and his dialectics see *Schlosser*, Abhundlung über den Gang der Studien in Frankreich, vorzüglich von der Schule zu St. Victor, in his Vincenz von Beauvais, Frkf. on Main, 1849, Bd. ii. 35, and Abelard's works by Cousin; comp. also *Engelhardt* in the work mentioned, note 9, p. 308, ss.

[8] According to Pagi he died A. D. 1140, according to others A. D. 1141. He was Count of Blankenburg, canon of St. Victor (alter Augustinus, lingua Augustini, Didascalus), and a friend of St. Bernard. Comp. **Liebner*, *A.*, Hugo von St. Victor und die theologischen Richtungen seiner Zeit. Leipz. 1832, 8.—Opera ex rec. Canonicorum Regularium S. Victoris Paris. Rotomagi, 1648, iii. f. His most important work is: De Sacramentis Christianæ Fidei, libri duo, T. iii. p. 487–712. Extracts from it are given by *Cramer*, vi. p. 791–848. Comp. *Ritter*, vii. 507, sq.

[9] Magnus Contemplator! He was a native of Scotland, and died A. D. 1173. Comp. **Engelhardt*, Richard von S. Victor und Johannes Ruysbroek, zur Geschichte der myst. Theol. Erl. 1838. Opp. studio Canonicorum S. Victoris. Rotomagi, 1650, ss.

[10] He was cardinal, and died between the years 1144 and 1150. He wrote: Sententiar. libr. viii., published by *Mathoud*. Par., 1655, fol. Comp. *Cramer*, l. c. vi. p. 442–529. *Ritter*, vii. 547, sq.

[11] Magister Sententiarum. He was born at Novara, raised to the episcopal see of Paris in the year 1159, and died A. D. 1164. His work: Sententiarum libri iv. edited by *J. Aleaume*, Venet. 1477, Louvain. 1546. "*It was not so much on account of the ingenuity and depth displayed in the*

work, as in consequence of the position which its author occupied in the church, of his success in harmonizing antagonisms, and of its general perspicuity, that it became the manual of the twelfth century, and the model of the subsequent one." *Hase.* A specimen of his method is given by *Semler* in his introduction to Baumgarten's Glaubenslehre, vol. ii. p. 81, ss. Comp. *Heinrich*, Geschichte der dogmatischen Lehrarten, p. 145, ss. The first book treats: De mysterio Trinitatis, s. de Deo uno et trino; the second: De rerum corporalium et spiritualium creatione et formatione aliisque pluribus eo pertinentibus; the third: De incarnatione verbi aliisque ad hoc spectantibus; and the fourth: De sacramentis et signis sacramentalibus. Comp. *Engelhardt*, Dogmengeschichte, p. 22.—"*The period of systematizing scholasticism, and of endless commenting on the sentences of the masters, commences with Peter Lombard. This period is, at the same time, the one in which there was no end of questioning and answering, of laying down theses and antitheses, arguments and counter-arguments, of dividing and splitting up the matter of the doctrines ad infinitum.*" *Baur*, l. c. p 214. "*It was owing to him that the scholastic treatment of the doctrines assumed that more steady, well regulated form of development in which it could be carried out to its legitimate consequences, without being disturbed by opponents.*" *Baur*, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, p. 159. Comp. Ritter, vii. 475–501. [Comp. J. Sighart, Albertus Magnus, sein Leben u. seine Wissenschaft. Regensb., 1857. *Hauréau*, ubi supra, ii. 1–104. *Baur*, Dogmengesch. 2te Aufl. p. 224, says of this first period of scholasticism, that it began with the attempt at a dialectic comprehension of the dogmas; and that this was unquestionably first seen in Anselm of Canterbury, by starting the question as to the relation of faith and knowledge, which gives the special object scholasticism had in view. Comp. Hauréau, ubi supra, i. ch. ii. De la Problème Scolastique.]

§ 151.

b. Second Period to the End of the Thirteenth Century.

The dogmatical works of *Robert of Melun*[1] (*Folioth*) and *Alanus of Ryssel*[2] (ab Insulis) appeared about the same time, while *Peter of Poitiers*,[3] a disciple of Peter Lombard, followed in the steps of his master. But this scholasticism, too, met with opposition, especially on the part of *Walter of St. Victor*,[4] and *John of Salisbury*.[5] Nevertheless, scholasticism gained ground, partly in consequence of external contingencies. In the *first* place, the orders of the mendicant friars acquired a greater influence upon the philosophical and theological studies pursued in the universities. And, *secondly*, by means of that more extensive intercourse with the East which followed the crusades, the western theologians, from the thirteenth century onwards, became acquainted with a more complete edition of the works of Aristotle, which had been translated and commented

on by the Arabs, and exerted from that time a still more decided influence upon their systems.[6] The works called "*Summas*," the first of which was composed by *Alexander Hales*,[7] now took the place of the "Sentences." *Albertus Magnus* wrote the first complete commentary on the works of Aristotle.[8] But when scholasticism had reached its height, towards the close of the thirteenth century, a division broke out between the different schools, which continued to exist as long as the system itself. The leader of the one of these schools was *Thomas Aquinas*,[9] a Dominican monk; the leader of the other was his opponent, *John Duns Scotus*,[10] a Franciscan monk. The scholastic disputes were connected with the jealousies of the religious orders.[11] But even in the present period the mystical tendency was sometimes united with the scholastic, as in the case of *John of Fidanza*[12] (Bonaventura), a Franciscan monk.

[5] He was bishop of Hereford from the year 1164, and died A. D. 1195. He composed a Summa Theologiæ (hitherto unpublished): comp. *Bulæus*, l. c. T. ii. 264, 585, ss. 772, 73. *Cramer*, l. c. vi. p. 553–586.

[6] He was called Doctor universalis, and died A. D. 1203 [1202 ?]. He belonged to the speculative school of Anselm, and composed the following works: Summa quadripartita de fide catholica (a controversial writing, in which he opposed the Albigenses, Waldenses, Jews, and Mohammedans).—Libri V. de Arte s. Articulis catholicæ Fidei, edited by *Pez*, Thesaur. Anecd. Noviss. T. i. p. ii. p. 475–504 (an abridgment of it is given by *Cramer*, v. 2, p. 445–459), and Regulæ theologicæ.—Comp. *Schleiermacher*, Kirchengeschichte, p. 527, ss. [Alain de Lille, Etudes de Philosophie Scolastique, par Alb. Dupuis. Lille, 1859. Comp. *Gieseler*, ii. p. 575, note 27. Cave, Historia Literaria, ii. 229.]

[7] He died A. D. 1205. His Libri V. Sententiarum were edited by *Mathoud*. Paris, 1655, fol. together with the sentences of Pulleyn (see § 150, note 10). Comp. *Cramer*, vi. p. 754–790.

[8] He flourished about the year 1180, and wrote: Libri IV. contra manifestas et damnatas etiam in Conciliis hæreses, quas Sophistæ Abælardus, Lombardus, Petrus Pictavinus et Gilbertus Porretanus, quatuor Labyrinthi Galliæ, uno spiritu Aristotelico efflati, libris sententiarum suarum acuunt, limant, roborant. Extracts from this work (hitherto unpublished) are given by *Bulæus*, l. c. Tit. ii. p. 620–660.

[9] Sarisberiensis; he was bishop of Chartres from the year 1176, and died A. D. 1182. About the year 1156 he addressed to Thomas Becket: Policraticus, sive de Nugis curialium et Vestigiis philosophorum, libri viii. This work was followed by Metalogici libri iv. published Lugd. Bat. 1639, 8. Amst. 1664, 8.—Epistolæ cccii. (which were written from 1155–1180), ed. *Papirius Masson*, Par. 1611, 4. Comp. Bibl. Patr. Max. Lugd. T. xxiii. *Schleiermacher*, l. c. p. 527. *Hermann Reuter*, Johan. von Salisbury, zur Geschichte der christlichen Wissenschaft im 12 Jahrhundert, Berl. 1842. *Ritter*, vii. 605, sq. *Scharschmidt*, Joan. Saresb. Lpz. 1862.]

[6] Among the Arabic commentators on Aristotle, *Avicenna*, who died 1036, and *Averrhoes*, who died 1217, deserve particular notice. [Comp. *Ritter*, Ueber unsere Kentniss der Arabischen Philosophie, 4to. Gotting., 1844. *Renan*, Averroes et l'Averroisme, Paris, 1853. On *Avicebron*, De Materia Universali (probably Jewish, not Arabic), see Theol. Jahrb. (Tübingen), 1856 and 1857, and *Munk*, Mélanges de Philos. juive et arabe, Paris, 1857.] Notwithstanding ecclesiastical prohibitions, the study of Aristotle gradually gained ground. On the historical development of these studies see *Amad. Jourdain*, Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristotle, et sur les commentaires grecs ou arabes, employés par les docteurs scolastiques. Par. 1819, 8, and the works on the History of Philosophy. *Tennemann*, viii. p. 353. [Ritter, ubi supra. Haurèau, La Phil. Scol. i. ch. v.]

[7] Alexander Alesius; he was called Doctor irrefragabilis, and died A. D. 1245. He was the first theologian who made a thorough use of the Aristotelian philosophy. His work entitled: Summa Universæ Theologiæ (divided into Quæstiones, Membra, and Articuli), was edited after his death by *Guilelmus de Melitona* about the year 1252, by order of Pope Innocent IV. Other editions are those of Venice, 1576, and of Colon. 1622, iv. fol. Extracts from it are given by *Semler*, l. c. p. 120, ss. *Cramer*, vii. p. 161, ss. *Heinrich*, p. 208, ss. Comp. *Scheiermacher*, p. 531–32. [*Haurèau*, i. 418, sq.]

[8] Called Simia Aristotelis; the most learned of the scholastics, a native of Suabia, taught at Paris and Cologne, was bishop of Ratisbon, and died at Cologne, 1280, Opp. ed. *Petrus Jammy*, Ord. Præd. Lugd. 1651, xxi. T. Fol. Among his numerous works we mention his Commentaries on Aristotle and Peter Lombard, as well as his Summa Theol. (ex edit. Basil. 1507, ii.)

[9] The Doctor angelicus; he was born A. D. 1224, in the kingdom of Naples. He was a disciple of Albert; but the strict theological tendency predominated in him more than in his teacher. He taught at Paris, Rome, Bologna, and Pisa, and died A. D. 1274, on his journey to the council of Lyons. He was canonized by Pope John XII. A. D. 1323. His principal works are: Commentarii in libros iv. Sententiar. Petri Lombardi c. notis *J. Nicolai*, Par. 1659, iv. fol.—Summa Totius Theologiæ in 3 partes distributa. Extracts from these works are given by *Semler*, l. c. p. 58, ss. *Cramer*, vii. p. 161, ss. *Heinrich*, p. 219, ss. *Schröckh*, xxix. p. 71–196. Opp. Omnia, Romæ, 1572, xvii. fol. Antverp. 1575. Venet. 1745, xx. fol. For further particulars see *Münscher*, edit. by von Cöln, ii. p. 19. Comp. *C. F. Kling*, Descriptio Summæ Theologicæ Thomæ Aquinatis succincta, Bonn. 1846–4. *H. Hörtel*, Thomas von Aquino und seine Zeit. nach Touron, Delecluze und den Quellen, Augsb. 1846. *Ritter*, viii. 257, 304. *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. 460: "*Thomas, with the finest and sharpest speculation unites the talent of clear exposition to a degree seldom found among the scholastics, and consequently his Summa attained the highest renown in the catholic church.*" [*Hampden*, Life of Aquinas, 1846. Aquinas in Kitto's Journal, vol. i Haurèau in his Phil. Scolast. ii. 104–214. *Jourdain*, La Phil. de St. Thos. d'Aquin, Paris, (a crowned memoir), 1859; comp. Am. Theol Review, Jan.

1861. Abbé Malé, La Theol. de St. Thos. i. Paris, 1856. *Cacheux*, De la Philos. de St. Thomas, Paris, 1858. *H. R. Fergueray*, La Doctrine Politique de St. Thos., Paris, 1857. A comparison of Aquinas and Scotus, in Secretan's Phil. de la Liberté, Tome i. *J. N. P. Oischinger*, Die Speculative Theol. des Aquin, 1858. *K. Werner*, Der heilige St. Thos. von Aquin, 3 Bde. Regensb., 1859. *H. E. Plassmann*, Die Schule und Lehre des heil. Thos. von Aquin. 5 Bde., 1858–9.—New edition of his works by *Migne;* with a full Index, 1860. *Billuart*, edited the Summa, 10 vols., Paris, 1839: *Lavergne and Durand*, the De Veritate, Nimes, 1854. A French transl. of the *Summa*, by Abbé Ecalle, Tome, i., 1851. Opuscula, transl. by M. Vedrine, 6 vols., 1856, sq. *Goudin*, Philosophia juxta D. Thomæ dogmata, 4 Tom., Paris, 1850. Aquinas Catena Aurea, in connection with the Oxford Library of the Fathers, translated, 4 vols.]

[10] Duns Scotus, surnamed Doctor subtilis, was born at Dunston in Northumberland, lectured on theology at Oxford from the year 1301, at Paris from the year 1304, and died at Cologne A. D. 1308. He introduced a number of barbarous technical terms, such as quidditates, hæcceitates, incircumscriptibilitates, etc.; with these began the degeneracy of scholasticism into hair-splitting subtilities. His complete works were edited by *Luc. Wadding*, Ludg. 1639, xii. fol. His principal work is: Quodlibeta et Commentaria in libros iv. sententiarum; also Quæstiones quodlibeticæ. Comp. *Semler*, l. c. p. 67–73. *Cramer*, vii. p. 295–308. *Heinrich*, p. 226, ss. *Schröckh*, xxix. p. 237, ss. *Baumgarten Crusius*, De Theologia Scoti, Jena, 1826. *Ritter*, viii. 354–472; he calls him the most acute and penetrating mind among the scholastics. [Comp. the works of *Hauréau*, *Werner*, and *Plassmann*, as cited above.]

[11] In the formal point of view the systems of Thomas and Scotus differ in this, that the former has regard rather to the scientific, the latter to the practical aspect of religion:* *Ritter*, viii. p. 365, 66. In the doctrine of ideas (universals) the Thomists were more Aristotelian, the Scotists more Platonic. The former take more profound views of the relation between divine grace and human liberty (Augustinism); the latter laying (in the manner of Pelagius) greater stress upon the freedom of the will, advanced notions which commended themselves to common sense and the interests of morality. And, lastly, the same difference respecting the doctrine of the immaculate conception of the Virgin, which caused a bitter enmity between the two orders, also existed between the two schools. ["Thomas and Duns Scotus," says *Baur*, Dogmengesch. 226, sq., "are the founders of two schools into which the whole of the scholastic philosophy and theology was divided." Among their differences are these, Thomas makes theology to be essentially theoretical, Scotus, practical; the former makes God to be essentially the one, universal, infinite essense; with the latter the *will* is the starting point, etc. Comp. *Ritter*, Christl. Phil. i. 663–697. *Neander*, Hist. Dogm. 544, sq. *Erdmann* on Scotus, in Stud. u. Kritik. 1863.]

* The same difference is found in the Dominicans and Franciscans; the former were zealous for the dogma, and became inquisitors; the latter were zealous for morals, and, in their reformatory zeal even ran into the danger of becoming heretical.

[8] John of Fidanza, surnamed Doctor Seraphicus, and called Eutychius, or Eustachius by the Greeks, was Doctor Theol. Parisiensis and Præpositus Generalis of the order of the Franciscans, died A. D. 1274 as cardinal, and was canonized A. D. 1482 by Pope Sixtus IV.—Opp. Romæ 1588–96, viii. F. L. Mogunt. 1609.....His principal works are: Commentarius in libros iv. Sententiarum, Breviloquium, Centiloquium. He is also said to be the author of the work entitled: Compendium Theologicæ Veritatis (de natura Dei). He wrote several mystical tracts: Speculum Animæ, Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, de Reductione Artium ad Theologiam. Comp. *Semler*, l. c. p. 52–58. *Heinrich*, p, 214, ss. *Gass* in *Herzog's* Realencyclop.

[On *Raimundus Lullus*, born at Majorca, 1226, see *Neander*, Hist. Dogm. 548. Opera, ed. Mogunt. 1772, in 10 vols. His chief work is his Ars Generalis. Comp. *Ritter*, Christl. Phil. i. 662. "It was a leading object with him," says *Neander*, "to prevent the spread of the principles of *Averrhoes* in theology." He disputed with the Arabian philosophers in North Africa, where he suffered martyrdom, at Bogia, A. D. 1315.]

§ 152.

c. *Third Period.—The Decline of Scholasticism in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries.*

During the last period of scholasticism, now on its decline, we meet with but few independent thinkers, among whom the most distinguished were *Durand of St. Pourçain*,[1] *Raimund of Sabunde*,[2] and *William Occam*,[3] the nominalistic skeptic. *Gabriel Biel*,[4] a disciple of the last mentioned, but less original, was the last of the scholastic divines; though the degenerate tendency still lingered to evoke a stronger desire for an entire reformation in theology.[5]

[1] Durandus de Sancto Portiano (a village in the diocese of Clermont), surnamed Doctor resolutissimus, was from the year 1312 professor of theology in the university of Paris, and afterwards bishop of Annecy and of Meaux: died in 1333. He wrote: Opus super Sententias Lombardi, Par. 1508, Venet. 1571, fol. (it is now scarce).—Though a Dominican monk, he ventured to oppose Thomas, on which account he was looked upon as an apostate by the genuine followers of Thomas; see *Cramer*, vol. vii. p. 801, ss. *Baur*, Dogmengesch. 230, 240. *Ritter*, viii. 547–574. *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. 462: "*He is distinguished for his apt and clear statements of the most difficult positions.*" [*Engelhardt* in *Herzog's* Realencyclop.]

[2] He was a teacher at Toulouse about the year 1436, and composed a work on natural theology under the title: Liber Creaturarum, seu Theol. Naturalis. Argent. 1496, fol. Fcf. 1635, 8. It was republished in a somewhat altered form by *Amos Comenius* under the title: Oculus Fidei. Amst. 1661, 8. Comp. *Montaigne*, Essais, L. ii. c. 12. *Matzke*, die natürliche Theologie des Raymundus von Sabunde, Bresl. 1846. Ritter, viii. 658–678.

[Comp. *Schaarschmidt* in Herzog's Real. Encyclop. Bd. xii. *M. Huttler*, Die Religionsphil. Raym. v. Sabunde, Augsb., 1851. *C. C. L. Kleiber*, De Raim., quem vocant de Sabunde, Vita et Scriptis, Berol. 1856. *F. Nitzsch*, Quæst. Raim., in Zeitschrift f. d. hist. Theol., 1859. *Ritter*, Gesch. d. Phil. Bd. viii.; Christliche Philos. 1859, ii. 747–754.]

[8] Occam died A. D. 1347. He was called Venerabilis inceptor, Doctor singularis. Though a Franciscan monk, he differed from Duns Scotus, as the Dominican Durand did from Thomas: in both these cases, therefore, the strict connection between the spirit of the order, and the spirit of the school, is destroyed. Occam took an independent position even in opposition to the Popes (John XXII.), by defending the doctrine of the poverty of Christ; on this point see the works on ecclesiastical history. As a scholastic divine, he brought nominalism again into repute. Of his works the following are dogmatical: Compendium Errorum Joh. XXII. (in Goldast. Monarchia. Han. 1612, p. 957). Quodlibeta vii. Tract. de Sacramento Altaris.—Centiloquium Theologicum (the last of which, in particular, contains a great many subtilities). See *Cramer*, vii. p. 812, ss. On his ironical skepticism, which he knew how to conceal under the mask of the most rigid orthodoxy, see *Rettberg* in the Studien und Kritiken, 1839, part 1. His works abound with absurd questions (such as those mentioned in note 5). Comp. *Rettberg*, p. 90. *Ritter*, viii. 574–604. *Baur*, Trinitätslehre, ii. 867, sq. But with philosophical scepticism, he and the later nominalists show only a still more rigid nominalism, in the theological sphere. [Hauréau, ii. 418–475. *Ritter*, Christliche Philos. i. 717–732. *Neander*, Hist. Dogm. 590.]

[9] He was born at Spires, was professor of philosophy and theology in the University of Tübingen, and died A. D. 1495.—He wrote: Collectorium s. Epitome ex Gulielmo Occam in iv. libros Magistri Sententiarum ed. *Wend. Steinbach*. Tüb. 1502, ii. *Wernsdorf*, Diss. Theol. de Gabr. Biel celeberrimo Papista Antipapista, Wittenb., 1719. [*Schröckh*, Kirchengesch., xxx. 425, xxxiii. 534, and *Gieseler's* Church History.] Biel was followed by *Antoninus Florentinus* and *Paul Cortesius*; see *Münscher* ed. by von Cölln, p. 30. Cajetan, Eck and others, who lived at the time of Luther, were also complete scholastics.

[10] Thus it was asked: Num possibilis propositio, Pater Deus odit filium? Num Deus potuerit suppositare mulierem, num diabolum, num asinum, num cucurbitam, num silicem? Tum quemadmodum cucurbita fuerit concionatura, editura miracula, figenda cruci? Et quid consecrasset Petrus, si consecrasset eo tempore, quo corpus Christi pendebat in cruce?....." Sunt innumerabiles λεπτολεσχίαι his quoque multo subtiliores, de instantibus, de notionibus, de relationibus, de formalitatibus, de quidditatibus, de eccëitatibus, quas nemo possit oculis assequi, nisi tam Lynceus, ut ea quoque per altissimas tenebras videat, quæ nusquam sunt." *Erasmi* Stultitiæ Laus, Bas. 1676, p. 141, ss. and in Annotation. in 1 Tim. i. 6, etc. Com. *Ad. Müller*, Erasmus, p. 155, and *Gieseler*, l. c. ii. § 144, note g. Respecting the decline of scholasticism, Luther wrote to John Lange at Erfurt: Aristoteles descendit paulatim, inclinatus ad ruinam propre futuram sempiternam. Mire fastidiuntur lectiones sententiariæ, nec est ut quis sibi auditores sperare possit, nisi theologiam hanc, *i. e.*, Bibliam aut S. Augustinum aliumve ecclesiasticæ auctoritatis doc-

torem velit profiteri. The letter in question is reprinted in *de Wette's* Collection, i. No. 34, p. 57. Comp. the sixtieth letter (addressed to Staupitz), p. 102.

[*Baur* in his Dogmengesch. p. 229, sq., traces the decline of scholasticism back to Duns Scotus: he says, that it had already lost its peculiar character, when theology was defined as a practical science: for this made a separation between theology and philosophy, and abandoned the position of the unity of faith and knowledge, which was essential to scholasticism. The more sharply Duns Scotus distinguished between understanding and will, the more did he separate the two, and sever the practical from the theoretical. All that remained was to separate thought from being, and the dissolution was complete. This was achieved by the nominalism of Occam, according to which there was no objective reality corresponding to general ideas. Between the two stood Durandus, who also viewed theology as a practical science, and made its object to be, not God, but the life of faith. Faith was at last left to rest merely upon authority.—The antagonism of realism and nominalism (p. 233) runs through the whole of the scholastic theology: it is its moving principle, and the stages of its development are also identical with the different periods of scholasticism.—Aristotelianism determined the *form* of scholasticism: but Platonism, through the influence of the writings of Dionysius the Areopagite, went along with it, and in the works of the great scholastics (*e. g.*, Aquinas) contributed its substantial elements to scientific theology. Comp. *Neander*, Hist. Dogm., 596, sq. On the Merits and Defects of Scholasticism, see *Gieseler*, Dogmengeschichte, § 83.]

§ 153.

MYSTICISM.

* *Schmid H.*, der Mysticismus des Mittelalters in seiner Entstehungsperiode, Jena, 1824. *Schmidt, Charles*, Essai sur les mystiques du quatorzième siècle. Strasburg, 1836, 4. *Helfferich*, die Geschichte der christlichen Mystik in ihrer Entwickelung und in ihren Denkmalen. 2 vols., Hamb., 1843. *Franz Pfeifer*, deutsche Mystiker des 14 Jahrhunderts. 1st vol. Lpz. 1845. *Wilh. Wackernagel*, Ueber die Gottesfreunde, s. Beiträge zur Vaterländ. Gesch. 2 Bd. Basel, 1843, p. 111 sq. *C. U. Hahn*, Gesch. d. Ketzer im Mittelalter, in 11, 12, 13, Jahr., Stuttg., 1850. *L. Noack*, Die Christl. Mystik, nach ihrem Geschichtlichen Entwicklungsgange; 1 Theil. die christl. Mystik des Mittelalt. *Ullmann*, Reformatoren vor d. Reformation [transl. in Clark's Foreign Library, Edinburgh. *Ullmann* in Studien u. Kritiken, 1852. *R. A. Vaughan's* Hours with the Mystics, 2d ed. 2 vols., Lond., 1860; comp. Brit. Quarterly Review, Oct. 1860. Mystic Theology of Holland, Christ. Remembrancer, April, 1853. German Mysticism in the 13th Century, Westminster Review, Oct. 1853. *C. Schmidt*, Die Gottesfreunde in XIV. Jahr. in Beiträge zur theol. Wiss. Strasb., 1854. *Neander*, Church Hist.; and Hist. Dogmas, 604, 639. J. Görres, die Christl. Mystik, 3, 1836, sq.]

The influence of scholasticism was beneficially counter-balanced by *Mysticism*, which, in effusions of the heart, rich indeed, though at times indistinct, restored to theology those vital streams of which it had been deprived by the excess of dialectics.[1] Theologians, whose

tendency was of a positive kind, such as *Bernard of Clairval*, had before this insisted upon the importance of religious feelings clinging to the orthodox faith, and of a devout disposition in opposition to a speculative tendency.[1] Some of the scholastic divines themselves had endeavored to reconcile the claims of pious emotions with the demands made by the scientific development of the age, on which account they are commonly called either mystical scholastics, or dialectic mystics.[2] But about the time of the decline of the scholastic philosophy, mysticism made its appearance in a much more vigorous and independent form, though under very different aspects. As had been the case with the scholastics, so some of the mystics adhered more closely to the doctrine of the church, while others, departing from it, adopted heretical opinions.[4] As to the scientific method, one class of mystics manifested a more philosophical culture and preparation than was shown by the other. The doctrines of *Master Eckart*[5] had much in common with the fanatical pantheistic sects, and were consequently condemned by the see of Rome. Among those who followed more closely (though with various modifications) the doctrine of the church, were *John Tauler*,[6] *Henry Suso*,[7] *John Ruysbroek*,[8] the (anonymous) author of the "Büchlein von der deutschen Theologie (*i. e.* the little book of German Theology),[9] *Thomas à Kempis*,[10] and *John Charlier Gerson*;[11] the last also endeavored to construct a scientific system of mysticism, and to give to it a psychological basis. In the Greek church, too, mysticism had its representatives (*Nicolas Cabasilas*).[12]

[1] "*Mysticism forms in itself a contrast to Scholasticism proper, inasmuch as the prevailing tendency of the latter is a dialectical process of the understanding.....But Mysticism could enter into a union with Scholasticism by creating a desire for preserving the very hearth of religion in the inmost depth of the human heart, as its true seat, in order to supply that which could not be furnished by purely dialectical thinking.*" *Baur*, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, p. 167. On the undoubtedly well founded difference between the psychological (religious) and speculative (theosophic) mysticism, see *ibid.* p. 468, and his work on the Trinity, ii. 880.

[2] He was surnamed Doctor mellifluus, and died A. D. 1153. His works were edited by *Mabillon*, Par. (1666—1690.) 1719, ii. fol. Ven. 1726, iii. fol. He wrote epistles, sermons, and mystical tracts: De consideratione, ad Eugenium III. Papam; Libri v. de Gratia et libero Arbitrio, etc. Comp. **Neander*, der heilige Bernhard und sein Zeitalter. Berlin, 1813, 1848, 8. *Ellendorf*, der heilige Bernhard von Clairvaux und die Hierarchie seiner Zeit. Essen., 1837. *H. Schmid*, l. c. p. 187, ss. *De Wette*, Sittenlehre, ii. 2, p. 208, ss.—Practical activity was also displayed by *Berthold*, a Franciscan monk, who lived between the years 1247 and 1272; he bordered upon mysticism. See his sermons, edited by *Kling*, Berl. 1824, and the review of *Jac. Grimm*, in the Wiener Jahrbücher, 1825, p. 194, ss.

[b] To these belong essentially *William of Champeaux*, and the theologians of the school of St. Victor, as well as *Bonaventura*. Comp. §§ 150 and 151. There is also a mystical background in the writings of Anselm of Canterbury, Albertus Magnus, and Thomas Aquinas. And here, too, it can not but be noticed, that the older mysticism shows an internal affinity for realism, and the latter made an alliance with nominalism.

[c] "*The ideas of the orthodox mystics rest on the positive foundation of the creed, and all the spiritual experience described by them is most intimately connected with the doctrine of the Trinity, the incarnation of Christ, the influence of the Spirit promised by Christ, and the mystery of the Lord's Supper. But the abstract theory of the heretical mystics usually seeks to fathom the depth of the soul, which, in their opinion is nothing but God himself; they teach that to become divine is the work of man himself, and regard the positive doctrines as at most the symbols of those spiritual transactions on which the attainment of the end of our life depends.* IT IS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE IN AN EXPOSITION OF THE HISTORY OF THIS PERIOD, DISTINCTLY TO SEPARATE THESE TWO KINDS OF CHURCHLY AND UNCHURCHLY OR ORTHODOX AND HETERODOX MYSTICS." *Engelhardt*, Richard von S. Victor, p. 2. Comp. p. 97, 98.

[d] *Amalrich of Bena* and *David of Dinanto* had previously developed the fanatical side of the mystico-pantheistic system of John Scotus Erigena, and given to it that dangerous practical direction which is exhibited by some later sects of the middle ages. Comp. *Krönlein*, Amalrich von Bena and David von Dinanto, in the Studien und Kritiken, 1847.* *H. Schmid*, l. c. p. 387, ss. *Engelhardt*, kirchengeschichtliche Abhandlungen. Erlang. 1832, p. 251. *Mosheim*, de Beghardis et Beguinabus, p. 211, ss. p. 255.—Among the mystics of the fourteenth century, *Master Eckart* (Aichard) a native of Saxony, and provincial of the order of the Dominicans in Cologne, bears most resemblance to the aforesaid theologians, though he surpasses them in being more systematic. "*His sense of the nearness of God, and his ardent love, are overwhelmed by the contemplation of an abyss of lusts and blasphemy.*" (*Hase.*) His doctrines were condemned, A. D. 1329, in a bull of Pope John XXII. Comp. *Schmidt, Charles*, Essai, p. 51–57, and Studien und Kritiken, 1839, 3. *Mosheim*, l. c. p. 180. Apophthegms of German mystics in *Wackernagel's* Lesebuch, i. Sp. 889–92. *Meister Eckart;* Eine theologische Studie von *H. Martensen*. Hamb., 1843. *Ullmann* ubi supra. [*Hollenberg* on Eckhart, in Deutsche Zeitschrift, Sept. 1858.]

[e] He was called Doctor sublimis et illuminatus, lived as a monk of the order of the Dominicans at Cologne and Strasburg, and died A. D. 1361. He was a spiritual preacher. A Latin edition of his works by *Laur. Surius*, Col. 1548. He wrote among others: Nachfolge des armen Lebens Christi. —Medulla Animæ (a collection of divers tracts) is a later compilation; Sermons, iii. Bde. Leipz., 1826, etc. Comp. *Wackernagel's* deutsches Lesebuch, Sp. 857, ss. [*Schmidt, Carl*, Johannes Tauler von Strasburg. Beitrag

* The doctrine of Amalrich is to be distinguished from that of his disciples: so, too, from that of David of Dinanto, whose connection with Scotus Erigena is denied by the author of the above essay.

zur Geschichte der Mystik und des religiösen Lebens im 14 Jahrhundert, Hamb., 1841.] Luther wrote concerning him to Spalatin (14 Dec. 1516): Si te delectat puram, solidam, antiquæ similliman theologiam legere, in germanica lingua effusam, sermones Johannis Tauleri, prædicatoriæ professionis, tibi comparare potes.....Neque enim ego vel in latina vel in nostra lingua theologiam vidi salubriorem et cum Evangelio consonantiorem. The letter is given by *De Wette*, vol. i. No. 25, p. 46. *De Wette*, on the contrary, says (christliche Sittenlehre ii. 2, p. 220, ss.): "*His mysticism is very profound and fervent, and at the same time very speculative; but it possesses no intrinsic worth, inasmuch as it is almost exclusively of a negative description, and consists only of a renunciation of all that is earthly and finite. On the contrary, the true, the essential, the divine is, as it were, an empty space, because it is not brought into any definite relation to the life and heart of man*," etc. *Böhringer*, Kirche. Christi., ii. 3. [Life and Sermons (25) of John Tauler, by S. Winkworth, London, 1857; New York ed. Preface by Prof. R. D. Hitchcock, 1858. British Quarterly on Tauler, April, 1857. *Rudelbach's* Christl. Biographie, i. on Tauler.]

[7] Henry Suso (Germ. *der Seuse*, sometimes called Amandus vom Berg) was born at Constance, and died A. D. 1365. His works were translated into Latin by *Laur. Surius*, Col. 1532.—Comp. Heinrich Suso's Leben und Schriften, herausgegeben von *†*Melch Dienpenbrock* mit einer Einleitung von *Görres*. 1829, 37,* 40. Geistliche Blüthen von Suso, 1834. *Wackernagel*, deutsches Lesebuch, Sp. 871, ss. He is more poetical than profound and speculative, his writings are full of allegories and imagery, frequently fantastical, but full of religious ardor. A romantic, chivalric, child-like soul! He is not to be confounded with the author of the work on the Nine Rocks (Rulman Mersurin); comp. *Ch. Schmidt*, in Illgens Zeitschrift, 1839. 2. An important contribution to the history of mysticism is the treatise of *W. Wackernagel* über die Gottesfreunde in Basel, 1843. *Ch. Schmidt* in Stud. u. Kritiken, 1843. *F. Bricker*, Sur la Vie et les Ecrits de H. Suso, Strasb.

[8] He was prior of the regular canons in Grünthal in Brabant, and died A. D. 1381. He was surnamed Doctor ecstaticus. His works (originally written in the Flemish language) were translated, into Latin by *Laur. Surius*, Cologne, 1552, 1609, 1692, and into German by *Gottfr. Arnold*, Offenbach, 1701. 4. New edition by Arnswaldt, with a Preface by Ullmann, Hamb., 1848. Comp. *Engelhardt* in the work mentioned § 150, note 9,—Ruysbroek stands, as it were, on the boundaries between the orthodox and the heterodox mystics; *Ch. Gerson*, who wrote against him, numbered him among the latter; but comp. *Engelhardt*, l. c. p. 275: "*The line of demarcation between heterodox and orthodox mysticism, which we find distinctly drawn in the writings of Ruysbroek, was so fine, and might so easily be passed over, that nothing but a firm adherence to that form of belief which was generally adopted and sanctioned by the usage of the Fathers, as well as by the authority of the church, seemed a sufficient guard against such errors.*"—Comp. *De Wette*, christliche Sittenlehre; he says, p. 247: "*In the writings of Ruysbroek* [as well as in those of Tauler], *the idea of something absolute*

* We cite the edition of 1837.

and of renouncing all that is finite, of being absorbed in the one and undivided, is set forth as that from which all things are derived. Ruysbroek acknowledged, even to a farther extent than Tauler, the indwelling of the Divine in man—an admission of much importance. In a moral aspect, the writings of Ruysbroek are of more value than those of Tauler: the former developes more distinctly the nature of a virtuous life, and warns against spiritual sloth, but he has fallen more frequently than Tauler into the error of mystical sensuousness and extravagance," etc.

[9] The full title of this work is: *Deutsche Theologie, oder ein edles Büchlein vom rechten Verstande, was Adam und Christus sei, und wie Adam in uns sterben und Christus in uns leben soll.* It was first published A. D. 1516, by *Luther* (with a recommendatory preface), afterwards (also in commendation) by *Joh. Arnd.* 1631, by *Grell*, 1817, by *Detzer*, Erl. 1827, by †*Troxler*, St. Gallen, 1837, and by *Pfeifer*, 1851. Comp. Luther's opinion of this work in *De Wette's* collection of Luther's letters, No. 60, p. 102: "*This noble book, though simple and without adornment in words of human wisdom, is much richer and more precious in art, and that wisdom which is divine. And, to praise according to my old folly, next to the Bible and St. Augustine, I do not know of any book from which I have learnt or would wish to learn more of what God, Christ, man, and all things are.*" Extract from Luther's Preface. *De Wette* (christl. Sittenlehre, p. 251), also calls the work, "*a sound and marrowy treatise, full of spirit and life, written in a pure and solid style, and worthy of being so strongly recommended by Luther.*" Comp. *Ullmann*, das Reformatorische und Speculative in der Denkweise des Verf. der deutschen Theologie, in the Stud. und Kritiken, 1852, p. 859, sq. [On *Pfeifer's* edition, see also Deutsche Zeitschrift, 1855. Die Heilslehre der Theologia Deutsch, *F. G. Sisso*, Stuttg., 1857.—Theologia Germanica, edited by Dr. Pfeifer, transl. by Susanna Winkworth, Preface by Rev. C. Kingsley, and Introd. by C. E. Stowe, Andover, 1856. *Schmitz*, Johannes Tauler.]

[10] His true name was *Thomas Hamerken* of Kempen: he was subprior of the Augustinian monks on St. Agnes' mount near Zwoll, and died A. D. 1841. "*He was rather a pious, warm-hearted, and edifying preacher, than a mystic properly speaking; at least he possessed scarcely anything of a speculative tendency.*" *De Wette*, l. c. p. 247. He was the author of several pious tracts: Soliloquia Animæ, Hortulus Rosarum, Vallis Liliorum, De tribus Tabernaculis, De Solitudine, De Silentio, etc. His most celebrated work (which some, however, have ascribed to other authors, *e. g.*, to Abbot Gerson or to John Gerson) is: De Imitatione Christi, libri iv. Opera Norimb., 1494. Par. 1520. fol. Antw., 1607. Comp. the critical examination of its authorship by †*J. P. Selbert* (who pronounces in favor of Thomas à Kempis), Wien. 1828. 8. *Gieseler*, l. c. ii. 4, § 146, notes l. and m. *Ch. Schmidt*, Essai sur Jean Gerson, p. 121. *Ullmann*, Reformatoren, ii. 711, *sq.* *J. Mooren*, Nachrichten über Thomas à Kempis, Crefeld., 1855. [In favor of Gerson, as the author; *A. A. Barbier*, Dissertation, Paris, 1812, and *J. B. M. Gence*, Paris, 1826. In favor of the Abbot *Gerson*. *G. D. Gregory*, Memoire revu par Lanjuinais, Paris, 1827. *Vert*, Etudes sur l'Imitation, Paris, 1856. *Ullmann*, in his biography of Wessel (in Ref. vor die Ref.) cites a positive testimony for à Kempis from Albert Har-

denberg, only 27 years after à Kempis. *B. Bähring*, Thos. von Kempen, 1840.]

[11] John Charlier Gerson, surnamed Doctor christianissimus, was chancellor of the University of Paris, and died A. D. 1429. In him, "*the mediæval mysticism came to a consciousness of its real character, and summed up its really speculative and truly religious principles in a purified form.*" *Meier* Dogmengesch. 203. He wrote: Considerationes de Theologia Mystica, De Perfectione, De Meditatione Cordis, etc. An edition of his complete works was published at Antv. 1706, fol. at Hagæ Comit. 1728. Comp. *Engelhardt*, de gersonio Mystico, 1822. *Hundeshagen*, *K. B.* über die mystische Theologie des Joh. Charlier Gerson. Leipz., 1734 (reprinted separately from the fourth volume of the Zeitschrift für historische Theologie). **Liebner*, *A.*, über Gersons mystische Theologie in the Studien und Kritiken, 1835, part 2, p. 277, ss. **Schmidt*, *Ch.*, Essai sur Jean Gerson, chancelier de l'université et de l'église de Paris. Strasb. et Paris, 1839.—On the different definitions of the nature of mysticism, see Consideratio 28, p. 384 (*Hundeshagen*, p. 49.). On his opposition to Ruysbroek, see above, note 6.—Gerson sees, "*in the sensuous imagination a powerful foe to pure and mystical contemplation, and takes care repeatedly and very strongly to warn against its illusions.*" *Hundeshagen*, p. 81.—On his philosophy, see Ritter, viii. 626–658. [*Bonnechose*, Gerson, Huss, etc., Paris, 2. 8vo. *J. B. Schwab*, Johannes Gerson, 1859, 8vo. pp. 800. On Gerson, see Presb. Quarterly, Oct. 1858.]

[12] Dr. *W. Gass*, Die Mystik des Nicolaus Cabasilas vom Leben in Christo, Greifswald, 1849. Comp. also *Engelhardt*, die Arsenianer und Hesychasten, in Illgen's Zeitschrift für hist. Theol. viii. 48, sq. [F. Pfeifer, Teutsche Mystiker des xiv. Jahr. 2. 8vo., Leips. 1845 (in vol. i. on *Hermann Fritzler's* Lives of the Saints.) *B. Bähring*, Johannes Tauler und die Gottesfreunde, Hamb., 1853.]

§ 154.

PHILOSOPHICAL OPPOSITION TO SCHOLASTICISM.

Meiners, *Ch.*, Lebensbeschreibungen berühmter Männer aus den Zeiten der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaft. Zürich, 1795. *Heeren*, *A. H. L.*, Geschichte der klassischen Literatur seit dem Wiederaufleben der Wissenschaft. Göttingen, 1797, 1801, 8. *Erhard*, *H. A.*, Geschichte des Wiederaufblühens wissenschaftlicher Bildung. Magdeburg, 1827, 30, ii. vol. [*Hallam's* Middle Ages. *G. Voigt*, Wiederbelebung d. class. Alterthums, Berl., 1859. *Ritter*, christl. Philos. ii. Kap. i., 1859. *Tennemann*, Gesch. d. Phil. Bd. ix.]

Even as early as the thirteenth century *Roger Bacon* had combated the one-sided speculative tendency of scholasticism, and endeavored to improve the method of studying theology.[1] But the second half of the fifteenth century was distinguished for the restoration of classical studies, by which the human mind was delivered from that one-sided theological speculation, which led

astray both the scholastic and the mystical divines, and excited and directed to a more harmonious development of all the powers of the soul, to a more simple and natural consideration of subjects, and above all, to a more judicious treatment of all spiritual matters.[1] *Laurentius Valla*,[2] *John Reuchlin*,[4] and *Desiderius Erasmus*[5] may, generally speaking, be considered as the restorers of classical (and to some extent of Hebrew) philology. *Marsilius Ficinus*,[6] and *John Picus of Mirandula*,[7] were the principal advocates of the study of the Platonic philosophy, and thus, on the one hand, limited the excessive authority of Aristotle and the dominion of scholasticism, and, on the other, showed how mysticism might be more intimately connected with speculation.

[1] Roger Bacon, surnamed Doctor mirabilis, was a monk of the order of the Franciscans, and professor of theology in the university of Oxford from the year 1240. He wrote (A. D. 1267): Opus Majus de Utilitate Scientiarum ad Clementum IV., [ed. *Sam. Jebb*, Lond., 1733; abstract in Brit. Biog. iv. 627.] Very characteristic extracts from it are given by *Gieseler*, ii. § 74, note 29, p. 471. [His Opera inedita, by J. S. Brewer, Vol. i. 1859; comp. Notes and Queries, Jan., 1860, p. 39.]

[2] "*If we ask what forms the most obvious contrast with the scholastic philosophy and theology, as well as with the tendency of scholasticism itself, we may say, that it is good common sense, experience (both outward and inward), knowledge of nature and humanity.*" *Hegel*, Geschichte der Philosophie iii. p. 200.

[4] He died A. D. 1457. His works were published at Basle 1540–43. Elegentiarum Lat. Ling. libri vi.: Dialect. libri iii.: Annot. in New Test. (ed. Erasmus, Tur., 1505: ed. Revius, Amst., 1631): De ementita Constantini Donatione.

[5] John Reuchlin, otherwise called Capnio, lived from 1455 to 1522. Comp. **Mayerhoff*, Reuchlin und seine Zeit. Berl. 1830. *Meiners* l. c. i. p. 44, ss. He especially furthered the study of the Hebrew language as well as that of the Cabbala, and gained a glorious victory over the Viri Obscuri of his age. [*J. A. Erhard*, Gesch. des Wiederaufblühens Wies. Bildung, Magd., 1827, Bd. 2. *Lamey*, Johann Reuchlin, 1855. *D. F. Strauss*, in Ulrich von Hutten, 1858, Bd. 1, p. 188–230. *Von d. Hardt*, Hist. lit. Ref. ii. Reuchlin's philosophical works are: De Verbo Mirifico, 1495: De Arte Cabbalist, 1517: In the Cologne Humanistic Controversy, from 1510, Reuchlin wrote on the proposal to burn all Jewish books, and the Speculum Oculare. The Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum, 1515: on the authorship, see Sir William Hamilton's Discussions (from Edinb. Review), p. 202–238.]

[6] Desiderius Erasmus (Gerhard) of Rotterdam, was born A. D. 1486, and died 1536. *Adolf Müller*, Leben des Erasmus von Rotterdam, Hamb., 1828. Opp. Bas. 1540. viii., and Ludg. Bat. 1703–6, x. fol. In his Ratio perveniendi ad Veram Theologiam, in the work entitled: Laus Stultitiæ, and elsewhere, he severely criticised the extravagancies of scholasticism, and pointed out a more judicious treatment of theology. His critical edition of the New

Test. (edit. princeps, published by *Froben*, Basle, 1516)* led to a more correct study of the Bible; in his letters and various essays he endeavored to spread the light of human knowledge. His relation to the Reformation, and to the theology of the reformers, will come before us in the next period. [His first work, De Contemptu Mundi, 1487. *Burigny*, Vie d'Erasme, Paris, 1757. English lives of Erasmus, by *Knight*, Cambr., 1726; by *Jortin*, 2. 4to., 1758–60; by *Charles Butler*, Lond., 1825. Articles in Eclectic (Lond.) Sept., 1854; Retrospective Rev., vol. v.; Southern Rev., vol. iii.; Christ. Examiner, vol. xlix.; North British, Feb. 1860. Comp. Zeitschrift f. d. hist. Theol., 1843, 1845. *Nesard* in Etudes sur la Renaissance, 1855. *Kerker*, Erasmus und sein theol. Standpunkt, in the Theol. Quartelschrift, 1859, p. 531–567.]

* Respecting the controversy between the Aristotelians and Platonists, see Münscher, ed. by von Cölln, ii. p. 27. *Marsilius Ficinus* translated the works of Plato, and wrote: De Relig. christ. et Fidei Pietate ad Laur. Med., and De Immortalitate Animæ; his works were published at Paris, 1641, fol. He died A. D. 1499. Comp. *Sieveking*, Gesch. d. Platon. Akad. zu Florenz., Gött., 1812. *Ritter*, v. 272–291.

† He was born A. D. 1463, and died 1494. He endeavored to harmonize Plato with Aristotle. His works were published at Basle, 1601, fol.: he wrote among others: In Hexaëmeron libros vii.—Quæstiones 900—De Christi Regno et Vanitate Mundi—In Platonis Convivium libri iii.—Epistolæ etc.. see *Meiners* l. c. ii. from the commencement.† Comp. *Sigwart*, Ulrich Zwingli, der Charakter seiner Theologie, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Picus von Mirandula, Stuttg., 1855, p. 14, sq. [*G. Dreydorff*, Das System des Joh. Picus, Graf von Mirandula, Marb., 1858.]

§ 155.

PRACTICAL OPPOSITION.—THE FORERUNNERS OF THE REFORMATION

Plathe, Geschichte der Vorläufer der Reformation, Leipz., 1835, 8. *Ullmann, C.*, Reformatoren vor der Reformation, vornehmlich in Deutschland und den Niederlanden, 2 vols., Hamburg, 1841, [translated by Menzies in Clark's Foreign Library, Edinb., 2 vols. Comp. Bibliotheca Sacra, i. 1844, p. 425, sq.]

The spirit of the Reformation manifested itself more and more, not only in science, but also directly in the sphere of the practical Christian life. *John de Wycliffe*,[1] *John Hus*,[2] and *Jerome of Prague*, as well as their followers, starting from a purer Biblical doctrine, adopted in part the doctrines of the mystics, in part the scholastic forms of thought, though their tendency was on the whole

* The publication of the Polyglott edition of Cardinal *Ximenes*, about the rise of the German Reformation, is no less important. [Comp. *Hefele's* Ximenes, 1856, trans. Lond. '60,]

† In the Greek Church, *Gemistius Pletho*, in the 15th century followed Plato, while Gennadius appears as a representative of Aristotelianism; comp. *Gass*, Gennadius und Plato, Bresl., 1844.

more practical. Some of their followers fell into the errors of former fanatical sects.[3] The tendency of *Jerome Savonarola*[4] is quite peculiar; his theology has much of the mystical, with an apocalyptic coloring. *John Wessel of Groningen*, on the contrary, united in himself the nobler spirit of mysticism, and the true spirit of scientific inquiry, striving to throw off the fetters of scholasticism; he thus became, in a stricter sense, a forerunner of Luther.[5]

[1] He was professor of theology at the university of Oxford, and combated from the year 1360 the order of the mendicant friars. Gregory XI. condemned nineteen of his theses (A. D. 1377). His controversy respecting the doctrine of transubstantiation will come under consideration in the special history of doctrines.—His principal doctrinal work is: Dialogorum libri v. (Trialogus) Bas., 1525, ed. L. Th. Wirth. Francof. et Lips., 1753, 4. Comp. *Vaughan, R.*, Life and Opinions of J. D. Wycliffe. Lond., 1829. ii. 2nd edit., 1831. *Webb, le Bas*, life of Wiclif. Lond., 1832. *Oscar Jäger*, John Wykliffe und seine Bedentung für die Reformation, Halle, 1854. *Böhringer*, Kirchengesch. in Biographieen ii. 4. 1.

[An enlarged edition of *Vaughan's* Life, in one vol., 1853. *G. Weber*, Gesch. d. akatholischen Secten, Bd. i. *Flathe's* Vorläufer der Ref. ii. 161, 1836. *Wiclif* und die Lollarden, by *Lechler*, in Neidner's Zeitschrift, f. die hist. Theol., 1853. Three Treatises, publ. from MSS. by *J. H. Todd*, Dubl. 1851. Tracts and Treatises of W. with transl. from his Latin works by *R. Vaughan*, for the Wycliffe Society, 1848. *E. W. Lewald*, Die theol. Doctrin *Wycliff's*, in Zeitschrift f. d. hist. Theol., 1846–7. Fasciculi Zizaniorum Mag. John *Wyclif* (ascribed to Thos. Nelter), ed. *W. W. Shirley*, Oxford. *De Reaven Gronemann*, Diatribe in J. W. Vitam, Traj. ad Rhen., 1859. *C. A. Winkelmann*, Wicl., Hus, Gerson, inter se cemparati, Göttg., 1857. *Herbert Cowell*, Character and Plan of W. as a Reformer, Oxford.—Wycliffe's Bible, Oxf. Univ. Press, 4, 4to., 1850.—Articles on *Wycliffe*, Christ. Examiner, vol. li.; Ebinb. Rev., lvi.; Christ. Rev., vi.; Meth. Quar., ii.; West. Rev., July, 1854; on Wycliffe's MSS. in (Lond.) Eclectic, 4th series, xv.; British Quarterly, Oct., 1858; Quarterly (Lond.), 1858; Presb. Quarterly (Phil.), by Prof. *R. D. Hitchcock*, Dec. 1857, and July 1858.]

[On the *Lollards*, see Hist. of England and France under the House of Lancaster, Lond., 1852. Erdersheim in his transl. of Kurtz's Church Hist. i. 490–494. *Lechler*, ubi supra. *Blunt's* Reformation in England. Notes and Queries, Mar., 1857, p. 193. *Weber*, Gesch. d. akatholischen Secten, i., 1845.]

[2] John Hus of Hussinecz, was, from the year 1402, pastor at Prague, and suffered martyrdom A. D. 1415 at Constance. His opposition to the church partook more of a practical than dogmatic nature. The views of Hus on the Lord's Supper differed less from the doctrine of the church, than those of his colleagues *Jerome of Prague* and *Jacobellus of Misa*, as will be shown in the special history of doctrines. Comp. *Neander*, kleine Gelegenheitsschriften. 3d edit. p. 214, ss. †*Helfert*, Hus und Hieronymus, Studie, Prag., 1853. [*A. Zitte*, Lebensbeschreib. d. Joh. Hus, Prag., 1799. L. Köhler,

Hus und seine Zeit. Leips., 1846, 2 vols. *Böhringer*, Kirche Christi, ii. 4, 2. *F. Palacky*, Gesch. d. Böhmen, Bd. iii. *L. Heller*, Hieron. von Prag. Tüb., 1835. *A. B. Zürn*, Joh. Hus auf d. Concil zu Costnitz, Leipz., 1836. Neander's Church Hist. v. *Horst*, De Hussi Vita, Amst., 1837. *Bonnechose*, Gerson, Hus, etc., Paris, 1853. Articles in Presb. Quarterly (Phil.), 1856; North American, lxv.; Meth. Qu. Rev., vol. v. Comp. *Gieseler's* Church Hist., New York ed. iii. 414, sq. Gillett's Life of Huss, 2. Bost. 1863.

[3] Concerning the history of the Husites (also called Taborites and Calixtines) see the works on ecclesiastical history.—*Lenfant*, Histoire de la Guerre des Hussites. Amst. 1731, ii. 4.—*John Rokyksana* was one of their most eminent theologians.—*Martin Lokwitz* (Loquis), of Moravia, belonged to the fanatical party among the Husites; see *Schröckh*, l. c. xxxiv. p. 687. [*A. Gindely*, Böhmen u. Mähren in Ref. Prag., 1858.]

[4] He was a monk of the order of the Dominicans, lived from the year 1489 in Florence, and suffered martyrdom A. D. 1498.—*Picus of Mirandola* composed a treatise in his defence, which is reprinted in *Goldast*, Monarchia, T. i. p. 1635.—He *wrote:* Compendio di revelazione, 1495, a Latin translation of which was published 1496.—De Simplicitate Vitæ Christianæ.—Triumphus Crucis s. de Veritate Fidei, 1497, and various sermons.—Comp **Rudelbach*, Hieronymus Savonarola und seine Zeit. Hamburgh., 1835.—**Meier, Karl*, Girolamo Savonarola. Berl., 1836. Concerning his *theological* opinions, see: *Ammon. F. W. Ph.* in Winers und Engelhardts Neues kritisches Journal, vol. viii. part 3, p. 257–82. *Hase*, Neue Propheten, p. 97, sq. [*Madden*, Life of Savonarola, 2d ed. 2 vols., Lond., 1854. *E. J. Perrens*, Vie de S., 2 vols. Paris, 1854. *Th. Paul*, Jer. Sav. précurseur de la Ref. Paris, 1857. *W. H. Rule*, Studies from Hist., vol. ii. Lond., 1856. Archiv. Storico Italiano, Tom. viii., Firenze, 1850. *Pasquale Villari*, La Storia di Savon. (from new documents), i. Florence, 1860.—Articles on *Savonarola*, Dublin Rev. Oct., 1854; Revue Chrét., Paris, 1855; Eclectic (Lond.) 4th series, xvi.; Christ. Remembrancer (Lond.), 1858; Quarterly (Lond.), 1856; Mercersburg Rev. by Dr. Schaff, July, 1858.]

[5] His family name was Gansfort; he was surnamed lux mundi, magister contradictionum, lived and taught theology at Cologne, Heidelberg, Louvain, and Paris, and died A. D. 1489. "*Though himself a scholastic divine, he announced that scholasticism would soon cease to exist, asserted that Scripture is the only foundation of faith, faith the sole ground of justification without works, and urged the spiritual nature of a religious life.*" (*Meier*, Dogmengeschichte, p. 238). His works were published at Groning., 1614.—Comp. *Muurling*, de Wesselii cum Vita tum Meritis in præparanda sacrorum Emendatione in Belgio Septentrionali. Traj. ad Rhen. 1831. *Ullmann, C.*, Johann Wessel, ein Vorgänger Luthers. Ham., 1834.

And lastly, *John Goch* of Mechlin, who died A. D. 1475; *John of Wesel*, professor of theology at Erfurt, and afterwards minister at Worms (he died A. D. 1482) and others, as well as *Gerhard Groot*, and the order of Regular Clerks must be numbered among this class of men. Comp. *Scholtz, J. G. L.*, Diss. exhibens Disquisitionem, qua Thomæ a Kempis Sententia de Re Christiana exponitur et cum Gerardi et Wesselii Gansfortii Sententiis comparatur. Gron., 1840, 8. *Ullmann's* Ref. vor d. Ref. Bd. i.

§ 156.

The connection of the history of doctrines with the history of the church and the world in the present period.

The present period illustrates as much as any other, the intimate connection subsisting between the development of the life of the church and of mankind in general, and the development of doctrine.[1] Thus a parallel may clearly be drawn between the history of Scholasticism on the one hand, and that of papacy and the hierarchy on the other.[2] Monasticism and celibacy not only tended to foster the spirit of subtile speculation manifested by the schoolmen, but also awakened profounder longings on the part of the mystics.[3] The splendor and magnificence of the Roman forms of worship had a reacting influence upon the doctrines of the church (especially upon the doctrines of the sacraments and the saints), in proportion as the former itself owed its existence to the latter.[4] The dogmatic spirit of the present period was also symbolically expressed in the art of the middle ages.[5] The advantages which the West derived from the crusades, the origin of which may be partly ascribed to the religious enthusiasm of the times, were manifold and of various description.[6]—The great calamities and plagues of the fourteenth century, also, so impressed the minds of the people, as to be at least a partial cause of the religious and mystical phenomena of those times (seen, *e. g.*, in the Flagellants).[7]—After the exclusive use of the Latin language in all ecclesiastical matters had led to the neglect of a searching and critical examination of the Bible, and the adoption of a barbarous terminology, the spread of Greek literature, from the conquest of Constantinople (A. D. 1453), exerted a beneficial influence both upon the study of the original languages of the Sacred Scriptures, and the mode of discussing theological subjects.[8] And in the last place, though the terrible institution of the Inquisition had for a time succeeded in intimidating the minds of the people, and in preventing the free exchange of ideas,[9] yet the invention of printing (about the year 1440),[10] the discovery of America (A. D. 1492), and the entire revolution which took place in the history of nations, prepared the way for a new period, which rendered a new development of religious life necessary, as a consequence of the manifold changes in the modes of thought and life.

[1] Compare the general introduction above.

[2] It was not accidental that scholasticism commenced with the age of Gregory VII. During the dispute about the episcopal investiture, *Anselm* supported the pretentions of the papal hierarchy, while somewhat later

Arnold of Brescia, a disciple of Abelard, practically carried out the more liberal doctrinal principles of his master. In a similar manner *Bernard of Clairval* united dogmatic orthodoxy with a rigid adherence to the papal institutions of the church.—Scholasticism reached its highest point of development about the same time that the papacy of the middle ages reached its summit under Pope Innocent III., and a parallel may be clearly drawn between the disruption of the schools (Thomists and Scotists), and the papal schism which occurred soon afterwards.—As the see of Rome had formerly found a support in the realistic tendency of Anselm, so it now met with open opposition on the part of the nominalist Occam.—The history of Mysticism may be likewise so traced out, as to show, that in one aspect it favored the pretensions of the Roman see, and opposed them in another. Papacy itself had its roots (in the real idea of it) in a mystical view of the world, but by its opposition to that idea, *i. e.*, by its externality and worldliness, it called forth opposition on the part of the advocates of that mystical (spiritual) view of the world and its destiny. Comp. *Hagenbach*, in the essay cited § 149. [*Niedner's* Gesch. d. Kirche, § 136, 140, 157, 167, 182.]

[a] Certain errors of the scholastics, as well as the mystics, can scarcely be comprehended but from the stand point of a monastic cell. In earlier times the scholastic divines were monks of the order of the Benedictines, or of that of the regular canons; in later times the monks of the order of mendicant friars occupied the theological chairs (notwithstanding the long opposition made by the university of Paris), and conferred degrees and preferments. We must also take into consideration the jealousy already alluded to between the different orders, which was in intimate connection with the divisions among the scholastics. [Comp. Monkish Literature, Lond. Quarterly, 1853. *S. P. Day*, Rise, etc., of Monastic Institutions, 3d ed. Lond., 1855. *Brownson's* Quarterly Review, July, 1855. Count de Montalembert, Les Moines d'Occident (from Benedict to Bernard), 2. 8vo., Paris, 1860. English version, 1861.]

[b] Compare the doctrine about the Saints and the Lord's Supper in the special history of doctrines.

[c] Is it altogether accidental, that the cities of Strasburg and Cologne, distinguished for their cathedrals, were the favored seats of the mystical theologians? see *Ch. Schmidt*, Essai, p. 45 and 52. There is also an evident connection between the mystical tendency and romantic poetry (comp. *Liebner*, Hugo von St. Victor, p. 246), as well as, on the one hand, between the old German school of painting and mysticism, and on the other, between the more cheerful Italian art and the classical tendency, mentioned § 154.

[d] See *Heeren*, Entwicklung der Folgen der Kreuzzüge für Europa (historische Schriften, Göttingen, 1808, vol. 2).

[e] Comp. *Hecker*, Der schwartze Tod im 14 Jahrhundert. Berlin, 1832, 8. [*Hecker*, Black Death, etc., new ed., 1859. See American Theol. Review, 1859.] *Förstemann*, die christlichen Geisslergesellschaften. Halle, 1828.

[f] Compare § 154.

[g] See *Llorente*, Geschichte der Inquisition, Leipzig. 1823. *Neudecker*, in Herzog's Realencyclopädie, vi. 677, sq. [*Hefele*, in his Life of Cardinal

Ximenes, p. 162, sq.: comp. Dublin Review, 1852 (also 1850, 1851.) *W. H. Rule*, The Brand of Dominic, New York ed., 1852.]

[10] "*Religion has undoubtedly gained the powerful, healthy, and clear development of piety, and of Christian piety in particular, by the invention of typography. The sources of Christian knowledge and education have been multiplied by it ad infinitum, and what was formerly inaccessible has been placed within the reach of all classes of society,*" etc. *Ullmann*, Rede am vierten Säcularfeste der Erfindung der Buchdruckerkunst. Heidelberg, 1840, p. 20.

B. SPECIAL HISTORY OF DOCTRINES DURING THE THIRD PERIOD.

FIRST DIVISION.

APOLOGETICO-DOGMATIC PROLEGOMENA.

TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY.—RELATION BETWEEN REASON AND REVELATION.—SOURCES OF REVELATION.—SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.

§ 157.

TRUTH AND DIVINE ORIGIN OF CHRISTIANITY.

The ground assumed by apologetical writers of the present period, in opposition to all who were not Christians, was considerably different from that taken during the first period. On the one hand, the Judaism of the middle ages was not the same with that which Justin Martyr combated in his Dialogue with Tryphon;[1] on the other, the views of the apologists of the middle ages on doctrinal subjects differed in many respects from those of the earlier fathers. Other weapons were also required in the controversy with Mohammedanism than those which had been used against the ancient forms of polytheism.[2] But the skepticism and freethinking, which made their appearance, especially towards the close of the present period, within the church itself, both in a more open, and a more concealed manner, rendered a philosophical defence of the Christian religion still more necessary, than did those historical forms of religion which existed alongside of Christianity.[3] Generally speaking, the apologists adopted former methods of argumentation. The arguments derived from miracles and prophecies were retained, as tradition had sanctioned them,[4] though some writers attained the idea that the religion of Christ would recommend itself by its internal excellencies, even without miracles.[5]

[1] Compare, *e. g.*, the manner in which *Agobard* upbraided the Jews of that time in his treatise De Insolentia Judæorum, Opp. T. i. p. 59–66. See *Schröckh*, xxi. p. 302.

[3] Compare the writings mentioned § 144, which were directed against Mohammedans, and *Gieseler*, Dogmengeschichte, 476.—The heathen, *i. e.*, the heathen philosophers in particular, were combated by *Thomas Aquinas* in his Summa Catholicæ Fidei contra Gentiles, Lugd., 1587, fol. which is not to be confounded with his larger Summa. Excerpts from it are given by *Schröckh*, xxix. p. 341, ss. *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, ii. p. 100, ss.

[3] *Anselm* himself held the principle: Fides nostra contra impios ratione defendenda est, non contra eos, qui se Christiani nominis honore gaudere fatentur: Epp. Lib. ii. 41. On the later apologetical writings of Savonarola and Ficinus, see § 154, 155.

[4] *Anselm* endeavored to define the idea of miracle by the difference of a threefold *cursus rerum*, viz., the miraculous (mirabilis), the natural (naturalis), and that dependent on the will of the creature (voluntarius). The miraculous can not be subjected to the conditions and laws of the other two, but rules free; yet it does not do violence to the two others (neque illis facit injuriam), since it is also dependent on the highest will, the will of God. The possibility of miracles, too, is grounded in the fact, that creation itself is a miracle, *i. e.*, a product of the divine will: See his De Concept. Virg. et Orig. Peccat., c. 11. *Hasse*, Anselm, ii. 457.

A definition of miracle is given by *Thomas Aquinas*, P. I., quæst. 110. art. 4: Dicendum quod miraculum proprie dicitur, cum aliquid fit præter ordinem naturæ: sed non sufficit ad notionem miraculi, si aliquid fiat præter ordinem naturæ alicujus particularis, quia sic, cum aliquis projicit lapidem sursum, miraculum faceret, cum hoc sit præter ordinem naturæ lapidis. Ex hoc ergo aliquid dicitur esse miraculum, quod fit *præter ordinem totius naturæ creatæ;* hoc autem non potest facere nisi Deus, quia quidquid facit angelus vel quæcunque alia creatura propria virtute, hoc fit secundum ordinem naturæ, et sic non est miraculum. Unde relinquitur, quod solus Deus miraculum facere possit. From this objective definition of miracle, he distinguishes the subjective one: Sed quia non omnis virtus naturæ creatæ est nota nobis, ideo cum aliquid fit præter ordinem naturæ creatæ nobis notæ per virtutem creatam nobis ignotam, est miraculum quoad nos. From the same point of view he draws a distinction between miraculum and mirum. Comp. *Baur*, Trinitätslehre, ii. p. 749, 750. [*Baur*, Dogmengesch. 243, says, Aquinas made a step in advance in the doctrinal definition of the miraculous, by referring the question to the doctrine of providence, or the government of the world.] †*Brischar*, der Wunderbegriff des heiligen Thomas von Aquino, in the Tübingen Quartalschrift, 1845, part 3.—*Ritter*, Gesch. d. Phil. viii. 266, and the passage there cited from Aquinas, Contra Gentes, III. 98. Even as late as this period Ficinus and others appealed to the Sibylline oracles in the matter of prophecy. See *Schröckh*, xxxiv. p. 352.

[5] Among their number we may mention, *e. g.*, *Æneas Sylvius*, see Platina in Vita Pii II. (towards the end). Comp. also Dante, Div. Commed. (Parad. 24 106–108.)

§ 158.

REASON AND REVELATION—FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE.

Though all Christians were convinced of the truth and divine origin of their religion (even where they knew it only through the impure medium of the doctrine of the church), yet the problem was raised by the inquisitive, as to the relation between that which is universal and human, and that which refers to Christianity alone, between revelation and natural reason, between the Christian religion and philosophy. *John Scotus Erigena* was the first who manifested a leaning towards Christian rationalism, and sought a union between that and supranaturalism, by considering the true religion and true philosophy as one and the same thing, and by looking for the inmost and deepest source of religious knowledge in man himself, *i. e.*, in his rational consciousness. But he did not deny the necessity of a positive revelation coming from without.[1] *Abelard* also finds a harmony between philosophy and Christianity, in the fact, that the universally acknowledged truths of reason, and the moral laws with which even the heathen were acquainted, are confirmed and enlarged by the higher authority of divine revelation.[2] Though *Anselm* asserted that it is first of all necessary to receive by an act of faith the truths of revelation sanctioned by the church, yet he admitted that reason might afterwards examine the grounds of what is believed: but in this, he proceeded on the supposition that reason and revelation can not contradict each other.[3] *Thomas Aquinas* endeavored to prove that the doctrines of Christianity, on the one hand, may be apprehended by reason, but, on the other, are above reason;[4] and *Duns Scotus* pointed out the distinguishing features of revelation in articulate propositions.[5] The mystics also admitted (though in a manner different from that of the scholastics) the existence of an immediate certainty as to truth in the mind of man; their theory was nearest allied to that of Anselm. There was, however, this difference among them, that some (viz., those who adhered to ecclesiastical orthodoxy) maintained, that the *internal* revelations were in accordance with the doctrines of the church,[6] while others (the fanatical mystics) held, that the new revelations of the Spirit were sometimes openly opposed to the doctrines historically received, and even to Scripture itself.[7]

[1] De divina Præd. (ap. *Mauguin*, T. i. c. 1. § 1, quoted by *Frommüller*, l. c. p. 50); Quid est de philosophia tractare, nisi veræ religionis, qua summa et principalis omnium rerum causa et humiliter colitur et rationabiliter investigatur, regulas exponere? Conficitur inde veram esse philosophiam veram religionem, conversimque veram religionem esse veram philosophiam (comp

Augustine, De Vera Rel. c. 5.) He held that self-consciousness is the last source of religious knowledge, Div. Nat. v. 31, p. 268: Nulla quippe alia via est ad principalis exempli purissimam contemplationem præter proximæ sibi suæ imaginis certissimam notitiam. But he does not on that account deny the necessity of an external (positive) revelation. On the contrary he says: ii. 31, p. 85; Nisi ipsa lux initium nobis revelaverit, nostræ ratiocinationis studium ad eam revelandam nihil proficiet (Comp. § 159, ss). Thus Scotus Erigena "*may in a certain sense be called the author of rationalism; but his rationalism is very different from that perverse form of rationalism* [rationalismus vulgaris?] *which exists at the present day; in fact, the rationalism of the Christian philosopher* [at least in one aspect] *is the exact contradiction of this modern rationalism.*" *Staudemaier*, Frieburger Zeitschrift, l. c. p. 241. [Comp. *Baur*, Trinitätsl. ii. 274.]

[a] De Theol. Christ. ii. p. 1211 (ed. *Martène*): Hinc quidem facilus evangelica prædicatio a philosophis, quam a Judæis suscepta est, cum sibi eam maxime invenirent ad finem, nec fortasse in aliquo dissonam, nisi forte in his quæ ad incarnationis vel sacramentorum vel resurrectionis mysteria pertinent.* Si enim diligenter moralia evangelii præcepta consideremus, nihil ea aliud, quam reformationem legis naturæ inveniemus, quam secutos esse philosophos constat; cum lex magis figuralibus quam moralibus nitatur mandatis, et exteriori potius justitia quam interiori abundet; evangelium vero virtutes ac vitia diligenter examinat, et secundum animi intentionem omnia, sicut et philosophi, pensat. Unde, cum tanta... *evangelicæ ac philosophicæ doctrinæ concordia* pateat, nonnulli Platonicorum.....in tantam proruperunt blasphemiam, ut Dominum Jesum omnes suas sententias a Platone accepisse dicerent, quasi philosophus ipsam docuisset Sophiam.—None but he who obtains a knowledge of the divine by *active* research, attains unto *firm* belief.† After man has done his part, divine love assists his efforts, and grants to him that which he could not acquire by *his own* researches, etc. "*But Abelard was far from imagining that his philosophy could give a full knowledge of divine things which should leave no scope for desire after more.*" *Neander*, der heilige Bernhard, p. 117, ss. Abelard made a distinction between *credere*, *intelligere*, and *cognoscere*; through doubt we come to inquiry, through inquiry to truth (dubitando ad inquisitionem, inquirendo ad veritatem). Abelard uses still stronger language on this point in his Introductio, than in his more modified Theologia Christiana; see *Neander*, l. c. p. 127, note 4, (comp. *Böringer* ubi supra, 118, sq.)—*Alanus ab Insulis*, also considered faith as superior to *opinio*, but inferior to *scientia* (Art. 17, quoted by *Pez*, i. p. 482). Comp. the opinion of Clement of Alexandria, § 34, note 6.—The view of *St. Bernard* is in sharpest contrast with that of Abelard. The rationalism of Abelard seems to him to be in contradiction, not only with faith, but also with reason: Quid enim magis *contra* rationem, quam rationem ratione conari transcendere? Et quid magis contra fidem, quam credere nolle quicquid non posses ratione attingi?—On the other hand, *Abelard* (Ep.

* From this passage it appears, that as early as the time of Abelard a distinction was made between articuli puri et mixti. Comp. also what Thomas Aquinas said, note 4.

† Hence his motto: Qui credit cito, levis est corde. (Sir. 19, 4).

ad Helois.): Nolo sic esse philosophus ut recalcitrarem Paulo, non sic esse Aristoteles, ut secludar a Christo: non enim aliud nomen est sub cœlo, in quo oporteat me salvum fieri: comp. *Neander, Bernhard*, p. 147, *seq.*

[1] Prosl. c. 1:.....Desidero aliquatenus intelligere veritatem tuam, quam credit et amat cor meum. *Neque enim quæro intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam. Nam et hoc credo, quia, nisi credidero, non intelligam.* De Incarn. Verbi, c. 2: Nullus quippe Christianus debet disputare, quod catholica Ecclesia corde credit et ore confitetur, quomodo non sit: sed semper eamdem fidem indubitanter tenendo, amando et secundum illam vivendo humiliter, quantum potest quærere rationem, quomodo sit. Si potest intelligere, Deo gratias agat: si non potest, non immittat cornua ad ventilandum, sed submittat caput ad venerandum. Citius enim in se potest confidens humana sapientia impingendo cornua sibi evellere, quam innitendo petram hanc evellere.....Palam namque est, quia illi non habent fidei firmitatem, qui, quoniam quod credunt, intelligere non possunt, disputant contra ejusdem fidei a sanctis patribus confirmatam veritatem, velut si vespertiliones et noctuæ, non nisi in nocte cœlum videntes, de meridianis solis radiis disceptent contra aquilas, solem ipsum irreverberato visu intuentes. Prius ergo fide mundandum est cor.....prius ea quæ carnis sunt posponentes secundum spiritum vivamus, quam profunda fidei dijudicando discutiamus.....Quanto opulentius nutrimur in Sacra Scriptura, ex his, quæ per obedientiam pascunt, tanto subtilius provehimur ad ea, quæ per intellectum satiant.....*Nam qui non crediderit, non experietur, et qui expertus non fuerit, non intelliget.* Nam quantum rei auditum superat experientia, tantum vincit audientis cognitionem experientis scientia.....Nemo ergo se temere mergat in condensa difficillimarum quæstionum, nisi prius in soliditate fidei conquisita morum et sapientiæ gravitate, ne per multiplicia sophismatum diverticula in tanta levitate discurrens, aliqua tenaci illaqueetur falsitate. Comp. De Sacram. Altaris ii, 2; Christianæ fidei veritas quasi hoc speciali jure præminet, ut non ipsa per intellectum, sed per eam intellectus quærendus sit.....Qui ergo nihil credere vult, nisi ratione vel intellectu præcedente, hic rem confundit, et scire omnia volens, nihil credens, fidem, quæ in ipso est, videtur annullare.—Epp. Lib. ii. 41: Christianus per fidem debet ad intellectum proficere, non per intellectum ad fidem accedere, aut si intelligere non valet, a fide recedere. Sed cum ad intellectum valet pertingere, delectatur: cum vero nequit, quod capere non potest, veneratur.—Nevertheless he asserts, that the acquisition of knowledge is a duty imperative upon him who has the power of knowing. In his treatise entitled, Cur Deus Homo i. c. 2, he represents Boso speaking as follows (without contradicting him): Sicut rectus ordo exigit, ut profunda christianæ fidei credamus, priusquam ea præsumamus ratione discutere, *ita negligentia mihi videtur, si, postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus quod credimus intelligere.* Comp. ibid. c. 10, 25. Nor does Boso declare himself satisfied (respecting the doctrine of satisfaction), until he has seen the *reasonableness* of the reasons adduced; ii. 19 and 21. " *The scholastic divines did not think it an extravagant notion, that all the truths contained in the Old and New Testament might be proved by rational speculation; but it was always presupposed, that what is matter of faith rests on its own grounds, and needs no proof: thus whatever is added by reason, how-*

ever valuable in other respects, is nothing but an opus supererogationis in reference to all matters of faith." *Baur*, Versöhnungslehre, p. 185, note. Comp. *Möhlers* Schriften, i. p. 137, 38. *D. J. H. Goldhorn*, De summis Principiis Theol. Abælardeæ, Lips., 1856. *Hasse's* Anselm, 34. Anselm is followed on this point by *Albertus Magnus;* comp. the passages in Ritter, viii., 103 [and Christl. Phil. i. 634, sq.].

[4] "*Thom. Aqu.* Summ. Cath. Fid. contra Gentiles, l. i. c. 3, (quoted by *Münscher*, edit. by von Cölln, p. 100): Et in his, quæ de Deo confitemur, duplex veritatis modus. Quædam namque vera sunt de Deo, quæ omnem facultatem humanæ rationis excedunt, ut: Deum esse trinum et unum. Quædam, vero sunt ad quæ etiam ratio naturalis pertingere potest: sicut est Deum esse, Deum esse unum, et alia hujusmodi, quæ etiam philosophi demonstrative de Deo probaverunt, ducti naturalis lumine rationis.—But even these points must be confirmed by revelation, otherwise the knowledge of God would be the privilege of but a few (viz., of those who think and know): others whom levity prevented during the earlier period of their life from giving heed to these things, would not acquire a knowledge of them until it was too late. But even in the most favorable case there would be reason for apprehending, lest error should be mixed up with truth. [Cap. 5, he proves that—ea quæ ratione investigari non possunt, convenienter fide tenenda proponuntur.] The truths of revelation, however, though going beyond reason, do not contradict, it, etc. Comp. *Schröckh*, xxix. p. 342, ss. [Comp. on Aquinas, *Baur*, Dogmengesch. 241–3; he first made the attempt to give a more precise statement of the relation of reason to revelation: the latter is necessary, because man could not otherwise attain the end of his being. "The chief idea, on which the supernaturalism of Aquinas rests is—the *finis superexcedens*, viz., man (as Aquinas says, Summa Theol. 1, qu. ., art. 1) *ordinatur ad Deum, sicut ad quendam finem, qui comprehensionem rationis excedit. Finem oportet esse præcognitum hominibus, qui suas intentiones et actiones debent ordinare in finem.*" Comp. Summa c. Gentes, i. 1–8, and 4, 1.]

[5] These elements are: Prænuntiatio prophetica, Scripturarum concordia, auctoritas scribentium, diligentia recipientium, rationabilitas contentorum, irrationabilitas singulorum errorum, ecclesiæ stabilitas and miraculorum claritas; according to *Baur*, Lehrbuch, p. 174. On the relation of philosophy to theology, see *Ritter*, viii. 264, *sq*,

[6] The series is opened by *Bernard of Clairvaux*, De Consideratione, v. 3: Deus et qui cum eo sunt beati spiritus, tribus modis veluti viis totidem, nostra sunt consideratione vestigandi; opinione, fide, intellectu. Quorum intellectus rationi innititur, fides auctoritati; opinio sola verisimilitudine se tuetur. Habent illa duo certam veritatem, sed fides clausam et involutam, intelligentia nudam et manifestam; ceterum opinio, certi nihil habens, verum per verisimilia quærit potius, quam apprehendit.... Verus intellectus certam habet non modo veritatem, sed notitiam veritatis.... Fides est voluntaria quædam et certa prælibatio necdum prolatæ veritatis. Intellectus est rei cujuscunque invisibilis certa et manifesta notitia. Opinio est quasi pro vero habere aliquid, quod falsum esse nescias. Ergo fides ambiguum non habet, aut si habet, fides non est, sed opinio. Quid igitur distat ab intellectu?

Nempe quod etsi non habet incertum non magis quam intellectus, habet tamen involucrum, quod non intellectus. Denique quod non intellexisti, non est de eo, quod ultra quæras; aut si est, non intellexisti. *Nil autem malumus scire, quam quæ fide jam scimus.* Nil supererit ad beatitudinem, cum, quæ jam certa sunt nobis fide, erunt æqua et nuda. He speaks in the same way of the knowledge of divine things (v. 13): *Non ea disputatio comprehendit, sed sanctitas.*

The same view is also espoused by *Hugo of St. Victor*, and *Richard of St. Victor*. Comp. Hugo de Sacramentis Fidei l. i. p. iii. c. 30 (de cognitione divinitatis) quoted by *Liebner*, p. 173, ss. 186: Alia enim sunt *ex ratione*, alia *secundum rationem*, alia *supra rationem*, et præter hæc quæ sunt *contra rationem*. Ex ratione sunt necessaria, secundum rationem sunt probabilia, supra rationem mirabilia, contra rationem incredibilia. Et duo quidem extrema omnino *fidem* non capiunt. Quæ enim sunt ex ratione, omnino nota sunt et *credi* non possunt, quoniam *sciuntur*. Quæ vero contra rationem sunt, nulla similiter ratione credi possunt, quoniam non suscipiunt ullam rationem, nec acquiescit his ratio aliqua. Ergo quæ secundum rationem sunt et quæ sunt supra rationem, tantummodo suscipiunt fidem. Et in primo quidem genere fides ratione adjuvatur et ratio fide perficitur, quoniam secundum rationem sunt, quæ creduntur. Quorum veritatem si ratio non comprehendit, fidei tamen illorum non contradicit. In iis, quæ supra rationem sunt, non adjuvatur fides ratione ulla, quoniam non capit ea ratio, quæ fides credit, et tamen est aliquid, quo ratio admonetur venerari fidem, quam non comprehendit. Quæ dicta sunt ergo secundum rationem, probabilia fuerunt rationi et sponte acquievit eis. Quæ vero supra rationem fuerunt, ex divina revelatione prodita sunt, et non operata est in eis ratio, sed castigata tamen, ne ad illa contenderet.—The theory of *Richard of St. Victor* is somewhat more complicated. According to him there were six kinds of contemplation. We know, 1, by the imagination (the sensible impressions made by creation); 2, by reason (perception of law and order in creation); 3, *in* reason according to imagination (symbolical knowledge of nature, as a mirror of the spiritual); 4, *in* reason and according to reason (the internal referred to the internal, without a sensible image—intellectual intuition?); 5, *above* and not *against* reason (revealed truth within the sphere of reason—rational knowledge carried to a higher power by revelation); 6, *above* and (apparently) *against* reason (particularly the mystery of the Trinity). Comp. Engelhardt, l. c. p. 60, ss.—*John of Salisbury*, in strict contrast taught that the endeavors of man after knowledge must be aided by God himself, Policrat. Lib. vii. c. 14 (Bibl. Max. T. xxiii. p. 352): Quisquis ergo viam philosophandi ingreditur, ad ostium gratiæ ejus humiliter pulset, in cujus manu liber omnium sciendorum est, quem solus aperit agnus, qui occisus est, ut ad viam sapientiæ et veræ felicitatis servum reduceret aberrantem. Frustra quis sibi de capacitate ingenii, de memoriæ tenacitate, de assiduitate studii, de linguæ volubilitate blanditur.....Est autem humilitati conjuncta simplicitas, qua discentium intelligentia plurimum adjuvatur. —The preacher *Berthold* also warned before the pride of speculation (in *Kling*, Grimm's Rec. p. 206): Swer faste in die sunnen sihet, in den brehenden glaft, der wird von ougen sô boese, daz er es niemer mêr gesiht.

Żeglicher wise alsô stêt ez umbe den glouben; wer ze faste in den heiligen cristenglouben sihet, alsô daz in vil gwundert *und ze tiefe darinne rumpelt mit gedenken.*—*Savonarola* appeals to the internal testimony, Triumph. Crucis proœm. quoted by *Rudelbach*. p. 376: Licet fides ex causis principiisque naturalibus demonstrari non possit, ex manifestis tamen effectibus validissi mas rationes adducemus, quas nemo sanæ mentis inficiari poteret.—So, too, Picas of Mirandula strikingly says: Philosophia veritatem quærit, theologia invenit, religio possidet (Ep. ad Manut. Opera ed. Basel, p. 243).

[1] Comp. § 161, note 5.

[On the views of *William of Paris*, *Roger Bacon*, and *Raymund Lulli*, as to the relation of reason and faith, see *Neander*, Hist. Dogmas, pp. 556–8.]

§ 159.

SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE.—SCRIPTURE AND TRADITION.

[*H. J. Holtzmann*, Kanon und Tradition, Ludwigsburg, 1859.]

Though the Bible was still theoretically regarded as the highest authority in all religious matters,[1] yet it was gradually overshadowed by tradition, which was deemed of equal importance with Scripture.[2] Its doctrines were more and more corrupted and mixed up with the arbitrary traditions of men. Besides the tradition of the church, the book of nature was also held in reverence along with the written Word of God.[3] Some of the mystical sects looked upon other writings beside the Bible as coming from heaven,[4] and even went so far as to put the imaginations of the natural man on an equality with the Word of God.[5] On the other hand, the principle of the authority of Scripture, in opposition to a corrupt tradition, made increased progress in the century immediately preceding the Reformation.[6]

[1] Joh. Dam. de fide Orth. i. 1: Πάντα τοίνυν τὰ παραδεδομένα ἡμῖν διά τε νόμου καὶ προφητῶν καὶ ἀποστόλων καὶ εὐαγγελιστῶν δεχόμεθα καὶ γινώσκομεν καὶ σέβομεν, οὐδὲν περαιτέρω τούτων ἐπιζητοῦντες..... Ταῦτα ἡμεῖς στέρξωμεν καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς μείνωμεν, μὴ μεταίροντες ὅρια αἰώνια, μηδὲ ὑπερβαίνοντες τὴν θείαν παράδοσιν. Comp. iv. 17.—*Joh. Scot. Erig.* De Div. Nat. i. c. 66, p. 37: Sanctæ siquidem Scripturæ in omnibus sequenda est auctoritas, quum in ea veluti quibusdam suis secretis sedibus veritas; (he makes, however, the following limitation): non tamen ita credendum est, ut ipsa semper propriis verborum seu nominum signis fruatur, divinam nobis naturam insinuans; sed quibusdam similitudinibus variisque translatorum verborum seu nominum modis utitur, infirmitati nostræ condescendens nostrosque adhuc rudes infantilesque sensus simplici doctrina erigens. Nor can Scripture contradict reason, c. 68, p. 38: Nulla itaque auctoritas te terreat

ab his, quæ rectæ contemplationis rationabilis suasio edocet. Vera enim auctoritas rectæ rationi non obsistit, neque recta ratio veræ auctoritati. Ambo siquidem ex uno fonte, divina videlicet sapientia, manere dubium non est. Comp. c. 69, p. 39, and *Böhringer*, ubi supra, p. 134, *seq.*—*John of Salisbury*, on the contrary, used much more unqualified language, Policrat. l. c. (§ 158, note 5): Serviendum est ergo scripturis, non dominandum; nisi forte quis se ipsum dignum credat, ut angelis debeat dominari.

[*Baur*, Dogmengesch. 244, says that Abelard and Aquinas both laid down principles, which logically involved the Protestant view of the Bible as the rule of faith. Abelard (Sic et Non., p. 14, of Henke's edition), ascribes unconditional authority only to the Scriptures of the Old and New Test. Aquinas (Summa Theol. P. I. qu. 1. Art. 8) defines theology as a science, in which the argument is peculiarly derived from authority; and recognizes only the canonical Scriptures as an authority, giving more than probabilities.]

[1] *Joh. Damascenus* De Fide Orth. [iv. 12: Αὐτὸν (Χριστὸν) οὖν ἐκδεχόμενοι ἐπὶ ἀνατολὰς προσκυνοῦμεν· ἄγραφος δε ἐστιν ἡ παράδοσις αὕτη τῶν Αποστόλων· πολλὰ γὰρ ἀγράφως ἡνῖν παρέδοσαν] Cap. 16: Ὅτι δὲ καὶ πλεῖστα οἱ ἀπόστολοι ἀγράφως παραδεδώκασι, γράφει Παῦλος ὁ τῶν ἐθνῶν ἀπόστολος (2 Thess. ii. 15, 1 Cor. xi. 2). De Imaginibus Orat. i. 23 (Opp. i. p. 318): Οὐ μόνον γράμμασι τὴν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν θεσμοθεσίαν παρέδωκαν (οἱ πατέρες), ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγράφοις τισὶ παραδόσεσι.....Πόθεν τὸ τρὶς βαπτίζειν; πόθεν τὸ κατ' ἀνατολὰς εὔχεσθαι; πόθεν ἡ τῶν μυστηρίων παράδοσις, κ. τ. λ.· Comp. Orat. ii. 16, p. 338.—*John Scotus Erigena*, by drawing a parallel between Scripture and reason, seems to subordinate tradition to both of them (and especially to reason) i. c. 71, p. 39: Omnis autem auctoritas, quæ vera ratione non approbatur, infirma videtur esse. Vera autem ratio, quum virtutibus suis rata atque immutabilis munitur, nullius auctoritatis adstipulatione roborari indiget. Nil enim aliud videtur mihi esse vera auctoritas, nisi rationis virtute cooperta veritas et a *sacris patribus* ad posteritatis utilitatem litteris commendata.....Ideoque *prius* ratione utendum est.....ac deinde auctoritate.....Ibid. iv. 9: Non sanctorum patrum sententiæ, præsertim si plurimis notæ sunt, introducendæ sunt, nisi ubi summa necessitas roborandæ ratiocinationis exegerit propter eos, qui cum sint rationis inscii, plus auctoritati quam rationi succumbunt.—Erigena, however, was almost alone in these views. Most writers adopted the definitions propounded by Augustine and Vincentius Lerinensis during the preceding period (comp. § 122). Thus *Alcuin* admonished to adhere to the doctrine generally received, and to invent no new names, etc. (in Ep. ad Felic. Opp. i. p. 783, comp. p. 791, ss.). Porro nos intra terminos apostolicæ doctrinæ et sanctæ *romanæ* ecclesiæ firmiter stamus: illorum probatissimam sequentes auctoritatem, et sanctissimis inhærentes doctrinis, nihil novi inferentes, nullaque recipientes, nisi quæ in illorum catholicis inveniuntur scriptis.—Though *Abelard*, by his work, *Sic et Non*, had undermined the authority of the earlier fathers, and consequently that of tradition, yet the scholastics kept on, not only appealing to the older tradition, but also justifying unbiblical doctrines, by saying that the church had the constant right to make new dogmas, as that of transubstantiation and the im-

maculate conception of Mary. Even Gerson (in relation to the latter dogma) appealed to this progressive formation of doctrines by the church. —The authority of Aristotle was added in later times to that of the church (though not directly authorized by the church, yet in fact), till the authority of Scripture was again prominently brought forward, as the highest, if not the only true authority in the age immediately preceding the Reformation (thus by *Wycliffe*, *Nicolas de Clemangis*, *Wessel*, etc.). [On *Clemangis*, see Presb. Qu. Rev., Dec., 1856. On *Gerson* and *Nicolaus de Cusa*, see Neander, Hist. Dogmas. 606–7. On *Clemangis* and *Gerson*, see *Gieseler*: Dogmengeschichte, p. 481 : see the latter, also, on the papal infallibility, in connection with the interpretation of Scripture, pp. 483, 484.]

[3] *John Scotus Erigena* maintains that every creature is a theophany of God, De Div. Nat. iii. 19.—According to the Theol. Naturalis of *Raymund of Sabunde*, God has granted to men *two* books, viz., the book of nature, and the book of revelation; they neither can, nor must, contradict each other; *the latter, however, is not accessible to all, but only to the priests.* All knowledge must commence with the former, which is equally within the reach of the laity; every creature is a letter written by God himself. But the highest knowledge is the love of God, the only thing of his own which man can offer to the Deity. Comp. *Hase*, Church History, (New York transl.) § 280, p. 325. *Tennemann*, viii. p. 964, ss. *Matzke*, die Nat. Theol. des Raimund de Sabunde, p. 30, sq.—In a similar manner *St. Bernard* asserted, that what he was able to accomplish in the way of interpreting Scripture, and what he understood of divine things, he acquired by contemplation and prayer, especially in forests and fields, and that he had no other teacher than beeches and oaks; see *Neander*, der heilige Bernhard, p. 6. Comp. *Bruder Berthold's* Predigten, edited by Kling, p. 113, where the same idea of two books (heaven and earth) occurs.*

[4] Thus the Spirituales in particular attached great importance to the Evangelium Æternum (prophecies of *Joachim*, abbot of Flore in Calabria, who died A. D. 1202). On the said work comp. *Engelhardt*, Kirchenhistorische Abhandlungen, Erl. 1832, No. 1. Extracts from it are given by *d'Argentré*, Coll. Judiciorum de Novis Error. Paris, 1728, T. i. p. 163, ss. [Comp. Gieseler, ii. 233, sq.]

[5] Some went so far as to make the most crazy assertions; thus *David of Dinanto* maintained, that God had made communications by Ovid no less than by Augustine [or, by the Bible!] *Engelhardt*, l. c. p. 255. The Beguines taught, quod homo magis tenetur sequi instinctum interiorem, quam veritatem evangelii, quod quotidie prædicatur; see the epistle of *John*, bishop of Strasburg, in *Mosheim*, l. c. p. 258. Comp. § 161.

[6] Thus *Wycliffe* says (Trial. iv., c. 7, p. 199): If there were a hundred popes, and all the monks were to be transformed into cardinals, we ought not to ascribe to their opinions in matters of faith any other value, than

* It is worthy of observation, in this dualism of Scripture and tradition, that one element, viz., the Scripture, is much more firmly established, while tradition undergoes more or less frequent changes, and sometimes has something else as a substitute, as, in the above case, nature; John Scotus Erigena introduced reason in the room of tradition, and the mystics did the same with the internal revelation.

they have as founded on the Scriptures. Comp. *Schröckh*, xxxiv. 504. On the principle of Hus about Scripture, see *Neander*, Züge aus dem Leben des heil. Joh. Hus, in his Kleine Gelegenheitsschriften, 217, *seq.* Thus he demanded that the council should convict him of error from the Scripture.* On the whole Biblical tendency of the period preceding the Reformation, see *Ullmann's* Reformatorem vor d. Reform. ii. 430. On *Wessel's* views of the authority of Scripture, ibid.

§ 160.

THE CANON OF THE BIBLE AND BIBLICAL CRITICISM.

The Canon had been compiled in the preceding period; and so that the Latin church generally regarded the books commonly called the Apocrypha of the Old Testament as a part of it.[1] The *Paulicians* in the East rejected (like the Gnostics) the Old Test. and the writings of Peter.[2] But as late as the age of the Carlovingians doubts were entertained, even within the pale of the catholic church itself, respecting the genuineness of various books of the Old Testament.[3]

[1] Comp. the Canon of *Isidore of Seville*, De Eccles. Off. i. c. 12, quoted by *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln. ii. p. 106, and the decisions of synods on this point. See also *John Damasc.* iv. 17 [he adopts the canon of the council of Laodicea, and mentions some apocryphal books (ἡ Πανάρετος, τουτέστιν ἡ Σοφία τοῦ Σαλαμῶντος, καὶ ἡ σοφία τοῦ Ἰησοῦ), respecting which he remarks: ἐνάρετοι μὲν καὶ παλαὶ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀριθμοῦνται, οὐδε ἔκειντο ἐν τῇ κιβωτῷ]. Concerning the apocryphal writings some western theologians, such as *Odo of Clugny*, *Hugo of St. Victor*, *John of Salisbury*, *Hugo of St. Caro*, and others, appealed to Jerome, but the Canon of Augustine was more generally adopted. See *Münscher*, l. c. p. 107, and *Liebner*, Hugo von St. Victor, p. 129. The Greek church allowed that the Apocrypha was useful and edifying, but definitely distinguished these from the canonical books: *John of Damasc.* De Fide Orthod. iv. c. 18.

[2] According to *Petrus Siculus*, quoted by *Wettstein*, Nov. Test. ii. p. 681, *de Wette*, Einleitung ins Neue Test. p. 281.

[3] "*The monks of the monastery of St. Gallen ventured to point out what they thought unworthy of God in the Canon of the Sacred Scriptures. Concerning the books of Chronicles and Esther, their opinion was:* in eis littera non pro auctoritate, tantum pro memoria tenetur. *They judged in like manner of the book of Judith, and of the Maccabees.*" *Johannes von Müller*, Geschichte der schweizerischen Eidgenossen. Book i. ch. 12, p. 287: after *Notker*, De Interpretat. S.S. ad Salomonem in *Pez*, Thes. Anecd. T. i. (From the stand-point of fitness for use, Ulfilas, it is well known, had omitted the Book of Kings, as being too warlike for his Goths.)

* Accordingly *Heefert* (from the Roman Catholic point of view) calls the principle held by Hus about Scripture, the Alpha and Omega of his error!

§ 161.

INSPIRATION.

Generally speaking, the views hitherto entertained respecting inspiration continued to prevail in the church,[1] so that the assertion of *Agobard, Archbishop of Lyons*, that the sacred penmen had not always adhered to the rules of grammar, called forth decided opposition on the part of *Fredegis, abbot of Tours*, against which, however, Agobard defended himself with sound mother wit.[2] *Euthymius Zigabenus* met with less opposition on the part of the Greek church, though he did not hesitate to speak openly about the discrepancies between the different evangelists.[3] The scholastic divines endeavored to define more precisely the idea of inspiration,[4] while the mystics confounded more or less the idea of the inspiration of Holy Writ with that of divine illumination in general.[5] On the whole, it is undoubtedly true, that the present period with its imaginative tendencies continued to believe in the power of Divine inspiration (even beyond the Canon of the Bible), and was far from restricting for all times the fullness of the manifestations of the divine Spirit within the limits of a single book, however strictly its divine origin might be maintained.[6]

[1] Johannes Damascenus De Fide Orth. iv. c. 17 (Opp. i. p. 282): Διὰ πνεύματος τοίνυν ἁγίου ὅ τε νόμος καὶ οἱ προφῆται, εὐαγγελισται καὶ ἀπόστολοι καὶ ποιμένες ἐλάλησαν καὶ διδάσκαλοι. Πᾶσα τοίνυν γραφὴ θεόπνευστος πάντος καὶ ὠφέλιμος κ. τ. λ. (2 Tim. iii. 16).

[2] Agobard ad Fredegisium Abbatem (Opp. Par. p. 157, ss.) Abbot *Fredegis* would extend infallibility even to translators and commentators. Concerning the sacred penmen themselves, Fredegis asserted: Turpe est credere Spir. Sanctum, qui omnium gentium linguas mentibus Apostolorum infudit, *rusticitatem* potius per eos, quam *nobilitatem* uniuscujusque linguæ locutum esse; hence he further maintained: Ut non solum sensum prædicationis et modos vel argumenta dictionum Spir. S. eis inspiraverit, sed etiam ipsa corporalia verba extrinsecus in ora illorum ipse formaverit. *Agobard* replied as follows: Quod si ita sentitis, quanta absurditas sequetur, quis dinumerare poterit?.....Restat ergo, ut, sicut ministerio angelico vox articulata formata est in ore asinæ, ita dicatis formari in ore Prophetarum, et tunc talis etiam absurditas sequetur, ut, si tali modo verba et voces verborum acceperunt, sensum ignorarent; sed absit *talia deliramenta cogitare*. He quotes several instances from Scripture relative to differences in style, and of confessions on the part of writers themselves, *e. g.*, Exod. iv. and 1 Cor. i.—Laus divinæ sapientiæ (he continues) in sacris mysteriis et in doctrina spiritus invenitur, non in inventionibus verborum.....Vos sic laudatis, ut laude vestra magis minoretur, quam augeatur (divina majestas), quoniam in his, quæ extrinsecus sunt, dicitis nobilitatem linguarum ministrasse Apostolis Spiritum Sanctum,

ut confuse et indifferenter cum Apostolis omnes interpretes et quoscunque expositores laudetis et defendatis. "*Near as Agobard was to drawing a precise distinction between the divine and that which is specifically human in the idea of inspiration*," yet he was far from "*fully developing it.*" *Neander*, Church History, iii. p. 388. (Thus Agobard supposed, p. 168, that the sacred penmen *could* have written better if they *would* have done so, but that they *accommodated* themselves to human infirmities). On the other hand, it can not be inferred from the assertion of Fredegis, that he would have reason entirely subject to authority. He thought that reason was confirmed and protected by the authority of the Bible. Comp. *Ritter*, vii. p. 189, and the passage there cited, De Nihilo, p. 403.

[3] Comment. in Evang. Matth. c. xii. 8 (T. i. p. 465, ed. Matthiæ). Comp. *Schröckh*, Kirchengesch. xxviii. p. 310. That one evangelist sometimes relates what is omitted by another, etc., he simply attributes to the circumstance that they did not exactly recollect all the events of the life of Christ, because it was not till a considerable space of time had elapsed that they composed their narratives.

[4] "*However much the scholastic divines have done in the development of the other fundamental ideas which determine the sphere of revelation, and however much we owe to them, especially as regards precise definition of the objective idea of a miracle, yet their definitions concerning this point (the doctrine of inspiration) are very scanty. This point was assumed as an ἀρχὴ πρώτη which needed no further proof, inasmuch as the whole Christian church moved in this element.*" *Rudelbach*, die Lehre von der Inspiration der heiligen Schrift (comp. § 32), p. 48, 49. We find, however, more precise definitions in the writings of the principal scholastic divines, *Thomas Aquinas*, and *Duns Scotus*.* The former treats of the subject in question in his Summa Theolog. Pars. i. qu. 1, art. 9, 10; the latter in his Prol. Sententt. qu. 2, quoted by *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, l. c. p. 103–5; *Gieseler*, p. 480.

[5] On this point, too, the opinions were different. The more considerate mystics, such as the disciples of the school of St. Victor, adhered closely to the Sacred Scriptures, and ascribed inspiration to them in a special sense. Comp. *Liebner*, Hugo von St. Victor, p. 128, ss. (where little is said respecting the idea of inspiration itself, but the inspiration of the Scripture is everywhere presupposed). Hugo supposed that in some instances the sacred penman had drawn from their own resources, *e. g.*, the author of Ecclesiastes, see *Liebner* p. 160; but in other places he distinguished between the divine and that which is peculiarly human. Thus he observed concerning Obadiah, that he combined profound ideas with a plain style, and was sparing in words, but rich in thoughts, ibid. p. 163.—*Savonarola*, whose opinions were allied to those of the mystics, also believed that the Sacred Scriptures are, strictly speaking, inspired by God; but he proceeded on the principle (as Clement of Alexandria and Chrysostom had done before him, comp.

* Similar definitions were set forth concerning the prophets of the Old Test. by the rabbins of the middle ages, Moses Maimonides and others; see *Rudelbach*, l. c. p. 50, ss. And how much attention some of the schoolmen must have given to the subject in question, may be seen from the circumstance that *Anselm* spent *whole nights* in meditating on it; see *Möhler*, l. c. p. 52.

§ 32, note 8, § 119, note 4), that the gospels were originally written not so much on tables of stone, or sheets of paper, as upon hearts of flesh by means of the finger and power of the Holy Ghost. He admitted at the same time the limitation, that God did not use the sacred writers as instruments which have no will of their own, but suffered women to talk as women, and shepherds as shepherds, etc.; see *Rudelbach*, Savonarola, p. 335, 36. Savonarola, however, did not limit inspiration to the Sacred Scriptures, inasmuch as it is well known that he ascribed prophetic gifts to *himself*, though without making any boast of them. Concerning this prophetic gift, as well as that claimed by *Joachim* and *Brigitta*, see Rudelbach, l. c. p. 297, ss.; the views of Savonarola himself on this subject are given ibid. p. 303 (they are taken from the Compendium Revelationum).—The fanatic mystics, on the contrary, maintained, in opposition to Scripture, that those filled with the Holy Spirit are above the law (see *Mosheim*, de Beguinis, p. 216); or openly taught: multa in Evangeliis esse poëtica quæ non sunt vera, sicut est illud: Venite, benedicti, etc. Item, quod magis homines debent credere humanis conceptibus, qui procedunt ex corde, quam doctrinæ evangelicæ. Item, aliquos ex eis posse meliores libros reparare *omnibus* libris catholicæ fidei, etc. (quoted by *Mosheim*, l. c. p. 258).—Comp. § 159.

[6] *Thomas Aquinas* says, P. I. Qu. xii. art. 13 (the passage refers, properly speaking, to the visions recorded in Scripture, but admits of a more general application): Lumen naturale intellectus confortatur per infusionem luminis gratuiti et interdum etiam phantasmata in imaginatione hominis formantur divinitus, magis exprimentia res divinas, quam ea, quæ naturaliter a sensibilibus accipimus. "*Such an extraordinary and direct inspiration was formerly ascribed to Thomas, Scotus, and other theologians, when the accounts of frequent appearances and visits on the part of God, as well as other blessed and holy beings, were generally believed;*" *Semler*, Introduction to Baumgarten, ii. p. 63.—It was held by the mystics, that higher divine inspiration was still vouchsafed to the pious. *Gerson*, Consid. X.: Intelligentia simplex est vis animæ cognitiva, *suscipiens immediate a Deo* naturalem quandam lucem, in qua et per quam principia prima cognoscuntur esse vera et certissima terminis apprehensis (quoted by *Liebner*, Hugo von St. Victor, p. 340, where further details are given respecting the mystical doctrine of revelation as held by Hugo and Richard of St. Victor). The reader may compare with this opinion the views of *Tauler* (Predigten, i. p. 124), who made a distinction between *active* and *passive* reason. The latter must fructify the former; but it receives its own revelations from God. In accordance with earlier notions, inspiration was extended even to worldly subjects, *e. g.*, to poetry. Thus it is said, in the biography of St. Elizabeth, concerning the singers on the Wartburg: "they contended against each other with songs, and enriched their songs with pretty mysteries which they borrowed from Holy Writ, without being very learned: *for God had revealed it to them;*" see *Koberstein*, über das Gedicht vom Wartburgkriege. Naumburg, 1823, 4. Append. p. 65. Comp. also Konrad von Würzburg's Trojanerkrieg, in *Wackernagels* Lesebuch, i. col. 706.

§ 162.

INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE—THE READING OF THE BIBLE.

[*Davidson*, Sacred Hermeneutics, p. 163–192.]

A sound interpretation, resting on a grammatico-historical basis, was scarcely known, in consequence of the neglect of philological studies, and it was not until the close of this period that light began to dawn. Scripture was interpreted, either in close accordance with the dicta of ecclesiastical tradition; or in an arbitrary and allegorical manner, to uphold a subtile scholasticism, or a refined mysticism.[1] *John Scotus Erigena* taught an infinite sense of Scripture,[2] others, with Origen, a threefold, or, with Augustine, a fourfold sense of Scripture, while some even went so far as to speak of a sevenfold or eightfold sense.[3] Practical rules of interpretation, however, were not altogether overlooked.[4] The rulers of the church endeavored (from fear of heresy) to restrict the perusal of the Bible on the part of the people,[5] while private individuals were anxious to recommend it.[6] Sound scriptural views and biblical interpretation are found in the writings of *John Wessel*, "*the characteristic feature of whose theology is a biblical tendency.*"

[1] See *Liebner*, Hugo of St. Victor, p. 132, 133: "*They* [the commentators of the present period] *either remained satisfied with collecting the interpretations of the Fathers according to the popular notion of a threefold sense of Scripture; or they pursued an independent course of exegesis, so as to dispense with all investigations of a philosophical and antiquarian character, further developing the said notion of a threefold sense, and indulging freely in those speculations to which a right or wrong apprehension of the Latin version of the Sacred Scriptures would accidentally give rise. The former method was almost exclusively adopted till the eleventh century. But it being found to be unsatisfactory, when from the middle of that century a new spiritual life began to manifest itself, and both mysticism and scholasticism were flourishing, the other method was resorted to. This new kind of mystico-dialectic exegesis.....seems to have been principally developed, though not first introduced, and brought into general use by Rupert of Duytz (he died* A. D. 1135). *A wide and fertile field was thus opened for mystical and subtile investigations. Both the mystics and scholastics, though each in their own way, now brought all their contemplations and speculations into Scripture, and carried this often so far as to leave scarcely any traces of the simple meaning of holy writ.*"

[2] De Div. Nat. iii. 24, p. 132, [134]: Infinitus conditor Sacræ Scripturæ in mentibus prophetarum, Spiritus Sanctus, infinitos in ea constituit intellectus, ideoque nullius expositoris sensus sensum alterius aufert, dummodo sanæ fidei catholicæque professioni conveniat, quod quisque dicat, sive aliunde

accipiens, sive a se ipso illuminatus, tamen a Deo inveniens. Comp. iii. 26, iv. 5, p. 164. He compares the Sacred Scriptures to a peacock's feather, the smallest particle of which glitters in various colors. Comp. *Ritter*, vii. p. 213. How anxious he was to penetrate the hidden meaning of Scripture, may be seen from the following passage, v. 37, p. 307: O Domine Jesu, nullum aliud præmium, nullam aliam beatitudinem, nullum aliud gaudium a te postulo, nisi ut ad purum absque ullo errore fallacis theoriæ verba tua, quæ per tuum Sanctum Spiritum inspirata sunt, intelligam.

[3] Thus *Paschasius Radbert* taught a threefold sense of Scripture, viz., 1. The literal (historical) sense; 2. the spiritual and mystical (that which refers to the church); and, 3. The moral (relative to the soul of every individual Christian). *Rabanus Maurus* spoke of a fourfold sense: 1. History; 2. Allegory; 3. Tropology; 4. Anagogy. [*Davidson*, l. c. p. 165, 66.] *Hugo of St. Victor* (see *Liebner*, l. c. p. 133, ss.) and *Savonarola* (see *Rudelbach*, p. 342), did the same. [*Davidson*, l. c. p. 173: History relates what is done; allegory teaches what is to be understood; anagogy what is to be sought; tropology what is to be done.] *Angelom*, a monk at Luxeuil held to a sevenfold sense: 1. The historical; 2. The allegorical; 3. The intermediate sense which lies between the two preceding ones (!); 4. The tropical (that referring to the Trinity); 5. The parabolical: 6. That sense which has regard to the two natures of Christ; and, 7. The moral: see *Pez*, Thesaurus, Tom. i. and *Schmid*, Mysticismus des Mittelalters, p. 76. Concerning the eightfold sense, see *Marrier* on Odonis Cluniacensis Moralia in Iobum (Bibl. Max. Patr. T. xvii. p. 315): 1. Sensus literalis vel historicus; 2. Allegoricus vel parabolicus; 3. Tropologicus vel etymologicus; 4. Anagogicus vel analogicus; 5. Typicus vel exemplaris; 6. Anaphoricus vel proportionalis; 7. Mysticus vel apocalypticus; 8. Boarcademicus vel primordialis (*i. e.*, quo ipsa principia rerum comparantur cum beatitudine æterna et tota dispensatione salutis, veluti loquendo de regno Dei, quod omnia sint ad Deum ipsum, unde manarunt, reditura). The threefold sense of Scripture was itself mystically interpreted, *e. g.*, by *St. Bernard* (Sermo 92, De diversis). The bridegroom conducts the bride, 1. Into the garden: the historical sense; 2. Into the different cellars for spices, fruit, and wine: the moral sense; 3. Into the cubiculum: the mystical sense. And *Hildebert of Mans* compared the fourfold sense of Scripture to the four legs of the table of the Lord (Sermo ii. in Fest. Assumtionis Mariæ). See *Lentz*, Geschichte der Homiletik, i. p. 275.

[4] Thus *Hugo of St. Victor* cautioned against indulging in allegorical interpretation, and asserted the equally great importance of literal interpretation; Prænott. c. 5, quoted by *Liebner*, p. 142. [Cum igitur mystica intelligentia nonnisi ex his, quæ primo loco litera proponit, colligatur: minor qua fronte quidam allegoriarum se doctores jactitent, qui ipsam adhuc primam literæ significationem ignorant. Nos, inquiunt, scripturam legimus sed non legimus literam. Non curamus de litera, sed allegoriam docemus. Quomodo ergo scripturam legitis, et literam non legitis? *Si enim litera tollitur, scriptura quid est?*"—"Noli itaque de intelligentia scripturarum gloriari, quamdiu literam ignoras."—"Noli igitur in verbo dei despicere humilitatem, quia per humilitatem illuminaris ad divinitatem. Quasi lutum tibi videtur totum

hoc; et ideo fortasse pedibus conculcas. Sed audi: Into isto cœci oculi ad videndum illuminantur."] But his own expositions are sometimes fanciful and trifling, as may be seen from the example given by *Liebner*, p. 153. [Opp. T. i. fol. 161, col. 4, ad Obadiah, vers. 18: In the house of Jacob the fire of human repentance burns, in the house of Joseph the flame of wisdom shines, in the house of Esau all is full of the stubble of malice. But conscience (by which he means Jacob) consumes the stubble of vice, destroys the hay of crime, burns to ashes the wood of sin, and now the wholesome fire of repentance is burning which expels the malice of Esau, and destroys the pernicious cares of the world. After this the flame of heavenly love is kindled in the soul, the sun of righteousness shines into it, it turns to its bridegroom in the uninterrupted desire of love, and fixes the spiritual eyes of the purest heart upon his beauty; it (the soul) is animated (*lit.* kindled) by the increase of virtues, the conflict of heavenly affections, the longing after heavenly embraces, the hope of coming into contact with the divine, the sweet smell of kisses, and the thirst caused by transcendent desires, and the flame of divine wisdom (Joseph) shines in it. But this state produces the fruits of innocence, the jewels of grace, and the flowers of glorious works by which the inordinate will, viz., Esau, is consumed, and the temptations of vanity are resisted.] *Thomas Aquinas* laid down the following principle (Summa, P. i. Qu. 102, art. 1): In omnibus, quæ S. Scriptura tradit, pro fundamento tenenda veritas historica et desuper spirituales expositiones fabricandæ.—According to *Savonarola* the first condition of a productive system of interpretation is to be filled with the same spirit in which the sacred books are written, *i. e.*, the spirit of faith, etc. See *Rudelbach*, p. 339, ss.

[5] This restriction was first imposed in the Greek church, in the 9th century, in the conflict with the Paulicians: comp. *Petri Siculi* (A. D. 870), Historia Manschæorum, and *Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. p. 484. To this came afterwards in the West the prohibition of Pope Innocent III. (A. D. 1199), of the Concil. Tolosanum (A. D. 1229), Canon the 14th: Prohibemus etiam ne libros Veteris Test. aut Novi laici permittantur habere: nisi forte Psalterium, vel Breviarium pro divinis officiis, aut horas B. Mariæ aliquis ex devotione habere velit. Sed ne præmissos libros habeant in vulgari translatos, auctissime inhibemus. Conc. Tarragonense (A. D. 1234), Can. 2: Item statuimus ne aliquis libros Veteris vel Novi Test. in Romania habeat. Et si aliquis habeat, infra octo dies post publicationem hujusmodi constitutionis a tempore sententiæ tradat eos loci Episcopo *comburendos:* quod nisi fecerit, sive clericus fuerit, sive laicus, tanquam suspectus de hæresi, quousque se pergaverit, habeatur. Then came the prohibitions of the council of Béziers, 1223 and 1246 (against the Waldenses), and that of Oxford (1408, against Wycliffe's version of the Bible). Comp. *Gottfr. Hegelmaier*, Geschichte das Bibelverbots, Ulm., 1783. [*Gieseler*, Church Hist., ii. 578.] See also the works of Ussher, Wharton, and Onymus, which are referred to by *Münscher* von Cölln, ii. 109.

[6] Thus *John Damascenus*, iv. 17, recommended the perusal of the Sacred Scripture, though in a rather fanciful manner. He called it *τὸν κάλλιστον παράδεισον, τὸν εὐώδη, τὸν γλυκύτατον, τὸν ὡραιότατον, τὸν παν-*

τοίοις τῶν νοερῶν θεοφόρων ὀρνέων κελαδήμασι περίηχοῦντα ἡμῶν τὰ ὦτα κ. τ. λ.—*Anselm* also strongly recommended the perusal of the Bible in his Tractacus Asceticus, quoted by *Möhler*, l. c. p. 62. *Bonaventura* (Principium in libros sacros) did the same. Comp. *Lentz*, Geschichte der Homiletik, i. p. 290. Concerning the Biblia Pauperum of *Bonaventura*, see ibid. l. c. Respecting the effects produced by the perusal of the Scriptures upon the Waldenses, see the account given by *Rainerius* in the thirteenth century, in the Bibl. Patr. Lugd. T. xxv., quoted by *Neander*, kleine Gelegenheitsschriften, p. 162; concerning the efforts of the Brethren of the Common Life for the spread of biblical knowledge among the people, see *Neander*, l. c. p. 182, note.—*Gerhard Zerbolt*, a priest, who was a member of the association of pious Christians at Deventer, composed a treatise: De Utilitate Lectionis sacrarum Litterarum in Lingua vulgari: see *Jacobi Revii* Daventria Illustrata, p. 41. Extracts from it are given by *Neander*, l. c. [This work contains full citations from the church fathers; it is given in full in *Schöpff's* Aurora, Tom. v., 1860. For *Hugo St. Victor's* view of the Scriptures, see ibid. Tom. iv.]

[1] *Ullmann*, Johann Wessel, p. 190, sq.

SECOND DIVISION.

THEOLOGY.

(INCLUDING COSMOLOGY, ANGELOLOGY, DEMONOLOGY ETC.)

§ 163.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

Eberstein, Natürliche Theologie der Scholastiker, Leipz., 1803. *Billroth*, De Anselmi Cant. Proslogio et Monologio, Lips., 1832. *Fricke*, Argumenta pro Dei Existentia exponuntur et judicantur, Lips., 1846. **F. Fischer*, Der ontologische Beweis für das Daseyn Gottes und seine Geschichte, Basel, 1852, 4to. [Anselm's Proslogion, by Maginnis, in Bibliotheca Sacra, vol. viii.]

The proofs of the existence of God have their proper origin in the scholastic philosophy. That which was formerly but the semblance of an argument, now appeared in the form of a philosophical demonstration. Thus the *cosmological proof* of Diodorus of Tarsus was fully developed by *John Damascenus*.[1] *Anselm*[2] followed the footsteps of Augustine and Boëthius (see § 123), and endeavored from the idea of God, as a datum, to prove his existence. This was the so-called *ontological* proof, which, however, did not at once obtain the assent of Anselm's contemporaries. *Gaunilo*, a monk, from the stand-point of an empirical philosophy, raised objections of an ingenious nature to the proof of Anselm, which were as ingeniously refuted by the latter.[3] The fate which this mode of proof encountered was various.[4] While *Hugo of St. Victor* endeavored to prove the existence of God in a different way, viz., from *contingency*,[5] the theologians of the thirteenth century in general, and *Thomas Aquinas* and *Duns Scotus* in particular, returned to the argument of Anselm, though they modified it in various ways.[6] *Raimund of Sabunde* propounded what is called the *moral* proof, according to which the existence of an eternal author of reward and punishment is inferred from the moral freedom and accountability of rational creatures.[7] The *historical* proof is found in *Savonarola*,[8] and others, who endeavored to demonstrate the existence of God from the consensus gentium.—There were, however, those who showed the insufficiency of these arguments, or at least abstained from the use of all proofs of such a nature, and simply appealed to the direct revelation of God in the heart of man. *John Duns Scotus*[9] and *William Occam*[10]

belonged to the former; *John Wessel*,[11] and especially the mystics, belonged to the latter class of theologians.[12]

[1] De Fide Orthod. i. 3. John Damascenus proceeds from the principle: Ἡ *γνῶσις τοῦ εἶναι θεὸν φυσικῶς ἡμῖν ἐγκατέσπαρται*—but this consciousness of God was impaired by sin. God restored it by his revelation which was accompanied by miracles. The feeble attempts at proof now take the place of miracles. He enumerates the following proofs: 1. The proof ex rerum mutabilitate (the cosmological); 2. The proof ex earum conversatione et gubernatione, and 3. Ex rerum ordinato situ (the last two may be comprehended under the designation, physico-theological proof). As for the first, he argues as follows: Πάντα *τὰ ὄντα ἢ κτιστά ἐστιν, ἢ ἄκτιστα· εἰ μὲν οὖν κτιστὰ, πάντως καὶ τρεπτά· ὧν γὰρ τὸ εἶναι ἀπὸ τροπῆς ἤρξατο, ταῦτα τῇ τροπῇ ὑποκείσεται πάντως, ἢ φθειρόμενα, ἢ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἀλλοιούμενα· εἰ δὲ ἄκτιστα, κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀκολουθίας λόγον, πάντως καὶ ἄτρεπτα· ὧν γὰρ τὸ εἶναι ἐναντίον, τοῦτων καὶ ὁ τοῦ πῶς εἶναι λόγος ἐναντίος, ἤγουν αἱ ἰδιότητες. Τίς οὖν οὐ συνθήσεται, πάντα τὰ ὄντα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀγγέλους τρέπεσθαι καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι καὶ πολυτρόπως κινεῖσθαι;*.....Τρεπτὰ *τοίνυν ὄντα, πάντως καὶ κτιστά· κτιστὰ δὲ ὄντα, πάντως ὑπό τινος ἐδημιουργήθησαν· δεῖ δὲ τὸν δημιουργὸν ἄκτιστον εἶναι. Εἰ γὰρ κἀκεῖνος ἐκτίσθη, πάντος ὑπό τινος ἐκτίσθη, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωμεν εἴς τι ἄκτιστον. Ἄκτιστος οὖν ὁ δημιουργὸς, πάντως καὶ ἄτρεπτός ἐστι. Τοῦτο δὲ τί ἂν ἄλλο εἴη, ἢ θεός.* Comp the method adopted by Diodorus of Tarsus, § 128, note 3. In the physico-theological proof (2 and 3) he followed the earlier theologians, especially Athanasius, and Gregory of Nazianzum.

[2] The name *ontological*, was given only in later times (by Kant?): see Fischer, in the work above referred to, p. 12. We can here give only the heads of the argument, the thread of reasoning must be seen from the connection. Monol. i.: Cum tam innumerabilia bona sint, quorum tam multam diversitatem et sensibus corporeis experimur et ratione mentis discernimus, estne credendum esse unum aliquid, per quod unum sunt bona, quæcunque bona sunt, aut sunt bona alia per aliud?.....III. Denique non solum omnia bona per idem aliquid sunt bona et omnia magna per idem aliquid sunt magna, sed quicquid est, per *unum* aliquid videtur esse.....Quoniam ergo cuncta quæ sunt, sunt per ipsum unum: procul dubio et ipsum unum est per se ipsum. Quæcunque igitur alia sunt, sunt per aliud, et ipsum solum per se ipsum. Ac quicquid est per aliud, minus est quam illud, per quod cuncta sunt alia et quod solum est per se: quare illud, quod est per se, maxime omnium est. Est igitur unum aliquid, quod solum maxime et summe omnium est; quod autem maxime omnium est et per quod est quicquid est bonum vel magnum, et omnino quicquid est aliquid est, id necesse est esse summe bonum et summe magnum et summum omnium quæ sunt. Quare est aliquid, quod sive essentia, sive substantia, sive natura dicatur, optimum et maximum est et summum omnium quæ sunt. Comp. Augustine and Boëthius in § 128, note 4. The mode of argument which is found, Proslog. c. ii. is more original (he there proceeds from the reality of the idea): The *fool* may say in his heart, there is no God (Ps. xiv. 1), but he thereby shows himself a fool,

because he asserts something which is contradictory in itself. He has the idea of God *in* him, but denies its reality. But if God is given in idea, he must also exist in reality. Otherwise the *real* God, whose existence is conceivable, would be superior to the one who exists only in imagination, and consequently would be superior to the highest conceivable object, which is absurd; hence it follows, that that beyond which nothing can be conceived to exist, really exists (thus idea and reality coincide). Convincitur ergo insipiens, esse vel in intellectu aliquid, quo nihil majus cogitari potest; quia hoc cum audit, intelligit, et quicquid intelligitur, in intellectu est. Et certe id, *quo majus cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re, quod majus est. Si ergo id, quo majus cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu: id ipsum, quo majus cogitari non potest, est quo majus cogitari potest: sed certe hoc esse non potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid. quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re.* If, therefore, the fool says: There is no God; he *says* it indeed, and may, perhaps, even *think* it. But there is a difference between thought and thought. To conceive a thing when the word is without meaning, *e. g.*, that fire is water (a mere sound, an absurdity!) is very different from the case in which the thought corresponds with the word. It is only according to the former mode of thinking (which destroys the thought itself), that the fool can say: There is no God, but not according to the latter. [*Baur* or *Anselm's* argument, Dogmengesch. 245: The major premise must be this—All that—quo majus cogitari non potest, is both an—esse in intellectu, and an—esse in re. But this is not a universally valid proposition: there is only one being to whom it applies. Consequently in the minor premise there is no logical subsumption. The syllogism is consequently false; we can not draw an inference; and yet, there is that—quo majus cogitari non potest: it is therefore in and of itself that (viz., real being), the reality of which the syllogism tries to prove it to be.]

[1] *Gaunilo* was a monk in the monastery of Marmoutier. He wrote: Liber pro Insipiente adv. Anselmi in Proslogio Ratiocinationem (in Anselmi Opp. p. 32, Gerb. p. 53).* The idea of a thing does not necessarily imply its reality; there are many false ideas. Yea, it is very questionable whether we can have any thought of God at all, since he is above all thought..... If one, in speaking of an island which he asserted to be more perfect and lovely than all known islands, should infer its existence from this, that it could not be most perfect if it did not exist, we should hardly know which was the greater fool, the man who made such an argument, or the one who gave his assent to it. The opposite method is to be adopted; we must first prove the existence of the island, and may then show that its excellence surpasses that of all others, etc. (comp. *Münscher*, von Cölln, ii. p. 33, 34. "*It is easy to see that Gaunilo argues against Anselm from the empirical, and consequently an essentially different point of view*," Möhler, ubi supra, p. 152. —*Anselm* defended himself against Gaunilo in his treatise: Liber Apolo

* Anselm was probably unacquainted with the author of the treatise in question. It is quoted as the work *incerti auctoris* in the earlier editions of Anselm's works. Comp *Gerberon*, T. i. p. ii.

geticus contra Gaunilonem respondentem pro insipiente (it is also called Contra Insipientem, Opp. p. 34, Gerberon, p. 37). He returns to the above distinction between thought and thought, and rejects the illustration taken from the island as altogether inappropriate. He observes, that if Gaunilo could *really* imagine an island more perfect than could ever be conceived, he would make him a present of it. "*With Anselm the idea of the most perfect being was a necessary rational idea, between which, and the arbitrary and imaginary notion of a most excellent island, no parallel could be drawn.*" *Möhler*, p. 158. Comp. *Hegel*, Encyclopædie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 2d edit. 1827, p. 61, ss. p. 181: "*Anselm was right in declaring that only that can be perfect which exists not merely subjectively, but also objectively. In vain we affect to despise this proof, commonly called the ontological, and this idea of the perfect set forth by Anselm; it is inherent in the mind of every unprejudiced man, and re-appears in every system of philosophy, even against knowledge and will, as well as in the principle of direct faith.*" On the question whether the proof of Anselm can be properly called a *proof*, see *Möhler*, l. c. p. 154. Respecting the entire controversy comp. *Ziegler*, *W. C. L.*, Beitrag zur Geschichte des Glaubens an Gott. Gött. 1792, 8. *Baur*, Trinitätsl. ii. 372, seq. *Fischer*, ubi supra. *Hasse's* Anselem, ii. 233, *seq.*

[a] The theory of Anselm "*has had a great history. It was not only applied in different ways, and further developed by eminent writers, but, up to the present day, it has been either opposed or defended, according to the respective character of every philosophical school.*" *Möhler*, p. 150.

[b] "*Hugo did not perceive the depth of Anselm's idea, being deceived by the superficial, dialectic reasoning af Gaunilo;*" *Liebner*, Hugo Von St. Victor, p. 369. The argument from *contingency* which *Peter of Poitiers* afterwards adopted, is given in Hugo's treatises, De Sacramentis c. 7–9, De tribus Dieb. c. 17, quoted by *Liebner*, p. 369, 370. It is as follows: Reason which, as the creature and image of God, is able to know him, is essentially distinguished from the body in which it dwells, and from all that is sensuous, being that which is invisible and spiritual. But it is aware that it has not always been either active or conscious of itself, and that therefore there was a time when it did not exist: for it is impossible to conceive of a faculty of knowledge without knowledge and consciousness. It must therefore have had a beginning. Possessing a spiritual nature, it cannot possibly have derived its origin from the sensuous, but must necessarily have been created out of nothing; hence it follows that it owes its existence to an external author. But this author himself can not have been created, for all that is created can not give existence to another being—otherwise we have the infinite series. We must therefore assume the existence of a self-existent and eternal being, as the first cause. (This proof occupies, as it were, an intermediate position between the cosmological and the ontological. The cosmological proof has the world for its foundation, the ontological the idea, and the argument of Hugo rests on the basis of the spirit.) Hugo also made use of the cosmological and physico-theological proof, which was at that time the most popular. Nor did even *Peter Lombard* make use of

the proof of Anselm; Sententt. i. dist. 3. comp. *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, ii. p. 34.

[s] *Thomas Aquinas*, Summa Theol. P. I. qu. 2, art. i. urges against the absolute stringency of Anselm's proof: Dato etiam, quod quilibet intelligat hoc nomine "Deus" significari hoc quod dicitur, scilicet illud, quo majus cogitari non potest: non tamen propter hoc sequitur, quod intelligat id, quod significatur per nomen esse, in rerum natura, sed in apprehensione intellectus tantum. Nec potest argui, quod sit in re, nisi daretur, quod sit in re aliquid, quo majus cogitari non potest: quod non est datum a ponentibus Deum non esse. The argument of Thomas himself (*Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, p. 35, *Schröckh*, xxix. p. 77), amounts to this, that the proposition: "*God exists*," may be regarded as evident, if considered in itself (quantum in se est), since the predicate is identical with the subject; but it is not so *in relation to us*. Thomas connected the various modes of argumentation with each other on the principle previously adopted by *Richard of St. Victor*, De Trin. i. c. 6, ss. (comp. *Engelhardt*, Richard von St. Victor, p. 99, ss. [*Münscher*, l. c. p. 35]). He enumerated five different kinds of proof: 1. That derived from the first moving principle (primum movens), which is not itself moved by any other; 2. That derived from the first great cause (causa efficiens); 3. That derived from what is necessary by itself (per se necessarium, these first three form together the cosmological proof in its dialectic form); 4. That derived from the gradation of things (or the argument from the imperfect to the absolutely-perfect; Augustine and Anselm had propounded the same proof); 5. That derived from the adaptation of things (the physico-theological, or teleological proof). See *Baur*, Trinitätslehre, ii. 581, *seq.* *Duns Scotus* seeks to give more color (colorari) to the argument of Anselm by different modifications and applications; see his De Primo Rerum Princ. cap. 4, and comp. *Fischer*, ubi supra, p. 7. Besides this he appeals to the proofs from experience; see *Münscher*, von Cölln's ed. ii. 56.

[t] *Abelard* had previously directed attention to this proof (Theol. christ. Lib. v. *Martène*, p. 1439), but not so much as a strictly cogent *proof* (magis honestis, quam necessariis rationibus nitimur); rather as the voice of conscience. Quam honestum vero sit ac salubre, omnia ad unum optimum tam rectorem quam conditorem spectare et cuncta potius ratione quam casu fieri seu regi, nullus est, cui propriæ ratio non suggerat conscientiæ. Quæ enim solicitudo bonorum nobis operum inesset, si, quem nec amore nec timore vereremur, Deum penitus ignoraremus? Quæ spes aut malitiam refræuaret potentum, aut ad bona eos alliceret opera, si omnium justissimus ac potentissimus frustra crederetur? Ponamus itaque, ut, dum bonis prodesse ac placere quærimus, obstinatos cogere non possimus, cum ora eorum non necessariis obstruamus argumentis. Ponamus, inquam, hoc si volunt; sed opponamus, quod nolunt, summam eorum impudentiam arguentes, si hoc calumniantur, quod refellere nullo modo possunt, et quod plurima tam honestate quam utilitate commendatur. Inquiramus eos, qua ratione malint eligere, Deum non esse, quam esse, et cum ad neutrum cogi necessario possint, et alterum multis commendetur rationibus, alterum nullis, iniquissimam eorum confundamus impudentiam, qui id, quod optimum esse non dubitent, omnibusque est tam rationibus, quam auctoritatibus consentaneum, sequi respuant et contrarium complec-

tantur.—The argument as used by *Raimund* has more of the logical form of proof; see Theolog. Natur. Tit. 83 (quoted by *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, p. 38. *Tennemann*, Geschichte der Philos. viii. p. 964, ss.). Since man is an accountable being, but can neither reward nor punish himself, it follows that there must be a being superior to him, who bestows rewards and inflicts punishments; for if there were no such being, the life of man would be fruitless, a game of chance. As, moreover, the irrational creation is subject to man, and exists for his sake, it would follow, if there were no corresponding higher being above man, that creation itself was without an object. But now we perceive [here comes in the physico-theological, as an auxiliary proof] order and harmony in the whole external creation which is subject to man;* how can we suppose that the order in the natural world is not repeated in the moral world? As the eye corresponds to things visible, the ear to things audible, the understanding to things comprehensible, so the moral actions of man must have their corresponding judgment and retribution, and consequently a judge and retributive governor. But this judge must possess a perfect knowledge of human actions, and their moral character—that is to say, he must be omniscient; it is also evident that he must be just, in the highest sense of the word; and, lastly, he must be possessed of unlimited power to execute his judgments, or, in other words, he must be almighty. But such a being can not but be the most perfect of all beings, *i. e.*, God. (The similarity between this proof and that of Kant has often been pointed out.)

[8] Comp. Triumph. Cruc. Lib. i. c. 6, p. 38, ss., quoted in *Meier's* Savonarola, p. 245.

[9] Sententt. 1, Dist. 2, Qu. 2, art. 1 (quoted by *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, p. 36. *Tiedemann*, Geist der speculativen Philosophie, iv. p. 632). An objection was especially made to the proof derived from the *necessarium per se*, inasmuch as Scotus made a distinction between the ideas of possibility and necessity.

[10] Centiloq. Theol. Concl. 1 (*Tiedemann.* l. c. v. p. 206). He opposed the principal argument of Aristotle derived from the πρῶτον κινοῦν.

[11] *Wessel* reasoned as follows: The general and most direct means by which man attains God, is the *original knowledge of God*, inherent in every rational spirit. As no place is so dark as not to receive some degree of light from a sun-beam, so no rational soul is without some sort of indwelling notion (notitia) of God.....(Ps. xix. 6). This knowledge, however, is not the same in all men, but develops itself differently in different persons according to their other capacities, and their whole moral and intellectual condition;

* Raimund directs attention to the gradation of beings. Some of them only *exist* (inorganic beings); others *exist* and *live* (plants); still others *exist*, *live*, and *are susceptible of sensations* (animals); and, lastly, others *exist*, *live*, *feel*, and *think* (man). In man all the earlier stages are repeated. Comp. Matzke, ubi supra, p. 49 [*Matzke*, p. 59, cites from Tit. 68: Regula autem quæ radicatur in homine, est ista, quod Deus est quo nihil magis cogitari potest, vel Deus est majus quod cogitari potest. Et ideo sequitur quod Deus est quidquid melius cogitari potest, et quidquid melius est esse, quam non esse. Quidquid ergo potest homo cogitare perfectissimum, opetimum, dignissimum, nobilissimum et altissimum, hoc est Deus....Et in ista regula fundatur tota scientia et cognitio de Deo certissima.]

just as the universal light of the sun is differently received by different objects according to their susceptibility, position, and distance. Wessel designates this simple and universal knowledge of God as the *name* of God, which dwells, as it were, in every spirit, is expressed in every soul, and may, therefore, in every soul be brought to consciousness; De Orat. Lib. v. *Ullmann*, p. 200.

[12] *Tauler*, Predigten, vol. i. p. 58: I possess a power in my soul which is altogether susceptible of God; I am as sure as I live, that no thing is so near to me as God. *God is nearer to me than I am to myself*, etc. Comp. the following §, note 3.

§ 164.

THE COMPREHENSIBILITY OF GOD.

In proportion as men think they can prove the existence of God, will they be more or less assured that they can know his nature. Hence the scholastic divines made the nature of God the special object of their speculations. Nevertheless they expressly asserted, that God can not be comprehended, and admitted for the most part only a *conditional* knowledge on the part of man.[1] The views of *Occam* on this subject bordered on skepticism.[2] The mystics, on the contrary, endeavored in opposition both to dogmatism as well as skepticism, to live a hidden life in God, and *thus* to obtain an immediate vision of God himself in his light, and of all things in God.[3]

[1] *John Damascenus* De Fide Orthod. i. 4, had taught after the example of some of the earlier fathers, that God does not come under the category of *things* (οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν), which is equivalent to the modern speculative deity, *i. e.*, a nonentity. He is ὑπὲρ γνῶσιν πάντως καὶ ὑπὲρ οὐσίαν, and it is only by way of negation (δι' ἀφαιρέσεως) that we acquire the knowledge of his attributes (comp. what Clement of Alexandria said in an earlier period, § 37. note).—*John Scotus Erigena*, in bolder style, surpassing the limits of what is allowable to man, maintained, De Divis. Nat. ii. 28, p. 78: that God does not know himself. Deus itaque nescit se, quid est, quia non est *quid*; incomprehensibilis quippe in aliquo et sibi ipsi et omni intellectui. The whole of theology, according to him, is divided into affirmative and negative (the *cataphatic* and the *apophatic*). But affirmation and negation are abolished in the absolute idea of God, and what to us is contradictory is not so to him. Comp. *Baur*, Trinität. ii. 276. [In *Christlieb's*, John Scotus Erigena (1860) p. 162, the passage is cited from the De Divis. Nat. i. 13: Theologia ἀποφατικη divinam essentiam seu substantiam esse aliquid eorum, quæ sunt, *i. e.*, quæ dici aut intelligi possunt, negat; altera vero, καταφατικη, omnia quæ sunt de ea prædicat, et ideo affirmativa dicitur, non ut confirmet aliquid esse eorum quæ sunt, sed omnia, quæ ab ea

sunt, de ea posse prædicari suadeat. Rationabiliter enim per causativa causale potest significari.]—The more modest *Anselm*, on the contrary, returned to correct views, by confessing in his Monologue, that God alone knows his own nature, and that no human wisdom can so much as presume to measure, or to comprehend the divine wisdom. For, it is certain, that what we ascribe to God only relatively, does not express his nature (si quid de summa natura dicitur relative, non est ejus significativum substantiæ). Compare the Monolog. c. 15–17; *Hasse*, ii. 129; *Münscher*, ed. von Cölln, p. 44, and *Möhler*, l. c. p. 154, 55. Similar language occurs in Alanus ab Insulis De Art. Cathol. Fidei. 16, 17, quoted by *Pez*, i. p. 482.—*Albertus Magnus* distinguishes between—attingero Deum intellectu, and—comprehendere. Creatures can only attain to the former. Comp. Summa Theol. i. tr. iv. qu. 18, membr. 3, p. 67 (in *Ritter*, viii. 197). Resting on this basis *Thomas Aquinas* (Summa P. i. Qu. 12, art. 12), proved that man has no cognitio quidditativa of God, (*i. e.*, no knowledge of God *per se*), *but only knows habitudo ipsius ad creaturas;* while *Scotus* (Sent. i. Dist. 3, Qu. i. art. 1) taught the opposite doctrine, partly with reference to the opinions of *Heinrich von Gent* (about 1280) a teacher of the Sorbonne.—The final result of the controversy carried on between the Thomists and Scotists on the question—de cognitione Dei quidditativa, was, that man has a cognitio quidditatis Dei, but not a cognitio quidditativa, *i. e.*, that he may know the *nature* of God (in contrast with a mere *accidental* and superficial notion), but that he can not know God thoroughly, *i. e.*, in such a manner that no part of his nature is concealed from man).* Comp. the passages quoted by *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, p. 63, 64, and *Eberhard*, natürliche Theologie der Scholastiker, p. 52–66.—*Darandus of St. Pourçain* (in Magistri Sentent. 1, Dist. 3, Qu. i.) speaks of a threefold way which leads to the knowledge of God: 1. *Via eminentiæ*, which ascends from the excellencies of creatures to the highest excellency, *i. e.*, to the perfect God. 2. *Via causalitatis*, which ascends from the phenomena of creation to the first cause. 3. *Via remotionis*, which begins with changeable and dependent existence, and ends with necessary and absolute existence (esse de se).—*Alexander Hales* used similar and still simpler expressions (Summa P. i. Qu. 2, Membr. i. Art. 2): Dicendum, quod est cognitio de Deo *per modum positionis et per modum privationis*. Per modum privationis cognoscimus de Deo, quid non est, per modum positionis, quid est. Divina substantia in sua immensitate non est cognoscibilis ab anima rationali cognitione positiva, sed est cognoscibilis cognitione privativa. Comp. *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, l. c. We must say, *apprehendi* guidem posse Deum, *comprehendi*, nequaquam, see *Schröckh*, xxix. 15.—On the endeavors of later Greek theologians, *e. g.*, *Nicolas of Methone* (especially after the example of Dionysius the Areopagite), to represent the insufficiency of our knowledge and terminology respecting divine things, see *Ullmann*, l. c. p.

* *Cajetanus* Summæ P. 1. Qu. 12, De Arte et Essentia c. 6, Qu. 4: Aliud est cognoscere quidditatem, s. *cognitio quidditatis:* aliud est *cognitio quidditativa*, s. cognoscere quidditative. Cognoscit nempe leonis *quidditatem*, quicunque novit *aliquid* ejus prædicatum essentiale. Cognoscit autum *quidditative* non nisi ille qui *omnia* prædicata quidditativa usque ad ultimam differentiam novit. The passage is given by *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, l. c.

72–74: The divine is in no wise to be ordinated and compared with all that exists: on the whole, it would be better to express in an exaggerated and exceptional manner (*ὑπεροχικῶς καὶ κατεξαίρετον*) all that is predicated of the divine, etc.

[8] *Occam* (as well as Alexander of Hales) starts from the position that there is a positive and negative knowledge of God, and in accordance with this shapes his definitions, which, however, are different only in form. Quodlibet. Theol. I. Qu. 1): *e. g.*, "Deus est aliquid nobilius et aliquid melius omni alio a se:" and then, "Deus est quo nihil est melius, prius vel perfectius." The former may be used as an argument for the *unity*, but not for the existence of God, inasmuch as the latter idea can not be proved by demonstration. The second may be appealed to in support of the doctrine of the *existence*, but not of the unity of God, since it may be supposed that such negative perfections belong to several individuals. From this point of view he refutes the arguments used by the earlier scholastics, especially Duns Scotus. See *Münscher*, p. 51. In the Centiloq. concl. 2, he combats the arguments derived from this "first cause;" nor does he give his assent to the argument derived from "the uniformity of the world." Thus he arrives at the following conclusion: Conclusio, quod non sunt plures Dei, non tanquam demonstrata, sed tanquam *probabilior* suo opposito tenenda est: eo quod omnes apparentiæ æqualiter apparent, et faciliter possunt salvari tenendo unitatem primæ causæ. Comp. Sent. 1, Dist. 3, Qu. 2: Nec divina essentia, nec divina quidditas, nec aliquid intrinsecum Deo, nec aliquid, quod est realiter Deus, potest hic cognosci a nobis, ita quod nihil aliud a Deo concurrat in ratione objecti. Deus non potest cognosci a nobis intuitive et puris naturalibus. *Baur*, *Trinitatslehre*, ii. 875.

[9] Thus *Gerson* said, (Contra vanam Curiositatem, lectio secunda, T. i. p. 100, quoted by *Ch. Schmidt*, p. 73): Fides saluberrima et omnis metaphysica tradit nobis, quod Deus est simplicissimus in supremo simplicitatis gradu, supra quam imaginari sufficimus. Hoc dato, quid opus est ipsam unitissimam essentiam per formas metaphysices vel quidditates vel rationes ideales vel alias mille imaginandi vias secernere, dividere, constituere, præscindere ex parte rei, ut dicunt, et non ex intellectus negotiatione circa eam? Deus sancte, quot tibi prioritates, quot instantia, quot signa, quot modeitates, quot rationes aliqui ultra Scotum condistinguunt! Jam mille codices talibus impleti sunt, adeo ut longa ætas hominum eos vix sufficiat legere, ne dicam intelligere.—Gerson's theory of the knowledge of God (viz., the knowledge of God through love) was appropriately designated, both by himself and by other theologians, as *Theologia affectiva* (Tract. iii. super Magnificat, T. iv. p. 262).—*Suso* expressed himself as follows in his treatise: Eine Ausrichtung, wo und wie Gott ist (see *Diepenbrock* das Leben und die Schriften von Heinrich von Suso, 1837, p. 212, c. lv.): "Most men assert, that the idea of space can not be applied to God, but that he is all in all. But now open the inner ears of your soul, and open them wide. The same masters maintain in the science called Logica, that we may obtain the knowledge of a thing by means of its name. Thus a certain teacher asserts, that the name *being* is the first name of God. Turn now thine eye to being in all its simplicity, excluding all notion of this or that particular being. Consider being in itself; look at being only as

such, and as it is unmixed with nonentity; for all that has no existence is contrary to that which has existence; the case is the same with being as such, for it is contrary to all that has no existence. Any thing which either has already existed, or has yet to exist, does not now exist in essential presence. But now mixed existence or non-existence can not be known but by some mark of that being which is in all. For if we wish to comprehend any thing, reason meets first with existence, viz., that being which has made all things. This is not the divided existence of this or that creature; for all divided existence is mixed up with something else, viz., the possibility of receiving something. Hence it follows, that the nameless divine being must be in itself the being which is all in all, and must preserve all compound beings by its omnipresence." Ibidem, p. 214: "Now open your inner eyes, and look, if possible, at the [Divine] being in all its simplicity and purity, and you will find that it owes its existence to none, has neither a 'before' nor an 'after,' and undergoes no change either from within, or from without, because it is a simple being. You will then be convinced that this being is the *most real*, *omnipresent*, and *most perfect* of all beings, in which there is neither defect nor change, because it is a single unity in perfect simplicity. And this truth is so manifest to the enlightened reason of man, that it can not conceive of any other; for the one proves and causes the other. Since this is a simple being, it must necessarily be the first of all beings, owing its being to none, and existing from eternity; since it is the first of all beings eternal and simple, it must be omnipresent. It is a necessary quality of highest perfection and simplicity, that nothing can either be added to, or taken from it. If you understand what I have said of the simple Godhead, you will know something of the incomprehensible light of the hidden truth of God. This pure, simple being is the first cause of all actual existence; from its peculiar omnipresence it follows that it includes all that has come into existence in time, as the beginning and the end of all things. It is in all things, and out of all things. Therefore a certain master says: '*God is a circular ring, the centre of which is everywhere, and the periphery of which is nowhere.*'" Compare with these expressions the language of *Tauler* (§ 163, note 11), of *Ruysbroek*, quoted by *Engelhardt*, p. 173 (God per se), and of the author of the "deutsche Theologie," cap. 1, where the practical point of view is most prominently brought forward, viz., the necessity of leading a godly life, in order to know God.

§ 165.

THE NATURE OF GOD IN GENERAL.

(*Pantheism and Theism.*)

The ingenious system of *John Scotus Erigena*, who, for purely scientific purposes, endeavored to make a dialectic mediation between the antagonism of God and the world (nature),[1] was so misunderstood and misused by some of his close imitators, particularly

Amalrich of Bena, and *David of Dinanto*, as to give rise to a gross adoration of the flesh.[3] It was combated by *Albertus Magnus*, and *Thomas Aquinas*,[3] and condemned by the Council of Paris (A. D. 1209), and the fourth Lateran Council (A. D. 1215).[4] The mystics also exposed themselves to the charge of pantheism, more or less justified, by asserting that nothing except God has a real existence.[5] But the more considerate among them retained, in accordance with orthodox theologians, the theistic principle of a difference between God and his creatures, though they could not always scientifically prove that to which they practically adhered.[6]

[1] In his Dialogus de Divisione Naturæ, *Erigena* divided all nature (which comprehends all being) into four modes of existence: 1. Natura creans, sed non creata, *i. e.*, God; 2. Natura creans et creata, *i. e.*, the Son of God; 3. Natura creata et non creans, *i. e.*, the world; and 4. Natura non creata et non creans, *i. e.*, God as the final object of all things. Inasmuch as Erigena regarded God as the principle and cause of all things, he arrived at the conviction that the divine essence, the goodness, the power, and the wisdom, could not be created by another being, because there is no higher being from which it could derive its existence. But since he regards, on the other hand, the divine being as the last object at which all things aim, and which is the end of their course, he hence concludes, that this nature is neither created nor creating; for as everything which has gone out from it returns to it, and as all existence rests in it, we can not say that it creates. What could God be supposed to create, since he must be in all things, and can at the same time represent himself in no other being, but in himself? Therefore he says, i. 74, p. 42: Cum audimus, Deum omnia facere, nihil aliud debemus intelligere, quam *Deum in omnibus esse*, hoc est essentiam omnium subsistere. Ipse enim solus per se vere est, et omne quod vere in his quæ sunt dicitur esse, ipse solus est.—The following statements are very beautiful, but easily misunderstood, i. 76, p. 43: Omne quodcunque in creaturis vere bonum vereque pulcrum et amabile intelligitur, ipse est. Sicut enim nullum bonum essentiale est, ita nullum pulcrum seu amabile essentiale præter ipsum solum. Comp. *Tennemann*, viii. 1, p. 80, ss. *Schmid*, über den Mysticismus des Mittelalters, p. 123, ss. *Frommüller*, in the Tübinger Zeitschrift, 1830, part 1, p. 58, ss. *Staudenmaier*, Freiburger Zeitschrift, 1840, iii. 2, p. 272, ss. [*Münscher*, von Cölln, ii. p. 40, 41.]—That there was also a striving after strict theistic modes of statement, along and in comparison with the pantheistic tendency of Scotus, is shown in *Ritter*, Gesch. d. Phil. viii. 242, 286 [Cf. Ritter's christl. Phil. i. 360–9. Comp. *Christlieb*, ubi supra, who gives full illustrations and comparisons with modern views. Erigena denies that any of the categories can be properly applied to God, De Div. Nat. i. 15: Si aliqua categoriarum de Deo proprie prædicaretur, necessario genus esse Deus sequeretur, Deus autem nec genus, nec species, nec accidens est. *Ibid.* i. 37: Non proprie, sed modo quodam translationis omnia de Deo prædicantur. *Ibid.* i. 73: Non aliud Deo esse et velle et facre et amare et diligere et videre, cæteraque hujusmodi, quæ de eo, ut dixmus, possunt prædicari, sed

hæc omnia in ipso unum idipsumque accipiendum, suamque ineffabilem essentiam eo modo, quo se significari sinit, insinuant. *Ibid.* i. 75: Videt se ipsum et videtur a se ipso, in se ipso et in nobis; nec tamen videt se ipsum, nec videtur a se ipso, in se ipso et in nobis, sed plus quam videt et videtur in se ipso, et in nobis.]

[3] Comp. § 153, note 4. From the proposition, that, he who is in *love* is also in *God*, they inferred that, "*that which is done in love* is no sin: therefore stealing, robbing, committing lasciviousness, etc., is not sinful, if it be done in love." Comp. Ditmars Chronik, edited by *Grautoff* in *Hurter*, Innocenz III., vol. ii. p. 238, ss. Cæsarius of Heisterbach (A. D. 1222), De Miraculis, lib. v. c. 22: Si aliquis est in Spiritu sancto, ajebant, et faciat fornicationem, aut aliquæ alia pollutione polluatur: non est ei peccatum, quia ille Spiritus, qui est Deus omnino separatus a carne, non potest peccare quamdiu ille Spiritus, qui est Deus, est in eo, ille operatur omnia in omnibus. *Engelhardt*, Kirchenhistorische Abhandlungen, p. 255, ss. Compare also § 184. (*Gieseler*, Church Hist. ii. § 74, note g.) [The doctrine of *David Dinanto*, says *Baur*, Dogmengesch. 248, note, was undoubtedly the same as that of Avicebron, in the newly discovered work, De Materia Universali, or Fons Vitæ, which *Seyerlen* has made known in the Theol. Jahrbücher (Tübing.), 1856. The fundamental idea is that of matter in its unity with form, and the unity of both with God.]

[4] [*Albert M.* Summæ theol. P. i. Tract. iv. Qu. 20. *Thom. Aq.* Sentent. lib. ii. Dist. 17, Qu. 1, art. 1: Quomodam antiquorum philosophorum error fuit, quod Deus esset de essentia omnium rerum. Ponebant enim, omnia esse unum simpliciter, et non differre, nisi forte secundum sensum vel æstimationem, ut Parmenides dicit; et illos etiam antiquos philosophos secuti sunt quidam moderni, ut David de Dinando. Divisit enim res in partes tres, in corpore, animas, et substantias æternas separatas. Et primum indivisibile, ex quo constituuntur corpora, dixit ὕλη, h. e. materiam. Primum autem indivisibile, ex quo constituuntur animæ, dixit νοῦς h. e. mentem. Primum autem indivisibile in substantiis æternis dixit Deum: et hæc tria esse unum et idem. Ex quo iterum consequitur, esse omnia, per essentiam, vocem.]

[5] [Comp. *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, ii. p. 42.]

[6] *Master Eckart* approached gross pantheism nearer than any other mystic. He said: "God is nothing, and God is something. That which is something is also nothing; what God is, he is altogether." (Sermon on the Feast of the Conversion of St. Paul, fol. 243, b. quoted by *Schmidt* in the Studien und Kritiken, 1839, part 3, p. 692.)—"He (God) has the nature of all creatures *in* him; he is an essence, that has all essences in him."—"All that is in the Godhead is, is *one*, and we can not speak of it. It is *God* that acts, but not the *Godhead*; it has not wherewith to work, in it then there is no work. There is the same difference between God and the Godhead, as there is between working and not working." (Sermon on the day of the execution of John the Baptist, fol. 302, a. quoted by *Schmidt*, l. c. 693.)—In Eckart's opinion, God becomes God only through the work of creation. "Prior to the creation of the world God was not God, he was what he was; nor was God in himself God, after creatures had been brought into existence,

but he was only God in them." (Second Sermon on All Saints' Day, fol. 307, a. *Schmidt*, l. c. p. 694.)—"*Pantheism is a great and noble phenomenon deceiving us by a peculiar charm, in the case of those who burn with love, and are, as it were, intoxicated with a sense of God, and the contemplation of divine things. But where it is only the result of subtile conclusions and philosophical definitions, or the proud but confused dream of an indefinite religious feeling, it loses its grand relations, and its mysterious poetry; and those faults which we once felt disposed to overlook, now become manifest, together with all the contradictions in which they involve us.*" *Schmidt*, l. c.

[e] *Suso* showed in a highly characteristic way that a pantheistic disposition was nothing but a transitory excitement of feeling, which must first of all subside (in a quotation given by *Diepenbrock*, p. 189).—"I call that state of our mind flourishing, in which the inner man is cleansed from sinful carnality, and delivered from remaining imperfections; in which he cheerfully rises above time and place, since he was formerly bound, and could not make free use of his natural nobility. When he then opens the eyes of his mind, when he tastes other and better pleasures which consist in the perception of the truth, in the enjoyment of divine happiness, in insight into the present now of eternity, and the like, and when the created mind begins to comprehend a part of the eternal, uncreated mind both in itself and in all things, then he is wonderfully moved. Examining himself and reflecting on what he once *was*, and what he now *is*, he recollects that he was a poor, ungodly, and wretched man, that he was blind, and lived far from God; but now *it seems to him that he is full of God, that there is nothing which is not God; further, that God and all things are one and the same. He then goes so hastily to work, that he becomes excited in his mind like wine in a state of fermentation, that has not as yet formed a sediment.*" etc. "Such men are like bees which make honey: when they are full grown, and come for the first time out of their hives, they fly about in an irregular manner, not knowing whither to go; some take the wrong direction and lose themselves, but others come back to the right place. Thus it is with the men before spoken of, when they *see God as all in all, without their reason being regulated*," etc. *Gerson* acutely defended the distinction between God and the creature (however highly favored) in opposition to Ruysbroek and Eckart, though he was not always consistent with himself. Comp. *Hundeshagen*, p. 62, ss. *Tauler* maintained (Predigten, vol. i. p. 61), that "nothing so much prevented the soul from knowing God as time and space: time and space are in his opinion parts, but God is one; therefore if the soul will know God, it must know him *beyond* time and *beyond* space; for God is neither *this* nor *that*, as those manifold things are, but he is one." The assertion of *Wessel* that "God alone *is*, and that all other things are *what* they are, through *him*" (De Orat. iii. 12, p. 76), and some other of his declarations, might lead to the supposition that he too was a pantheist; but compare, on the other hand, the appropriate observation of *Ullmann*, p. 230, note.

§ 166.

THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

a. The Relation of God to Time, Space, and Number. (The Omnipresence, Eternity, and Unity of God.)

The writings of *John Damascenus*,[1] and his successors in the Greek church,[2] contain less ample definitions and classifications of the attributes, than the works of the schoolmen, which are very copious on just this point. Though *Anselm* and others insisted upon the importance of the proposition laid down by Augustine, that the attributes of God not only form one whole, but are also identical with the divine essence itself, and can not therefore be regarded as something foreign and manifold, which is merely attached to God,[3] yet the speculative and systematizing tendency of the scholastics frequently led them to lose sight of this simple truth. Concerning the *omnipresence* of God, some, *e. g.*, *Hugo* and *Richard of St. Victor*, defended the substantial *omnipresence* among the metaphysical attributes of God; Anselm laid most stress upon the *eternity* and *omnipresence;* the former showed that there could not be in God either an *Aliqando* or an *Alicubi* in the proper sense of the terms,[4] in opposition to the merely dynamic view, while others endeavored to unite the two.[5] A difference was also made between the *èternity* of God, and a mere *sempiternitas*, the latter of which may be ascribed even to creatures (*e. g.*, angels and the souls of men).[6] And lastly, it was asserted that the *unity* of God, which many of the schoolmen numbered among his attributes, was not to be regarded as a mere mathematical quantity. The theologians of the Greek church signified this by extending the idea of a numerical unity to that of a unity which is above all other things.[7]

[1] John of Damascus De Fide Orth. i. 4: Ἄπειρον οὖν τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἀκατάληπτον· καὶ τοῦτο μόνον αὐτοῦ κατάληπτον, ἡ ἀπειρία καὶ ἀκαταληψία· ὅσα δὲ λέγομεν ἐπὶ θεοῦ καταφατικῶς, οὐ τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τὴν φύσιν δηλοῖ. Κἂν ἀγαθὸν, κἂν δίκαιον, κἂν σοφὸν, κἂν ὅ τι ἂν ἄλλο εἴπῃς, οὐ φυσιν λέγεις θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τὴν φύσιν. Εἰσὶ δὲ καί τινα καταφατικῶς λεγόμενα ἐπὶ θεοῦ, δύναμιν ὑπεροχικῆς ἀποφάσεως ἔχοντα· οἷον, σκότος λέγοντες ἐπὶ θεοῦ, οὐ σκότος νοοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐστι φῶς, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τὸ φῶς· καὶ φῶς, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστι σκότος. Comp. cap 9: Τὸ θεῖον ἁπλοῦν ἐστι καὶ ἀσύνθετον· τὸ δὲ ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ διαφόρων συγκείμενον, συνθετόν ἐστιν. Εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄκτιστον καὶ ἄναρχον καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰώνιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δημιουργικὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐσιώδεις διαφορὰς εἴπομεν ἐπὶ θεοῦ, ἐκ τοσούτων συγκείμενον, οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ σύνθετον· ὅπερ ἐσχάτης ἀσεβείας ἐστίν. Χρὴ τοίνυν ἕκαστον τῶν ἐπὶ θεοῦ λεγομένων, οὐ τί

κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστὶ σημαίνειν οἴεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἢ τί οὔκ ἐστι δηλοῦν, ἢ σχέσιν τινὰ πρός τι τῶν ἀντιδιαστελλομένων, ἢ τι τῶν παρεπομένων τῇ φύσει ἢ ἐνέργειαν. Comp. cap. 19, and what was said § 164, note 1.

[2] Comp. *Ullmann*, Nicolaus von Methone, etc., p. 69, ss., and § 164, note 1.

[3] Monol. c. 14–28. *Hasse*, ii. 127, sq. God is not only just, but he is justice itself, etc., cap. 16: Quid ergo, si illa summa natura tot bona est, eritne composita tot pluribus bonis, an potius non sunt plura bona, sed unum bonum tam pluribus nominibus significatum?....Cum igitur illa natura nullo modo composita sit et tamen omni modo tot illa bona sit [sint], necesse est, ut illa omnia non plura, sed unum sint. Idem igitur est quodlibet unum illorum quod omnia [sunt] sive simul, sive singula, ut cum dicitur vel justitia vel essentia, idem significet quod alia, vel omnia simul, vel singula. Cap. 18: Vita et sapientia et reliqua non sunt partes tui, sed omnia sunt unum, et unumquodque horum est totum quod es, et quod sunt reliqua omnia. *Hugo of St. Victor* adopted similar views, see Liebner, p. 371. Comp. also *Abelard*, Theolog. Christ. iii. p. 1264: Non itaque sapientia in Deo vel substantialis ei forma vel accidentalis, imo sapientia ejus ipse Deus est. Idem de potentia ejus sentiendum est et de cæteris quæ ex nominum affinitate formæ esse videntur in Deo quoque sicut in creaturis, etc. *Alanus* also said, l. c. art. 20 (quoted by *Pez*, i. p. 484): Nomina enim ista: potentia potens, sapientia sapiens, neque formam, neque proprietatem, neque quicquid talium Deo attribuere possunt, cum simplicissimus Deus in sua natura nihil sit talium capax. Cum ergo ratiocinandi de Deo causa nomina nominibus copulamus, nihil quod non sit ejus essentia prædicamus, et si transsumtis nominibus de Deo quid credimus, improprie balbutimus. [*Duns Scotus*, Comm. in Sent. 1, Dist. 8, Qu. 4, maintains a real difference in the attributes: *e. g.*, in application to the Trinity. Comp. *Baur*, ubi supra, 249.]

[4] See Monolog. c. 18, *sq.* *Hasse's* Anselm, ii. 134, *sq.*—Of God we can say *Est*, and not, *Fuit* or *Erit*. Time and space are to him no bounds: comp. Proslog. c. 19. *Hasse*, ii. 282, *sq.* So, in respect to omniscience, God has not his knowledge from the things, but the things have their being from God.

[5] *Hugo of St. Victor*, De Sacram. Lib. i. P. ii. c. 17: Deus substantialiter sive essentialiter et proprie et vere est in omni creatura, sive natura sine sui definitione et in omni loco sine circumscriptione et omni tempori sine vicissitudine vel mutatione. Est ergo, ubi est, totum, qui continet totum et penetrat totum; see *Liebner*, p. 372. From the proposition that God is *potentialiter* in all things, *Richard of St. Victor* drew the inference that he also exists *essentialiter* in them; de Trin. ii. 24, see *Engelhardt*, p. 174. He is *above* all the heavens, and yet he is at the same time *in* them; he is in all that is corporeal and spiritual, in all that he has created, and governs according to his will.—This notion of an essential presence of God was substantially the same as that of Peter Lombard, though he acknowledged that it was above human comprehension; Sent. i. Dist. 27, g. According to *Alexander Hales*, God is in all things, but he is not *included* in the same; he is without all things, but he is not *excluded* from them. God exists in things in a threefold manner; essentialiter, præsentialiter, potentialiter; these three

modes, however, do not differ in themselves, but only in our idea of them. God does not exist in all things in the same manner, *e. g.*, in those whose sins are pardoned, in the sacraments, etc. The question was also started: Can the indwelling grace of God be in the body of a man prior to its union with the soul? etc., see *Cramer*, vii. p. 295, 7. The definitions of *Thomas Aquinas* are based on the system of Alexander; Summa I, Qu. 8, art. 1, (quoted by *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, p. 49): Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essentiæ, vel sicut accidens, sed sicut *agens adest ei in quod agit.* Oportet enim omne agens conjungi ei, in quod immediate agit, et *sua virtute illud contingere*.....Art 2: Deus omnem locum replet, *non sicut corpus*.....immo per hoc replet omnia loca, quod dat esse omnibus locatis, quæ replent omnia loca. Art. 3: Substantia sua adest omnibus ut *causa essendi*, etc. Art. 4: Oportet in omnibus esse Deum, quia nihil potest esse nisi per ipsum.—The dynamic (virtual) scheme of the Thomists was opposed by the ideal view of the Scotists. See *Münscher*, ed by von Cölln, ii. p. 50.—*Bonaventura*, Comp. Theol. (Edit. Mogunt. 1609, p. 695,) said: Ubique Deus est, tamen nusquam est, quia nec abest ulli loco, nec ullo capitur loco (August.). Deus est in mundo non inclusus, extra mundum non exclusus, supra mundum non elatus, infra mundum non depressus. Ex his patet, quod Deus est intra omnia, et hoc quia omnia replet et ubique præsens est. Ita extra omnia est, quia omnia continet, nec usquam valet coarctari. Sed nota, quod hæc propositio, "extra," dicit ibi *non actualem præsentiam ad locum, sed potentialem*, quæ est Dei immensitas, quæ infinitos mundos potest replere, si essent. Idem ipse est supra omnia, quia omnibus præstat nec aliquid ei æquatur. Item infra omnia est, quia omnia sustinet et sine ipso nihil subsisteret. Dicimus etiam, quod ubique est, non ut indigeat rebus, quod ex eis sit, sed potius res sui indigeant, ut per eum subsistant..... Sciendum est ergo, ut aliquid est in loco *circumscriptive et diffinitive*, ut corpus; aliquid *diffinitive*, non circumscriptive, ut angelus; aliquid nec sic, nec sic, ut Deus, et hoc ideo, quia non individuatur per materiam, ut corpus, neque per suppositum, ut Angelus. Aliquid est etiam in loco, partim circumscriptive, partim diffinitive, ut Corpus Christi in sacramento.....Corpus autem Christi.....in pluribus tamen locis est.....sed non ubique..... Nota, quod Deus est multipliciter in rebus, scilicit per naturam: et sic est ubique potentialiter, præsentialiter, essentialiter. Item per gratiam; sic est in bonis .....Item per gloriam; sic est in rationali virtute animæ, ut veritas, in concupiscibili, ut bonitas, in irascibili, ut potestas. Item per unionem; sic fuit in utero virginis unitus humanæ naturæ, et in sepulcro unitus carni, et in inferno unitus animæ Christi, etc.—They even went so far as to ask, whether and in what manner God was in the devil? and to reply in the *affirmative, so far as the devil is composed of nature and spirit!*—*St. Bernard* said in his Meditations (cap. i. quoted by Bonaventura, l. c.): Deus in creaturis mirabilis, in hominibus amabilis, in angelis desirabilis, in se ipso incomprehensibilis, in reprobis intolerabilis, item in damnatis ut terror et horror.—*Tauler* also made a distinction between the presence of God in things, and that in men: God is no less present in a piece of wood and stone, than in men, but the former are not conscious of it. If the piece of wood knew God, and felt his nearness, even as the highest angels know him, the one would be quite

as happy as the other. Man is happier than a piece of wood, because he recognizes God, etc. (Predigten, vol. i. p. 58, 59.) [Comp. also *Anselm*, Monol. c. 22. *Albertus Magnus*, Summa, P. i. Qu. 70, Membr. 1.]

[6] This was done, *e. g.*, by *Alexander Hales*, see Cramer, l. c. p. 209, as. Comp. *Bonaventura*, Comp. i. 18. He defined æternitas (after the example of Boëthius) as interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio (interminabilitas).

[7] *John Damascenus*, De Fide Orth. i. 5. *Nicolas of Methone*, Refut. p. 25 (quoted by *Ullmann*, l. c. p. 72), said: "When we call the unity [God] beginning, we do not mean to draw a comparison between it and that which is posterior to the beginning; for the same reason we do not merely use the term 'beginning,' without further qualifying it, but we say *over*-commencing beginning; nor do we restrict ourselves to the term '*unity*' as such, but we call it the *over-all-one*; and instead of the first, and first of all, we say the *over-first*, instead of the great or the greatest, we make use of the term *over-great*." He called God the ὑπερέν and even used the expression ὑπέρθεος μονάς καὶ τριάς (Refut. 26). Comp. *Hugo of St. Victor*, quoted by *Liebner*, p. 371; he understood by unity not the numerical unity, but also simplicity (vera unitas), and immutability (summa unitas). [*Abelard*, Introd. in Theol. L. iii. 2: Nulla tanta fieri concordia, vel regi possunt, quanta illa quæ unus tantum vel condit, vel regit. *Richard of St. Victor*, de Trin. Lib. i. 14.]

§ 167.

b. The Relation of God to Existences—Omnipotence and Omniscience.

The application of the divine *knowledge* and *power* to things out of God easily gave rise to anthropomorphitic notions and absurd subtilities,[1] which were best removed by regarding the attributes of omnipotence and omniscience not as separate attributes, but in their connection with the divine essence. *Anselm*[2] and *Abelard*[3] agreed in asserting that God can do everything which may be done without interfering with his infinite perfection; *Peter Lombard*, *Hugo of St. Victor*, *Richard of St. Victor*, and others, adopted the same view.[4] The *knowledge* of God was farther looked upon as immediate and omnipresent, and a distinction was made between that aspect of this knowledge which refers to things (as *habitus*), and that which has regard to himself (as *actus*).[5] Respecting the divine *omnipotence* some, *e. g.*, *Abelard*, maintained that God could make nothing else and nothing better, than what he really makes;[6] others, *e. g.*, *Hugo of St. Victor*, thought this assertion blasphemous, because the infinite power of God is thus restricted within certain limits.[7]

[1] *E. g.*, whether God could make undone that which is done? whether he

could change a harlot into a pure virgin? and similar absurd questions; see the passages quoted § 152, note 5, from the work of Erasmus.

[8] Thus Anselm asserted, in reply to the question, whether God could lie, if he would? (Cur Deus Homo, i. 12): Non sequitur, si Deus vult mentiri, justum esse mentiri, sed potius *Deum illum non esse.* Nam nequaquam potest velle mentiri voluntas, nisi in' qua corrupta est veritas, immo quæ deserendo veritatem corrupta est. Cum ergo dicitur: Si Deus vult mentiri, non est aliud, quam: Si Deus talis est naturæ, quæ velit mentiri, etc. Comp. ii. 5: Denique Deus nihil facit necessitate, quia nullo modo cogitur aut prohibetur aliquid facere. Et cum dicimus Deum aliquid facere, quasi necessitate vitandi inhonestatem, quam utique non timet, potius intelligendum est, quia hoc facit necessitate servandæ honestatis, quæ scilicet necessitas non est aliud, quam immutabilitas honestatis ejus, quam a se ipso et non ab alio habet; et *idcirco improprie dicitur necessitas.* Ibid. 18: Quoties namque dicitur Deus *non posse*, nulla negatur in eo potestas, sed insuperabilis significatur potentia et fortitudo. Non enim aliud intelligitur, nisi quia nulla res potest efficere, ut agat ille, quod negatur posse. Nam multum usitata est hujusmodi locutio, ut dicatur res aliqua posse, non quia in illa, sed quoniam in alia re est potestas; et non posse, non quoniam in illa, sed quia in alia re est impotentia. Dicimus namque: Iste homo potest vinci, pro: Aliquis potest eum vincere, et: Ille non potest vinci, pro: Nullus eum vincere potest. Non enim potestas est, posse vinci, sed impotentia, nec vinci non posse impotentia est, sed potestas. Nec dicimus Deum necessitate facere aliquid, eo quod in illo sit ulla necessitas, sed quoniam est in alio sicut dixi de impotentia, quando dicitur non posse. Omnis quippe necessitas est aut coactio, aut prohibitio, quæ duæ necessitates convertuntur invicem contrarie, sicut necesse et impossibile. Quidquid namque cogitur esse, prohibetur non esse, et quod cogitur non esse, prohibetur esse; quemadmodum quod necesse est esse, impossibile est non esse, et quod necesse est non esse, impossibile est esse, et conversim. Cum autem dicimus aliquid necesse esse aut non esse in Deo, non intelligitur, quod sit in illo necessitas aut cogens, aut prohibens, sed significatur, quod in omnibus aliis rebus est necessitas prohibens eas facere, et cogens non facere; contra hoc, quod de Deo dicitur. Nam cum dicimus, quod necesse est Deum semper verum dicere, et necesse est eum nunquam mentiri, non dicitur aliud, nisi quia tanta est in illo constantia servandi veritatem, ut necesse sit, nullum rem facere posse, ut verum non dicat, aut ut mentiatur.—Comp. Proslog. 7:.....Inde verius es omnipotens, quia potes nihil per impotentiam et nihil potes contra te.--Comp. *Hasse*, ii. 274, *sq.* De Concord. Præsc. et Præd. P. i. c. 2, ss. (where the question is discussed, how far the term necessitas can be applied to God). Respecting the *knowledge* of God, Anselm (after the example of Augustine) endeavored to prove that God does not know the things because they are, but that they are because he knows them, ibid. c. 7.

[9] However different the general theories of Abelard and Anselm, yet in this one point they agreed. *Abel.* Theol. Christ. v. p. 1350 (edit. Martène): Quærendum itaque primo videtur, quomodo vere dicatur omnipotens, si non possit omnia efficere; aut quomodo omnia possit, si quædam nos possumus, quæ ipse non possit. Possumus autem quædam, ut ambulare, loqui, sentire,

quæ a natura divinitatis penitus aliena sunt, cum necessaria istorum instrumenta nullatenus habere incorporea queat substantia. Quibus quidem objectis id prædicendum arbitror, quod juxta ipsos quoque philosophos, et communis sermonis usum, numquam potentia cujusque rei accipitur, nisi in his, quæ ad commodum vel dignitatem ipsius rei pertinent. Nemo enim hoc potentiæ hominis deputat, quod ille superari facile potest, immo impotentiæ et debilitati ejus quod minime suo resistere potest incommodo, et quicquid ad vitium hominis vergit, magisque personam improbat quam commendat, impotentiæ potius quam potentiæ adscribendum est.....Nemo itaque Deum impotentem in aliquo dicere præsumat, si non possit peccare sicut nos possumus, quia nec in nobis ipsis hoc potentiæ tribuendum est, sed infirimitati. .....P. 1351:.....Sicut etiam quædam, quæ in aliis rebus potentiæ deputanda sunt, in aliis vero minime.....Inde potentem hominem comparatione aliorum hominum diceremus, sed non ita leonem vel elephantem. Sic in homine, quoad ambulare valet, potentiæ est adscribendum, quoniam ejus necessitudini congruit, nec in aliquo ejus minuit dignitatem. In Deo vero, qui sola voluntate omnia complet, hoc omnino superfluum esset, quod in nobis necessarium est, atque ideo non potentiæ, sed vitio penitus tribuendum esset in eo, præsertim cum hoc in multis excellentiæ ipsius derogaret, ut ambulare videlicet posset.....Non absurde tamen et de his omnibus, quæ efficere possumus, Deum potentum prædicabimus, et omnia quæ agimus, ejus potentiæ tribuemus, in quo vivimus, movemur et sumus. Et qui omnia operatur in omnibus (utitur enim nobis ad efficiendum quæ vult, quasi instrumentis) et id quoque facere dicitur, quæ nos facere facit, sicut dives aliquis turrem componere per opifices quos adhibet, et posse omnia efficere dicitur, qui sive per se sive per subjectam creaturam omnia, quæ vult et quomodo vult, operatur, et ut ita fiant, ipse etiam facit. Nam etsi non potest ambulare, tamen potest facere, ut ambuletur.....*Posse itaque Deus omnia dicitur, non quod omnes suscipere possit actiones, sed quod in omnibus, quæ fieri velit, nihil ejus voluntati resistere queat.** Comp. *Baur*, Trinitätsl. ii. 487, *sq.* [Comp. also *Neander*, Hist. Dogmas, 501–6.]

[a] *Hugo of St. Victor*, De Sacram. Lib. i. C. 22: Deus omnia potest, et tamen se ipsum destruere non potest. Hoc enim posse, posse non esset, sed non posse. Itaque omnia potest Deus, quæ posse potentia est. Et ideo vere omnipotens est, quia impotens esse non potest. Comp. *Liebner*, p. 367.—*Peter Lombard*, Sentent. i. Dist. 42, E.: Deus omnino nihil potest pati, et omnia facere potest præter ea sola, quibus dignitas ejus læderetur ejusque excellentiæ derogaretur. In quo tamen non est minus omnipotens: hoc enim posse non est posse, sed non posse. Comp. *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, ii. p. 47, 48, where other passages are quoted from the writings of *Richard of St. Victor*, de Trin. L. I. c. 21; *Alexander Hales*, Summa, I. qu. 21, Membr. 1, art. 2; *Albertus Magnus*, Summa, P. I. qu. 77, Membr. 1; and *Thomas Aquinas*, Summa, P. I. qu. 25, art. 3.

[b] *Hugo of St. Vtcior* (cap. 9, 14–18, quoted by *Liebner*, p. 363, 364), expressed himself as follows: "All things which were created by God in time, existed uncreated in him from eternity, and were known to him for

* Abelard, speaking of the Trinity, ascribed *omnipotence* principally to the Father, without denying it, however of the Son or the Spirit. Comp. § 170.

this very reason, *because* they existed *in* him, and were known to him *in the very manner* in which they existed in him. God knew nothing out of himself, because he comprehended all things in himself. They were not in him, because they should at some future period come into existence; the fact of their being designed to exist in time to come was not the cause of their existence in God, nor were they created in time because they existed in God, as if the eternal could not have existed without the temporal. On the contrary, the former would have existed without the latter: but it would not have stood in any relation to the latter, if this had not existed as something which was to be in future. There would always have been the knowledge of an existence, viz., of an existence in God, though not of a future existence; but the knowledge of the creator would not therefore have been less comprehensive, because it could only be said that he had no foreknowledge of that which was not future."—In the opinion of *Alexander Hales*, God knows all things *through* himself and *in* himself; for if God knew them by means of something else, then the ground of his knowledge would be some perfection existing out of him, and he could not be the most perfect being if he owed anything to any other being.....God knows all things at once; for he sees all things in himself, and since he knows himself at once and completely, it is evident that he knows all things in himself at once and perfectly. The things themselves may be multiplied or lessened, but not the knowledge of God: the latter is immutable; see *Cramer*, vii. p. 240.—*Bonaventura*, Comp. i. 29: Scit Deus omnia præsentialiter et simul, perfecte quoque et immutabiliter. Præsentialiter dico, hoc est, ita limpide ac si cuncta essent præsentialiter existentia. Simul etiam scit omnia, quia videndo se, qui sibi præsens est, omnia videt. Perfecte quoque, quia cognitio ejus nec potest augeri, nec minui. Scit et immutabiliter, quia noscit omnia per naturam sui intellectus, qui est immutabilis. Dicendum ergo, quod Deus cognoscit temporalia æternaliter, mutabilia immutabiliter, contingentia infallibiliter, creata increate, alia vero a se, in se et per se. Comp. Brev. i. 8.—*Thomas Aquinas*, Quæst. xiv. Art. 4.....In Deo intellectus et id, quod intelligitur, et species intelligibilis et ipsum intelligere sunt omnino unum et idem. Unde patet per hoc, quod Deus dicitur intelligens, nulla multiplicitas ponitur in ejus substantia. Comp. art. 13: Deus autem cognoscit omnia contingentia, non solum prout sunt in suis causis, sed etiam prout unumquodque eorum est actu in se ipso. Et licet contingentia fiant in actu successive, non tamen Deus successive cognoscit contingentia, prout sunt in suo esse, sicut nos, sed simul: quia sua cognitio mensuratur æternitate, sicut etiam suum esse. Æternitate autem tota simul existens audit totum tempus .....Unde omnia, quæ sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab æterno præsentia, non solum ea ratione, qua habet rationes rerum apud se præsentes, ut quidam dicunt, sed quia ejus intuitus fertur ab æterno super omnia, prout in sua præsentialitate. Unde manifestum est, quod contingentia et infallibiliter a Deo cognoscuntur, in quantum subduntur divino conspectui secundum suam præsentialitatem, et tamen sunt futura contingentia suis causis comparata..... Ea, quæ temporaliter in actum reducuntur, a nobis successive cognoscuntur in tempore, sed a Deo in æternitate, quæ est supra tempus...Sicut ille, qui audit per viam, non videt illos, qui post eum veniant, sed ille, qui ab aliqua

altitudine totam vitam intuetur, simul videt omnes transeuntes per viam. On the relation between knowledge and foreknowledge, see *John of Salisbury*, Policrat. ii. 21. (Bibl. Max. xxiii. p. 268.) An instance of subtile reasoning is given by *Liebner*, l. c. p. 365, note.

[6] *Abelard*, Theol. Christ. v. p. 1354.....Facit itaque omnia quæ potest Deus, et tantum bene quantum potest.....Necesse est, ut omnia quæ vult, ipse velit; sed nec inefficax ejus voluntas esse potest: necesse est ergo, ut quæcunque vult ipse perficiat, cum eam videlicet sumamus voluntatem, quæ ad ipsius pertinet ordinationem. Istis ergo rationibus astruendum videtur, quod plura Deus nullatenus facere possit quam faciat, aut melius facere, aut ab his cessare, sed omnia ita ut facit necessario facere. Sed rursus singulis istis difficillimæ occurrunt objectiones, ut utroque cornu graviter fidem nostram oppugnet complexio. Quis enim negare audeat, quod non possit Deus eum qui damnandus est salvare, aut meliorem illum qui salvandus est facere, quam ipse futurus sit collatione suorum donorum, aut omnino dimisisse, ne eum unquam crearet? Quippe si non potest Deus hunc salvare, utique nec ipse salvari a Deo potest. Necessaria quippe est hæc reciprocationis consecutio, quod si ipse salvatur a Deo, Deus hunc salvat. Unde, si possibile est hunc salvari a Deo, possibile est Deum hunc salvare. Non enim possibile est antecedens, nisi possibile sit et consequens: alioquin ex possibili impossibile sequeretur, quod omnino falsum est.....Comp. the subsequent part of the chapter. And so he comes to the following conclusion: Quicquid itaque facit (Deus), sicut necessario vult, ita et necessario facit.

[7] On the opposition of Hugo of St. Victor to the optimism of Abelard (by which he was compelled to suppose a higher extent of the divine power than of the divine will), comp. *Liebner*, p. 367, 368.

§ 168.

c. *Moral Attributes.*

The so-called *moral attributes* of God, viz., his holiness, wisdom, justice, and benevolence, were treated in connection with other doctrines, and sometimes in such a manner as to give the appearance of contradictions.[1] As the knowledge of God is one with his being, so likewise is his will, whose final object can be only the absolutely good, that is God.[2] The mystics loved to descend into the depth of divine *love*, and endeavored to explain this in their own way,[3] while the scholastics proposed wondrous questions respecting even this attribute of God, which least of all admits of being dialectically discussed.[4]

[1] This was the case with the justice, omnipotence, and love of God in reference to the theory of satisfaction. Comp. *Anselm*, Cur Deus homo i. c. 6–12, and Proslog. c. 8: see the preceding §, note 1. *Hasse*, ii. 275, *sq.* [*Ritschl.* in Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. 1860, pp. 584–595.]

Thomas Aquinas, Summa P. I. Qu. 19, art. 13: Voluntas divina necessariam habitudinem habet ad bonitatem suam, quæ est proprium ejus objectum, The question was raised, whether God has a liberum arbitrium, since in him everything is necessary. Thomas decided that God is free respecting that which is not an essential determination of his nature, that is, respecting the accidental, finite. But respecting himself he is determined by his own necessity, comp. art. 10, and *Baur*, Trinitätslehre, ii. p. 641.—*Duns Scotus*, on the contrary, asserted the absolute liberty of God; see *Baur*.

[3] The language of the author of the *Deutsche Theologie* is worthy of notice (c. 50): "God does not love himself as such, but as the most perfect being. For if God knew anything better than God, he would love it, and not himself. Egoism and self-hood, *i. e.*, self-love and self-will, are entirely foreign to God; only so much belongs to God as is necessary to constitute his personality, or the distinction between the different persons of the Trinity."

[4] Thus *Alexander Hales* asked (the passage is quoted by *Cramer*, vii. p 261), whether the love wherewith God loves his creatures is the same with that which he has towards himself, and which the divine persons have towards each other. He replies in the affirmative in reference to the principal idea (principale signatum), but in the negative respecting the secondary idea (connatum), *i. e.*, that love is the same on the part of him who loves, but not the same with regard to those who are loved. It is also on that account that God does not manifest the same degree of love towards all his creatures, but more of it towards the better portion of them, less towards the less good. He loves all creatures from eternity (in the idea), but he does not love them in reality, until they come into existence.—Another question was: Whom does God love most, the angels or men? The answer is: The former, inasmuch as Christ did not belong to the number of the latter; but the love wherewith God loves Christ, and consequently the human race *in* Christ, even surpasses the love which he has towards the angels.—We have here a profound Christian truth expressed in a scholastic form.

§ 169.

DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

Procession of the Holy Spirit.

Walch, J. G., Historia Controversiæ, etc., *Pfaff*, Historia succincta (comp. § 94). *Hasse*, Anselm, ii. 322 [*Kahnis*, Gesch. d. Lehre vom heil. Geiste.]

Before the doctrine of the Trinity could be more philosophically developed and fully established, it was necessary to settle the controversy which had arisen between the Eastern and the Western church respecting the procession of the Holy Ghost from both the Father and the Son. After the view taken by the Greek church had been received in the East as the orthodox doctrine, through the influence of *John Damascenus*,[1] the Emperor Charlemagne summoned a synod

at Aix-la-Chapelle in the year 809, which, being influenced especially by the Frank theologians, *Alcuin* and *Theodulph of Orleans*, confirmed the doctrine of the Western church, according to which the Holy Ghost proceeds not only from the Father, but also from the Son.[1] Pope Leo III. approved of the doctrine itself, but disapproved of the uncritical introduction of the clause "filioque" into the creed adopted by the council of Constantinople. He numbered the doctrine in question among mysteries difficult to be investigated, and which are of greater importance in a speculative point of view, than in the aspect of a living faith.[2] But when in later times the controversy between *Photius*, patriarch of Constantinople, and *Nicolas I.* led to the disruption of the two churches, their difference on the said doctrine was again made the subject of discussion. Photius defended the doctrine of the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father alone, and rejected the additional clause "filioque," which the theologians of the Western Church, such as *Æneas*, bishop of Paris, and *Ratramn*, a monk of Corvey, wished to retain.[3] *Anselm*, archbishop of Canterbury, likewise defended the doctrine of the Latin church at the synod of Bari (in Apulia) in the year 1098, and discussed it more fully in a separate treatise.[5] *Anselm*, bishop of Havelberg, defended it (1135–1145).[6] The attempt made at the synod of Lyons in the year 1274, to reconcile the two parties, did not lead to any satisfactory result. The controversy was resumed in the year 1277; but the formula proposed at the synod of Florence (A. D. 1439) did not settle the point in question.[7] Hence, from that time, the two churches have ever differed in this, that according to the Greek church the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father alone, but according to the Latin church, from both the Father and the Son. There were, however, some theologians in the latter who were satisfied with the view taken by the Greek divines.[8]

[1] De Fide Orth. i. c. 7. He called the Holy Ghost (in distinction from a mere breath, or a mere divine power) *δύναμιν οὐσιώδη, αὐτὴν ἑαυτῆς ἐν ἰδιαζούσῃ ὑποστάσει θεωρουμένην, καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς προερχομένην*; but added: *καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἀναπαυομένην καὶ αὐτοῦ οὖσαν ἐκφαντικὴν, οὔτε χωρισθῆναι τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι, καὶ τοῦ λόγου, ᾧ συμπαρομαρτεῖ, δυναμένην, οὔτε πρὸς τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον ἀναχεομένην, ἀλλὰ καθ' ὁμοιότητα τοῦ λόγου καθ' ὑπόστασιν οὖσαν, ζῶσαν, προαιρετικὴν, αὐτοκίνητον, ἐνεργόν, πάντοτε τὸ ἀγαθὸν θέλουσαν, καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν πρόθεσιν σύνδρομον ἔχουσαν τῇ βουλήσει τὴν δύναμιν, μήτε ἀρχὴν ἔχουσαν, μήτε τέλος· οὐ γὰρ ἐνέλειψέ ποτε τῷ πατρὶ λόγος, οὔτε τῷ λόγῳ πνεῦμα.* *Baur*, ii. p. 177.

[2] *Alcuinus*, de Processione Spir. S. libellus. Opp. T. i. ed. *Froben*, p. 743. —In support of his views he appealed to Luke vi. 19 (Omnis turba quærebat eum tangere, quia virtus de illo exibat et sanabat omnes); to John xx. 21, 22; 1 John iii. 23, 24, and to the authority of the Fathers. *Theodulphi* de Spiritu S. liber, in Theodulphi Opp. ed. *Sirmond*. Par. 1646, 8,

and in Sirmondii Opp. T. ii. p 1695, cf. Libr. Carolin. Lib. iii. c. 3; Ex patre et filio—omnis universaliter confitetur ecclesia eum procedere. Concerning the historical part, see the works on ecclesiastical history. [*Gieseler*, ii. § 12, § 93, § 156.].

[s] On the occasion of a controversy between the Greek and Latin monks at Jerusalem prior to the Synod of Aix-la-Chapelle, the Pope had given it as his opinion: Spiritum Sanctum a Patre et Filio æqualiter procedentem.—Respecting the relation in which he stood to the Synod itself, see Callatio cum Papa Romæ a Legatis habita et Epist. Caroli Imperat. ad Leonem P. III. utraque a Smaragdo Abb. edita. (in *Mansi*, T. xiv. p. 17, ss.).

[t] See *Photii* Epist. Encyclica issued A. D. 867 (given by *Montacutius*, Ep. 2, p. 47); the following, among other charges, is there brought forward against the Roman church: Τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς μόνον, ἀλλά γε ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐκπορεύεσθαι καινολογήσαντες.—The writings of his opponents, *Ratramn* and *Æneas* are no longer extant in a complete form, comp. *d'Achery*, Spicil. Ed. i. T. i. p. 63, ss. *Rössler*, Bibliothek der Kirchenväter, vol. x. p. 663, ss. [They rested their view upon Gal. iv. 6; Phil. i. 19; Acts ii. 33; xvi. 7; John viii. 42; xx. 22.]—The Greeks considered the Father as the πηγὴ θεότητος, and said, that if the Spirit also proceeded from the Son, this would involve a πολυαρχία, which the Latins did not concede, since Father and Son are one. [On *Photius*, see Abbé *Jager*, Histoire de Photius (from original documents), 2d ed. Paris, 1853. *J. Hergenröther*, Photii Constantinopl. Liber de Spiriti Sanct. Mystagogia, Regensb., 1857: Comp. Hergenröther, Die theol. Polemik des Photius gegen die Lateiner, in Theol. Quartalschrift, 1858, pp. 559–629. *Hase*, Glaubenszeugnisse d. griechischen Kirche, Anhang zur 5. Aufl. der Dogmatik., Leipz. 1860.]

[u] Concerning the synod, see *Eadmer*, Vita Anselmi, p. 21, quoted by *Walch*, l. c. p. 61.—The work of *Anselm* is entitled: De Processione Spiritus S. contra Græcos. Opp. p. 49 (Edit. Lugd. p. 115). In chapters 1–3 he shows in a clear and concise manner the points of *agreement* between the two churches (in reference to the doctrine of the Trinity, and that of the Holy Spirit in its general aspects), as well as the points of *difference*. Respecting the doctrine of the Western church itself, Anselm argued from the proposition: Deus est de Deo, as follows (c. 4): Cum est de Patre Spiritus S., non potest non esse de filio, si non est filius de Spiritu Sancto; nulla enim alia ratione potest negari Spiritus S. esse de filio..... Quod autem filius non sit de Spir. S., palam est ex catholica fide; non enim est Deus de Deo, nisi aut nascendo ut filius, aut procedendo ut Spir. S. Filius autem non nascitur de Spiritu S. Si enim nascitur de illo, est filius Spir. Sancti, et Spiritus S. pater ejus, sed alter alterius nec pater nec filius. Non ergo nasciter de Spiritu S. filius, nec minus apertum est, quia non procedit de illo. Esset enim Spir. ejusdem Spiritus Sancti, quod aperte negatur, cum Spiritus S. dicitur et creditur Spiritus Filii. Non enim potest esse Spiritus sui Spiritus. Quare non procedit filius de Spir. Sancto. Nullo ergo modo est de Spir. Sancto filius. Sequitur itaque inexpugnabili ratione, Spir. Sanctum esse de filio, sicut est de patre.—C. 7: Nulla relatio est patris sine relatione filii, sicut nihil est filii relatio, sine patris relatione. Si ergo alia nihil est sine altera, non potest

aliquid de relatione patris esse sine relatione filii. Quare sequitur, Spiritum S. esse de utraque, si est de una. Itaque si est de patre secundum relationem, erit simul et de filio secundum eundem sensum.....Non autem magis est pater Deus quam filius, sed unus solus verus Deus, Pater et Filius. Quapropter si Spiritus S. est de Patre, quia est de Deo qui pater est, negari nequit esse quoque de filio, cum sit de Deo, qui est filius.—(C. 8–12, he gives the scriptural argument.) In the thirteenth chapter he meets the objection, that the doctrine in question would lower the dignity of the Spirit.....Qui dicimus Spiritum S. de filio esse sive procedere, nec minorem, nec posteriorem eum filio fatemur, namque quamvis splendor et calor de sole procedant, nec possint esse nisi sit ille, de quo sunt, nihil tamen prius aut posterius in tribus, in sole et splendore et calore, intelligimus: multo itaque minus, cum hæc in rebus temporalibus ita sint, in æternitate, quæ tempore non clauditur, prædictæ tres personæ in existendo susceptibiles intervalli possunt intelligi.—The concession made by the Greek theologians, viz., Spiritum Sanct. de patre esse *per* filium, did not appear satisfactory to Anselm. As a lake is formed not only by the spring, but also by the river which flows from the spring, so the Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son.* (C. 15 and 16.) We must not, however, assume the existence of *two* principles from which the Spirit proceeds, but only *one* divine principle, common to the Father and the Son (c. 17). In chapters 18–20, he considers those scriptures which apparently teach the procession of the Spirit from the Father alone; c. 21, he defends the introduction of the clause "filioque" as a necessary means of preventing any misunderstanding. In chapters 22–27, he repeats and confirms all he has said before. As Anselm commenced his treatise by invoking the aid of the Holy Spirit himself, so he concluded it by saying: Si autem aliquid protuli quod aliquatenus corrigendum sit, *mihi* imputetur, non *sensui Latinitatis*. Comp. *Hasse*, ubi supra.—Concerning the progress of the controversy, comp. *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, ii. p. 112, 113. On the later definitions of the scholastics, see *Baur*, Trinitätslehre, ii. 705, *sq.*; especially on Aquinas and Duns Scotus. [Aquinas argues: The Son is from the Father, as the word from the mind, the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, from the will; but love must also proceed from the word, because we can not love what we do not conceive; hence the Spirit proceeds from the Son....Comp. also *Twesten* on Trinity, transl. in Bibliotheca Sacra, iv. p. 25, *sq.*]

[6] He was in 1135 the ambassador of Lothair II., in Constantinople, where the controversy was in progress. Pope Eugene III. in 1145 bade him put his views in writing. See *Spieker*, in Illgen's Zeifschrift f. hist. Theol. 1840.

[7] At the Synod of Lyons the Greeks agreed with the council in adopting as Can. I.: Quod Spir. S. æternabiliter ex Patre et Filio, non tanquam ex duobus principiis, sed tanquam ex uno principio, non duabas spirationibus, sed unica spiritione procedit.—But new differences arose, respecting which

* A similar illustration is adduced by *Abelard*, Theol. Chr. iv. p. 1335: Spir. Sanct. ex Patre proprie procedere dicitur, quasi a summa origine, quæ scilicet aliunde non sit, et ab ipso in Filium quasi in rivum.....et per Filium ad nos tandem quasi in stagnum hujus seculi.

see the works on ecclesiastical history and compare *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, l. c. p. 114.—In the formula of union framed by the synod of Florence, A. D. 1439, July 6th (given by *Mansi*, T. xxi. p. 1027, ss. and *Gieseler*, iii. § 156, *Münscher*, von Cölln, p. 115) use was made of the expression, quod Spirit. S. ex Patre et Filio æternaliter est; the phrase: procedere *ex* Patre *per* filium, was interpreted in accordance with the views of the Latin church, and the clause *filioque* was retained. But the peace thus established did not last long, and the patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem issued (A. D. 1443) a letter against the union. Comp. *Leo Allatius*, De Ecclesiæ occidentalis et orientalis perpetua Consensione, p. 939, ss. For the other works see *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, and *Gieseler*, l. c.

[a] Thus *John Wessel*, comp. *Ullmann*, die Reformatoren, etc., i. p. 388, 394.

§ 170.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

C. Schwartz, De Sancta Trinitate quid senserint Doctores ecclesiastici prima Scholasticæ Theologiæ Periodo, Hal., 1842. [Comp. the works referred to in § 87. *Neander*, Hist. Dogmas. 497, *sq.*, 562, *sq.*]

The doctrine of the Trinity, developed in the preceding period, and, to a certain extent, summed up by John Damascenus,[1] challenged the speculative tendencies and ingenuity of the scholastics, as well as the imagination of the mystics, to fathom the unsearchable depth of that mystery. But all dialectic attempts were accompanied by the old danger of falling into heretical errors either in the one or the other direction. This was especially the case with the first bold and youthful attempts of Western speculation. *John Scotus Erigena* declared that the terms Father and Son are mere names, to which there is no corresponding objective distinction of essence in the Godhead, which strongly savours of pantheism.[2] The nominalism of *Roscelinus* exposed him to the charge of tritheism,[3] while that of *Abelard* exposed him to the accusation of Sabellianism.[4] The distinction which *Gilbert of Poitiers* drew between the *quo est* and the *quod est* gave to his doctrine the semblance of tetratheism.[5] *Anselm*,[6] and *Peter Lombard*,[7] adopted in the main the views held by Augustine; the terminology, however, used by the latter gave rise to misunderstandings. The treatment of the subject by the scholastics of the second period was more strictly systematic and speculative.[8] But this very tendency, which more and more lost sight of the practical aspect of the doctrine, led to those subtile distinctions and absurd questions, which have for a long time seriously injured the reputation of scholasticism, but which were, in fact, the excesses of an otherwise powerful tendency.[9] Among

the Greeks, *Nicetas Choniates* contented himself with representing the mystery in question in figurative language,[10] while *Nicolas of Methone* manifested a stronger leaning to the dialectic tendency of the Western theologians.[11] The mystics followed for the most part *Dionysius the Areopagite*, and wrestled with language in the endeavor either to represent the incomprehensible in itself,[12] or to bring it more within the reach of the understanding (in doing which they did not always avoid the appearance of pantheism).[13]— The disciples of the school of St. Victor, held, as it were, the medium between sterile dialectics and fantastic mysticism.[14] *Savonarola*,[15] and *Wessel*,[16] instead of indulging in philosophical reasonings, based upon the nature of God, returned to natural and human analogies fitted to men's religious needs, and which might serve to illustrate the mystery, but were not meant to explain it.

[1] *John Damascenus* brings forward nothing new. He repeats the earlier propositions, making use of the traditional terms, νοῦς and λόγος, and the comparison with the human word and spirit, in the sense of former theologians. God can not be ἄλογος, but the Logos must have a πνεῦμα. He lays great stress upon the unity *in* the Trinity, so that the Son and the Spirit, though persons, have yet their unity in the Father; what they are, they are through him. He has therefore been charged with a wavering between Unitarianism and Tritheism, and, at any rate, the dialectic contradictions, from which the logic of the old church could not free itself, is strikingly manifest in his statements. Comp. *Baur*, Trinitätslehre, ii. p. 176, ss. *Meier*, p. 199, ss.

[2] De Div. Nat. i. 18: Num quid veris ratiocinationibus obsistit, si dicamus, Patrem et Filium ipsius habitudinis, quæ dicitur ad aliquid, nomina esse et plus quam habitudinis? Non enim credendum est, eandem esse habitudinem in excellentissimis divinæ essentiæ substantiis, et in his, quæ post eam ab ea condita sunt. Quemadmodum superat omnem essentiam, sapientiam, virtutem, ita etiam habitudinem omnino ineffabiliter supergreditur. According to i. 14, Scotus (appealing to earlier theologians and Inquisitores veritatis) calls the Father the *essentia*, the Son the *sapientia*, and the Spirit the *vita Dei*. On the question respecting the relation between the four categories of nature, creans etc. (see § 165), and the three persons of the Trinity, comp. *Baur*, Trinitätlehre, ii. p. 275, ss. *Meier*, p. 230, ss. *Ritter*, vii. 250. [*Christlieb* in his recent work on John Scotus Erigena, 1860, gives a full exposition of his views on the Trinity, pp. 178–187. Thus in De Div. Nat. ii. 29, he teaches, that there are three causes in one cause, and one in three, as there is one God existing "in tribus substantiis per se subsistentibus." On the procession of the Holy Spirit, he agreed more nearly with the Greek than with the Latin church; for he says, if the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, he proceeds from two causes; and, "ex duabus causis unam causam confluere, rationi non facile occurrit" But his whole doctrine of the Trinity is modified by his fundamental pantheistic view, that

there are no distinctions in God; God is not essentially either a unity or trinity, but more than both; comp. Christlier, p. 184.]

[3] In accordance with his nominalistic notions *Roscelinus* regarded the appellation *God*, which is common to the three persons, as a mere name, *i. e.*, as the abstract idea of a genus, under which the *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost* are comprehended (as three individuals, as it were). This was at least the meaning which his opponents attached to his language: see Ep. *Joannis Monachi* ad Anselmum (given by *Baluze*, Miscell. L. iv. p. 478): Hanc de tribus Deitatis personis quæstionem Roscelinus movet: Si tres personæ sunt una tantum res, et non sunt tres res per se, sicut tres angeli aut tres animæ, ita tamen ut voluntate et potentia omnino sint idem: ergo Pater et Spir. S. cum filio incarnatus est.—This opinion was condemned by the synod of Soissons (A. D. 1093), and combated by *Anselm* in his treatise: De Fide Trinitatis et de Incarnatione Verbi contra Blasphemias Rucelini.—But Anselm doubted the accuracy of the statements made by his opponents, c. 3: Sed forsitan ipse non dicit: "sicut sunt tres animæ aut tres angeli;" he thought it more probable that Roscelinus had expressed himself in general terms: Tres personas esse tres, sine additamento alicujus similitudinis, and that the above illustration was added by his opponents. Nevertheless he was also disposed to attach credit to the statements of his opponents? comp. c. 2* Comp. *Baur*, Trinitätslehre, ii. p. 400, ss. *Meier*, 243. *Hasse*, ii. 287, *sq.*

[4] Concerning the history of *Abelard's* condemnation at the synod of Soissons (Concilium Suessionense, A. D. 1121), and at Sens, 1140, comp. the works on ecclesiastical history, and Neander, der heilige Bernhard, p. 121, ss. His views are principally contained in his Introductio ad Theologiam, and in his Theologia Christiana. He proceeds from the absolute perfection of God. If God is absolutely perfect, he must also be absolutely powerful, wise, and good. Power, wisdom, and love, are therefore, in his opinion, the three persons of the Trinity, and the difference is merely nominal. Theol. Christiana I. 1, p. 1156, ss.: Summi boni perfectionem, quod Deus est, ipsa Dei sapientia incarnata Christus Dominus describendo tribus *nominibus* diligenter distinxit, cum unicam et singularum individuam penitus ac simplicem substantiam divinam, Patrem et Filium et Spirit. S. tribus de causis appellavit: Patrem quidem secundum illam unicam majestatis suæ potentiam, quæ est omnipotentia, quia scilicet efficere potest, quidquid vult, cum nihil ei resistere queat; Filium autem eandem Divinam substantiam dixit secundum propriæ sapientiæ discretionem, qua videlicet cuncta dijudicare ac discernere potest, et nihil eam latere possit, quo decipiatur; Spiritum S. etiam vocavit ipsam, secundum illam benignitatis suæ gratiam, qua omnia, quæ summa condidit sapientia, summa ordinat bonitate et ad optimum quæque finem accommodat, malo quoque bene semper utens et mirabiliter quan-

* At a later period *Jerome of Prague* was charged with *tetratheism*, and even with more than that. He is said to have taught: In Deo sive in divina essentia non solum est Trinitas personarum, sed etiam *quaternitas* rerum et *quinternitas*, etc. Istæ res in divinis sunt sic distinctæ, quod una non est alia, et tamen quælibet earum est Deus. Istarum rerum una est aliis perfectior. See *Hermann von der Hardt*, Acta et Decreta, T. iv. p. viii. ss. p. 645.

tumlibet perverse facta optime disponens, quasi qui utraque manu pro dextra utatur et nesciat nisi dextram.....Tale est ergo tres personas, hoc est Patrem et Filium et Spirit. S. in divinitate confiteri, ac si commemoraremus divinam potentiam generantem, divinam sapientiam genitam, divinam benignitatem procedentem. Ut his videlicet tribus commemoratis summi boni perfectio prædicetur, cum videlicet ipse Deus et summe potens, *i. e.*, omnipotens, et summe sapiens et summe benignus ostenditur. Comp. Introd. ad Theol. I. 10, p. 991, and the other passages quoted by *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, p. 53, 54.—The relation in which the Father stands to the Son and Spirit, Abelard compares to that in which matter stands to form (materia et materiatum). As a wax figure is composed of wax, but, being a distinctly shaped figure, differs from the unshapen mass, so the Son, as *materia materiata*, differs from the Father. The latter, however, remains the *materia ipsa*, nor can it be said with the same propriety, that the wax owes its origin to the figure, as it can be said that the figure owes its origin to the wax. He also compares the Trinity to a brass seal, and draws a distinction between the substance of which the seal (æs) is composed, the figure carved in the brass (sigillabile), and the seal itself (sigillans), inasmuch as it shows what is in the act of sealing.—The comparison which Abelard drew (Introd. ii. 12) between the three persons of the Trinity, and the three persons in grammar (prima quæ loquitur, secunda ad quam loquitur, tertia de qua loquuntur) was particularly offensive, and might easily be represented as countenancing Tritheism. See *Baur*, ii. 503. *Meier*, 251.

[4] The heterodox opinions of *Gilbert* were also connected with the controversy between Nominalism and Realism; he started from Realism, but at last arrived at the same results to which Roscelinus had been led by Nominalism. According to the statements made by him in Paris 1147, and in Rheims 1148, in the presence of Eugenius III., he asserted: divinam essentiam non esse Deum. The former is the form by which God is God, but it is not God himself, as humanity is the form of man, but not man himself. The Father, the Son, and the Spirit are *one*; but not in reference to the *quod est*, but only in reference to the *quo est*, *i. e.* (the substantial form). We can therefore say: Father, Son, and Holy Ghost *are* one; but not: God *is* Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Gilbert considered the error of Sabellius to have consisted in this, that he confounded the *quo est* with the *quod est*. He himself was charged with separating the persons in the manner of Arius. There was indeed the semblance of tritheism in his proposition: that that which makes the three persons to be three, are tria singularia quædam, tres res numerabiles. The distinction which he drew between the quod est, the divine essence as such, and the three persons, brought upon him the further charge of believing in a quaternitas.—Gilbert was not formally condemned, but Eugenius III. declared, that in theology, God and the Godhead could not be separated from one another. Comp. especially *Gaufredi*, Abbatis Clarævallensis, Epistola ad Albinum Card. et Episc. Albanens. (*Mansi*, T. xxi. p. 728, ss.), and his Libellus contra Capitula Gilberti Pictav. Episcop. in *Mabillon's* edition of Bernhard's works, T. II. p. 1336, ss. *Baur*, ii. 509. *Meier*, 264, sq.

[5] In *Anselm*, as in *Augustine*, the Son is the intelligence of God, and the

Spirit is the love of God; Monol. c. 27, s. C. 30, he says of the Son (the Word): Si mens humana nullum ejus aut sui habere memoriam aut intelligentiam posset, nequaquam se ab irrationabilibus creaturis, et illam ab omni creatura, secum sola tacite disputando, sicut nunc mens mea facit, discerneret. Ergo summus ille spiritus, sicut est æternus, ita æterne sui memor est, et intelligit se ad similitudinem mentis rationalis: immo non ad ullius similitudinem, sed ille principaliter, et mens rationalis ad ejus similitudinem. At si æterne se intelligit, æterne se dicit. Si æterne se dicit, æterne est verbum ejus apud ipsum. Sive igitur ille cogitetur nulla alia existente essentia, sive aliis existentibus, necesse est, verbum illius coæternum illi esse cum ipso .....C. 36: Sicut igitur ille creator est rerum et principium, sic et verbum ejus; nec tamen sunt duo, sed unus creator et unum principium..... C. 37: Quamvis enim necessitas cogat, ut sint duo: nullo tamen modo exprimi potest, quid duo sint.....C. 38: Etenim proprium unius est, esse ex altero; et proprium est alterius, alterum esse ex illo. C. 39:.....Illius est verissimum proprium esse parentem, istius vero veracissimam esse prolem. C. 42:.....Sicut sunt (pater et filius) *oppositi relationibus*, ut alter numquam suscipiat proprium alterius: sicut sunt *concordes natura*, ut alter semper teneat essentiam alterius. C. 43:.....Est autem perfecte summa essentia pater et perfecte summa essentia filius: pariter ergo perfectus pater per se est, et pariter perfectus filius per se est, sicut uterque sapit per se. Non enim idcirco minus perfecta est essentia vel sapientia filius, quia est essentia nata de patris essentia, et sapientia de sapientia: sed tunc minus perfecta essentia vel sapientia esset, si non esset per se, aut non saperet per se. Nequaquam enim repugnat, ut filius per se subsistat, et de patre habeat esse.— Nevertheless he speaks of a priority of the Father, c. 44: Valde tamen magis congruit filium dici essentiam patris, quam patrem essentiam filii; quoniam namque pater a nullo habet essentiam nisi a se ipso, non satis apte dicitur habere essentiam alicujus nisi suam: quia vero filius essentiam suam habet a patre, et eandem habet pater, aptissime dici potest, habere essentiam patris.—C. 45: Veritas quoque patris aptissime dici potest filius, non solum eo sensu, quia est eadem filii veritas, quæ est et patris, sicut jam perspectum est, sed etiam hoc sensu, ut in eo intelligatur non imperfecta quædam imitatio, sed integra veritas paternæ substantiæ, quia non est aliud, quam quod est pater. At si ipsa substantia patris est intelligentia et scientia et sapientia et veritas, consequenter colligitur: quia, sicut filius est intelligentia et scientia et sapientia et veritas paternæ substantiæ, ita est intelligentia intelligentiæ, scientia scientiæ, sapientia sapientiæ et veritas veritatis.....C. 47: Est igitur filius memoria patris et memoria memoriæ, *i. e.*, memoria memor patris, qui est memoria, sicut est sapientia patris et sapientia sapientiæ, *i. e.*, sapientia sapiens patrem sapientiam, et filius quidem memoria nata de memoria, sicut sapientia nata de sapientia, pater vero de nullo nata memoria vel sapientia.—Concerning the *Spirit* he expresses himself as follows. C. 48: Palam certe est rationem habenti, eum idcirco sui memorem esse aut se intelligere, quia se amat, sed ideo se amare, quia sui meminit et se intelligit: nec eum se posse amare, si sui non sit memor aut se non intelligit. Nulla enim res amatur sine ejus memoria et intelligentia, et multa tenentur memoria et intelliguntur, quæ non amantur. Patet igitur amorem summi spiritus

ex eo procedere, quia sui memor est et se intelligit. Quodsi in memoria summi spiritus intelligitur pater, in intelligentia filius, manifestum est: quia a patre pariter et a filio summi spiritus amor procedit. C. 49: Sed si se amat summus spiritus, procul dubio se amat pater, amat se filius, et alter alterum: quia singulus pater summus est spiritus, et singulus filius summus spiritus, et ambo simul unus spiritus. Et quia uterque pariter sui et alterius meminit, et se et alterum intelligit, et quoniam omnino id ipsum est quod amat vel amatur in patre et quod in filio, necesse est, ut pari amore uterque diligat se et alterum.—C. 55. Respecting *the relation in which the three persons stand to each other*, he says: Patrem itaque nullus facit sive creat aut gignit, filium vero pater solus gignit, sed non facit; pater autem pariter et filius non faciunt neque gignunt, sed quodammodo, si sic dici potest, spirant suum amorem: quamvis enim non nostro more spiret summa incommutabilis essentia, tamen ipsum amorem a se ineffabiliter procedentem, non discedendo ab illa, sed existendo ex illa, forsitan non alio modo videtur posse dici aptius ex se emittere quam spirando. C. 57: Jucundum est intueri in patre et filio et utriusque spiritu, quomodo sint in se invicem tanta æqualitate, ut nullus alium excedat.....Totam quippe suam memoriam summus intelligit spiritus* et amat, et totius intelligentiæ meminit et totam amat, et totius amoris meminit et totum intelligit. Intelligitur autem in memoria pater, in intelligentia filius, in amore utriusque spiritus. Tanta igitur pater et filius et utriusque spiritus æqualitate sese complectuntur et sunt in se invicem, ut eorum nullus alium excedere, aut sine eo esse probetur.....C. 60:...Et enim unusquisque non minus in aliis quam in se ipso.....(It should be observed that Anselm admitted that this relation can neither be comprehended, nor expressed in suitable words, c. 62.) Comp. *Baur*, ii. 380, *sq* *Meier*, 238, *sq.* *Hasse*, ii. 127, 146, 181, 287, 222, *sq.*

[7] Sentent. Lib. i. Dist. 5 (quoted by *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, ii. p. 56, 57), and Dist. 25. K: Alius est in persona vel personaliter pater, *i. e.*, proprietate sua pater alius est quam filius, et filius proprietate sua alius quam pater. Paternali enim proprietate distinguitur hypostasis patris ab hypostasi filii, et hypostasis filii filiali proprietate discernitur a patre, et Spir. S. ab utroque processibili proprietate distinguitur. Comp. *Baur*, Trinitätslehre, ii. p. 550. *Meier*, 268, *sq.* *Joachim*, abbot of Flore, opposed Peter Lombard, and charged him with having taught: Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanct. quandam summam esse rem, quæ neque sit generans, neque genita, neque procedens. But Peter Lombard had only urged the importance of the distinction often neglected between *God* (as such) and God the Father (as one of the persons of the Trinity), and had therefore asserted: Non est dicendum, quod divina essentia genuit filium, quia cum filius sit divina essentia, jam esset filius res, a qua generaretur, et ita eadem res se ipsam generaret.....quod omnino esse non potest. Sed pater solus genuit filium, et a patre et filio procedit Spiritus S. But he thus exposed himself to the appearance of holding to a quarternity. (On the doctrine of Joachim himself, see note 13).

* The word *spiritus* is also used through the whole treatise in reference to God in general.

Alexander Hales, Summa, P. i. Q. 42, Membr. 2 (quoted by *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, p. 55, *Cramer*, vol. vii. p. 309, ss.): *Thomas Aquinas*, P. i. Qu. 27–43. On the latter and *Duns Scotus*, see *Baur*, ii. 685, *sq.* *Meier*, 274.—We meet with a purely speculative apprehension of the Trinity in the work of *Alanus ab Insulis*, i. art. 25 (*Pez*, i. p. 484); he regarded the Father as *matter*, the Son as *form*, and the Holy Spirit as the *union of both*. On *Alexander Hales* see *Cramer*, l. c. The generation of the Son is explained by Alexander from the diffusive nature of God; at the same time a distinction is made between *material* generation (from the substance of the Father), *original* generation (as a human son is begotten by his father), and *ordinal* generation (as the morning gives rise to noon); but none of these can be applied to the divine being. It is only in so far admissible to speak of the Son being begotten from the substance of the Father, as such language is not meant to imply anything material, but only intended to teach, that the essence of the Son is not distinct from that of the Father.

[9] Questions such as the following were started: Was it *necessary* that God should beget? or might he have possessed the *power*, but not the *will* to beget? why are there just *three* persons in the Trinity? why not more or less? how does it happen that the name of the Father is put *first*, and the names of the Son and Spirit follow, though all three are equal? is it allowed to invert the order, and why not? etc. *Anselm* (Monol. c. 40), inquired into the reason for calling God Father, in reference to the act of generation, and not mother. He also demonstrated very seriously, that the Son was the fittest of the three persons of the Trinity to become man (Cur Deus homo ii. 9: Si quælibet alia persona incarnetur, erunt duo filii in Trinitate, filius scilicet Dei, qui et ante incarnationem filius est, et ille qui per incarnationem filius erit virginis: et erit in personis, quæ semper æquales esse debent, inæqualitas secundum dignitatem nativitatum..... Item, si Pater fuerit incarnatus, erunt duo nepotes in Trinitate, quia Pater erit nepos parentum virginis per hominem assumtum, et Verbum, cum nihil habeat de homine, nepos tamen erit virginis, quia filii ejus erit filius, quæ omnia inconvenientia sunt, nec in incarnatione Verbi contingunt. Est et aliud, cur magis conveniat incarnari filio, quam aliis personis, quia convenientius sonat filium supplicare Patri, quam aliam personam alii.* Item, homo, pro quo erat oraturus, et diabolus, quem erat expugnaturus, ambo falsam similitudinem Dei per propriam voluntatem præsumserant. Unde quasi specialius adversus personam Filii peccaverunt, qui vera Patris similitudo creditur, etc. (Comp. below, § 179.)

[10] One of the illustrations of *Nicetas* is, *e. g.*, taken from a balance (Thesaur. c. 30). The Son represents the central point of union between the Father and the Holy Spirit, and preserves the most perfect equilibrium between the two; but the whole denotes the perfect equilibrium between honor, power, and essence, the internal divine equality and harmony, inasmuch as no person elevates himself above the other. The double-winged Seraphim also are in his view a figure of the Trinity. But while in the former case the *Son* is made the central-point of union, in the latter the body

* Why *conveniantius*, excepting that in the background the Father always has the priority?

of the seraphim represents the *Father*, and the wings denote the *Son* and the *Holy Spirit*. Comp. *Ullmann*, l. c. p. 41, 42.

[11] "*Many of the earlier theologians asserted the incomprehensibility of God, and at the same time propounded the most profound mysteries of the doctrine of the Trinity with a degree of assurance which would allow of no doubt; and Nicolas shows the same inconsistency. In the same sentence he represented the nature of God as beyond knowledge and expression, beyond the apprehension and investigation even of the highest order of spirits, and gave the most precise and apodictical definitions concerning the relation between the divine essence and the divine persons*" (*e. g.* Refut. p. 23, 24); *Ullmann*, p. 78. *Nicolas* removed the apparent contradiction of a Trinity in unity by avoiding all analogies with created objects. He would not have the terms unity and trinity understood in the sense in which they are used by mathematicians, viz., as *numeric determinations*. But in his opinion the unity of God is only a unity of essence, and the trinity a trinity of *persons*. He thought that there was nothing contradictory in the union of *such* a unity with *such* a trinity; see *Ullmann*, p. 79, 80. (He also appealed to Gregory of Nazianzum, Orat. xxix. 2: Μονὰς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς εἰς δυάδα κινηθεῖσα, μέχρι τριάδος ἔστη.) "We adore," said Nicolas (Refut. p. 67), "as the creative principle of all existence, that God who is one as respects his essential nature, but consists of three persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. With regard to these three, we praise the Father as *that which causes* (ὡς αἴτιον), but as to the Son and the Holy Spirit, we confess that they proceeded from the Father as *that which is caused* (ὡς αἰτιατά); not created or brought forth in the common sense of the word, but in a supernatural, superessential manner. Being of the same essence, they are united with the Father (the one by generation, the other by procession), and with each other, without being confounded; they are distinct without separation." Regarding the term αἴτιον, he would have it understood that it does not denote a *creative* or formative, but a *hypostatic* causality, which might be called γεννητικόν (*i. e.*, *generating*) in relation to the Son, and προακτικὸν εἴτουν προβλητικὸν (*i. e.*, the source of *procession*) in reference to the Spirit. Thus he also said (p. 45: ὁ πατὴρ ἓν πνεῦμα προβάλλει; see *Ullmann*, l. c. p. 82).

[12] *Tauler* (Predigten, ii. p. 172) said: "Concerning this most excellent and holy triunity, we can not find any suitable words in which we might speak of it, and yet we must express this superessential, incomprehensible Trinity in words. If we therefore attempt to speak of it, it is as impossible to do it properly, as to reach the sky with one's head. For all that we can say or think of it, is a thousand times less proportionate to it, than the point of a needle is to heaven and earth, yea a hundred thousand times less, beyond all number and proportion. We might talk to a wonderful amount, and yet we could neither express nor understand how the superessential unity can be with the distinction of the persons. It is better to meditate on these things than to speak of them; for it is not pleasant either to say much about this matter, or to hear of it, especially when words must be introduced [taken from other matters], and because we are altogether unequal to the task. For the whole subject is at an infinite distance from us, and wholly foreign

to us, nor is it revealed to us, for it even surpasses the apprehension of angels. We therefore leave it to great prelates and learned men; they must have something to say, in order to defend the catholic faith; but we will simply believe."

[18] In opposition to Peter Lombard, *Joachim*, Abbot of Flore, laid down a theory which was condemned by the fourth council of the Lateran (A. D. 1215), though he pretended to have received it by inspiration. He regarded the psaltery of ten strings as the most significant image of the Trinity. Its three corners represent the trinity, the whole the unity. This unity he compares with the unity of believers in the church. Concerning the further development of this notion, running out into a rude substantialism, see *Engelhardt*, kirchenhistorische Abhandlungen, p. 265, ss.—The views of *Master Eckart* on the doctrine of the Trinity are given by *Schmidt* in the Studien und Kritiken, l. c. p. 694. In his Sermon on the Trinity, fol. 265 A, it is said: "What is the speaking of God? The Father beholding himself with a simple knowledge, and looking into the simple purity of his nature, sees all creatures there pictured, and speaks within himself; that Word is a clear knowledge, and that is the Son; therefore the phrase "God speaks," is equivalent to "God begets." For other passages, comp. *Schmidt*, l. c. p. 696.—*H. Suso* taught as follows (c. 55, see *Diepenbrock*, p. 215): "In proportion as any being is simple in itself, it is manifold in its powers and capacities. That which has nothing, can give nothing; that which has much, can give much. God is in himself the fullness of all that is perfect, the inflowing and everflowing good, but, because his goodness is unlimited and higher than all, he will not keep it to himself, but he delights in sharing it in himself and out of himself. On this account, the first and highest act of the manifestation of the summum bonum must have reference to itself, and that can not be, except in a presence, inward, substantial, personal, natural, necessary without being compulsory, infinite, and perfect. All other manifestations which are in time or in created objects, are only the reflex of the eternal pouring out of the unfathomable divine goodness. Therefore the schoolmen say, that in the emanation of the creature from the first original there is a *circular return of the end into the beginning:* for as the flowing out of the person from God is a complete image of the origin of the creature, so it is also a type of the re-inflowing of the creature into God. Now observe the difference of the emanation of God.....A human father gives to his son in his birth a part of his own nature, but not at once, and not the whole of that which he is; for he himself is a compound being. But as it is evident, that the divine emanation is so much more intimate and noble according to the greatness of the good which he himself is, and as God infinitely surpasses all other goods, it necessarily follows that his emanation is equal to his nature, and that such a pouring out of himself can not take place without imparting his nature in personal property. If you can now contemplate with a pure eye, and behold the purest goodness of the highest good, which is in its very nature a present and operative beginning, and loves itself naturally and willingly, then you will see the exceeding supernatural going forth of the Word from the Father, by whose generation and speaking all things are spoken into being and formed, and you will

see in the highest good, and in the highest manifestation of it, the necessary origin of the Holy Trinity: Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. And as this highest flowing forth proceeds from the supreme and essential Godhead, there must be in the said Trinity the most supreme and most intimate sameness of essence, the highest equality and self-hood of being which the three persons possess in triumphant process, in the undivided substance and the undivided omnipotence of the three persons in the Deity." (Suso, however, acknowledged that none could explain in words how the Trinity of the Divine persons could exist in the unity of being. Ibid. p. 217.) Comp. *Schmidt* in Stud. und Kritik. 1840, p. 43.—Similar but more definite views were entertained by *Ruysbroek*, whose opinions concerning the Trinity are given in the work of *Engelhardt*, p. 174–177. According to Ruysbroek, there are four fundamental properties in God. "He manifests himself in nature through wisdom and love, he draws to himself by unity and substantiality. The eternal truth is begotten from the Father, the eternal love proceeds from the Father and the Son. These are the two emanating attributes of God. The unity of the Divine nature draws the three persons within by the bonds of love, and the Divine wisdom comprehends the unity in a certain repose with a joyful embrace in essential love. These are the centripetal attributes of God."

[14] *Hugo of St. Victor* found in *external nature* an indication of the Trinity. He perceived a still purer impression of it in the *rational* creation, viz., the *spirit*, which is only assisted by the external world, or the world of bodies; in the one case we have a true type, in the other only a sign. How the Trinity manifests itself in the external creation (power, wisdom, and goodness), he showed in his treatise, De tribus Diebus, T. i. fol. 24–33. Comp. De Sacram. Lib. i. P. iii. c. 28; *Liebner*, p. 375. In his dialectic developments, Hugo followed his predecessors, Augustine and Anselm, but employed that fuller and more poetical style which is peculiar to the mystics, especially in his treatise: De tribus Diebus. On the whole, Hugo differed from Anselm "*by remaining at a certain distance, and thus keeping to more general and indefinite expressions, in the use of which he exposed himself to less danger.*" *Liebner*, p. 381. We may notice as very remarkable, foreign to the general spirit of mysticism, but truly scholastic, the manner in which Hugo answered the question, *Why* the Sacred Scriptures* have ascribed power in particular to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and love to the Holy Spirit, since power, wisdom, and love belong equally and essentially to all the three, and are eternal. He argued as follows: "When men heard of the Father and Son being in God, they might, in accordance with human relations, think of the Father as old and aged, and consequently weaker than the Son, but of the Son as juvenile and unexperienced, and therefore less wise than the Father. To prevent any such mistake, Scripture has

* It is scarcely necessary to observe that Scripture by no means sanctions such an arbitrary distribution of the Divine attributes among the three persons. With equal if not greater propriety, the Son might have been called love, and the Spirit wisdom or power. It was only the tracing of the idea of the Logos to that of the Sophia in the Old Testament, and the predominant speculative tendency (according to which *intelligence* precedes all else), which led to this inference from the Scripture usage.

wisely and cautiously ascribed power to the Father and wisdom to the Son. Likewise men, hearing of God the Holy Spirit (Spiritus) might think of him as a snorting (Germ. schnaubend) and restive being, and be terrified at his supposed harshness and cruelty. But then Scripture coming in and calling the Holy Ghost loving and mild, tranquillized them" (De Sacram. c. 26). The passage is cited by Liebner, p. 381 and 382, where further particulars may be compared. Hugo, however, rejected, generally speaking, all subtile questions, and had a clear insight into the figurative language of Scripture.—Nor did *Richard of St. Victor* indulge so much in subtile speculations in his work, De Trinitate, as many other scholastics. It is true, he adopted the same views concerning the trias of power, wisdom, and love, but he laid more stress upon the latter, and ascribed to it the generation of the Son. In the highest good there is the fullness and the perfection of goodness, and consequently the highest love: for there is nothing more perfect than love. But love (amor), in order to be charity (charitas), must have for its object, not itself, but something else. Hence where there is no plurality of persons, there can be no charity. Love toward creatures is not sufficient, for God can only love what is worthy of the *highest* love. The love of God to none but himself would not be the highest love; in order to render it such, it is necessary that it should be manifested toward a person who is Divine, etc. But even this is not yet the highest love. Love is social. Both persons (who love each other) wish a third person to be loved as much as they love each other, for it is a proof of weakness not to be willing to allow society in love. Therefore the two persons in the Trinity agree in loving a third one. The fullness of love also requires highest perfection, hence the three persons are equal.....In the Trinity there is neither a greater nor a less; two are not greater than one, three are not greater than two. This appears indeed incomprehensible, etc. Compare also the passage De Trin. i. 4, quoted by *Hase*, Dogmatik, p. 637, and especially *Engelhardt*, l. c. p. 108, ss. *Baur*, Trinit. ii. 536. *Meier*, 292.—The other scholastics who manifested a leaning to mysticism, argued in a similar way. Thus *Bonaventura*, Itiner. Mentis, c. 6. *Raimund of Sabunde*, c. 49.* (Compare also *Gerson*, Sermo I. in Festo S. Trin. quoted by *Ch. Schmidt*, p. 106).

[On Raymund Lulli's view of the Trinity, see *Neander*, Hist. Dog. 563,

° On Raimund's Doctrine of the Trinity, see *Matzke*, p. 54 sq. Among other things he compares the three persons with the three forms of the verb; the Father is the active, the Son the passive, and the Holy Spirit the impersonal verb! *Matzke*, p. 44. [*Matzke*, p. 55, Note, quotes from Tit. 51, on the Trinity: Et quia dare non potest esse sine recipere, neque dans sine recipiente, ideo necessario in esse divino et in natura divina sunt duo, scilicet unus dans et alter recipiens, unus producens et alter productus, etc. And on the Holy Spirit (p. 56), from Tit. 52: Et cum ex dare et recipere, quando sunt perfecta, oportet quod procedat et sequatur aliud, quod non est dare neque recipere, scilicet amor, ideo, cum in divina nature sit dare et recipere, oportet quod procedat amor a dante in recipientem et a recipiente in dantem, et sic est ibi processio amoris ab uno in alterum et e converso, et sic est ibi tertia res producta scilicet amor, quæ quidem res non est pater neque filius, sed procedens necessario de ambabus, quia pater non potest non amare suum filium ab ipso productum, nec filius non amare patrem qui genuit eum æqualem per omnia sibi.]

sq.—In his Liber Preverbiorum, on the Son: Quælibet divinarum rationum est principium per patrem in filio et per filium est medium et per Spiritum Sanctum est quies et finis. Id propter quod spiritus sanctus non producit personam, est, ut appetitus cojuslibet rationis in illo habeat finem et quietem. Quia pator et filius per amorem se habent ad unum finem, ille finis est Spiritus Sanctus.....Quia Deus est tantum Deus per agere, quam per existere, habet in sua essentia distinctas personas. Nulla substantia potest esse sine distinctione: sine distinctione non esset quidquam.]

[15] *Savonarola* showed in a very ingenious manner (Triumphus Crucis, Lib. iii. c. 3, p. 192–96, quoted by *Rudelbach*, p. 366, 67), that a certain *procession* or *emanation* exists in all creatures. The more excellent and noble these creatures are, the more perfect the said procession: the more perfect it is, the more internal. If you take fire and bring it into contact with wood, it kindles and assimilates it. But this procession is altogether external, for the power of the fire works only externally. If you take a plant, you will find that its vital power works internally, changing the moisture which it extracts from the ground into the substance of the plant, and producing the flower which was internal. This procession is much more internal than that of fire; but it is not altogether internal, for it attracts moisture from without, and produces the flower externally; and though the flower is connected with the tree, yet the fruit is an external production, and separates itself from the tree.—The sentient life is of a higher order. When I see a picture, a procession and emanation comes from the picture which produces an impression upon the eye; the eye presents the object in question to the imagination or to the memory; nevertheless the procession remains internal though it comes from without. Intelligence is of a still higher order; a man having perceived something, forms in his inner mind an image of it, and delights in its contemplation: this gives rise to a certain love which remains in the faculty of thinking. It may indeed be said that even in this case there is something external (the perception). But from this highest and innermost procession we may draw further inferences with regard to God, who unites in himself all perfection—that the Father, as it were, begets out of himself an idea—which is his eternal Word (Logos), and that the love, which is the Holy Spirit, proceeds from the Father and the Son. This procession is the most perfect, because it does not come from without, and because it remains in God.* Comp. *Meier*, Savonarola, p. 248, ss.

[16] *Wessel* (de Magnitudine Passionis, c. 74, p. 606, quoted by *Ullmann*, p. 206) expressed himself as follows: "In our inner man, which is created after the image of, and in resemblance to God, there is a certain trinity: understanding (mens), reason (intelligentia), and will (voluntas). These three are equally sterile, inactive, and unoccupied, when they are alienated from their prototype. Our understanding without wisdom, is like the light with-

* But *Savonarola* also pointed out in very appropriate language the insufficiency of our conceptions: "God treats us as a mother treats her child. She does not say to him: Go, and do such and such a thing; but she accommodates herself to the capacity of the child, and makes her wishes known by broken words and by gestures. Thus God accommodates himself to our ideas." See *Rudelbach*, l. c. p. 369.

out the eye, and what else is this wisdom but God the Father?* The Word (the Logos) is the law and the norm of our judgments, and teaches us to think of ourselves with humility according to the true wisdom. And the Spirit of both, the divine love, is the food of the will (Spiritus amborum, Deus charitas, lac est voluntati)." The practical application follows, of course.

The *three persons* in the Trinity were referred in a peculiar way to *the development of the history of the world.* According to *Hugo of St. Victor*, (De tribus Diebus, quoted by *Liebner*, p. 383, note), the day of fear commenced with the promulgation of the law given by the Father (power); the day of truth with the manifestation of the Son (wisdom); and the day of love with the effusion of the Holy Spirit (love). Thus there was a progressive development of the times towards greater and greater light!—Amalrich of Bena and the mystico-pantheistic sects, on the other hand, interpreted these three periods after their own notions, in connection with millennarian hopes. (Comp the Eschatology.) [A similar view was advanced by *Joachim of Flore*, and forms (says *Baur*, Dogmengesch., 253), the chief contents of his three works, viz., Concordia Vet. et Nov. Test., Expositio in Apocalyps., and Psalterium decem Chordarum. The Father is the principium principale, the Son and Spirit are the principia de principio. In the period of the Father (the more materialistic), God appears as the mighty—the terrible God of the law. The Son assumes human nature, to reveal the merciful love of God; and the Spirit appears in the form of the dove, the figure of the holy mother, the church. This revelation is a progressive one, gradually subduing the fleshly and material, and transforming it into the spiritual, etc.]

Although the doctrine of the Trinity was generally reckoned among the mysteries, which could be made known to us only by revelation (compare § 158), yet there was still a controversy on the question, whether God could make himself known to the natural consciousness as triune, and in what way? Compare on this, *Baur*, Trinitätslehre, ii. 697, *sq.* [This is entirely denied by Aquinas, and admitted in a qualified way by Duns Scotus.]

[The scholastics, says *Baur*, Dogmengesch. 252, give to the Trinity a more refined character, but in a sense not congruent with the dogma of the church. What they called persons, were not persons in the sense of the church, but relations. To construct the Trinity, they (with the exception of Anselm and Richard), did not get beyond the psychological distinction of *intelligence* and *will*, putting these into a merely coordinate relation, instead of endeavoring to grasp the different relations, in which God as Spirit, stands to himself, from the point of view of a vital spiritual process in its unity and totality. The more profound mystics struggle after such a conception, in what they say of a *speaking* of God, etc., see above, note 13.]

§ 171.

THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION, PROVIDENCE, AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD.—THEODICY.

The pantheistic system of *John Scotus Erigena*,[1] found no imitators among the orthodox scholastics; they adhered rather to the idea of a creation out of nothing.[2] Later writers endeavored to define this doctrine more precisely, in order to prevent any misunderstanding, as if *nothing* could have been the cause of existence.[3]—

* Here he calls the *Father* Wisdom; the scholastics applied this term to the Son. Comp. above, note 14.

The Mosaic account of the creation was interpreted literally by some, and allegorically by others.[1] The opinion still continued generally to prevail, that the world is a work of divine goodness, and exists principally for the sake of man.[2] Though mysticism tended to induce its advocates to regard the independence of the finite creature as a separation from the Creator, and consequently as a rebellion, and thus to represent creation as the work of Satan (after the manner of the Manicheans),[3] yet these pious thinkers were roused by the sight of the works of God to the utterance of beautiful and elevating thoughts, and lost in wonder and adoration.[4] On the other hand, the schoolmen, fond of vain and subtle investigations, indulged here also in absurd inquiries.[5]—Concerning the existence of evil in the world, the scholastics adopted for the most part the views of Augustine. Thus, some (*e. g., Thomas Aquinas*) regarded evil as the absence of good, and as forming a necessary part of the finite world, retaining however, the difference between moral evil and physical evil, (the evil of guilt, and the evil of its punishment).[6] Others adopted, with Chrysostom, the notion of a twofold divine will (voluntas antecedens et consequens).[10]

[1] Comp. above § 165, 1, and De divina Natura, ii. c. 19, quoted by *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, p. 63.

[2] God is not only the former (factor), but the creator and author (creator) of matter. This was taught by *Hugo of St. Victor* (Prolog. c. 1. Liebner, p. 355), and the same view was adopted by the other mystics. The advocates of Platonism alone sympathised with the notions of Origen.

[3] *Fredegis* of Tours defended the reality of nothing, as the infinite (all-embracing) genus, from which all other genera and species of things derive their form: comp. his work De Nihilo, and *Ritter*, Gesch. der Christl. Phil. vii. 189, *sq.* *Alexander Hales* (Summa, P. ii. Quæst. 9, Membr. 10), drew a distinction between nihilum privativum and negativum; see on this point *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, p. 61, 62.—*Gieseler*, Dogmengesch. 495. [The *nihil privativum* abolishes the object of the act, the *negativum*, the act itself: the creation from nothing is in the former sense.] *Thomas Aquinas* (Pars. i. Qu. 46, art. 2), represented the doctrine of a creation out of nothing as an article of faith (credibile), but not as an object of knowledge and argumentation (non demonstrabile vel scibile), and expressed himself as follows, Qu. 45, art. 2: Quicunque facit aliquid ex aliquo, illud *ex quo* facit, præsupponitur actioni ejus et non producitur per ipsam actionem.....Si ergo Deus non ageret, nisi ex aliquo præsupposito, sequeretur, quod illud præsuppositum non esset causatum ab ipso. Ostensum est autem supra, quod nihil potest esse in entibus nisi a Deo, qui est causa universalis totius esse. Unde necesse est dicere, quod Deus ex nihilo res in esse producit. Comp. *Cramer*, vii. p. 415, ss. *Baur*, Trinitätslehre, ii. p. 716: "*The fact that Thomas considered God the first cause and type of all things, plainly shows that in his opinion the creation, which is designated as a creation out of nothing, was not a sudden transition from non-existence to existence.*" Quæst. 44, art. 2:

Dicendum, quod Deus est prima causa exemplaris omnium rerum....Ipse Deus est primum exemplar omnium.—While Thomas and still more *Albertus Magnus* draw no distinct line of demarcation between the idea of emanation and that of creation (*Baur*, l. c. p. 723, ss.), *Scotus* adheres to the simple notion that God is the primum efficiens; nevertheless he distinguishes between an esse existentiæ and an esse essentiæ; but both can not be separated in reality, and the latter presupposes the former; see lib. ii. Dist. 1, Qu. 2, and other passages in *Baur*, 726, sq.

[4] Thus *Hugo of St. Victor* thought that the creation out of formless matter in six days might be literally interpreted. The Almighty might have made it differently; but in this way he would teach rational beings in a figure, how they are to be transformed from moral deformity into moral beauty.....In creating the light prior to all other works, he signified, that the works of darkness displeased him. The good and evil angels were separated at the same time, when light and darkness were separated. God did not separate light from darkness, till he saw the light, that it was good. In like manner, we should first of all see to our light, that it is good, and then we may proceed to a separation, etc. Observing that the phrase "and God saw that it was good," is wanting in reference to the work of the second day in the Mosaic account of the creation, this mystic scholastic was led into further inquiries respecting the reason of this omission. He found it in the number two, which is an inauspicious number, because it denotes a falling away from unity. Nor is it said, in reference to the waters *above* the firmament, as is done with regard to those *under* the firmament, that they were gathered together unto *one* place—because the love of God (the heavenly water) is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost. This love must expand itself and rise higher; but the waters under the firmament (the lower passions of the soul) must be kept together. Fishes and birds are created out of one and the *same matter*, yet different places are assigned to them, which is a type of the elect and the reprobate, from *one and the same mass* of corrupt nature: Comp. *Liebner*, p. 256, 57.—Friar *Berthold* saw in the works of the first three days of the creation, faith, hope, and love; see *Kling*, p. 462, 63.

[5] *Joh. Dam.* De Fide Orth. ii. 2, (after Gregory of Nazianzum and Dionysius Areopagita): Ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὑπεράγαθος Θεὸς οὐκ ἠρκέσθη τῇ ἑαυτοῦ θεωρίᾳ, ἀλλ' ὑπερβολῇ ἀγαθότητος εὐδόκησε γενέσθαι τινὰ τὰ εὐεργετηθησόμενα, καὶ μεθέξοντα τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀγαθότητος, ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παράγει καὶ δημιουργεῖ τὰ σύμπαντα, ἀόρατά τε καὶ ὁρατὰ, καὶ τὸν ἐξ ὁρατοῦ καὶ ἀοράτου συγκείμενον ἄνθρωπον.—*Petr. Lomb.* Sententt. ii. Dist. i. C.: Dei tanta est bonitas, ut summe bonus beatitudinis suæ, qua æternaliter beatus est, alios velit esse participes, quoniam videt et communicari posse et minui omnino non posse. Illud ergo bonum, quod ipse erat et quo beatus erat, *sola bonitate, non necessitate* aliis communicari voluit..... Lit. D: Et quia non valet ejus beatitudinis particeps existere aliquis, nisi per intelligentiam (quæ quanto magis intelligitur, tanto plenius habetur), fecit Deus *rationalem creaturam*, quæ summum bonum intelligeret et intelligendo amaret et amando possideret ac possidendo frueretur.....Lit. F.: Deus perfectus et summa bonitate plenus, nec augeri potest nec minui. Quod

ergo rationalis creatura facta est a Deo, referendum est ad creatoris bonitatem et ad creaturæ utilitatem. Comp. *Alan. ab Ins.* ii. 4 (quoted by *Pez*, Thes. i. p. 487, 88).—*Hugo of St. Victor* also said (quoted by *Liebner*, p. 357, 58): "The creation of the world had man, that of man had *God* for its end. The world should serve man, and man should serve God; but the service of the latter is only man's own advantage, since in this service he is to find his own happiness. For God being all-sufficient to himself, nor standing in need of the services of any one, man has received both, *i. e.*, all, viz., the good under him, and the good above him, the former to supply his necessities, the latter to constitute his happiness, the former for his benefit and use, the latter for his enjoyment and possession. Thus man, though created at a later period, was nevertheless the cause of all that was under him, and *hence* the high dignity of human nature." *Thomas Aquinas* supposed God to have no other object than the communication of his own being, Summa, P. i. Qu. 44, art. 4: Primo agenti, qui est agens tantum, non convenit agere propter acquisitionem alicujus finis: sed intendit solum communicare suam perfectionem, quæ est ejus bonitas. Et unaquæque creatura intendit consequi suam perfectionem, quæ est similitudo perfectionis et bonitatis divinæ. Sic ergo divina bonitatis est finis rerum omnium. Comp. *Cramer*, vii. p. 414, 15. *Baur*, Trinit. ii. 731, sq. *Ritter*, viii. 284. [Christl. Phil. i. 650. *Bonaventura*, on the end of God in creation, argues, "that God's highest end must be his own glory, for it is said, God created all things for himself; not as if it was necessary for him, or to increase his glory, but in order to reveal and communicate it, in which the highest well-being of his creatures consists... Should any one say, that such a highest end is egotistic, the answer is, that it is one thing in God, and another with the creature; for in God there is no distinction between the general and the particular good; he is the original ground of all good, and of the highest good. If He, from whom all other goodness is derived, were not to perform all his acts on account of himself, the effect that proceeded from him would not be truly good. Since the use of the creatures depends altogether on their relation to the supreme good, everything proceeds from the love of God, since he makes all things tend towards himself...What is the highest end of creation must also be the same for human actions." See *Neander*, Hist. of Dogmas. pp. 564–5.]

* According to the author of the work, *German Theology* (cap. 1, from the commencement) the ideas of being a creature, being created, being an ego, and self-hood, are synonymous with love of the world, love of the creature, self-love, self-will, natural carnal sense, and carnal pleasure. The creature must depart, if God is to enter. He thinks it sinful "to esteem created things, and to look upon them as *something*, while they are in reality—*nothing*." Subsequently he admits, however, that those things have their being only in God: "Out of that which is perfect, or without it, there is no true existence, but all is mere accident, or mere semblance and glitter, which neither is nor has true being, except in the fire from which the shining proceeds, like the brightness which proceeds or flows out from fire, or light, or the sun."—Some of the *heretical* sects of the middle ages entertained views on these points which bordered upon Manicheism. Thus *Berthold*, a Franciscan monk, said in a sermon (quoted by *Kling*, p. 305; *Wackernagel*,

Lesebuch, i. Sp. 678): Some heretics believe and maintain that the devil created man, when our Lord created the soul in him. Comp. *Ermengardi*, Opusc. contra Hæreticos, qui dicunt et credunt, mundum istum et omnia visibilia non esse a Deo facta, sed a Diabolo, edited by Gretser in Bibl. Max. PP. T. xxiv. p. 1602. *Gieseler*, Church History, ii. § 82, note o. [Comp. Vaughan's Hours with the Mystics, 2d ed., 1859.]

* *Henry Suso* (c. 54, quoted by *Diepenbrock*, p. 208) said: "Now let us remain here for a while and contemplate the high and excellent master in his works. Look above you and around you, look to the four quarters of the world, how wide and high the beautiful sky is in its rapid course, and how nobly the master has adorned it with the seven planets, each of which, with the exception of the moon, is much larger than the earth, and how it is beautified with the innumerable multitude of the bright stars. O, how clearly and cheerfully the beautiful sun rises in the summer season, and how diligently it gives growth and blessings to the soil; how the leaves and the grass come forth, how the beautiful flowers smile, how the forest, and the heath, and the field resound with the sweet airs of the nightingale and other small birds, how all the animals which were shut up during the severe winter come forth and enjoy themselves, and go in pairs, how young and old manifest their joy in merry and gladsome utterances. *O, tender God! if thou art so loving in thy creatures, how fair and lovely must thou be in thyself!*—Look further, I pray you, and behold the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, and all the wonderful things in them, the variety and diversity of men, quadrupeds, birds, fishes, and the wonders of the deep, all of which cry aloud and proclaim the praise and honor of the boundless and infinite nature of God! O Lord, who preserves all this? who feeds it? Thou takest care of all, each in its own way, great and small, rich and poor, thou, O God! thou doest it, thou God art indeed God!"

* *John Damascenus*, De Fide Orth. ii. 5, ss. treated of the whole range of natural science (cosmography, astronomy, physics, geology, etc.), so far as it was known to him, in the section on creation. Most of the scholastics followed his example. Comp. *Cramer*, vii. p. 388, ss. But in introducing natural history into the province of dogmatic theology, they thought that they might put limits to physical investigation by the doctrine of the church. Thus it happened that *e. g.*, in the time of Boniface [Bishop of Mayence], the assertion of Virgilius, a priest, that there are *antipodes*, was considered heretical; see *Schröckh*, xix. p. 219, 220.*

* *Anselm* himself taught that *this* world is the best (omne quod est, recte est, Dial. de Ver. c. 7); and *Abelard* agreed with what Plato asserted (in the Timæus): Deum nullatenus mundum meliorem potuisse facere, quam

* An additional point in reference to the work of creation was the question, whether it is to be assigned to only *one* of the persons of the Trinity? The theologians of the present period adopted the opinion of the earlier church, that all the three persons participated in it; *Thomas Aquinas*, Qu. 45, art. 6, *Cramer*, vii. p. 416. This was, however, scarcely more than a speculative idea. The power of creating was supposed to be more particularly possessed by the Father, for the very reason that *power* was peculiarly ascribed to him; though various expressions were used, in the liturgical services, *e. g.* in the hymn: Veni Creator Spiritus.

fecerit (Introd. ad Theol. iii. c. 5, quoted by *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, ii. p. 70.) This assertion, however, met with opposition on the part of others. (Com. § 167, note 7.) According to *Alexander Hales*, every individual possesses its own perfection, though it may appear imperfect compared with the whole, see *Cramer*, vii. p. 413.—Concerning the nature of evil, *Thomas Aquinas* expressed himself quite in the sense of Augustine (Qu. 48 and 49): evil is not a thing which exists by itself, but the absence and want of good. Evil is, moreover, necessary to constitute a *difference of degrees;* the imperfection of individual things belongs even to the perfection of the world (Summa. P. i. Qu. 48, art. 2, quoted by *Münscher*, von Cölln, p. 74). But Thomas well knew how to make an exception in the case of moral evil: the latter is not only a defect, but the wicked are wanting in something in *which they should not be wanting;* therefore the idea of evil belongs more properly to the evil of guilt (malum culpæ) than to the evil of punishment (malum pœnæ). (Comp. Tertull. advers. Marc. ii. 14). [According to Duns Scotus, all depends on the freedom of the finite creature, and accordingly, the goodness of God revealed in the perfection of the world, is conditioned by that freedom.", *Baur*, Dogmengesch. 254.]

[10] The scholastics commonly treated of *Providence*, and of the *Theodicy*, in connection with the divine attributes, with the divine will in particular. *Hugo of St. Victor* even said that the Divine providence itself is an attribute, viz. that attribute of God by which he takes care of all the works of his hands, abandons nothing that is his, and gives to every one his due and right. Both the actual existence of good, and the mode of its existence, depend on the *arrangements* (dispositio) of God. It is not so with evil. Only the *mode* of its existence depends on God, but not its existence itself: for God does not do evil himself; but when evil is done, he overrules it (malum ordinabile est). De Sacram. c. 19–21, quoted by *Liebner*, p. 366. *Cramer*, vii. p. 274, ss. On the *θέλημα προηγούμενον*, etc., comp. § 126, note 5, and *John Damasc.* De Fide Orthod. ii. 29. By the scholastics the *θέλημα προηγούμενον* was also called voluntas bene placiti, the *θελ. ἑπόμενον* (consequens), voluntas signi (expression of one's will). Comp. *Liebner*, Hugo of St. Victor, p. 386. *Peter Lomb.* Lib. i. Dist. 45, F. *Alex. Hales*, Summa, P. i. Qu. 36, Membr. 1.—*Thomas Aquinas* both denies and admits that evil proceeds from God. So far as evil presupposes a defect, it can not have its origin in God, for God is the highest perfection. But so far as it consists in the corruption of certain things, and this corruption in its turn forms a part of the perfect universe, it proceeds indeed from God—ex consequenti, and—quasi per accidens. The theodicy of Thomas may be comprised in this proposition, Summa theol. P. i. Qu. 15, art. 3: Malum cognoscitur a Deo non per propriam rationem, sed per rationem boni. Comp. *Baur*, Trinitätslehre, ii. p. 734, ss. *Ritter*, viii. 285, and the passage there cited. *Münscher*, by *von Cölln*, 72. *Cramer*, 264.*

* A peculiar Oriental controversy is that about the *created* and the *uncreated* light. The *Hesychasts* (Quietists) of Mt. Athos, with Palamas, afterward archbishop of Thessalonica, at their head, held that there is an eternal, uncreated and yet communicable light (the light of the transfiguration on Tabor). The monk *Barlaam* (from Calabria) opposed this assertion, maintaining that the light on Tabor was a created light. A Confession adopted

§ 172.

THE ANGELS AND THE DEVIL.

John Damascenus and others[1] adhered to the classification of the angels given by Pseudo-Dionysius (§ 131, note 8). The council of the Lateran, A. D. 1215, under Pope Innocent III. pronounced as the doctrine of the church, that the angels are spiritual beings, and that they were created holy.[2] But with regard to particular points, such as the nature and the offices of the angels, the relation in which they stood to God, the world, man, and the work of redemption, ample scope was left for poetical and imaginary speculations, sometimes running out into wilful conceits.[3] The idea of the devil penetrated even deeper, than did the belief in angels, into the popular creed of the Germanic nations, sometimes connected in a horrible way with the belief in sorcery and witches, so common during the middle ages, sometimes treated with levity and humor, interwoven with legends and popular tales.[4] In the history of doctrines, this living and national belief in the devil is to be considered as well as the theorems and systems of the schools, founded for the most part upon traditional definitions.[5] In the religious point of view the only point of importance is this, that it was held that the devil can not compel any one to commit sin, while he himself is delivered up to eternal condemnation.[6] He, as well as his associates, the evil spirits, feel their own punishment, but also take pleasure in the torments of the damned; this compensation, worthy of their devilish disposition, is all their joy.[7]

[1] De Fide Orthod. ii. 3. Most of the scholastics adopted this classification. Thus *Hugo of St. Victor* mentioned and explained the orders and names of angels (according to Pseudo-Dionysius) only very briefly (De Sacr. i. 5), "*a proof of his good sense.*" (*Liebner*, p. 395). Comp. Lomb. Sent. lib. ii. Dist. 9, A. Thom. Aquinas, Summ. P. i. Q. 108 (quoted by *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, p. 65).

[2] Conc. Lateran. IV. Can. i. Mansi, T. xxii. p. 982, quoted by *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln, p. 65.

at Constantinople in 1341, was favorable to the Hesychasts. *Acindynus*, Barlaam's coadjutor, resumed the controversy, but lost his case at a second synod at Constantinople. But he almost got the victory at a third synod (after the death of Andronicus, 1341) under the empress Anna; but a fourth synod, under Cantacuzenus, again declared the doctrine of the Hesychasts to be correct. This dispute was connected with that about the οὐσία and ἐνέργεια of the divine nature. Comp. *Gass* in Herzog's Realencycl., under Hesychasts (after the report of Nicephorus Gregoras), and the essay of Engelhardt, referred to § 153, Note 12.

[1] Most of the scholastics adopted the opinion of Augustine, that the angels were created *with* all other creatures, and only in so far prior to them, as they surpass them in dignity. Thus *Hugo of St. Victor* (quoted by *Liebner*, c. 28 and 29, p. 392), *Alexander Hales*, *Thomas Aquinas*, *Bonaventura*, etc. (quoted by *Cramer*, vii. p. 426). A fact adverted to about the angels, not unimportant in a religious point of view, is, that the angels are represented only as distinct and isolated creations of God, not forming one whole, like the human race; hence, it is said, the fall of individuals did not involve the fall of the whole angelic world. Comp. *e. g. Anselm's* Cur Deus Homo 1, ii. 20: Non enim sic sunt omnes angeli de uno angelo, quem admodum omnes homines de uno homine. "*There is a human race, but not an angelic race* (*keine Engelheit*):" *Hasse's* Anselm, ii. 391.—According to the statements of the later scholastics, the angels are distinguished from the souls of men, 1. Physically (they do not stand in absolute need of a body); 2. Logically (they do not obtain knowledge by inferences); 3. Metaphysically (they do not think by means of images, but by intuitive vision); 4. Theologically (they can not become either better or worse). Alexander Hales, however, made this last assertion with reserve. As creatures without body, they are not made up of matter and form; yet actus and potentia are not identical with them as with God. Also (according to Thomas) there are no two angels of the same species; but this is denied by Duns Scotus. The question was raised, whether thinking is the essence of an angel? The reply was in the negative. Yet Aquinas says, the thinking of an angel is never merely potential, but at the same time, actual. The knowledge of angels is purely à priori, and the higher the rank of an angel, so much more universal are the conceptions, by which he knows. Scotus says, that the angels have a capacity for obtaining knowledge empirically (intellectum agentem et possibilem); according to others their knowledge is either matutina (cognitio rerum in verbo), or vespertina (cognitio rerum in se), or, lastly, meridiana (aperta Dei visio). Comp. *Bonaventura*, Compend. ii. 15. The knowledge of some angels, however, is more comprehensive than that of others. Some *e. g.* foreknew the mystery of the incarnation of Christ, which was unknown to others. The angels also have a language, not, however, born of sense, but intellectual. They have moreover a place, *i. e.*, they are not omnipresent like God, but move with immeasurable celerity from one place to another, and pervade all space more easily than man. It was also asked, whether they could work miracles? whether one angel could exert any influence upon the will of another? etc., see *Cramer*, l. c. (These quotations are for the most part taken from Alexander Hales and Thomas Aquinas). See *Baur*, Trinit. ii. 731, sq.—Peter Lombard and others also retained the idea of *guardian-angels*, see Sent. ii. Dist. ii. A. (in *Münscher*, ed. by von Cölln. p. 66). Some entertained the singular notion of a *hatred* on the part of the angels against sinners of the human race, of which *Berthold* speaks in one of his sermons, quoted by Kling, p. 18, 20: "They cry daily at the sight of sinners: Lord, let us kill them! But he appeases and exhorts them, to let the tares grow among the wheat."—But the more sober scholastics did not enter into any further inquiries of this kind. Thus *Hugo of St. Victor* said: "*We walk among those things timidly,*

and, as it were, blindfolded, and we grope with the sense of our insignificant knowledge after the incomprehensible." *Liebner*, p. 393.—*Tauler* expressed himself in similar language, Sermon upon St. Michael's Day, (vol. iii. p. 145); "With what words we may, and ought to speak of these pure spirits, I do not know, for they have neither hands, nor feet, neither shape, nor form, nor matter; and what shall we say of a being which has none of these things, and which can not be apprehended by our senses? *What* they are is a mystery to us; nor should this surprise us, for we do not know ourselves, viz., our spirit by which we are made men, and from which we receive all the good we possess. How then could we know this exceeding great spirit, whose dignity far surpasses all dignity which the world may possess? *Therefore we speak of the works which they perform toward us, but not of their nature.*" Nevertheless Tauler followed the example of his contemporaries in adhering to the *hierarchia cœlestis* of Dionysius.

[a] "*It is somewhat remarkable, that the devil of the middle ages seems to have lost much of his terror and hideousness, and to play rather the part of a cunning impostor, and merry fellow.....more like a faun, which excites laughter rather than fear.*" *Augusti*, Dogmengesch. p. 320. Comp. *Grimm*, deutsche Mythologie, p. 549, ss. *Hase*, Gnosis, i. p. 263. *Koberstein*, Sage vom Wartburgkriege, p. 67, 68. (The trials for witchcraft did not become general until the close of the present period, in the fifteenth century, from which time faith in the power of the devil became increasingly dismal and portentous.)

[b] *Anselm* composed a separate treatise respecting the fall of the devil (De Casu Diaboli). His leading idea, cap. 4, is: Peccavit volendo aliquod commodum, quod nec habebat, nec tunc velle debuit, quod tamen ad augmentum beatudinis esse illi poterat.....Peccavit et volendo quod non debuit, et nolendo quod debuit, et palam est, quia non ideo voluit, quod volendo illam [justitiam] deseruit.....At cum hoc voluit, quod Deus illum velle nolebat, voluit inordinate similis esse Deo—quia propria voluntate, quæ nulli subdita fuit, voluit aliquid. Solius enim Dei esse debet, sic voluntate propria velle aliquid, ut superiorem non sequatur voluntatem. Non solum autem voluit esse æqualis Deo, quia præsumsit habere propriam voluntatem, sed etiam major voluit esse, volendo, quod Deus illum velle nolebat, quoniam voluntatem suam supra voluntatem Dei posuit. Comp. *Hasse*, ii. 393 sq. Most theologians still adhered to the opinion that *pride* was the principal cause of the fall of the devil: but Duns Scotus finds the word *luxuria* more appropriate (Lib. ii. Dist. 3, p. 544; *Baur*, Trinit. ii. 771 sq.)—In accordance with Isa. xiv. 2, Satan was identified with Lucifer, and the latter name was thenceforward constantly applied to the devil.* According to *Anselm* (substantially as in Augustine, Enchiridion, c. 29) the fall of the

* *Bonavent.* Compend. ii. 28: Dictus est autem Lucifer quia præ cæteris luxit, suæque pulchritudinis consideratio eum excœcavit. Among the earlier fathers of the church, Eusebius was the only one who applied the appellation Lucifer to the devil (Demonst Evang. iv. 9). Neither Jerome nor Augustine ever d'd so. Comp. *Grimm*, l. c. p. 550, note

devil was the cause of the creation of man, which was to be a kind of compensation, by supplying the deficiency in the number of the elect spirits (Cur. Deus Homo, c. 16–18). The same idea was entertained by *Hugo of St. Victor*, and *Peter Lombard*, though in a somewhat modified form; see *Liebner*, p. 395. According to *Alexander Hales*, some fell from among all the different classes of angels, but the number of fallen angels is less than that of those who preserved their innocence. *Duns Scotus* maintains, that the fallen angels can even raise themselves up so as to will what is good; but it remains a mere volition, and never comes to act (Dist. 7, p. 577: *Baur*, Trinit. ii. 786). Neither the evil nor the good angels can perform miracles in the proper sense; the former may, however, exert some power over the corporeal world, though they can not go so far (as popular superstition would have men believe), as to change men into other beings, *e. g.*, wolves or birds; see *Cramer*, p. 44. The scholastics have also contributed their part to liberal thinking!

[s] Thomas Aquinas, i. Qu. 64. The power of Satan has been especially limited since the appearance of Christ (comp. *Cramer*, p. 447).—*Anselm* declared it impossible that the evil angels should finally be redeemed (as Origen supposed); Cur Deus Homo, ii. c. 21: Sicut enim homo non potuit reconciliari nisi per hominem Deum (see below, § 179), qui mori posset.... ita angeli damnati non possunt salvari nisi per angelum Deum qui mori posset.....Et sicut homo per alium hominem, qui non esset ejusdem generis, quamvis ejusdem esset naturæ, non debuit relevari, ita nullus angelus per alium angelum salvari debet, quamvis omnes sint unius naturæ, quoniam non sunt ejusdem generis sicut homines. Non enim sic sunt omnes angeli de uno angelo, quemadmodum omnes homines de uno homine. Hoc quoque removet eorum restaurationem, quia sicut ceciderunt nullo alio suadente ut caderent, ita nullo alio adjuvante resurgere debent: quod est illis impossibile.

[t] *Cramer*, l. c. p. 448: "*They may indeed delight in the evil and mischief which they do to man, but this joy is a joy full of bitterness, and prepares them for still more painful punishment.*" According to *John Wessel* (De Magnit. Pass. c. 38, p. 532, quoted by *Ullmann*, p. 236), "Satan (or the dragon) finds his first and greatest unhappiness in his clear knowledge, that God is ever blessed in himself.....His second misery is, seeing in his own condition, and in the case of all others, that the Lamb, as the victor, has received from God a name which is above every name.....His third misery is, that he himself, with all the host of the powers of darkness, has prepared this crown of victory for the Lamb."

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